Strengthening Wa defensive capabilities while at the same sending a sharp message to Naypyidaw appears
consistent with Beijing's broad policy towards the UWSA over recent decades. This has centred essentially on
maintaining stability along its south-western border by providing the UWSA with capabilities sufficient to deter
Tatmadaw ambitions to reassert government control over the autonomous special regions. At the same time,
sustaining a powerful cross-border proxy has afforded Beijing a degree of leverage in dealings with Myanmar's
central government that has never been more in evidence than now.
The need for a credible UWSA deterrent rose sharply with the arrest in October 2004 and subsequent imprisonment of Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt, intelligence chief of Myanmar's then military regime and
architect of the ceasefires with ethnic armies. The ouster of Lt Gen Khin Nyunt (who was released in January
2012), who had maintained good relations with Beijing, paved the way for the rise of more hawkish generals,
most notably General Maung Aye, with no love for China and determined to reassert central government control
along Myanmar's borders.
Following Tatmadaw demands for all ethnic ceasefire forces to either disarm or accept integration into the
national military structure as Tatmadaw-commanded border guard forces, tensions rose in 2009. In August that
year, in defiance of Chinese appeals for border stability, Tatmadaw forces moved suddenly against the weakest
link in the chain of former CPB factions, the so-called Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)
based in the ethnic-Chinese Kokang region (SR 1), north of the Wa area.
Brushing weak MNDAA forces aside, the Tatmadaw takeover of Kokang drove more than 30,000 refugees into
temporary camps in China, soured relations with Beijing, and raised the threat of further offensives against other
ethnic groups that refused integration as state border guard forces. Along the UWSA-Tatmadaw front lines, both
sides reinforced in preparation for a war that, in the event, did not occur.
By contrast, three years later, the prospect of war in eastern Shan State has declined notably. Indeed, with the
Tatmadaw currently bogged down in a costly and seemingly open-ended conflict with the KIA in Kachin State to
the north, the chances of an offensive campaign by government forces against the Wa are lower than they have
been for years.
To this extent, it is difficult to interpret this year's sudden and unprecedented reinforcement of UWSA as
anything other than a reaction to the reverses China has suffered in Myanmar. These have surfaced from a
rising tide of anti-Chinese popular sentiment, which the government of President Thein Sein appears ill-
prepared to hold in check. Naypyidaw's abrupt suspension in September 2011 of the USD3.6 billion dollar
Myitsone dam project in Kachin State, in which the China Power Investment Corporation was heavily invested,
was the first and most striking reflection of unpalatable new realities. As Chinese analyst Yun Sun, a visiting
fellow at the Brookings Institute in Washington wrote in an October 2011 article in Asia Times Online: "Thein
Sein's surprise decision has been interpreted by many Chinese as a serious betrayal that should not be
brooked without some sort of retribution.". ....
.....
There are strong indications that the message China appears to be sending through its reinforcement of the
UWSA has been heard and taken to heart by some in Naypyidaw. Recent comments made by Aung Min, the
minister for the President's Office and the government's point-man in negotiations with the ethnic minorities,
were particularly revealing. During a 23 November public meeting with Latpadaung protesters demanding a
complete closure of the project, the minister was seen on a video clip later posted online asserting that, "we do
not dare to have a row with China. If they feel annoyed with the shut-down of their projects and resume their
support to the communists, the economy in border areas would backslide. So you'd better think seriously."
Given that the Communist Party has been defunct since 1989, there is little doubt Aung Min was referring to
support to the UWSA. What he did not say, but almost certainly knew, was that support had already been
resumed several months earlier.
Source: Anthony Davis. State of Wa, Jane's Intelligence Review, (Vol. 25, I.1).
).
. The article I've quoted from made reference to another report. And that report made it sounded like supporting the UWSA can provide China with some leverage on the Myanmar officials.
I don't know how you derived that, bro. The Kokang are very much going strong. They were punished in 2009 for some reason. I'm guessing something to do with making weapons but that's in the past. Infact, last week they ambushed a bunch of Burmese soldiers in a surprise attack. Back to their old tricks. Which the government will no doubt tolerate.
