Iranian Chill Thread

[bsruzm]

Some other say Cavosoglu is being a double prostitute

F.ck it, what about Zarif?

 

[Muhammed45]

F.ck it, what about Zarif?

UAE the little shit has said many things, if israel needed 1 week to bring them on knees and fk them, we need only half an hour to raze their capitals. Doesn't matter how many supporters they have.

They are planning to isolate and then invade Qatar , looks like a new scenario

 

[bsruzm]

UAE the little shit has said many things, if israel needed 1 week to bring them on knees and fk them, we need only half an hour to raze their capitals. Doesn't matter how many supporters they have.

They are planning to isolate and then invade Qatar , looks like a new scenario

How's F313 going? I don't know Zarif but it never fail to put a smile on my face. I hope it becomes operational until then, I mean in 10-15 years

 

[Muhammed45]

How's F313 going? I don't know Zarif but it never fail to put a smile on my face. I hope it becomes operational until then, I mean in 10-15 years

Whenever you find an engine for Altay, it will be operational hehhh

 

[bsruzm]

Whenever you find an engine for Altay, it will be operational hehhh

Okay, we speak about it then

 

[Dinky]

https://twitter.com/x/status/984001126990340103

https://twitter.com/x/status/984060599557672961

I dont know if this is true, i havent seen any actual news on it. But this should of been done a long time ago, its a no brainer. Iran and Russia are fighting on the same side. US has bases in Turkey, Jordan, Israel, and uses it to attack Syira. On the other hand Russia and Iran who are fighting on the same side don't cooperate militarily enough which is insane. Iran letting Russia use Iranian territory to bomb its targets would benefit both. I know Iran has a law which prohibits Foreign bases on its territory but its time they removed it or changed it. Maybe change it to allow foreign basses in times of war on a common enemy in this case isis and other jihadist groups or to aid a common ally in this case would be the Syrian government. Or Maybe a joint base where both Russia and Iranians Use it so to circumvent the law since its no longer a foreign base since there are Iranians in it. These are just rough suggestions.

 

[agarrao a las kalandrakas]

@yavar Bro, what about possible strikes in Syria by US, NATO & Israel?

What about +++++++++++++++ and ***************** and big mamma and ********** and IRGC there etc??

I remember what you said in 2013. But now in 2018? What do you think?

I'm waiting for a response from my brother Yavar.

 

[skyshadow]

عکس قدیمی از موشک ذوالفقار با بدنه جدید

 

[skyshadow]

سرباز فرانسوی درحال تست اسلحه ضد پهپاد.

اسلحه ضد پهپاد داشتیم وقتی داشتن اسلحه ضد پهپاد مد نبود

 

[yavar]

@yavar Bro, what about possible strikes in Syria by US, NATO & Israel?

What about +++++++++++++++ and ***************** and big mamma and ********** and IRGC there etc??

I remember what you said in 2013. But now in 2018? What do you think?

I'm waiting for a response from my brother Yavar.

same we at state of war
Trump want to do quick hit and run and declare victory and lift up America image with cheap atct which as not got any military equipment to come .
so we will play

 

[skyshadow]

Democracy Dies in Darkness
National Security

U.S. launches missile strikes in Syria
By Anne Gearan, Missy Ryan

April 13, 2018 at 9:12 PM

President Trump announced on April 13 that the U.S. conducted a military strike against the Syrian government in response to suspected chemical attack in a Damascus suburb. (The Washington Post)
President Trump ordered a military attack against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on Friday, joining allies Britain and France in launching missile strikes in retaliation for what Western nations said was the deliberate gassing of Syrian civilians.

The coordinated strike marked the second time in a year that Trump has used force against Assad, who U.S. officials believe has continued to test the West’s willingness to accept gruesome chemical attacks.

Trump announced the strikes in an address to the nation Friday evening. “The purpose of our action tonight is to establish a strong deterrent” against the production and use of chemical weapons, he said, describing the issue as vital to national security. Trump added that the United States is prepared “to sustain this response” until its aims are met.

Trump asked both Russia and Iran, backers of Assad, “what kind of nation wants to be associated” with mass murder and suggested that someday the United States might be able to “get along” with both if they change their policies.


