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Iranian Chill Thread

روش بهتر اصلا جواب تویتش را کسی نمیداد . کسی تگش نمیکرد . توی سریالهای آبکی تلوزیونم دیگه بهش نقش نمیدادن تا توی ناشناسی خودش بمونه و از درد همون دق کنه . من نمیفهمم چرا هر بی نام نشانی که معلوم نیست کی هست و چی هست هر غلطی بکنه یک عده که خیلی ادعاشون میشه برایش باید تبلیغ مجانی کنن . اصلا کی تا حالا اسم این را شنیده بود . که الکی الان این همه برادران حزب اللهی و بی بصیرتهای خبرنگار نما اینقدر دارن براش تبلیغ مجانی میکنن . اصلا اون مدیرهای خبر اگر یک ذره عقلشان میرسید نمیگذاشتن خبرهای این شخص و امثال اون پخش بشه . ولشون میکردن تا توی همون ناشناسسی خودشان بمونن. برای یک بازیگر آخه مگر درد بزگتر و بدتر از ناشناس بودن و کسی نشناسدشش پیدا میشه ؟

خوب بهتر از جای بی آب و علف اینه که اصلا اسمی از اینها نبری . اونوقت اینجوری حسابی دردشان میگیره وگرنه چی کارش میکنی . 10 سال زندان براش میگذاری و بعد از 2 سال آزادش میکنی ؟ اونهم همین را میخواد . میخواد بگه من کی بودم و با من چه کردن بعدش بره اون ور آب و توی یکی از این شبکه ها استخدام بشه وگرنه بازیگر درست و حسابی که نیست که بتونه یک نقش درست و حسابی بازی کنه.
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خوب چه خوب اول تبعید میشه بعد چند تا شبکه اونور آب براش تبلیغ میکنن که چه ظلمی در حق کسی که نظرش را بیان کرده شده و این شخص کی بوده و چی بوده و........ بعدش عم این شهرها که حساب وکتاب ندارند . یک شب یهویی غیب میشه و فردا سر از پاکستان در میاره و میره سفارت کانادا و یا آمریکا و یا هر جایی و میگه با من چه ها کردن و تقاضای پناهندگی میده و کارش هم توی یکی از اون شبکه ها آماده هست

دقیقاً مسئله اینجاست که طرف برای 10 سال یا بیشتر ممنوع الخروج هم می شه. حالا تا می تونند براش زار بزنند یا بعداً براش نمایش درست کنند. طرف 10 سال از عمرش رو از دست می ده و برای بقیه درس عبرت می شه. البته من هنوز هم با سیستم گولاگ برای ایران موافق هستم

این مسئله که هر کسی بدون هیچ تاوانی هر چیزی دلش می خواد علیه منافع ملی بگه بسیار بسیار بسیار خطرناک هست​
 
دقیقاً مسئله اینجاست که طرف برای 10 سال یا بیشتر ممنوع الخروج هم می شه. حالا تا می تونند براش زار بزنند. البته من هنوز هم با سیستم گولاگ برای ایران موافق هستم

این مسئله که هر کسی بدون هیچ تاوانی هر چیزی دلش می خواد علیه منافع ملی بگه بسیار بسیار بسیار خطرناک هست​
شما خروجش را ممنوع بکن . من که کارم این نیست در عرض 24 ساعت از یکی از همون شهرهای اطراف زاهدان میبرمش پاکستان. کسی که این کارس که اینقدر را هم برای رد شدن از مرز لازم نداره.
 
شما خروجش را ممنوع بکن . من که کارم این نیست در عرض 24 ساعت از یکی از همون شهرهای اطراف زاهدان میبرمش پاکستان. کسی که این کارس که اینقدر را هم برای رد شدن از مرز لازم نداره.
نه عزیز من، چنین خبری نیست. اگه شما هم جز همون دسته ای هستی که می گی هر کس هر چی دلش می خواد بگه، لااقل مزخرف نباف و نظرت رو مستقیم بگو
این که چون 1% ممکن هست کسی از زیر اجرای قانون فرار کن پس اصلاً نباید قانون رو اجرا کن مزخرف گفتن هست. ببخشید که انقدر رک می گم البته​
 
