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Iranian Nuclear Technology and Industry (technical only... non-political)

Iranian nuclear Sites seem not to be save against nuclear earth penetrating attack.

" (..) a tunnel buried 2km deep would be squeezed by the rocks"
"(..) tactical nuclear warhead could trigger seismic activity which would release total energy up to 1,000 times that produced by the weapon itself"
" (..) B61 nuclear bomb(...) has a yield ranging from 0.3 to 50 kilotons (..) can be delivered by hypersonic missile to evade missile defence systems"
"(..)destruction caused by a nuclear bunker buster using the latest technology could reach three to 10 times deeper underground than previously thought."


Thanks to @Stryker1982 mentioning this youtube channel in the chill thread. I watched all videos on the same time i read your Post.
All began with watching this analyse:


After that I researched for this topic and found following sources:

South China Morning Post

Yahoo Article with reference to South China Morning Post

Interesting comment by user on that topic (Yahoo)


Main Source: Li Jie, lead project scientist with the Army Engineering University of PLA in Nanjing, Jiangsu province, in a paper published in the peer-reviewed Chinese Journal of Rock Mechanics and Engineering

Opinion:
if this is true, hardly any bunker is unassailable. So a relatively small nuclear weapon could destroy almost any bunker. This danger applies not only to Iran's nuclear facilities, but also to the nations that could be planning such an attack against Iran.

Through the development of hypersonic weapons, any air defense would have no chance for the time being, especially since it cannot be guaranteed that every air defense can be maintained over the entire duration of a war at any time and in any place. In other words, a state is reached in which one party can inflict damage on the other and that (when using a weak warhead with a large depth of penetration into the earth) little to no fallout occurs and every target is eliminated.

Previously there were 2 obstacles that would have prevented such weapons from being used.

1.) Nuclear fallout would outlaw any aggressor internationally. If Israel or the US plans to attack Iran with a small nuclear warhead deep underground without any fallout, they could do so now if the warhead penetrates deep enough into the earth.

Conclusion:
Under these circumstances, there is no other option for Iran than to necessarily produce its own nuclear weapons. That would be the absolutely necessary logical consequence of these developments.

Question:
What is your opinion about that new development? Would you take it serious?
What impact will have such a development on iranian strategy or specially on irans enemy strategy ?

Would the inhibition threshold of the West now be lower to equip e.g. a hypersonic missile with a 1 kt warhead and then detonate it 60 meters underground, e.g. at Fordow or the underground missile cities? Or would this only be one of the last options in the context of a war?
B61 is a gravity bomb, recently converted to be compatible with the F-35. Specifically the Israeli F-35 as well. Such a gravity bomb could be a secret weapon they are holding in case they need them. I don't discount this potential scenario. Their is no nuclear hypersonic gliders made by the USA yet. They are still working on their conventional one. Their primary means is delivering through subsonic cruise missiles or ICBMs. ICBMs having a much higher CEP.

You will definitely get seismic activity with usage, but 1000 times is rather bullshit and an exaggeration. Depending on use of a B61- Mod 11 you can probably get 5 MT earthquake and beyond, which is very dangerous for underground facilities.
B61 Mod 11 would be the main and most likely system to be used.

B61 does not have to penertate very deep to still be quite dangerous, an F-35 can drop multiple 10kt bombs simultaneously, and while I can't say for sure, even if it does a small penetration of a few meters, the shockwave through granite mountains would be quite heavy.


One of this issues with Fordow is that it is old relatively, and less secure then some new missile bases which run deeper through more complex geography. Iran is far far more head in construction engineering today than it once was. Fordow, relatively is much more simpler than some of these other bases in West Azerbaijan, Haji Abad, Kermanshah etc... Tech has change alot since the early 2000s, from both Iran and it's enemies.

The new expansion of Natanz they are doing is set to be more secure, more deeper and complex than Fordow by far. My impression is they don't want to rely on Fordow and prefer to create more means of protection in more sites. Because of the IAEA restrictions, they can't build a new one from scratch in a super secure location, so they resort to expanding existing facilities, but Fordow is not geographically suitable for it.


As for your Q's
What is your opinion about that new development? Would you take it serious?

Forget about Israeli conventional bunker busters, which would not be successful against Fordows hard rock granite, even with detonation inside. They would have to conduct repeated attacks with conventional munitions over and over and over again to create instability in the tunnel network. Israel would have to use several B61-11's (nuclear) to collapse the sites. For example, for Israel to carry a GBU-28 all the way from Israel to Fordow would require alot of refueling capability, and force reduced loadout to compensate for the weight. The GBU-28 is said to be able to penetrate 6m of concrete, let alone UHP Concrete or granite. I only take the nuclear threat seriously.


What impact will have such a development on iranian strategy or specially on irans enemy strategy ?

