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IRN-05 (Shahed-131) UAV Technical report
1.
General overview. The IRN-05 (Shahed-131) is a deadly drone
one-way attack device (OWA - one way attack). (UAS) production system
Shahed Aviation Industries Research Center (SAIRC). IRN-05 (Figures 1-4) is made of
carbon fiber reinforced with internal metal supports. Total length
2.6 m; The wingspan is 2.2 m with an estimated weight of 135 kg. Internal piston engine
combustion sets the platform in motion by means of a wooden screw with a fixed
step by step The electronic system inside the UAS was interconnected using
special marked wire. All markings in the UAS were written in English
language It is estimated that it can be launched from static rails or a truck.
2.
Components to be studied:
a. GNSS transceiver. A commercial off-the-shelf GNSS receiver (Figure 18-22) was
encased in a custom-made metal box made of CPC. It should be noted,
that the GNSS has been processed and manufactured from the same material as the GNSS,
flight control unit (FCU) and power control unit (PCU) that can
see on the IRN-16 platform. He has the ability to receive from four
outer washers of the COTS receiver. A fifth COTS GNSS receiver was also present
outside the fuselage of IRN-05, but the wire leading from it was cut. black
GNSS washers from other systems were also either cut out or disabled, FIT Comment:
this suggests that an OWA UAS has been conducted on Iranian weapons systems
modernization of the average service life; system upgrade from standard black
GNSS systems to a system that can now operate in airspace where
prohibited GNSS (multiple white GNSS washers). End of FIT comment.
b. Flight Control Unit (FCU) The FCU (Fig. 12-14) contained five
order of printed circuit boards (PCBs) that contained TMS320 F28335 processors “Texas
Instruments". It is a highly integrated high performance chipset for
demanding management programs. Four printed circuit boards were identical, and the fifth
the circuit board was evaluated as a power distribution system for others
printed circuit boards. FIT Comment: Four identical PCBs look very similar to
fee from IRN-16 FCU. End of FIT comment. As of May 2019 in
the MEPED reports claimed that the IRN05 had the ability to connect a direct line
line of sight (LOS), Iridium SATCOM radio, possibly a homing gun and pre
programmed flight paths, which may explain that each of the 4 PCBs
programmed to run.
c. ATOL. The UAS had a box marked ATOL (Automatic take off and landing) (Fig.
27-30). FIT Comment: Evaluated Acronym for Automatic Takeoff and Landing. It
the first time this system was used by FIT exploit teams.
End of FIT comment. This system is connected between the GNSS system and the FCU and,
appears to be a new addition. This system can offer many extras
services for UAVs, but can also simply be part of a commercial system that
is not used. As seen in Figure 30, there are four LEDs labeled;
PGNSS, DGNSS, SGNSS and HDG. Initial open source research has shown
the following regarding LED labels:
i.
PGNSS. Unknown through search from open sources..
ii.
DGNSS. Differential GNSS. Functions as a supplement system,
based on the improvement of primary information about the GNSS constellation; by
by using a network of ground base stations that allow
broadcast differential information to UAS to improve accuracy
determining its position. This can be used to transfer known
GPS coordinates on the drone to help it
maintain a flight path in airspace where GPS is prohibited.
iii.
SGNSS. The S-GNSS upgrade provides improved accuracy, sensitivity and
multipath mitigation and also provides
a completely new measurement category for the GNSS receiver with one
antenna - reception angle. It is by distinguishing the direction of arrival that the SGNSS can identify, ignore and (if necessary) locate the source
GNSS spoofing.
iv.
HDG. Hold direction – holds the current direction
UAV platform. This is possibly used if/when the UAV
loses the GNSS signal and continues its flight at altitude until it receives
the GNSS signal or will not recover it. This may indicate why
UAV platforms get close to targets but are not 100% accurate
for the desired purpose. When course hold is enabled and switched from GNSS
per unit of inertia to continue flight, ambient wind
will cause in-flight drift that the FCU cannot accommodate,
as a result of which the UAV slightly deviates from the target but continues its flight and
lands close behind. FIT Comment: For example, if the UAV received
jamming/spoof signal 5km from target and switched to HDG, it will
drift about 5% in distance depending on speed and
wind direction, (5000 m/100)x5=250 m of potential drift from
original GPS target. End of FIT comment.
d. Power Distribution Unit (PDU). The PDU (Fig. 12, 15, 16) has two inside
custom printed circuit boards. It is believed that this device
designed to receive input power from the battery pack at
25.9 volts and converting it to the probable 5 volts needed to run everything
printed circuit boards in the system.
e. Battery. The 25.9 V, 17,000 mAh Li-ion battery consists of 35
of battery cells in a blue heat-shrinkable package. Marked as S/N: 004, Code
client: D19BS0705.
f.
Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU). Digital air data computer (Fig. 23).
The IMU used both static and pitot tubes. This will allow you to evaluate the air
aircraft speed, altitude and altitude trend. They will go to FCU and ATOL,
to help determine flight altitude and can be used as a primary
input source in case of GNSS loss.
e. Cables Several connections were labeled as follows: P31 FC, P13 PDU, P2 AV PANEL, P43
S.L.R, P19 IRIDUME, P45 L.O.E, P44 S.L.I.E, P1 REG, P15 ATOL, P41 S.R.I.E, J1. P106
FUEL.D, P107. Some connectors are not marked.
g. Internal combustion piston engine. The UAV contained a large piston
engine. A scan of the fluid in the fuel tank showed a mixture of diesel fuel and
other oil-based substances. According to estimates, the maximum range is
up to 900 km
h. Engine control unit (ECU). The ECU (Fig. 31-33) contained one printed circuit board with
processor "Texas Instruments", according to estimates, this module will control all
engine performance during flight.
