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Ahmadinejad’s regime and Iran’s culture: Like oil and water

Monday, August 23, 2010
By Sheda Vasseghi

Iran’s secular culture and heritage is the complete opposite of Islamic teachings. It has become very clear that the two do not mesh, let alone compromise.

In recent decades, it has taken Iranians a bloody revolution, a tragic war, and generations of lost dreams to realize that.

Now “experts” on Iran’s affairs are analyzing Ahmadinejad’s latest move to embrace a “nationalist” approach to Islam.

First, this is a clear sign of the imminent fall of the regime in Tehran. The regime in its entirety, by and for the clerics, is in danger from the sudden National Revolution that started in June 2009.

Second, in order to counter this enemy, the clerics tried to use an apologist or “reformist” movement called the Green Movement to stop the people of Iran from revolting against the entire theocratic dictatorship. However, this pathetic attempt, supported in recent months by well-paid lobbyists and apologists in the Western countries, fell flat on its face as the regime confronted an opposition tsunami. So now the “reformist” trick is being replaced by a “nationalist” deception.

This latest maneuver from Tehran provides a slew of opportunities for the “experts” to write more articles and give more interviews making them and their institutions appear knowledgeable and relevant. It is, however, very clear that the so-called “experts” fail to note or convey a very important fact that is, Islam does not recognize nationalism or pre-Islamic culture, history, and philosophy any where, thus rendering the term “Iranian Islam” an oxymoron.

Iran’s population which is overwhelmingly under the age of 30 — hip and culturally modern — does not and will not become Arabized despite the clerics’ efforts to radically shove foreign beliefs, language, and way of life down their throats via three decades of Islamic Republic’s propaganda in textbooks and well-funded multimedia. The Iranian youth have clearly demonstrated they do not want religion to play a part in its social and political makeup. Further, they have mastered the concepts of secularism, equality, freedom of choice, and the pursuit of happiness.

Iran has suffered for over a century during its struggle for modernization, because of the opportunist theocrats’ use of Iran’s glorious pre-Islamic culture of tolerance, assimilation, and individual freedom when it suited Islam.

When Islam, as a political and social ideology, is endangered then its followers can change their tune or hide their true beliefs in order to fool the enemy. This is an Islamic psychological warfare! It is a strategy that has paid off — at least in Iran, the first nation to declare a bill of human rights 25 centuries ago, now thrown into 7th century mentality.

The regime in Tehran is now faced with harsher economic sanctions which directly affect the already abused and battered population of Iran, threat of foreign military strikes, internal political and religious factions, and domestic terrorism. History has shown that when an ideologue ruling party is in danger and running out of options, it will embrace momentary nationalism.

A sense of nationalism, the recognition of a unique culture and language, has been a part of Iranian existence since at least 1500 BC. The mullahs who made it their trade to control the Iranian masses are fully aware of this fact. Furthermore, since the spread of terrorism with the birth of an Islamic Iran in 1979, the citizens of the Free World have now realized they are facing a real threat — global terrorism — and not just isolated, random incidents. The citizens of the Free World are also on the side of Iran’s National Revolution as they have witnessed the crimes committed by that barbaric regime against the Iranian people. Therefore, the Islamic Republic faces isolation and resentment from all corners of the world.

Those who were and are part of the regime in Tehran will do everything they can to stay in power even if it means re-instituting the Iranian national “lion/sun” flag that was so symbolically ripped from the hearts of Iranians after the 1979 revolution. Despite the physical, emotional, and financial anguish brought on by the mullahs, what Iranians will not forget is the meddling of Sharia Laws in their Constitutions — both the 1906 and the 1979 versions. What Iranians have learned — that apparently the so-called “experts” have not — is that when it comes to Iran, one is either a “Nationalist” irrespective of religious/philosophical affiliations or not! The regime knows the majority of Iranians despise it and will not rest until they have brought it down. Its assessment in this regard is correct.


Sheda Vasseghi is on the Board of Azadegan Foundation.

