Missile 358 with rocket booster??!
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Iranian UAVs | News and Discussions
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Missile 358 with rocket booster??!
Stryker1982
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Hack-Hook
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Th people who think only ground base air defense is enough can feast on this.
lydian fall
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Sineva
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An interesting article....
February 22, 2022
The Arash loitering munition. Via Iranian media.
In the span of just four short years the Islamic Republic’s aerospace and military-industrial sector developed what could be the largest drone arsenal in the Middle East. While Israel’s own unmanned aircraft are premium “defense” exports coveted by governments around the world Iran has at least surpassed the Israelis in production volume thanks to strong demand by its various military branches. Since 2021 one of the heaviest and most powerful loitering munitions–drones that surveil and then crash on their target–ever developed called the Arash has become a clear favorite among numerous other models.
The Arash first came to prominence at an outrageous exhibition for the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) leadership in early 2021. At the time, scores of new drones were displayed at an airfield while specific models occupied an indoor exhibition filled with armaments. Among the drones outside the venue was the Arash (pictured above) with a fuselage shaped like a rifle bullet and a fixed delta wing configuration. Details about it soon trickled out thanks to occasional publicity by Iranian media. Like other domestic military products made by state-owned companies the Arash is a simple and cost-effective precision weapon system.
Because of its size and weight the Arash is launched with a separating booster until the propellers accelerate and stabilize its flight path. It’s launchable from many different transports, including pickup trucks, although a containerized launcher used to be its original arrangement for its chosen transport such as a flatbed truck–the same as Israeli loitering munitions. Details about its engine type, altitude and speed, flight endurance and actual arrange are still kept from the public but it was claimed when the Arash was being tested in mid-2021 it could travel over 1,000 kilometers. The size of its warhead has never been revealed either. Iranian media have shown the Arash destroying mock up vehicles and small structures.
The scale of Iranian mass-production when it comes to drones is so great that it can be assumed their costs are minimal. If this is indeed the case then loitering munitions assembled in Iran are filling the gap left by the air force’s mixed fleet of fighter jets. Their effectiveness is proven beyond doubt. The foremost example were the attacks on two Saudi oil refining sites in 2019 where a drone swarm successfully disabled a large targets. Wreckage from the surprise attack carried out on September 14 revealed parts of “flying wing” drones that navigated a distance beyond several hundred kilometers without being detected. Propeller driven flying wing airframes are common among Iranian loitering munitions and these are seen in the Arash and its smaller sibling the Kian. Other “kamikaze drones” have different layouts such as the fixed wing Sammad-series delivered to Iraqi militias and Ansar Allah in Yemen.
The IRGC and its secretive Quds Force are the likeliest perpetrators of further long-range drone strikes since disabling Abqaiq and Khurais. In mid-2021, as the Arash garnered a little news coverage in Iran, a mysterious projectile hit an oil tanker sailing the Arabian Sea. CENTCOM’s intervention revealed two of the ship’s crew were killed as a result. Meanwhile, Iran’s favored militias in Iraq conducted monthly drone attacks on US forces throughout 2021 albeit with little effect. As recently as last December suspected Iranian-made drones almost struck a base occupied by the US military near the Iraq-Syria border but were foiled by an intercepting RAF Tornado fighter-bomber.
There could be as many as a dozen models of loitering munitions now possessed by the regular armed forces, the Artesh, and the IRGC. These are mostly propeller driven propeller driven and scale smaller than the Arash and many have been transferred to Tehran’s regional proxies. A popular model is the Ababil, which has repeatedly violated Saudi Arabia’s airspace thanks to persistent attacks by Ansar Allah, but other dangerous loitering munitions are the Shahed 136 that resembles the Israeli-made Harop and are carried in false shipping containers pulled by trucks.
Iranian drones and missiles are considered its most effective homegrown military technology. (Artillery and small arms are improving at a rapid clip.) Taken together they allow the Artesh and the IRGC to engage in “below threshold” conflict that drags out for years and exhausts their adversaries. It worked during campaigns in Iraq and Syria against Sunni militants and is now being unleashed on CENTCOM and the GCC
Loitering Munitions Revived Iranian Air Power
https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2022/02/22/loitering-munitions-revived-iranian-air-power/February 22, 2022
The Arash loitering munition. Via Iranian media.In the span of just four short years the Islamic Republic’s aerospace and military-industrial sector developed what could be the largest drone arsenal in the Middle East. While Israel’s own unmanned aircraft are premium “defense” exports coveted by governments around the world Iran has at least surpassed the Israelis in production volume thanks to strong demand by its various military branches. Since 2021 one of the heaviest and most powerful loitering munitions–drones that surveil and then crash on their target–ever developed called the Arash has become a clear favorite among numerous other models.