3.
Payload. The payload of the system consisted of high-explosive (HE)
warhead (Fig. 5-8), copper cone-shaped charge and preformed
shrapnel sleeve. The copper conical charge had a diameter of 111 mm and a depth of 162 mm. Size
of pre-formed fragmentation is 7 mm in a cube. Materials and components
of this warhead are very similar to IRN-16. The content of BP is estimated at 10-15 kg of cast explosive
substances; explosives could not be tested during operation. Comment
FIT: the formation of a copper cone-shaped charge will be negatively affected by its placement
in the nose cone of the UAV. Both the battery box and several lead ballasts
are in the zone where the jet is formed, this will negatively affect the ability
jets penetrate. There is a hole in the center of the lead weights that can be passed through
form charge. This shows a lack of understanding of the Munro effect and how
formation charges are formed, or that this warhead has a modular one
a design that can be retro-installed in various systems. End of comment.
a. Safety device/fuse. The Safe To Arm (STA) block/fuse is the same as the
in IRN-16. It is made of a ground alloy consisting of a pre
of a wound rotor that acts as a physical barrier between the striker and the detonator is
acts as a safety measure during transport and storage. Percussive inertial percussion
the trunnion is held by an uncompressed spring; it is this spring that must be overcome
inertia striker on impact to trigger the detonator. The battle platoon probably
takes place during flight using a rotating electronic motor
inside the fuse, giving room for the firing pin to go back,
ready to strike There was no presence of electrically controlled initiation. Bloc
The STA/fuse in this IRN-05 was not on a combat platoon during service; it
was confirmed by the use of a protective window on the safety system
an entrenchment that glowed green for the unarmed.
4.
Weight and dimensions. The weight and dimensions of the UAV platform are estimates because the platform
was not intact during operation. Table 1 shows the weights
"gross weight" including approximately full fuel tanks.
Component
General
BLA
Warhead
Capacity
fuel
Mass
135 kg
Section
Wingspan
dimensions
2.2 m
15 kg
unknown
length
2.6 m
Table 1. IRN-05 weight and dimensions
Figure 1. IRN-05 (Shahed-131).
.
Figure 2. IRN-05 (Shahed-131) rebuilt showing warhead.
Figure 3. IRN-05 main fuselage with panels labeled.
Figure 4. IRN-05 base of fuselage.
Figure 5. IRN-05 Warhead with fuse
Figure 6. IRN-05 warhead with a copper cone for the forming charge
Figure 7. IRN-05 striking elements in the warhead (cubes 7mm edge)
Figure 8. IRN-05 Warhead with installed
.
fuse
Figure 9. Panel 1, Panel 1 (power supply device)
Figure 10. Panel 2 Fuel tank
.Figure 11. Panel 3 - empty
.
Figure 12 Panel 4 containing Flight Control Unit (FCU) and Power Distribution Unit (PDU).
Figure 13 Flight Control Unit. Flight control unit
Figure 14. Internal FCU, containing five bespoke PCBs. Inertial block
control
Figure 15. Power Distribution Unit (PDU).
B
Figure 16. Internal PDU.
Figure 17. Panel 5 containing fuel tank.
Figure 18. Panel 6 showing four new “hardened” GNSS pucks in white. Figure 18 also shows the
old black GNSS puck, which has been cut from the system.
Figure 19. Panel 6, Containing GNSS Transceiver.
Figure 20. IRN-05 Transceiver.
Figure 21. IRN-05 GNSS Transceiver.
Figure 22. Internal GNSS Transceiver.
Figure 23. Panel 7 containing Inertia Measurement Unit (IMU).
Figure 24. Panel 8 containing connectors for aileron servos.
Figure 25. Panel 9 containing wiring loom connectors.
Figure 26. Panel 10 fuel or lubricants tank.
Figure 27. Panel 11 containing ATOL – “Automatic Take Off and Landing”.
Figure 28. ATOL - "Automatic Take Off and Landing".
Figure 29. Internal ATOL.
Figure 30. LEDs on ATOL PCB showing “PGNSS, DGNSS, SGNSS, HDG”.
Figure 31. Panel 12 containing Engine Control Unit (ECU).
Figure 32. Panel 12 containing Engine Control Unit (ECU).
Figure 33. IRN-05 Combustion Engine.
Figure 34. 3D Scan of IRN-05 fuselage.
Figure 35. 3D Scan of IRN-05 fuselage.
Figure 36. 3D Scan of IRN-05 fuselage.
Figure 37. 3D Scan of new “hardened” GNSS pucks on panel 11.
Figure 38. 3D Scan of IRN-05 Power Distribution Unit (PDU).
Figure 39. 3D Scan of IRN-05 Engine Management Unit (ECU).
Figure 40. 3D Scan of IRN-05 ATOL “Automatic Take Off and Landing” Unit.
Figure 41. 3D Scan of IRN-05 panel 10 fuel/lubricants tank.
Figure 42. 3D Scan of IRN-05 Flight Control Unit (FCU).