نه عزیز من، چنین خبری نیست. اگه شما هم جز همون دسته ای هستی که می گی هر کس هر چی دلش می خواد بگه، لااقل مزخرف نباف و نظرت رو مستقیم بگو
این که چون 1% ممکن هست کسی از زیر اجرای قانون فرار کن پس اصلاً نباید قانون رو اجرا کن مزخرف گفتن هست. ببخشید که انقدر رک می گم البته​
شما اون شهرهای مرزی زاهدان رفتی ؟ من سربازیم اونجا بود و دقیقا میدونم چه خبر . و چه راحت مردم میرن اونور مرز و بر میگردن.
شما هم اگه اصرار داری برای ایشان تبلیغ مجانی کنی و کار آینده اش را اون ور آب براش تضمین کنی . بسم الله کسی جلوی شما را نگرفته اصلا به من چه فردا این رفت توی یکی از شبکه های اون ور آب چرندیاتی را که براش نوشتن شروع کرد به تبلیغ کردن.
 
شما اون شهرهای مرزی زاهدان رفتی ؟ من سربازیم اونجا بود و دقیقا میدونم چه خبر . و چه راحت مردم میرن اونور مرز و بر میگردن.
شما هم اگه اصرار داری برای ایشان تبلیغ مجانی کنی و کار آینده اش را اون ور آب براش تضمین کنی . بسم الله کسی جلوی شما را نگرفته اصلا به من چه فردا این رفت توی یکی از شبکه های اون ور آب چرندیاتی را که براش نوشتن شروع کرد به تبلیغ کردن.
مگه همه شهرهای ایران شهرهای مرزی زاهدان هستند؟
این همه زندانی سیاسی سالها هست که در اوین زندانی هستند. کدومشون مثل آب خوردنی که شما می گین فرار کردن؟

مگه مهناز افشار رو که قلاده اش رو نکشیدن، آخر سر نرفت اون ور و اتفاقاً به همین بهانه توئیت ها اون ور بهش بیشتر هم پر و بال دادن؟ تازه مهناز افشاری که با آقازاده هم ازدواج کرده بود​
 
مگه همه شهرهای ایران شهرهای مرزی زاهدان هستند؟
این همه زندانی سیاسی سالها هست که در اوین زندانی هستند. کدومشون مثل آب خوردنی که شما می گین فرار کردن؟

مگه مهناز افشار رو که قلاده اش رو نکشیدن، آخر سر نرفت اون ور و اتفاقاً به همین بهانه توئیت ها اون ور بهش بیشتر هم پر و بال دادن؟ تازه مهناز افشاری که با آقازاده هم ازدواج کرده بود​
از کی تا حالا اوین شد تبعید توی شهر های کوچک اطراف زاهدان و کرمان.
در ضمن زندانی سیاسی به یک چیزی اعتقاد داره برای اون میخواد بمونه و مبارزه کنه . این خانم به چی اعتقاد داره که بخواهد براش بمونه . اصلا هدف این خانم از گفتن این حرف چی بوده .اصلا این الان هم ازش بپرسی میدونه دکتر فخریزاده چه کاره بوده ؟
 
از کی تا حالا اوین شد تبعید توی شهر های کوچک اطراف زاهدان و کرمان.
در ضمن زندانی سیاسی به یک چیزی اعتقاد داره برای اون میخواد بمونه و مبارزه کنه . این خانم به چی اعتقاد داره که بخواهد براش بمونه . اصلا هدف این خانم از گفتن این حرف چی بوده .اصلا این الان هم ازش بپرسی میدونه دکتر فخریزاده چه کاره بوده ؟
چندین آپشن پیشنها شد. مطمئن باش کسی هم که تبعید بشه، به این راحتی نمی تونه فرار کنه. حداقلش یک پابند الکترونیک هست که همین الان هم قوه قضائیه داره به خیلی از زندانی ها می زنه. اگه قرار بود هر کی تبعید می شه فرار کنه که دیگه اصلاً چنین مجازاتی مطرح نمی شد. مگه همون زمان رضا شاه که انقدر امکانات کنترلی نبود، کسی که تبعید می شد فرار می کرد؟

به نظرم داریم از بحث دور می شیم. این خانم برای دم تکون دادن برای شبکه ایران اینترنشنال، یه گوهی خورده. اگه برای تاوانی نده، تبدیل به عرف می شه این کار. هر رفتاری که بدون هزینه باشه، تکرار می شه. تو این مورد خاص که احتمالاً پاداش هم در فضای مجازی برای طرف وجود داره (مثلاً یک سری هندونه زیر بغلش بذارن و ازش تعریف کنند و ...) اگر به پاداش و جزا تو رفتارشناسی کسی اعتقاد داشته باشه، واضح هست که باید برای این کار جزا در نظر گرفت