They would already be aware of their capabilities at destroying these sites. They created the GBU-57 (30,000lb) bomb specifically to target Iranian nuclear facilities and by extension against any enemy with well protected facilities. Again of course, not a capability Israel has and requires SEAD/DEAD to enter deep into Iran with a B-52.

Nothing much has changed in the equation. USA is the only country which can use super heavy conventional munitions in large enough quantities to destroy deep sites, but this requires heavy SEAD/DEAD operation under missile fire. They already know this. It doesn't change the fact that Iran can still enrich uranium in secret with its highly efficient IR-9's, and it can be done in even a easily disguised warehouse building. One of the purposes of these sites is to kill the idea of a swift stand-off decapitation strike via conventional means which is complete. Same as before regarding Israel, nuclear weapons is essentially a mandatory requirement to successfully destroy the programs overt sites (with no guarantee of long term success).

Only the US is capable with conventional means, Israel is not. However, if USA provides B61-11 to Israel, they may find much more probability for success using them compared to the limited damaged they can do with only conventional means. This ultimately changes 1 equation. That is, the best defense is a 2000km max range missile with 10kt nuclear warhead at minimum with atleast 25 warheads


Would the inhibition threshold of the West now be lower to equip e.g. a hypersonic missile with a 1 kt warhead and then detonate it 60 meters underground, e.g. at Fordow or the underground missile cities? Or would this only be one of the last options in the context of a war?

In the absence of total air superiority, use of nuclear warheads would be the only option.

The few US hypersonic missiles they are developing won't have alot of penetration power. After separation of the booster from the warhead with subsequently release of the glider from the nose, it wouldn't have the needed weight & performance to be comparable with their GBU-57. GBU-57 is slated to penetrate 60m at most and that is a 30,000lb bomb. Nuclearize the warhead of a hypersonic glide vehicle with 50kt warhead, and their would certainly be a problem.
 
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Some photos from Nuclear exhibition today

Notice the inside cut out of 4 rotor centrifuge (IR-9 may be!). Also I am guessing mockup of the site buildings of the Iranian designed rector "Karoun" being built.

Atom_1.jpg
Atom_2.jpg
Atom_3.jpg
Atom_4.jpg
Atom_5.jpg


This photo shows how Iran has mastered the full nuclear cycle
Atom_7.jpg
Atom_6.jpg


your guess on this one..Karoun core!!!!
1675429378625.jpeg
 
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Could the Arak HWR reopen someday? Since its closure, thermonuclear is out of the picture

Why Rouhani did that? To please the west for the JCPOA?
 
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More photos :

Iranian made nuclear reactor Fuel assembly
Atom _fuel.jpg

Individual fuel rods made of zirconium metal and the Uranium pellets inside
Fuel_pellets.jpg

Zirconium Ore ..the only metal that can tolerate heat and radiation of a nuclear core and sanctioned for Iran..mined in Iran
Zirconium.jpg

medical radioisotopes made in Iran
4412059.jpg

The mock up on the right..no idea but the color is nice!..may be an atomic nite lite!..lol
4412077.jpg

no idea!
4412082.jpg
 
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More photos :

Iranian made nuclear reactor Fuel assembly
View attachment 914863
Individual fuel rods made of zirconium metal and the Uranium pellets inside
View attachment 914864
Zirconium Ore ..the only metal that can tolerate heat and radiation of a nuclear core and sanctioned for Iran..mined in Iran View attachment 914865
medical radioisotopes made in Iran
4412059.jpg

The mock up on the right..no idea but the color is nice!..may be an atomic nite lite!..lol
4412077.jpg

no idea!
4412082.jpg

4412082.jpg

Perhaps an atomic chandelier...
 
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Don't post pictures of workers. They will be targets for west.
 
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More photos :

Iranian made nuclear reactor Fuel assembly
View attachment 914863
Individual fuel rods made of zirconium metal and the Uranium pellets inside
View attachment 914864
Zirconium Ore ..the only metal that can tolerate heat and radiation of a nuclear core and sanctioned for Iran..mined in Iran View attachment 914865
medical radioisotopes made in Iran
4412059.jpg

The mock up on the right..no idea but the color is nice!..may be an atomic nite lite!..lol
4412077.jpg

no idea!
4412082.jpg
I love how they put carpets everywhere 😆

Could the Arak HWR reopen someday? Since its closure, thermonuclear is out of the picture

Why Rouhani did that? To please the west for the JCPOA?
Their was a time, where it was genuinely believed a successful JCPOA can be created and implemented.
 
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Could the Arak HWR reopen someday? Since its closure, thermonuclear is out of the picture

Why Rouhani did that? To please the west for the JCPOA?