Ahmadinejad’s regime and Iran’s culture: Like oil and water
 
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The cracks in the Iranian regime

Sanctions have aggravated infighting among Iran's ruling clique. Now the US must take care not to play into hardliners' hands

guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 24 August 2010 13.12 BST

Looking at the Iranian press over the past few weeks you would be forgiven for thinking that Iran is in a state of hypertension. The long list of new military hardware ready to fire against the "enemy" is mindboggling.

While punitive sanctions are taking effect, Iran continues to face the threat of a military strike from Israel. At the same time the US refuses to remove from the table the possibility of military action. The inauguration of the Bushehr nuclear power plant on Saturday – described by Israel as "totally unacceptable" – seems to have made matters even worse.

On Monday, Iran's Revolutionary Guards naval force commander, Ali Fadavi, announced the production of two new high-speed boats with missile launchers. He said Iran had "reached unparalleled power" in cruise missile defence. These are new versions of Zolfaqar and Seraj 1 rocket launchers. They are "unrivalled" in high speed, according to Iran's defence minister, Ahmad Vahidi. He warned the "enemies" of Iran that they are "playing with fire".

On Sunday, Iran unveiled its homemade, unmanned, long-distance bomber drone, described by the country's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as "an ambassador of death" to Tehran's enemies.

On Saturday, while the world was watching the opening of Bushehr nuclear power plant, Iranian TV was repeatedly showing the latest surface-to-surface missile, Qiam1, which follow Sajil and Shahab.

Meanwhile Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has stressed on "keeping unity" among the ruling clique. He warned in a speech last Thursday against "intentional" opposition to government, especially from "high office". They should "confess and repent" in the holy month of Ramadan.

The internal feud between the "pragmatist" right – led by the speaker of parliament, Ali Larijani, and the hardline president, Ahmadinejad, has not been a well-kept secret. Larijani has blocked several of Ahmadinejad's policy proposals and Ahmadinejad has in turn refused to implement those that the parliament ratified. Larijani then had to intervene and order the executive branch to implement what parliament had ratified.

And his brother, Sadeq Larijani, who is the head of judiciary, has openly criticised Ahmadinejad's interference in the work of the judiciary and for his lack of "appropriate political language" in internal and international affairs. In turn, Ahmadinejad supporters such as the rightwing member of parliament, Fatemeh Alia, criticised the judiciary for encouraging attacks on Ahmadinejad. The opposition to Ahmadinejad is also supported by a leading member of parliament, Ahmad Tavakoli, and by Mohsen Rezai, a former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), as well as by Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, Tehran's mayor. There are also two other potent opponents, both sons of respected ayatollahs: Ali Motahari and Hassan Khomeini.

The same group have also been actively pursuing the president's chief of staff, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai. Yet, Ahmadinejad has just given him an added portfolio as the president's special representative for the Middle East. He is regarded as the president's protege for the next presidential elections. The constitution bars Ahmadinejad from a third term. Instead he has been nurturing support in a group called the Sweet Scent of Service.

So, the infighting among the ruling clique has been persistent and serious. The official conservative media has given it coverage since the powerbrokers have their own mafia-like groups inside the media.

The Fars news agency, close to the IRGC, quotes Ahmad Karimi-Esfahani, the head of the powerful bazaar merchants' guild, apparently criticising Ahmadinejad for his "non-diplomatic" language, which is "provocative" and leads to international sanctions. If our leaders did not quarrel so much, says Esfahani, "the west would not be able to use internal problems as justification for sanctions".

Insecurity about the punitive sanctions has clearly aggravated the tension at the top. "Under the threat of sanctions," Iran's supreme leader warned, "no one must speak in a way that implies tension between the parliament, the judiciary and the government."

Another effect of sanctions seems to have been an official rapprochement towards the United States. We know that Ahmadinejad and the foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, have recently repeatedly spoken of their willingness to talk. However, far more important was the clearest green light given by the supreme leader, Khamenei. In a somewhat unnoticed part of his speech last Thursday he said:

"Speaking to the US under conditions of threat and pressure cannot be regarded as talks. We are happy to hold talks but not with a US that wants talks under sanctions, threats and pressure. We are ready for talks if they [the US] could climb down from their superpower ladder and stop sanctions and threats."

