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Not sure who the author is, and obviously it is hurried "research" if one can call it that. With a little bit of time, and prior knowledge one can find alot of verifiable details. It's hard to even start with this one, but its definitely either is just rushed and poorly "researched" or deliberate dis-information. I guess I should try to clear some things up.

I am curious as to where you found the engine on Aliexpress if you can show me the link, unless you just meant component level. As far as our research goes, the engine is a German Limbach L550E engine. It is a patented design, so I would be surprised to see Aliexpress would have it. Either way, this engine is reverse engineered by Iranian MADO company made under the designation of M550 and used in many. different UAVs. Quick search on google will show.

This engine in the market costs around $23,000 so his cost estimation is already wrong. Actually production cost would be cheaper though

On to the body, alot of "analyists" believe the body is the same as a Harpy or some Harpy-copy. Once again, with very minimal research, one can see the honeycomb RAS design, layered with carbonfiber interior, and fiberglass exterior. This is part of the reason why radars have such trouble catching them from long ranges.
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A combination of INS and GPS/GNSS course correction is a very high of being inside the UAV. I'll give the clown that one. As for guidance, this is where things can be interesting. GPS can only get you so far if you are not using NATO military grade GPS.

Terminal Guidance:
1. Via IR sensor in the nose cap (Also seen in other UAS models)
2. Guided via another Recon UAV (Per Russian telegram sources). Apparently Recon UAVs can act as commanders and flying relays to guide suicide drones to their targets that are loitering around.

Example:
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View attachment 883096

The drone is actually large for a suicide UAV, much larger than a IAI Harop which is purported to have 1000km ferry range. On can see the human in relation to size. Arms length of a person only reaches 25% of the wingspan (if you can see the man), while an Arms length of the man with the Harop could go atleast 50% of the wingspan. It is also thicker from a side view.

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Laser system would be good if it had a clear LOS and within short ranges. This is a large front , and the long endurance of the UAS allows it to plan a flight path that avoids centers of high AD saturation. It's strange that he mentions lasers systems of Turkish or Israeli origin which are not even operational and are still in development/testing stages or not in production in high numbers. Meanwhile their are plenty of other systems from other NATO nations that can be used, but are not economical at all. GPS jammer won't be effective once it reaches near it's target or mission, if relay drones are involved and the UAS is under communication range.

Best case for GPS Jammer would be to use in the event Russia would use these for some deep strike missions. But due to its low RCS profile, it may not even be detected on time to use such systems nor can it be deployed in scale across the country. We've seen this play out already and if it's already near it's target by then, it's IR sensor complete a lock once its pre-deterimed target is within visual range.

You simply cannot use commercial level GPS to target something slightly thicker than a telephone poll perfectly. Or can you use it to target refinery towers in Abqaiq. It is simply not possible without accurate terminal guidance.


View attachment 883091View attachment 883092


If such assertion by these Russian telegram accounts about other drones providing guidance for these UAS's, once Russian get higher operational skills, they can use them in larger loitering swams, and instead of a single operator, commanding a single suicide drone, you'd have a 2 operators guiding 1 recon drone, and commanding suicide drones to attack designated targets. Which would make for interesting testing ground for how to operate a network of UAVs rather than single units individually.

In my opinion the cost of each drone would probably be around 20k-40k per unit, so something akin to a American JDAM which should be affordable for a country like Russia to have thousands of units if they can use these effectively, it would be worth it. Alas, most of this information is open source, as far as we are concerned this drone didn't even exist prior to it's usage in Abqaiq in 2019 and it's information is classified.
Thanks for the detailed answer, the writer also contradicts himself saying he is relying on Iran specs but yet he knows the guidance method and everything.

I really have no clue how they can let people like him write about a subject like this, i wanted to be sure he is a typical clown "military expert".

I don't know much about Iran's drone specs or capabilities except that same clowns like him were directly contradicted after a perfect strike on sensible Saudi structures.

I'm french, we have literally no drones or even a program, I'm impressed and at the same i'm laughing on how such a sanctioned country is managing to escape million dollar western systems, here the army purchases MQ9 from US, too much is made onto fighter jets and exporting way too much of them to unstable countries, we literaly don't have enough Rafales for ourselves, but these drones achieve strikes similar to them, Iran just needs a strong airforce and it would be perfect, too bad France would never sell Rafale jets or 2000Ns to Iran, they would have made the best use of them surely😋 but i'm sure Iran will get an equivalent and make a decent indigenous program, they were literally 40 years in advance drone wise.
 