 
مثالتون خیلی درست نیست. باید ایران رو با کشورهای هم فرهنگ و مسلمون که حجاب اجباری ندارن مقایسه کنید، نه با کشورهای اروپایی یا آسیای شرقی که از قدیم فرهنگ و تعریفشون از فساد اخلاقی با ما فرق داشته

الان شما یک نگاه به کشورهایی مثل اندونزی، مالزی یا ترکیه یا پاکستان بندازین، هیچ کدوم حجاب اجباری ندارن، اما خیلی به اسلام بیشتر از ایرانی ها اعتقاد دارن و نرخ زادآوری بیشتری دارن و نرخ طلاق کمتری هم دارن

نرخ رشد جمعیت ایران داره کمتر از کشورهای اسکاندیناوی می شه. آمار طلاق داره می رسه به بالای 50%. این چجور حفاظت از حریم خانواده هست که بر عکس جواب داده؟

این که حجاب اجباری باعث کاهش فساد اخلاقی می شه یک ادعا هست که آمار ازش پشتیبانی نمی کنه


Population growth figures for 2018 based on World Bank statistics:

Turkey: 1.5%
Iran: 1.4%
Malaysia: 1.4%
Indonesia: 1.1%

Fertility rates as per 2017 World Bank numbers:

Indonesia: 2.34 births per woman
Iran: 2.12 births per woman
Turkey: 2.08 births per woman
Malaysia: 2.02 births per woman

In Turkey's case, bear in mind that the recent massive influx of Syrian nationals and the sizeable Kurdish minority, both of which have significantly higher fertility rates than the Turkish average, give that figure a boost.

As for Scandinavian nations, here are their 2018 population growth figures as given by the World Bank:

Finland: 0.2%
Denmark: 0.6%
Norway: 0.7%
Sweden: 1.2%

So with the exception of Sweden, they have considerably inferior growth rates compared to Iran. Plus, their population growth is first and foremost driven by immigrants from developing countries with high fertility rates, not by their native peoples.

Therefore when it comes to this topic, it is erroneous to state that the other three Muslim countries are doing better than Iran, or that Iran is getting close to Scandinevian levels. In fact all four Muslim countries named above have very comparable figures, and when it comes to both population growth and fertility rate, Iran is second best among the four. As for Scandinevian countries, they are in a desperate situation compared to Iran.

Regarding the population's comparative adherence to and reverence for Islam, I would recommend not to take political cliches, amplified by enemy-controlled media at face value. Most studies and surveys in this regard are conducted by mainstream sources that follow propagandistic guidelines set by the zio-American empire, or by institutes linked to or funded by hostile intelligence agencies. In short, they are political instruments more than objective scientific assessments. More realistic surveys applying sounder methods yield very different results. One such survey, the link to which I cannot find right now, even came to the conclusion that Iranians are the most religous people in the world.

I recently discussed this in another topic. For more information, see:

The thing is also that sometimes, Iranians will tend to establish somewhat flawed comparisons to other countries (including the non-Arab Muslim ones you cited) based on subjective experience and individual empirical observation of their own society coupled with lesser knowledge of the socities they compare Iran with. In fact, if you go looking for it, you will find lots of expressions of irreligiosity and even in some cases hostility towards Islam in Turkish, Indonesian, Malaysian societies too (but probably less so in Pakistan).

Another aspect to take into account here are the differences in political culture between these countries, particularly on the level of identity politics, including from a historical perspective. In Iran, the modern period has seen the emergence of a brand of nationalism focused on Iran's pre-Islamic history and identity, some of whose currents tend to delve into islamophobia. This has evolved into a feature of Iranian political life since the 1920's and has no comparable equivalent in the other Muslim countries mentioned. Less religious segments of society in Iran will thus have a greater tendency to find in Iran's pre-Islamic civilization a readily available substitute-identity to Islamic culture, whereas in the other Muslim countries cited, irreligiosity will more often be accompanied by ongoing adherence to Islam as a cultural identity rather than a religious practice, simply because in the political culture of those societies, no major political current has historically been focusing to the same extent on the pre-Islamic era and identity.