Under these changing circumstances two steps could be regarded as immature: first, if the US fell for the ploy and began talks before sanctions took full effect, and second, if there was a decision by Israel or the US to strike Iran's nuclear sites. Both would play into the hands of the hardliners. The most prudent response could be to continue with the present policy while ensuring close scrutiny of the nuclear sites by the IAEA.

The cracks in the Iranian regime | Massoumeh Torfeh | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk
 
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Former Nuclear Negotiator Was A Spy, Says Iranian Ministry
Hossein Mousavian



August 25, 2010

Former Iranian nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian, who is currently a visiting fellow at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, is in the news again after being accused of espionage -- again.

Mousavian was briefly jailed in Iran in 2007 and charged with espionage. He was later cleared of the charges against him by the judiciary, which declared him innocent "in the spy case and possession of classified documents."

Three years later, the Iranian Intelligence Ministry has again accused him of espionage.

The timing of the accusation against Mousavian has raised questions and led to speculation that it could be linked to the ongoing political infighting within the Iranian establishment. His arrest in 2007 was also seen as part of a factional dispute. Mousavian is said to be close to President Mahmud Ahmadinejad's rival, former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

In an August 22 statement, the Intelligence Ministry said Mousavian was "clearly" found guilty of having conducted espionage activities while a member of Iran's nuclear negotiating team under former President Mohammad Khatami. The ministry issued the statement in reaction to comments by the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, who had said a few days earlier that as far as he knew there was no spy in the negotiating team of Iran's reformist government.

The statement said that the Intelligence Ministry "firmly declares that keeping in mind the final verdict issued by Bench 15 of the Revolutionary Court, according to Article 505 of the Islamic Penal Code, Hossein Mousavian has been found guilty for collecting highly classified information under the cover of a system official and delivering them to others (nonqualified people and aliens), and sentenced to two years behind bars and a five-year ban from activities at diplomatic offices, or service at country's other international organs. Therefore, he is clearly found guilty of having conducted espionage activities."

Salehi has reacted by issuing a brief statement in which he said that "the judgment of the qualified authorities" based on legal documents and proof was "more correct "than his own personal understanding and views.

Iranian news websites, including "Khabar Online" have interpreted Salehi's statement as an acceptance of the Intelligence Ministry claim, even though he might have referred to the ruling by the judiciary, which had cleared Mousavian of espionage charges.

Mousavian's lawyer, Houshang Pourbabayi, has reacted to the Intelligence Ministry statement with a statement saying that his client was cleared of espionage charges by three judges who worked on the case.

Pourbabayi writes that "the issue of espionage" was not initially brought against the former diplomat, and it was "put to" his client 10 months after his arrest, in the second Iranian calendar month of 2007.

Pourbabayi has questioned the Intelligence Ministry's statement against Mousavian and asked, "Is this not an insult of the judicial system?"

Mousavian, a former senior nuclear negotiator and former ambassador to Germany, was the head of the Foreign Policy Committee of Iran's Supreme National Security Council. He also worked at the Tehran-based Center for Strategic Research.

Journalist Mehdi Mahdavi Azad, who was arrested in Iran in connection with Mousavian's case, has told RFE/RL's Radio Farda that the "reopening " of Mousavian's case demonstrates that "the real power struggle" in Iran began not after last year's disputed presidential election, but after the 2005 presidential election.

"One of the most important aspects of this struggle is the cutting of ties of the moderate and technocratic forces of the Iranian establishment with the outside world and the diminishing of their power and influence in internal politics," Mahdavi Azad said.

"The statement by the Intelligence Ministry demonstrates that the ministry, which is now under the full control of Ahmadinejad, is following a specific path. Mousavian is one piece of the puzzle."

Mahdavi Azad believes the case against Mousavian is connected to his criticism of Iran's "neoconservatives and ultra-hard-liners". He also said that "the documents" on the basis of which Mousavian was accused of espionage include research papers Mousavian did while working at the Center for Strategic Research and documents related to his time as Iran's top diplomat in Germany.