Oy https://news.yahoo.com/military-expert-iranian-shahed-136-135000436.html

What are your thoughts about this article made by a "Military Expert"? He is claiming that the Shahed-136 is fully made of components bought on "AliExpress", that the GPS is bought from freely available civilian stuff, that it got no other way of guidance than it

He also says that each Shahed-136 costs 1000$

I've only saw the motor on Aliexpress, but i didn't found anything about other components, which he say himself that he is relying on Iran specs, he is saying the drone is small and no way it can reach 1500 or 2000km

He is saying that Israeli and Turkish "laser beam" systems will counter them easily and directly, and that Ukraine can counter it "by using jammers bought on Aliexpress", easily and that western systems are going to counter it easily.

He seems trying to demonize Shahed136 and Iran as much as he can, is it just an attempt to demonize Iran and reassure himself and people or is he right on the whole thing made out of AliExpress components, is he just speculating the specs with his hatred also? Because he doesn't know the specs himself but manages to claim that it uses a freely available civilian GPS for guidance
He's an uneducated idiot who's literally confusing Shahed-131 with more advanced Shahed-136 lmao
 
He's an uneducated idiot who's literally confusing Shahed-131 with more advanced Shahed-136 lmao
Is S-131 even used anymore. Rarely ever see it, and not capable for this war except for getting opponent to waste their SAMs
I really have no clue how they can let people like him write about a subject like this, i wanted to be sure he is a typical clown "military expert".
Seems like theirs an incentive here, war to shape a persons mind is 24/7, and I think he probably got it off Ukr accounts that have a major incentive. As far as we are even aware of, not even Russia has talked about these UAVs or published anything about it, it's almost like they are pretending they don't have them lol.
I'm french, we have literally no drones or even a program, I'm impressed and at the same i'm laughing on how such a sanctioned country is managing to escape million dollar western systems, here the army purchases MQ9 from US, too much is made onto fighter jets and exporting way too much of them to unstable countries, we literaly don't have enough Rafales for ourselves, but these drones achieve strikes similar to them, Iran just needs a strong airforce and it would be perfect, too bad France would never sell Rafale jets or 2000Ns to Iran, they would have made the best use of them surely😋 but i'm sure Iran will get an equivalent and make a decent indigenous program, they were literally 40 years in advance drone wise.
Seems like a choice, France's aviation industry is one of the best, those Rafales are serious aircraft, but at the end of the day, it's a profit incentive, and focus on actual warfighting is not the priority, so that is why you see them selling Rafales to other countries before making more for themselves, or selling equipment to other countries before making them first for themselves in large quantities. Why does UAE have more Leclerec tanks than France! Why do I get the feeling some countries have more CAESAR's than France.
 
Is S-131 even used anymore. Rarely ever see it, and not capable for this war except for getting opponent to waste their SAMs

Seems like theirs an incentive here, war to shape a persons mind is 24/7, and I think he probably got it off Ukr accounts that have a major incentive. As far as we are even aware of, not even Russia has talked about these UAVs or published anything about it, it's almost like they are pretending they don't have them lol.

Seems like a choice, France's aviation industry is one of the best, those Rafales are serious aircraft, but at the end of the day, it's a profit incentive, and focus on actual warfighting is not the priority, so that is why you see them selling Rafales to other countries before making more for themselves, or selling equipment to other countries before making them first for themselves in large quantities. Why does UAE have more Leclerec tanks than France! Why do I get the feeling some countries have more CAESAR's than France.

It is cause France also has to subdue to the US.
 
@drmeson @Hack-Hook @Shawnee @TheImmortal @Stryker1982 @Ich
@Sineva

not sure if this has been posted ..a lot of info.


A study of downed Iranian drones (the Russians wrote "Geran-2" on their boards) showed that they had many foreign components despite Iran's sanctions.

For example, the Shahed-131 UAV is the predecessor of the Shahed-136 version, and the two have similar working principles and the most unified main components.

Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


The flight control unit of the Shahed-131 drone contains five custom printed circuit boards (PCBs) with Texas Instruments TMS320 F28335 processors, a set of highly integrated and efficient microcircuits for demanding control procedures.

The Engine Control Unit (ECU) contains a single circuit board with a Texas Instruments processor that monitors all engine characteristics during flight.

Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


The electronic systems inside the drone are connected by wires with special markings, all markings in the UAS (production system) are written in English.