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The assault followed repeated threats of military action from Trump, who has been moved by civilian suffering to set aside his concerns about foreign military conflicts, since the reported chemical attack that killed civilians in a rebel-held town outside Damascus last weekend.

Even after international inspections and a U.S. air strike in 2017, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is being accused of using chemical weapons to attack civilians in Douma, Syria, on April 7. (Jason Aldag/The Washington Post)
The operation capped nearly a week of debate in which Pentagon leaders voiced concerns that an attack could pull the United States into Syria’s civil war and trigger a dangerous conflict with Assad ally Russia — without necessarily halting chemical attacks.

Both Syria and Russia have denied involvement in the attack, which Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov alleged had been staged.

The episode is the latest illustration of the hazards arising from a conflict that has killed an estimated half-million people and drawn in world powers since it began as a peaceful uprising in 2011.

The attack raised the possibility of retaliation by Russia or Iran, which also provides military support to Assad, threatening in particular to increase the risks facing a force of 2,000 Americans in Syria, as part of the battle against the Islamic State. While the United States has not been at war with the Syrian government, U.S. troops often operate in proximity to Iranian- or Russian-backed groups.


In the wake of last weekend’s gruesome attack, some U.S. officials advocated a larger, and therefore riskier, strike than the limited action Trump ordered in April 2017, also in response to suspected chemical weapons use.

That attack involved 59 Tomahawk missiles fired from two U.S. warships in the Mediterranean Sea. It fulfilled Trump’s vow that chemical weapons are a “red line” that he, unlike his predecessor Barack Obama, would not allow Assad to cross. But the airfield targeted by the Pentagon resumed operations shortly after the attack and, according to Western intelligence assessments, chemical attacks resumed.

Assad’s defiance has presented Trump with a choice of whether to make a larger statement and incur a larger risk this time. Planning for these strikes focused on ways to curb Assad’s ability to use such weapons again.

President Trump enters to speak in the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House on Friday in Washington, about the United States’ military response to a chemical weapons attack in Syria on April 7, 2018. (Susan Walsh/AP)
Risks of a wider attack include the possibility of a dangerous escalation with Russia, whose decision to send its military to Syria in 2015 reversed the course of the war in Assad’s favor. Since then, Russia has used Syria as a testing ground for some of its most sophisticated weaponry.

“Get ready Russia, because they will be coming, nice and new and ‘smart!’ ” Trump tweeted Wednesday, referring to U.S. missiles.

That took military officials by surprise. But on Thursday, Trump said he did not mean to suggest missile strikes were imminent.

“Never said when an attack on Syria would take place,” he tweeted. “Could be very soon or not so soon at all!”

A larger strike, possibly including stealth aircraft and strikes on multiple sites, could inflict lasting damage on military facilities and economic infrastructure that have been vital to Assad’s ability to gain the upper hand in a seven-year civil war.


Since last year’s strike, multiple chemical attacks have been reported in opposition areas, most of them involving chlorine rather than the nerve agent sarin, as was used in 2017, suggesting the government may have adjusted its tactics.

Among the chief factors that military planners must consider are air defenses in Syria, which were bolstered by Russia’s decision to enter the war and could pose a threat should the Pentagon employ manned aircraft in the attack. Their reach was demonstrated in February when an Israeli F-16 fighter jet crashed amid Syrian antiaircraft fire.

The United States has flown an array of aircraft over Syria since it began strikes against the Islamic State in 2014, but those operations have mostly steered clear of government and Russian activities. The Assad regime has not authorized the U.S. operations, but it also has not tried to shoot down American aircraft.

Earlier Friday, Nikki Haley, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, accused Russia of lying and covering up for the Assad government. Assad’s government had used chemical weapons at least 50 times in the past seven years of warfare, Haley claimed.

“Russia can complain all it wants about fake news, but no one is buying its lies and its coverups,” she said. “Russia was supposed to guarantee Assad would not use chemical weapons, and Russia did the opposite.”

Russia had called for the emergency meeting on Syria as military action seemed likely.

Russia’s U.N. ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia, accused the United States, France and Britain of saber-rattling.


“Why are you seeking to plunge the Middle East into such difficulties, provoking one conflict after another, pitting one state against another?” he said, claiming that anti-government militias had received “instructions” to begin an offensive as soon as an act of force begins. “Is the latest wave of chaos being unleashed only for the sake of that?”