"Mousavian kept a copy of the documents with the permission of the then-President Hashemi Rafsanjani so that he could defend himself and tell the truth" on a future day of reckoning, Mahdavi Azad added.

Mousavian was the ambassador to Germany during the 1992 assassination of three leading members of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan and an interpreter by Iranian agents in the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin.

Asked whether Mousavian has any documents related to these killings, Mahdavi Azad said: "Mousavian has to answer this question. I know that an important part of the documents are from his time at the embassy in Germany, he kept the documents at his house with the permission of an official above him."

Mousavian said in a June interview with "The Wall Street Journal" that he intended to return to his country at some point. "I don't need asylum from any country, and I would never apply for it," he said.

The recent statement by the Intelligence Ministry suggests that the former Iranian diplomat might not be able to return to Tehran as long as Ahmadinejad is in power.

-- Golnaz Esfandiari

Former Nuclear Negotiator Was A Spy, Says Iranian Ministry - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty 2010
 
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Iran’s secular culture and heritage is the complete opposite of Islamic teachings. It has become very clear that the two do not mesh, let alone compromise.


This is a very incorrect statement that Iran's cultural heritage negates Islam. Iranian culture and the morals attested to that culture are tied with the Islamic beliefs of the majority of Iranians. Moreover, Iran's older pre-Islamic culture isn't secular either for it is strongly influenced and developed by Zoroastrian beliefs and principles.

In recent decades, it has taken Iranians a bloody revolution, a tragic war, and generations of lost dreams to realize that.

A arduous eight year long war which was imposed on Iran.

First, this is a clear sign of the imminent fall of the regime in Tehran. The regime in its entirety, by and for the clerics, is in danger from the sudden National Revolution that started in June 2009.

I have numerous qualms with and heavily criticize Iranian governance but to say a fall is eminent is sheer exaggeration. The only revolution that could foreseeable occur would be a reformist one, which again, is supported by a host of clerics within Iran.

Second, in order to counter this enemy, the clerics tried to use an apologist or “reformist” movement called the Green Movement to stop the people of Iran from revolting against the entire theocratic dictatorship. However, this pathetic attempt, supported in recent months by well-paid lobbyists and apologists in the Western countries, fell flat on its face as the regime confronted an opposition tsunami. So now the “reformist” trick is being replaced by a “nationalist” deception.

Conspiracy theories galore. The Iranian reformist movement grew out of local causes, heavily justified by the reformists, and they are neither apologetic nor against the entire governmental setup. The Iranian reform movement is an umbrella group composed of groups which often have much differences amongst themselves. The unity is built upon the common view to reform.

This latest maneuver from Tehran provides a slew of opportunities for the “experts” to write more articles and give more interviews making them and their institutions appear knowledgeable and relevant.

Judging form the article thus far, they are neither experts nor knowledgeable of Iran and considerably below par the average Iranian. The claim remains unsubstantiated.

It is, however, very clear that the so-called “experts” fail to note or convey a very important fact that is, Islam does not recognize nationalism or pre-Islamic culture, history, and philosophy any where, thus rendering the term “Iranian Islam” an oxymoron.

I'm not the proper person to comment on this as I personally find patriotism and the different forms of nationalism a virtue of the vicious (Oscar Wilde) and a self-destructive force. The paragraph would be better referred to an Iranian nationalist.

Iran’s population which is overwhelmingly under the age of 30 — hip and culturally modern — does not and will not become Arabized despite the clerics’ efforts to radically shove foreign beliefs, language, and way of life down their throats via three decades of Islamic Republic’s propaganda in textbooks and well-funded multimedia.

How is it that one becomes "Arabised" ? By following a Muslim faith, which again is not Arab, as it is a belief which mounts itself well above ethnic paradigms. Also, as all generalizations are incorrect, so is the one above concerning Iran's youth as they, like their counterparts in other nations, are not uniform in outlook nor opinion. Foreign beliefs? Foreign language?