The Arash first came to prominence at an outrageous exhibition for the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) leadership in early 2021. At the time, scores of new drones were displayed at an airfield while specific models occupied an indoor exhibition filled with armaments. Among the drones outside the venue was the Arash (pictured above) with a fuselage shaped like a rifle bullet and a fixed delta wing configuration. Details about it soon trickled out thanks to occasional publicity by Iranian media. Like other domestic military products made by state-owned companies the Arash is a simple and cost-effective precision weapon system.
Because of its size and weight the Arash is launched with a separating booster until the propellers accelerate and stabilize its flight path. It’s launchable from many different transports, including pickup trucks, although a containerized launcher used to be its original arrangement for its chosen transport such as a flatbed truck–the same as Israeli loitering munitions. Details about its engine type, altitude and speed, flight endurance and actual arrange are still kept from the public but it was claimed when the Arash was being tested in mid-2021 it could travel over 1,000 kilometers. The size of its warhead has never been revealed either. Iranian media have shown the Arash destroying mock up vehicles and small structures.
The scale of Iranian mass-production when it comes to drones is so great that it can be assumed their costs are minimal. If this is indeed the case then loitering munitions assembled in Iran are filling the gap left by the air force’s mixed fleet of fighter jets. Their effectiveness is proven beyond doubt. The foremost example were the attacks on two Saudi oil refining sites in 2019 where a drone swarm successfully disabled a large targets. Wreckage from the surprise attack carried out on September 14 revealed parts of “flying wing” drones that navigated a distance beyond several hundred kilometers without being detected. Propeller driven flying wing airframes are common among Iranian loitering munitions and these are seen in the Arash and its smaller sibling the Kian. Other “kamikaze drones” have different layouts such as the fixed wing Sammad-series delivered to Iraqi militias and Ansar Allah in Yemen.
The IRGC and its secretive Quds Force are the likeliest perpetrators of further long-range drone strikes since disabling Abqaiq and Khurais. In mid-2021, as the Arash garnered a little news coverage in Iran, a mysterious projectile hit an oil tanker sailing the Arabian Sea. CENTCOM’s intervention revealed two of the ship’s crew were killed as a result. Meanwhile, Iran’s favored militias in Iraq conducted monthly drone attacks on US forces throughout 2021 albeit with little effect. As recently as last December suspected Iranian-made drones almost struck a base occupied by the US military near the Iraq-Syria border but were foiled by an intercepting RAF Tornado fighter-bomber.
There could be as many as a dozen models of loitering munitions now possessed by the regular armed forces, the Artesh, and the IRGC. These are mostly propeller driven propeller driven and scale smaller than the Arash and many have been transferred to Tehran’s regional proxies. A popular model is the Ababil, which has repeatedly violated Saudi Arabia’s airspace thanks to persistent attacks by Ansar Allah, but other dangerous loitering munitions are the Shahed 136 that resembles the Israeli-made Harop and are carried in false shipping containers pulled by trucks.
Iranian drones and missiles are considered its most effective homegrown military technology. (Artillery and small arms are improving at a rapid clip.) Taken together they allow the Artesh and the IRGC to engage in “below threshold” conflict that drags out for years and exhausts their adversaries. It worked during campaigns in Iraq and Syria against Sunni militants and is now being unleashed on CENTCOM and the GCC
lydian fall
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Iranian drones destroy Yankee patriot systems in Syria for fun 
:
Yankees: please don't destroy our systems so noone will buy our trash anymore
:Yankees: please don't destroy our systems so noone will buy our trash anymore
Messerschmitt
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Sineva
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Stryker1982
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Where's the antenna?
Sineva
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What a great way for the west to show its utter lack of good faith when its trying to negotiate its return to the jcpoa,and with that of course comes the removal of sanctions against iran,but hey,in the meantime might as well slap on yet still more sanctions,right? 
Plus theres literally not been a single shred of evidence of ANY transfers of iranian drones or even drone tech to russia,despite the wests repeated claims of such....