Russia is Assad’s most powerful ally and has thousands of troops and military advisers, as well as air-defense systems, deployed in Syria.

Russia’s military has threatened to shoot down any U.S. missiles that put Russian lives at risk. Russia could also fire at the launch platforms used — potentially U.S. planes or ships. Russian officials have said U.S. and Russian military staffs remain in contact regarding Syria, even as Russian media have carried stories in recent days about the potential outbreak of “World War III” as a consequence of a U.S. airstrike against Assad.

Russian President Vladimir Putin warned French President Emmanuel Macron in a phone call Friday the situation remained tense, the Kremlin said in a statement.

“Most important, it is imperative to avoid badly planned and dangerous actions that would be crude violations of the U.N. Charter and would have unpredictable consequences,” the Kremlin said. “Both leaders directed the ministers of defense and foreign affairs to maintain close contact with the goal of de-escalating the situation.”

U.N. Secretary General António Guterres told the Security Council that he feared events could escalate rapidly into a regional and even global conflict, and urged all states “to act responsibly in these dangerous circumstances.”

France’s U.N. ambassador, Francois Delattre, said the Syrian government’s decision to use chemical weapons meant that it had “reached a point of no return,” necessitating a “robust, united and steadfast response.”

“France will shoulder its responsibility to end an intolerable threat to our collective security,” Delattre told the Security Council.

British U.N. Ambassador Karen Pierce noted that Prime Minister Theresa May’s Cabinet “has agreed on the need to take action to alleviate humanitarian distress and to deter the further use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime.”

Announcement of that approval Thursday did not specify that the response should be military, although that was the expectation.

“We will continue to work with our friends and allies to coordinate an international response to that end,” Pierce said Friday.

Opposition lawmakers urged May to first seek Parliament’s consent before committing to any military action. Nothing requires that May do so, but the convention is for British lawmakers to be given the chance to vote. Parliament is in recess but could be recalled for an emergency session.

Meanwhile, a team of investigators from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons arrived in Syria to look for evidence.

 

[OldTwilight]

در مورد سوریه و پاسخ ایران ... تقریبا 4500 نفر از فرزندان مسئولین دارند توی انگلیس زندگی می کنند ، اونوقت امثال من انتظار داریم جمهوری اسلامی به جنگنده های انگلیس و ناوهاش حمله ی متقابل کنه !؟

خاک بر سر ما ...

این جمهوری اسلامی داره تبدیل به کلونی انگلیس می شه ...

 

[yavar]

 

[Parsipride]

The Fruits of Iran’s Victory in Syria
https://www.lawfareblog.com/fruits-irans-victory-syria

Editor’s Note: Syria's civil war has many losers, but Iran is not one of them. Tehran backed its ally in Damascus to the hilt from the start of the civil war, and its ally survived in large part because of Iran's aid. Ariane Tabatabai of Georgetown explains the reasons for Iran's involvement and the strategic and economic benefits Tehran has gained.

***

Seven years ago, in March, Syria descended into chaos when President Bashar al-Assad undertook to crush the popular protests challenging his rule. Iran quickly became involved on the dictator’s side and, covertly, at first, provided assistance to him and his forces. By 2014, Iran’s presence in Syria was undeniable and the Revolutionary Guards were spotted in theater. Since then, Tehran has committed money and troops to propping up Assad while supporting him politically on the international stage—even as the international community has decried mass atrocities, including the use of chemical weapons, by Assad’s forces. Although the exact scale of Iranian commitment to Syria remains contested, it is estimated that the country has deployed thousands of troops, dozens of military advisors, and millions (maybe even billions, by some accounts) of dollars to protect Assad’s rule. But while Iran has paid a cost for its involvement in Syria, today it is beginning to reap its fruits of its investment.