The electronic components of the drone are all civilian. From the point of view of the guidance system, there is only a civilian-grade GPS receiver, which allows the drone to specifically deal with stationary objects.

A system has been added to the GPS guidance system to prevent GPS signals from being jammed by electronic warfare (EW). A primitive inertial system is installed on the drone, which can maintain approximate heading and altitude if GPS navigation is disabled.

Therefore, the GPS guidance system of this UAV is difficult to suppress using electronic warfare.
 
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همیشه چند تا پرنده کنار شاهد بال بال میزنن

@drmeson @Hack-Hook @Shawnee @TheImmortal @Stryker1982 @Ich
@Sineva

not sure if this has been posted ..a lot of info.


A study of downed Iranian drones (the Russians wrote "Geran-2" on their boards) showed that they had many foreign components despite Iran's sanctions.

For example, the Shahed-131 UAV is the predecessor of the Shahed-136 version, and the two have similar working principles and the most unified main components.

Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


The flight control unit of the Shahed-131 drone contains five custom printed circuit boards (PCBs) with Texas Instruments TMS320 F28335 processors, a set of highly integrated and efficient microcircuits for demanding control procedures.

The Engine Control Unit (ECU) contains a single circuit board with a Texas Instruments processor that monitors all engine characteristics during flight.

Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


The electronic systems inside the drone are connected by wires with special markings, all markings in the UAS (production system) are written in English.

The electronic components of the drone are all civilian. From the point of view of the guidance system, there is only a civilian-grade GPS receiver, which allows the drone to specifically deal with stationary objects.

A system has been added to the GPS guidance system to prevent GPS signals from being jammed by electronic warfare (EW). A primitive inertial system is installed on the drone, which can maintain approximate heading and altitude if GPS navigation is disabled.

Therefore, the GPS guidance system of this UAV is difficult to suppress using electronic warfare.

Dirt cheap
 
@drmeson @Hack-Hook @Shawnee @TheImmortal @Stryker1982 @Ich
@Sineva

not sure if this has been posted ..a lot of info.


A study of downed Iranian drones (the Russians wrote "Geran-2" on their boards) showed that they had many foreign components despite Iran's sanctions.

For example, the Shahed-131 UAV is the predecessor of the Shahed-136 version, and the two have similar working principles and the most unified main components.

Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


The flight control unit of the Shahed-131 drone contains five custom printed circuit boards (PCBs) with Texas Instruments TMS320 F28335 processors, a set of highly integrated and efficient microcircuits for demanding control procedures.

The Engine Control Unit (ECU) contains a single circuit board with a Texas Instruments processor that monitors all engine characteristics during flight.

Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


The electronic systems inside the drone are connected by wires with special markings, all markings in the UAS (production system) are written in English.

The electronic components of the drone are all civilian. From the point of view of the guidance system, there is only a civilian-grade GPS receiver, which allows the drone to specifically deal with stationary objects.

A system has been added to the GPS guidance system to prevent GPS signals from being jammed by electronic warfare (EW). A primitive inertial system is installed on the drone, which can maintain approximate heading and altitude if GPS navigation is disabled.

Therefore, the GPS guidance system of this UAV is difficult to suppress using electronic warfare.
Yes, the S-131 is very cheap, and parts are sourced for around the world. Which is why foreign forces used it and procured parts from it. Because it did not rely on Iran specifically as parts can be source from anywhere. This is part of the reason why we see these groups end up with such large arsenal of UAS weapons.

Other Yemeni drones like Qasef-2 and Samand-3 also use foreign commercial parts precisely cause they are easy to procure and more difficult to intercept during transit. This allows for on-battlefield assembly rather than relying directly from Iranian factories.

S-136 is at a much higher level that it cannot be made outside of Iran without the correct machinery, especially construction of the body and engine have to be smuggled. That's why you might not see alot of them in Yemen

The way these people think is precisely why they've lost every proxy war with Iran.
 
Yes, the S-131 is very cheap, and parts are sourced for around the world. Which is why foreign forces used it and procured parts from it. Because it did not rely on Iran specifically as parts can be source from anywhere. This is part of the reason why we see these groups end up with such large arsenal of UAS weapons.

Other Yemeni drones like Qasef-2 and Samand-3 also use foreign commercial parts precisely cause they are easy to procure and more difficult to intercept during transit. This allows for on-battlefield assembly rather than relying directly from Iranian factories.