Treasury Sanctions Iranian Persons Involved in Production of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Weapon Shipment to Russia
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0940
WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating an air transportation service provider for its involvement in the shipment of Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to Russia for its war against Ukraine. Additionally, OFAC is designating three companies and one individual involved in the research, development, production, and procurement of Iranian UAVs and UAV components, including the Shahed series of drones, for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Aerospace Force (IRGC ASF) and Navy.
“Russia is making increasingly desperate choices to continue its unprovoked war against Ukraine, particularly in the face of our unprecedented sanctions and export controls,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Brian E. Nelson. “The United States is committed to strictly enforcing our sanctions against both Russia and Iran and holding accountable Iran and those supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. We will also not hesitate to target producers and procurers who contribute to Iran and its IRGC’s UAV program, further demonstrating our resolve to continue going after terrorist proxies that destabilize the Middle East. Non-Iranian, non-Russian entities should also exercise great caution to avoid supporting either the development of Iranian UAVs or their transfer, or sale of any military equipment to Russia for use against Ukraine.”
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation authority, Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, as well as E.O. 14024, “Blocking Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation.” The action also follows OFAC’s October 2021 designation of the commander of the IRGC ASF UAV Command and a network of companies and individuals that provided critical support to IRGC UAV programs and those of its expeditionary unit, the IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF). The IRGC was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in 2007 for its role in Iran’s ballistic missile program.
Tehran-based Safiran Airport Services (Safiran) has coordinated Russian military flights between Iran and Russia, including those associated with transporting Iranian UAVs, personnel, and related equipment from Iran to Russia. Information also indicates that after assembly and testing, the Russian Aerospace Forces intend to deploy Iranian UAVs alongside Russian UAVs in their war against Ukraine.
Safiran is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russia Federation.
Paravar Pars Company, closely associated with IRGC-controlled Imam Hossein University, has produced UAVs for the IRGC ASF and has tested UAVs for the IRGC Navy. In particular, Paravar Pars Company was involved in the research, development, and production of the Iranian Shahed-171 UAV developed by the IRGC ASF. In the past, the IRGC ASF distributed U.S. and Israeli-made UAVs to Paravar Pars Company, which were ultimately used to reverse engineer and reproduce indigenously made UAV models.
Paravar Pars Company is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided or attempted to provide financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC ASF.
Design and Manufacturing of Aircraft Engines (DAMA) is an Iranian company that was involved in the research, development, and production of the Iranian Shahed-171 UAV program, which is owned by the IRGC ASF. DAMA is a front company that carried out covert procurement activities for Iran’s Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA), an entity affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Some of DAMA’s customers included the IRGC and the Aerospace Industries Organization. DAMA has been involved in acquiring equipment to modify UAV components that would eventually be indigenously produced by the IRGC and implemented into IRGC UAVs. DAMA has also been involved in the manufacture and procurement of equipment for planned use in jet engines used by the IRGC.
Baharestan Kish Company has overseen various defense-related projects, which included the manufacturing of UAVs. As of 2021, the company was working on Shahed UAV components. Rehmatollah Heidari, Baharestan Kish Company’s managing director and a member of its board of directors, has been involved with various aspects of the company’s operation to include securing facilities for the company.
DAMA and Baharestan Kish Company are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided or attempted to provide financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC.
Rehmatollah Heidari is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Baharestan Kish Company.
The IRGC in its entirety, including the IRGC ASF and Navy, was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on February 12, 2013. HESA was designated pursuant E.O. 13382 on September 17, 2008. MODAFL was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in 2007 and pursuant to E.O. 13224 on March 26, 2019. The Aerospace Industries Organization was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on June 28, 2005.
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the individuals and entities that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.
In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals or entities designated today may themselves be exposed to designation. Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the individuals or entities designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent or payable-through account sanctions.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from its ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897.
Click here for identifying information on the individuals and entities designated today.
Plus theres literally not been a single shred of evidence of ANY transfers of iranian drones or even drone tech to russia,despite the wests repeated claims of such....
Treasury Sanctions Iranian Persons Involved in Production of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Weapon Shipment to Russia
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0940
WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating an air transportation service provider for its involvement in the shipment of Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to Russia for its war against Ukraine. Additionally, OFAC is designating three companies and one individual involved in the research, development, production, and procurement of Iranian UAVs and UAV components, including the Shahed series of drones, for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Aerospace Force (IRGC ASF) and Navy.