Iranian authorities were reluctant to publicize their country’s involvement in the Syrian conflict at first. Tehran had grappled with internal challenges of its own just two years before. In summer 2009, then-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won a second four-year term in a hotly contested election. Ahmadinejad’s deep unpopularity and the questions surrounding the health of the elections sparked what has since become known as the “Green Movement,” a series of large-scale protests throughout the nation calling for a recount of the votes. The regime responded to the unrest by crushing the movement quickly and fairly effectively. When the Arab Spring started in 2010, Iranians watched the events closely and saw other dictators fall one by one. Envy quickly turned into horror as they, and the rest of the world, watched the Arab Spring take a sour turn and Syria descend into chaos. And when Assad began to employ chemical weapons against his own civilian populations in December 2012, Iranians were further horrified, having experienced the use of such weapons by Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Given this recent political context, Iran initially decided to keep its involvement in the conflict under the radar.

But the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 changed Iranians’ view of the conflict. That summer, Iranians watched ISIS declare a “caliphate” next door in Iraq and wondered when and how, not if, the group would target their own country. This threat perception was shaped by ISIS’ geographical proximity and its ideology. Iranians were acutely worried by the advent of another adversarial force in Iraq, which could threaten the Iranian state, as Baghdad had under Saddam Hussein, combined with ISIS’ anti-Shia and anti-Iranian ideology and brutality. As ISIS spread in Iraq and Syria, Tehran saw it as both convenient and critical to increase its presence in both countries, and to do so visibly.

Soon, body bags began to return to Iran and the Revolutionary Guards were joined by the country’s conventional military, the Artesh. Iran also began to deploy militias composed of Afghan and Pakistani fighters, the Fatemiyoun and Zeynabiyoun. What had initially seemed like a quick intervention on the side of an ally—which during the Iran-Iraq War had provided significant support and had since allowed Tehran access to its preferred non-state ally, Hezbollah—became a long civil conflict, leading to one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Against this backdrop, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif presented his “four-point plan” for ending the Syrian civil war to his foreign interlocutors. “The gist” of the plan, as he put it, “is a national-unity government, a ceasefire, fighting terrorism, constitutional reform, and creation of a permanent government based on the new constitutional institutions that have been created.” In private, Iranian officials would also note that they weren’t married to Assad, but that they also did not see any viable alternatives to him. As they viewed it, Assad was the only thing standing between the region and even more chaos.

But while Tehran was gaining prominence on the battlefield and in international fora aimed at addressing the Syrian crisis, Iran began to pay greater costs for its involvement there. Domestically, the Iranian populace and regime insiders alike were torn on their country’s presence in Syria. They believed containing ISIS was critical, but also saw Assad as a horrifying figure whose forces were leaving hundreds of thousands displaced, wounded, and killed. The Guards and Artesh were beginning to see their death tolls rise, with the number of killed troops repatriated surpassing1,000 by 2016. And as the country was struggling to reap the economic benefits of the 2015 nuclear deal and subsequent sanctions relief, it was also dedicating millions of dollars to supplying Assad and his forces with funds, advisors, weapons, and other equipment. According to reporting by Haaretz, “Iranian state-owned banks set up credit lines for the Syrian government of $3.6 billion in 2013 and $1 billion in 2015 to let the regime buy oil and other goods from Iran.” And this amount doesn’t include Iranian-supplied arms to various groups in the region.

Internationally, many saw Tehran as supporting a brutal dictator whose days would have been numbered without Iranian backing. Iran’s support for Assad also projected the image of a sectarian player throughout the region, tarnishing the country’s image on the Arab street and fueling the concerns of neighboring governments. Matters became more complicated when Moscow joined the fight, often providing air cover to Iranian and Syrian ground forces. Despite this cooperation, Russian officials have at times butted heads with Tehran—in particular, over Russia publicizing its use of an Iranian airbase for refueling purposes, a controversial matter in Iran which many deemed contrary to the constitution. Other regional conflicts have made matters even more complicated. The Saudi-Iranian rift widened in 2016, when the two countries severed ties and escalated proxy wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen—and Syria.

The Islamic Republic did not anticipate when it became involved in Syria that the conflict would last seven years and that Assad would preserve his tenure. Iran may have signaled in the middle of the war that it would have been willing to drop Assad for another friendly presence in Damascus, but that view changed as it became clear that the international community, chiefly the United States and its European allies, were at least tacitly willing to live with Assad.