S-136 is at a much higher level that it cannot be made outside of Iran without the correct machinery, especially construction of the body and engine have to be smuggled. That's why you might not see alot of them in Yemen

The way these people think is precisely why they've lost every proxy war with Iran.
Yes it is very economical .I have done designs with similar COTS microcontroller but keep in mind both controllers require programed codes that are specific to their tasks..that code is the heart of the design and any client that receives the hardware needs that code to be placed in the controllers..that is where the original supplier of the drone has the key to its reproduction...what is interesting is that Iran has access to TMS controllers and the associated development tools..they must have bought thousands of these chips ..If I were them I would buy 100,000 at around $ 10 dollars you can build anything with them.
 
@drmeson @Hack-Hook @Shawnee @TheImmortal @Stryker1982 @Ich
@Sineva

not sure if this has been posted ..a lot of info.


A study of downed Iranian drones (the Russians wrote "Geran-2" on their boards) showed that they had many foreign components despite Iran's sanctions.

For example, the Shahed-131 UAV is the predecessor of the Shahed-136 version, and the two have similar working principles and the most unified main components.

Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


The flight control unit of the Shahed-131 drone contains five custom printed circuit boards (PCBs) with Texas Instruments TMS320 F28335 processors, a set of highly integrated and efficient microcircuits for demanding control procedures.

The Engine Control Unit (ECU) contains a single circuit board with a Texas Instruments processor that monitors all engine characteristics during flight.

Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


The electronic systems inside the drone are connected by wires with special markings, all markings in the UAS (production system) are written in English.

The electronic components of the drone are all civilian. From the point of view of the guidance system, there is only a civilian-grade GPS receiver, which allows the drone to specifically deal with stationary objects.

A system has been added to the GPS guidance system to prevent GPS signals from being jammed by electronic warfare (EW). A primitive inertial system is installed on the drone, which can maintain approximate heading and altitude if GPS navigation is disabled.

Therefore, the GPS guidance system of this UAV is difficult to suppress using electronic warfare.

The ergonomical approach is amazing this way because one can assemble these drones anywhere and when they hit the targets, nobody cares where the parts come from. The authors pointing towards parts of old Shahed-131 or Shahed-136 are stupid kids who lack common sense. See the results not the means. Its war and damage counts not who fought with what.

.............................................

Guys we need a separate thread in Iranian section of collection of videos, pics of Iranian weapon performance in Ukraine. This is a must so whoever is following start it please
 
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@drmeson @Hack-Hook @Shawnee @TheImmortal @Stryker1982 @Ich
@Sineva

not sure if this has been posted ..a lot of info.


A study of downed Iranian drones (the Russians wrote "Geran-2" on their boards) showed that they had many foreign components despite Iran's sanctions.

For example, the Shahed-131 UAV is the predecessor of the Shahed-136 version, and the two have similar working principles and the most unified main components.

Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


The flight control unit of the Shahed-131 drone contains five custom printed circuit boards (PCBs) with Texas Instruments TMS320 F28335 processors, a set of highly integrated and efficient microcircuits for demanding control procedures.

The Engine Control Unit (ECU) contains a single circuit board with a Texas Instruments processor that monitors all engine characteristics during flight.

Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


Iranian drones used by Russia are equipped with U.S. components, and the guidance system is difficult to suppress with electronic warfare


The electronic systems inside the drone are connected by wires with special markings, all markings in the UAS (production system) are written in English.

The electronic components of the drone are all civilian. From the point of view of the guidance system, there is only a civilian-grade GPS receiver, which allows the drone to specifically deal with stationary objects.

A system has been added to the GPS guidance system to prevent GPS signals from being jammed by electronic warfare (EW). A primitive inertial system is installed on the drone, which can maintain approximate heading and altitude if GPS navigation is disabled.

Therefore, the GPS guidance system of this UAV is difficult to suppress using electronic warfare.

Very hard to stop this. They are computer components. They are found across the Middle East, Africa, South America, Europe. They aren’t “sensitive” tech that you can monitor the buyer and seller that easily.

Would be like trying to ban Apple IPhones from reaching Iran.
 
Very hard to stop this. They are computer components. They are found across the Middle East, Africa, South America, Europe. They aren’t “sensitive” tech that you can monitor the buyer and seller that easily.

Would be like trying to ban Apple IPhones from reaching Iran.
Precisely why you see current gen UAS in hands of other are made with these parts, and are often not even seen in Iran itself!
 

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