“Russia is making increasingly desperate choices to continue its unprovoked war against Ukraine, particularly in the face of our unprecedented sanctions and export controls,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Brian E. Nelson. “The United States is committed to strictly enforcing our sanctions against both Russia and Iran and holding accountable Iran and those supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. We will also not hesitate to target producers and procurers who contribute to Iran and its IRGC’s UAV program, further demonstrating our resolve to continue going after terrorist proxies that destabilize the Middle East. Non-Iranian, non-Russian entities should also exercise great caution to avoid supporting either the development of Iranian UAVs or their transfer, or sale of any military equipment to Russia for use against Ukraine.”
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation authority, Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, as well as E.O. 14024, “Blocking Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation.” The action also follows OFAC’s October 2021 designation of the commander of the IRGC ASF UAV Command and a network of companies and individuals that provided critical support to IRGC UAV programs and those of its expeditionary unit, the IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF). The IRGC was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in 2007 for its role in Iran’s ballistic missile program.
Shipment of Iranian UAVs to Russia
Tehran-based Safiran Airport Services (Safiran) has coordinated Russian military flights between Iran and Russia, including those associated with transporting Iranian UAVs, personnel, and related equipment from Iran to Russia. Information also indicates that after assembly and testing, the Russian Aerospace Forces intend to deploy Iranian UAVs alongside Russian UAVs in their war against Ukraine.
Safiran is being designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russia Federation.
UAV Producers
Paravar Pars Company, closely associated with IRGC-controlled Imam Hossein University, has produced UAVs for the IRGC ASF and has tested UAVs for the IRGC Navy. In particular, Paravar Pars Company was involved in the research, development, and production of the Iranian Shahed-171 UAV developed by the IRGC ASF. In the past, the IRGC ASF distributed U.S. and Israeli-made UAVs to Paravar Pars Company, which were ultimately used to reverse engineer and reproduce indigenously made UAV models.
Paravar Pars Company is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided or attempted to provide financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC ASF.
Design and Manufacturing of Aircraft Engines (DAMA) is an Iranian company that was involved in the research, development, and production of the Iranian Shahed-171 UAV program, which is owned by the IRGC ASF. DAMA is a front company that carried out covert procurement activities for Iran’s Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA), an entity affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Some of DAMA’s customers included the IRGC and the Aerospace Industries Organization. DAMA has been involved in acquiring equipment to modify UAV components that would eventually be indigenously produced by the IRGC and implemented into IRGC UAVs. DAMA has also been involved in the manufacture and procurement of equipment for planned use in jet engines used by the IRGC.
Baharestan Kish Company has overseen various defense-related projects, which included the manufacturing of UAVs. As of 2021, the company was working on Shahed UAV components. Rehmatollah Heidari, Baharestan Kish Company’s managing director and a member of its board of directors, has been involved with various aspects of the company’s operation to include securing facilities for the company.
DAMA and Baharestan Kish Company are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having provided or attempted to provide financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the IRGC.
Rehmatollah Heidari is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Baharestan Kish Company.
The IRGC in its entirety, including the IRGC ASF and Navy, was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on February 12, 2013. HESA was designated pursuant E.O. 13382 on September 17, 2008. MODAFL was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 in 2007 and pursuant to E.O. 13224 on March 26, 2019. The Aerospace Industries Organization was designated pursuant to E.O. 13382 on June 28, 2005.
Sanctions Implications
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the individuals and entities that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States (including transactions transiting the United States) that involve any property or interests in property of blocked or designated persons.
In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the individuals or entities designated today may themselves be exposed to designation. Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant transaction or provides significant financial services for any of the individuals or entities designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent or payable-through account sanctions.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from its ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer to OFAC’s Frequently Asked Question 897.
Click here for identifying information on the individuals and entities designated today.
Stryker1982
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Is this guy an idiot or a genius? Can't tell.
Ich
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Is he this one?
"Iran is selling military equipment of its own production to 'certain major world powers'" - IRGC
Commander General Salami also said that the Iranian military is training unnamed buyers to use the equipment received"
Stryker1982
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This is Kiomars Heydari, who is the commander of the land forces of the regular army (Artesh).
But if Gen. Salami said that, then I find that to o be a strong confirmation that a transfer has infact taken place, and they are currently undergoing training. I'd imagine these training courses could last several months to develop proficiency of use.
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