Now of course, this doesn't mean that all those who take pride in Iran's pre-Islamic heritage and civilization are destined to oppose Islam or vice versa - we also have many political and identitarian currents in Iran which reconcile the two dimensions instead of systematically contrasting them.

At any rate, when some distanciate themselves from Islam in favor of pre-Islamic identity, this is not so much a consequence of the dress code than of pre-existing patterns of political culture and identity.

At this point another observation can be made. Indeed, it is noticeable how many of those Iranians who tend to consider the religious cultural policies of the Islamic Republic, in particular the dress code, as responsible for what they perceive as a regression of tradition, are either (and I'm not saying it applies to you in person, please don't misunderstand):

* Not particularly attached to tradition themselves, seeing how they fully adhere to western liberalism in the social-cultural area. Their own lifestyles are largely westernized, yet they lament challenges to tradition allegedly induced by rebellious reactions to the Islamic Republic's non-secular, Islamic legislation.

* Naive to the point of believing that a government can tolerate and legalize every source and agent of moral corruption without directly jeopardizing deeply rooted cultural traditions in society. Or even assuming that as with a vaccine, the inoculation of a certain dosis of the nefarious element is going to generate a counter-reaction by the social body thanks to the resilience of cultural traditions, thereby ensuring that decadence will remain marginal.

Now this is a profoundly mistaken and highly dangerous belief. Because aforementioned agents of moral corruption appeal to primal biological instincts of man, and that culture and civilization cannot act as counter-weights to this unless they are backed by a measure of legal coercion.

Secondly, because national culture and civilization do not stand the slightest chance against "mafia"-like heavyweight multinational corporations (for example the pornographic "industry") propping up and making a living off these commercialized agents of moral corruption. The sheer power of the underlying capitalist logic will neutralize any resistance from society and devour those who dare to resist, as seen in the west - and make no mistake about it, the west too used to follow different cultural norms some time ago, although perhaps not as strict ones as the Islamic world. But in western society too, capitalists first needed to methodically dismantle any and all cultural obstacles, before being able to subject more and more areas of human life and interaction to the alienating process of commodification.

Let me also add a word or two about the divorce rate you mentioned. To begin with, the very notion of "divorce rate" is an extremely multi-faceted one, because it is very far from having a single universally admitted or even dominant acception. The Census Bureau of the US regime, for instance, uses two definitions:

- Crude divorce rate, that is the number of divorces per 1000 people, usually over a given year.
- Refined divorce rate, i.e. the number of divorces per 1000 married women.

In addition to this, there are many other ways of evaluation the prevalence of the phenomenon of divorce in a given society. For instance:

- "Divortiality" rate or reduced sum of divorces, meaning the number of divorces pronounced for each 1000 marriages within a given population over a year.

Each of these measures inform about slightly different aspects of the prevalence of divorce in a given society.

Now let us examine where Iran really stands, alarmist media reports massively relayed by hostile foreign-based Persian language media notwithstanding.

A ranking based on figures from the United Nations Statistical Division, Eurostat as well as national statistical institutes, places Iran in 92nd position of out 102 countries when it comes to "divortiality" rates in 2017. With a rate of 14,29 per 1000, Iran is among the 10% of countries with the lowest "divortiality" rates in the world. Many Muslim-majority countries, including Turkey, Algeria, Azarbaijan, the UAE, Qatar, Libya, Bangladesh, Qatar or Kuwait are worse off.

Source: https://atlasocio.com/classements/s...ment-etats-par-taux-de-divortialite-monde.php

Looking at the crude divorce rate, Iran with a figure of 1,6 per 1000 in 2016 may not be as well positioned as it is in terms of "divortiality", but the figure for Turkey is the same, there are still various Muslim countries faring worse than Iran (such as Egypt, Kazakhstan, Jordan, Kuwait). One ranking puts Iran in 72nd position out of 135, which is stil in the lower half of the table, i.e. the majority of countries are doing worse than Iran.

Source: https://atlasocio.com/classements/societe/divorce/classement-etats-par-taux-de-divorce-monde.php

Another ranking, of 104 countries this time, places Iran 56th with its 2017 crude divorce rate of 1,6, i.e. in the worldwide average. Here again, Muslim majority countries such as Jordan, Kuwait, Algeria fare worse and in some cases far worse, while figures for others such as Lebanon and Turkey are very close to Iran's.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divor..._country/region_(per_1,000_population_/_year)

I'm not sure what the cited 50% figure was exactly referring to, but given the above it would in any case still place Iran in an average to favorable position on the global scale.