The Iranian youth have clearly demonstrated they do not want religion to play a part in its social and political makeup. Further, they have mastered the concepts of secularism, equality, freedom of choice, and the pursuit of happiness.

I disagree with this entirely. Iran's youth have demonstrated the need for reform and a revampment of the governance in Iran.

Iran has suffered for over a century during its struggle for modernization, because of the opportunist theocrats’ use of Iran’s glorious pre-Islamic culture of tolerance, assimilation, and individual freedom when it suited Islam.

Iran has suffered because of the failings of it's past rulers, it's monarchs, their short vested interests and foreign intervention. Glorification is done when something lacks substance or value within itself or on it's on, as such it is much of a statement of contradiction. Iranian chauvinists have forged the idea of an ancient utopian Iran, which it wasn't.

I honestly cannot be bothered any longer with tackling the rest of article as it is useless. It's flaws are too numerous to deserve paragraphs upon paragraphs for in the end no true purpose is achieved. The same goes for the remainder of the articles in this post. Iran is much too complex for those outside of Iran to comprehend, including those Iranians who have not been in continuous stay within Iran. The internal complexities of Iran are much to great in that they even cause bewilderment and amazement for Iranians themselves.
 
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Thanks Pasban. Those articles show us how Americans have mistook Iran for decades.
I would like to add that not only Iran affair but also Iranian themselves are complicated and the religious thought exist in deepest layer of Iranian culture.
 
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The Iranian always had both religious and secular traditions. This propaganda from Royalists/Bahais and others really does not represent the Iranian public opinion.
 
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Positive Chemical Reaction to Iran Sanctions

By LIAM DENNING

LyondellBasell Industries' decision to withdraw from Iran is a smart move, and not just because it wants to list shares in New York.

Lyondell's technology division, which licenses, processes and sells catalysts to Iranian petrochemical plants, among others, is less than 2% of sales, so the revenue loss is minimal. Its withdrawal will, however, add pressure to an already struggling Iranian chemicals industry. Therein lays the advantage for Lyondell.
[chemherd0825] Bloomberg News

Lyndoll's revenue loss from withdrawing from iran is minimal. Above, LyondellBasell's Wesseling Complex in Germany.

Chemical building block ethylene usually is made from either oil-based naphtha or natural-gas-derived ethane. America's unlocking of shale gas has caused natural-gas prices to collapse. Natural gas on the New York Mercantile Exchange costs just one-eighteenth the price of oil compared with a normal energy-equivalent level of one-sixth. That gives ethane-heavy chemicals producers, primarily in North America and the Middle East, a cost advantage over those relying on naphtha, primarily European and Asian plants.

Iran is slated to start up 11% of new global ethylene capacity by 2014, according to Alembic Global Advisors. But Alembic also says Iranian plants built since 2005 have been delayed, on average, 18 to 24 months and run at 60% or less of capacity in their first two years of operation.

Tightening sanctions should limit Iran's operating rates and expansion, enabling Lyondell and other U.S.-focused producers like Dow Chemical to expand their share of a tighter market. That should catalyze profits.

HEARD ON THE STREET: Positive Chemical Reaction to Iran Sanctions - WSJ.com
 
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US Fed Orders Barclays To Improve Economic Sanctions Compliance

By Meena Thiruvengadam Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES

WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)-- The U.S. Federal Reserve on Wednesday ordered Barclays Bank PLC (BCS, BARC.LN) to better comply with U.S. economic sanctions on a global basis.

A federal judge earlier Wednesday approved a $298 million legal settlement that allows Barclays to avoid prosecution on charges that it violated U.S. economic sanctions, even though the judge voiced concerns that the agreement is too lenient.

The U.S. on Monday filed charges alleging Barclays for more than a decade hid transactions banks and other entities in countries including Iran and Cuba.

US Fed Orders Barclays To Improve Economic Sanctions Compliance - WSJ.com
 
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The Persia has a heritage of Islam attached to it and is credited with spread of Islam through out the world.
 
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