Today, Iran sees an end in sight in Syria. And although it has paid a high price for its involvement in that theater, it is now beginning to see its efforts pay dividends. First, Iran’s military has gained significant battlefield experience, with its armed forces becoming much more cohesive. And this experience isn’t limited to Iranian troops, but also the militias Iran has deployed from other parts of the region, including approximately 14,000 Fatemiyoun and 5,000 Zeynabiyoun. Iran is now able to redirect these trained and experienced fighters to other significant theaters, including Afghanistan and Yemen. And, as some Western military officials told me, it may have started doing so already. Second, Tehran’s been able to project power beyond its means through its strategic deployment of militias in Syria. While the country lacks a seat at the UN Security Council, a nuclear arsenal, or conventional military capabilities able to challenge the world powers, Iran has affirmed its place as a significant regional force. Third, the country has increased its strategic depth and preserved its lifeline to its chief non-state ally. Hezbollah’s ability to preserve its stronghold in Lebanon and to thrive is vital to the Islamic Republic because of the ways it increases Iran’s strategic depth, provides intelligence and counterintelligence benefits, and assists with Iran’s power projection, including by providing a deterrent against the United States and Israel. From its perch in Syria and with its proxy in Lebanon, Iran is now able to deter one of its primary adversaries in the region, Israel, from its own backyard—and the Jewish state’s lack of strategic depth, combined with the Islamic Republic’s anti-Israeli rhetoric and stance, growing missile capabilities, and support for terrorist groups targeting Israelis, fuel its concerns about the increased Iranian presence and capabilities at its borders. Fourth, Iran has been able to contain ISIS in Syria, allowing it to minimize the threat posed by the group against its own territory and population.

Another significant benefit of the Syrian conflict for Iran may still be yet to come. As Tehran has seen the nuclear deal challenged by President Trump and been frustrated by the slow pace of economic recovery post-sanctions relief, it has increasingly turned its attention to its neighborhood for investment and business. And while war-torn Syria may not seem like an obvious economic El Dorado, Tehran is preparing the grounds for increased cooperation with Damascus.

In recent months, Iranian officials and civil society have started to assess their role in Syrian reconstruction efforts. Iranian companies seem to have received “priority” over others in these plans. Importantly, the Revolutionary Guards will continue to be involved in the security sector in Syria and have already made agreements with Assad. Iran is now involved in rebuilding Syria’s infrastructure, including in the energy sector. And the Guards are a natural candidate for these efforts, given their presence in Syria and experience in the Iranian oil and gas sectors. At home the Iranian government is trying to scale back the Guards’ economic activities, so they may see investment abroad as a natural next step. There have also been talks of joint transportation projects between Damascus and Tehran, which would facilitate bilateral trade. Iran hopes to become a key exporter of goods to Syria. Iranians are also eyeing the public health and education sectors as possible arenas for future involvement. Lastly, the Islamic Republic hopes to become a key arms supplier in the region and Syria is a natural market for its weapons and defense equipment.

Ever since the Syrian conflict started, analysts have argued that the United States and its allies should contain and counter Iran in that theater. As the conflict has dragged on and Assad has remained in place, Tehran has solidified its position there. Today, it’s virtually impossible to imagine reconstruction without Iranian involvement—and Tehran is making sure that it remains indispensible. Tehran’s efforts to cement its role in Syria has regional implications. The sustained Iranian presence in Israel’s backyard and tensions between Jerusalem and Tehran render possible escalation between the two Middle Eastern powers probable. The international community has failed to counter Iran in Syria.

Both policies presented and pursued by the Trump administration—ad hoc responses to the Assad regime or pulling out of Syria altogether—would only strengthen Iran’s hand in Syria. On the one hand, more ad hoc attacks on Syria without a clear and comprehensive policy will escalate the conflict, allow Tehran to further justify its presence on the battlefield, and bring Iran and Russia closer together, forcing them to put their differences concerning military operations aside to tackle the common U.S. adversary. On the other hand, if President Trump pulls out U.S. troops out of Syria, Iran will enjoy a free hand in the country and will be able to move ahead with its post-conflict reconstruction plans. Instead, the United States must formulate a comprehensive policy that takes Iranian activities in Syria into account. Such a policy must include a multi-layered approach, one that continues to contain Iran and Russia in Syria, tackles the threat of ISIS, and engages key stakeholders through a multilateral process rather than unilateral ad hoc responses conducted by the Untied States.

 

[yavar]