It was supposed to be redesigned to use a much smaller leu core under the terms of the jcpoa,the chinese company that was supposed to advise and sign off on the new smaller core design seemed to take a leaf out of russias book back when it was constructing bushehr,ie it worked veeeery sloooowly,before ultimately leaving the project half completed under the threat of the chumpenfuhrers sanctions when the us quit the jcpoa.Ever since then construction has been in limbo sadly.
Now I suppose that so long as theres any chance of the jcpoa being resuscitated then it would be something of a risk to construct a new core based on its original larger plutonium producing configuration.
However its certainly not a deal breaker as the spent fuel could be easily shipped to russia along with the spent fuel from bushehr,in the event that the jcpoa was revived.In fact thats all that rouhani should`ve ever offered the west as far as arak was concerned,imho.

It was irans slv/space program that was the free-bee that rouhani gave to the west.
 
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Latest IAEA report on Iran's nuclear activities released/leaked (Feb 2023).

Highlights of February 2023 report (vs November 2022 report):
  • 87.5kg of uranium enriched to 60% (62.3kg) [42kg uranium enriched to 60% is sufficient for one nuclear bomb (if further enriched)]
  • 434.7kg of uranium enriched to 20% (386.4kg)
  • IAEA cannot re-establish continuity of knowledge of centrifuge inventory even if new deal is reached
  • 3,760kg of total enriched uranium [JCPOA limit was 202.8kg]
  • Traces of uranium enriched to 83.7% found in modified cascades
Iran has sufficient 60% HEU for at least two nuclear warheads (if further enriched to 90% for weaponisation). And sufficient 20% HEU for another warhead. The US estimates this process would take Iran 12 days.

If Iran is confident in its ability to quickly weaponise 90% HEU then the best (but riskiest) move is to rapidly accumulate large stockpiles of 60% HEU. Current rates of accumulation are very slow (+ 8.4kg 60% HEU per month = sufficient 60% HEU for 1 additional nuclear warhead every 5 months). 210kg+ or 420kg+ 60% HEU would be a critical amount (sufficient for 5 or 10 nuclear warheads) and probably the 'do or die' moment for Israel.

For context, 28kg of 90% HEU is typically required for a nuclear warhead (equivalent to 400kg of 20% HEU).

Iran must balance the risk of enriching to 90% HEU now with the time delay to further enrich 60% HEU to 90% HEU in the event the decision is made to do so. Ideally, 90% HEU would be stockpiled. If it indeed takes 12 days to further enrich 42kg of 60% HEU to 28kg of 90% HEU for one warhead then that is a relatively substantial delay).
 
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Latest IAEA report on Iran's nuclear activities released/leaked (Feb 2023).

Highlights of February 2023 report (vs November 2022 report):
  • 87.5kg of uranium enriched to 60% (62.3kg) [42kg uranium enriched to 60% is sufficient for one nuclear bomb (if further enriched)]
  • 434.7kg of uranium enriched to 20% (386.4kg)
  • IAEA cannot re-establish continuity of knowledge of centrifuge inventory even if new deal is reached
  • 3,760kg of total enriched uranium [JCPOA limit was 202.8kg]
  • Traces of uranium enriched to 83.7% found in modified cascades
Iran has sufficient 60% HEU for at least two nuclear warheads (if further enriched to 90% for weaponisation). And sufficient 20% HEU for another warhead. The US estimates this process would take Iran 12 days.

If Iran is confident in its ability to quickly weaponise 90% HEU then the best (but riskiest) move is to rapidly accumulate large stockpiles of 60% HEU. Current rates of accumulation are very slow (+ 8.4kg 60% HEU per month = sufficient 60% HEU for 1 additional nuclear warhead every 5 months). 210kg+ or 420kg+ 60% HEU would be a critical amount (sufficient for 5 or 10 nuclear warheads) and probably the 'do or die' moment for Israel.

For context, 28kg of 90% HEU is typically required for a nuclear warhead (equivalent to 400kg of 20% HEU).

Iran must balance the risk of enriching to 90% HEU now with the time delay to further enrich 60% HEU to 90% HEU in the event the decision is made to do so. Ideally, 90% HEU would be stockpiled. If it indeed takes 12 days to further enrich 42kg of 60% HEU to 28kg of 90% HEU for one warhead then that is a relatively substantial delay).
Could you post a source or the leak link pls?
 
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Latest IAEA report on Iran's nuclear activities released/leaked (Feb 2023).

Highlights of February 2023 report (vs November 2022 report):
  • 87.5kg of uranium enriched to 60% (62.3kg) [42kg uranium enriched to 60% is sufficient for one nuclear bomb (if further enriched)]
  • 434.7kg of uranium enriched to 20% (386.4kg)
  • IAEA cannot re-establish continuity of knowledge of centrifuge inventory even if new deal is reached
  • 3,760kg of total enriched uranium [JCPOA limit was 202.8kg]
  • Traces of uranium enriched to 83.7% found in modified cascades
Iran has sufficient 60% HEU for at least two nuclear warheads (if further enriched to 90% for weaponisation). And sufficient 20% HEU for another warhead. The US estimates this process would take Iran 12 days.

