completely wrong assumption .first GCC also have missiles of its own
Only KSA among them has few purchased DF-21 (C?) without launchers. The missile has a CEP of ~50-100m and Saudi are known to possess only 12 x TEL's that actually belonged to DF-3 from 80s. There is no evidence that DF-21 has any TEL or is eve deployed. If another War of Cities like exchange starts up between PGCC and Iran, they have nothing but to lose in the conflict. Iranian Missiles, UCAV firepower will just overwhelm them. Their water resources, oil terminals, fields are lying in open. Situation can change very quickly if Saudis or UAE purchase more DF-21 and TELs from China which can happen any time. We know Chinese companies will do anything for money and are masters of under the table deals.
GCC have anti basaltic missile capabilities
Houthis with Qiam-I have many times breached the MIM-104. Why are you assuming that only one type of trajectory will be used to fire at a SAM site? IRGC has always mixed up its attack options. With Qassem and KS the trajectory is getting even more depressed and the terminal speed is enhanced.
List of Iranian Ballistic Missile attacks
Day | Date | Target | No. of missiles |
Sunday | 18 June 2017 | ISIS after they detonated Bombs in Iran, killing children | 6 (Solid Zolfaghar, Liquid Qiam-1) |
Saturday | 8 September 2018 | Terror group KDPI that often targetted Iranian soldiers on the border | 7 (Solid Zolfaghar) |
Monday | 01 October 2018 | ISIL | 6 (Zolfaghar, Liquid Qiam-1) + UCAV Shahed 191 |
Wednesday | 08 January 2020 | US bases for martyrdom of Gen. Qassem Soleimani (Status of war) | 22 (Solid Fateh 313, Liquid Qiam-II) |
Monday | 13 March 2022 | Anti Iranian Training Facility/Potential Threat | 12 (Solid Fateh-110) |
If you include Houthis strikes on KSA and UAE they also use a combination of BM and loitering UAVs, Cruise missiles. THAAD can be neutralized this way if the system is overwhelmed from multiple tracjectories of:
Ballistic
Quasi Ballistic
Glide
Skip Glide
Cruise
Skim Cruise
loitering UAVs
2nd those F-15 can operate well outside the range of those missiles you mentioned.
What would the F-15 do when the base of the F-15 be gone ? KSA has them in 2 FABs. Yes Saudi can theoretically pull some stunt and land back at highways whatever jets will not be taken out by Iranian HIMADS (RCS of 25 m2). But the base is gone. To get into battle zone again the plane will have to be Re-fueled, Re-armed, Re-checked, New mission has to be planned, New pilots need to get to the plane etc etc. Will all of this happen when the jet is parked on a high way in the desert in 50 degrees Celsius while its hangars, maintenance equipment, mission rooms, towers, and armament caches are gone in its home base?
This is what happened to a large base that received 11 Fateh313/Zolfaghars and Qiam-1 missiles. I was talking about 30-40 Missile per base so imagine the havoc.
and you can clear an airfield fairly fast but clearing those underground bases won't be as fast.
No you cant clear up the airfield very quickly. IRGC is not stupid that they would not target the logistics and Communications of the base first.
problem with long range search radar and OTH radars . you can't hide them and you can't move them as fast. they are the primary target for a first strike
By that theory, Salman's palace in Riyadh can also be destroyed with 15 Haj Qassems GV's carrying thermobaric munitions (10 tons in total) in the first wave. Countries escalate the conflict based upon what kind of retaliation they may face as a consequence. OTHR of Iran are deeper into territory and won't be fired at easily atleast not by PGCC. They get targetted means conflict escalation to the point that even the red sea coast infrastructure will be targetted by IRGC using bigger weapons.
the notion of a uav centric airforce that have so much popularity between some people seems not based on the fact how successful were bayraktar in Ukraine conflict.
UAVs are suitable for army aviation not air force.
If I am a planner of PGCC my best bet will be to arm my large AF's with as many long range SOWs as possible and launch them in bulk towards coast near-coast military infrastructure of IRIN, IRGN, IR-AD, IRIAF, UCAV bases to just cut short the arm of Iranian attack capability. Repeated softening of the targets will just put more and more stress on the IADS of Iran because IRIAF will offer little deterrence. Its too small a force. Again, I am in favor of the survival of IRIAF. I want leadership to realize this, and increase the current 200 Million USD budget to atleast 800 USD. A robust interceptor force of atleast 200+ fighters comprising of F-14AM (40), MIG-29M (50), Kowsar-I/II (120) are required along with SIGINT, ELINT UCAVs to enforce A2/AD zones over PG. Currently they are hell bent on murder of IRIAF.
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