If Iran is confident in its ability to quickly weaponise 90% HEU then the best (but riskiest) move is to rapidly accumulate large stockpiles of 60% HEU. Current rates of accumulation are very slow (+ 8.4kg 60% HEU per month = sufficient 60% HEU for 1 additional nuclear warhead every 5 months). 210kg+ or 420kg+ 60% HEU would be a critical amount (sufficient for 5 or 10 nuclear warheads) and probably the 'do or die' moment for Israel.

For context, 28kg of 90% HEU is typically required for a nuclear warhead (equivalent to 400kg of 20% HEU).

Iran must balance the risk of enriching to 90% HEU now with the time delay to further enrich 60% HEU to 90% HEU in the event the decision is made to do so. Ideally, 90% HEU would be stockpiled. If it indeed takes 12 days to further enrich 42kg of 60% HEU to 28kg of 90% HEU for one warhead then that is a relatively substantial delay).
If Israel has them, it's only right that IRI has them too. It's my opinion she has several already.
 
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Latest IAEA report on Iran's nuclear activities released/leaked (Feb 2023).

Highlights of February 2023 report (vs November 2022 report):
  • 87.5kg of uranium enriched to 60% (62.3kg) [42kg uranium enriched to 60% is sufficient for one nuclear bomb (if further enriched)]
  • 434.7kg of uranium enriched to 20% (386.4kg)
  • IAEA cannot re-establish continuity of knowledge of centrifuge inventory even if new deal is reached
  • 3,760kg of total enriched uranium [JCPOA limit was 202.8kg]
  • Traces of uranium enriched to 83.7% found in modified cascades
Iran has sufficient 60% HEU for at least two nuclear warheads (if further enriched to 90% for weaponisation). And sufficient 20% HEU for another warhead. The US estimates this process would take Iran 12 days.

If Iran is confident in its ability to quickly weaponise 90% HEU then the best (but riskiest) move is to rapidly accumulate large stockpiles of 60% HEU. Current rates of accumulation are very slow (+ 8.4kg 60% HEU per month = sufficient 60% HEU for 1 additional nuclear warhead every 5 months). 210kg+ or 420kg+ 60% HEU would be a critical amount (sufficient for 5 or 10 nuclear warheads) and probably the 'do or die' moment for Israel.

For context, 28kg of 90% HEU is typically required for a nuclear warhead (equivalent to 400kg of 20% HEU).

Iran must balance the risk of enriching to 90% HEU now with the time delay to further enrich 60% HEU to 90% HEU in the event the decision is made to do so. Ideally, 90% HEU would be stockpiled. If it indeed takes 12 days to further enrich 42kg of 60% HEU to 28kg of 90% HEU for one warhead then that is a relatively substantial delay).

Fascinating findings
 
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Mikhail Ulyanov, resident representative of the Russian Federation to the IAEA, slammed the propaganda against Iran in relation to traces of 84% enriched uranium supposedly detected by inspectors in centrifuges.

Ulyanov's statement:

The issue of 84% uranium enrichment in Iran has been successfully settled. There is nothing to speculate about anymore.


Great to see Russia acting as a counterweight to imperialist regimes and countering their anti-Iranian plots at the IAEA.

shutterstock_1859467489.jpg
 
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Iran's future road map in nuclear technology
Excerpts from Interview with Iran's "Advanced Technologies" company presiden.
Three domains of responsibilities identified :

1-Fusion Technologies
2-Stable Isotope Technologies
3-Quantum Technologies
Establishment of infrastructure for a world class fusion technology research including research on Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) and Magnetic Confinement Fusion (MCF) .
Plans are now in place to turn Iran into a world class center for the above technologies in Asian continent.

I have included some info regrading Iran's past fusion activities That I copied from another thread. I am guessing that all these activities are now part of this new "advanced Technology" company.

Iranian's Fusion Reactor TOKOMAK
Iran started research on TOKOMAK as early as 1985 with her first reactor named "ALVAND".Tokamaks are used to generate electricity through fusion.
The next recactor was named "Alborz". Alborz Tokamak unveiled in 2013 was Iran's first fully indigenous encapsulating device of nuclear fusion plasma. It includes deuterium-tritium plasma and is kept by two series of electromagnetic fields. Alborz Tokamak had a 0.45 meter major radius and 0.15 minor radius and could hold the capacity of 3 KV .

nuclear_fuison_reactor.jpg



N_F.jpg

All design, simulation and operation phases of Alborz Tokamak were carried out by Iranian scientists in various universities. The research work has progressed to this day using bigger and more capable reactors .
 
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