Also I must reiterate, as concerns divorce rates and statistics and survey results in general, please always be aware of biased and sometimes even faked numbers spread by sources with political interests linked to Iran's existential enemies, namely regimes such as the US and its European vassals, as well as the network of NGO's that oftentimes serve as a cover for propaganda, psy-ops, spying, sabotage and hostile social engineering activities by those same regimes. Many of these stats about Iran are plain untrustworthy, especially when encountered on or relayed by mainstream news platforms (the usual suspects, BBC, VOA, Manoto, Saudi International, plus anti-IR propaganda accounts on Instagram and Telegram etc).

Indeed, fake statistics have historically been a weapon of choice for social engineering. They are employed in the framework of the propagation of self-fulfilling statistical falsehood (a term I coined). In fact, the imperial oligarchy used this very same method of social engineering to bring about the decadence of sexual norms in the US, soon followed by western Europe and the rest of the western world. Bogus experiment results are exactly what a scientist by the name of Alfred Kinsey, bankrolled by the capitalist (and probably zionist) publisher of erotic magazines Hugh Hefner, used to kickstart a process by which the remnants of traditional sexual morality were undermined and progressively eliminated in post-WW2 America. To this effect a targeted, elaborate scheme of social engineering was implemented.

At the core of this scheme is the effort to make the audience believe they are more decadent than they actually are, so as to dismantle the last bullwarks of resistance to immorality, to discourage people from resisting the upcoming onslaught of amoral cultural consumer goods though the generation of a virtual, suggestive and subliminal form of group think imposed from outside. The starting point is always to make people believe they are more degenerate than they really are.

Once again I would recommend taking a brief look at a previous commentary of mine which expands upon the subject in greater detail:


Hence my stern warning against all these dubious statistics and figures Iranians are flooded with on a daily basis, both by hostile foreign-based media and possibly by domestic agents of influence ('nofoozis'). I'm not saying that every figure published is always wrong, mind you. But that some will definitely be, while others will be used in specific contexts to serve as a basis for biased and erroneous conclusions, and that this entire, permanent, relentless bombarding of the Iranian public with seemingly negative figures and findings is clearly part of a comprehensive psychological operation by the enemies of the Iranian nation and of the Islamic Republic.

The political goals pursued by this sustained psy-ops endeavour are both to challenge the legitimacy of Iran's current Islamic ruling system because it is resisting zio-American imperial oppression and inviting others to join in, as well as to propagate false and counter-productive explanations regarding the actual sources of moral corruption, that if acted upon (i.e. through a progressive liberalization of Iran's legislation on cultural affairs, including but not restricted to the dress code) will only accelerate the decay of moral norms in society, instead of containing it.

Another point we need to pay attention to is social modernization sui generis as a factor of pressure on the viability of the traditional family structure. The Islamic Republic did not oppose modernization of society as long as it didn't go directly against Islamic customs. However, such processes are still fraught with indirect hazards that may negatively affect cultural traditions.

To give an example, both the phenomenon of urbanization (concerning over 70% of the Iranian population nowadays), and increased integration and participation of Iranian women in economic life, as well as the strong progress in the education levels of women, have been double-edged swords unfortunately. All of which were allowed to if not encouraged by successive administrations of the Islamic Republic (as well as the former regime, which however was far less concerned about conformity with Islamic sharia and theological principles).

Any "emancipatory" evolution of traditional gender roles of women, any accelerated urbanization, however confined within formal respect of Islamic norms, will inevitably lead to a heightened average age of marriage, to a decrease of fertility, which in turn will more or less of a challenge to the traditional family structure.

So prior to taking issue with the dress code as an alleged factor of adverse reaction to tradition, one should ask oneself what one's priorities and goals really are - if one wishes to preserve the traditional nuclear family, then one cannot remain oblivious to the way in which general social modernization and greater participation of women in education and the economy threatens said family structures. If we do everything in our might to ensure that Iranian women make up 60% or more of university graduates, if we encourage women to work, then we will hardly be in a position to lament the relative decline of fertility rates in Iran - Islamic dress code or Islamic no dress code.

The exposure to western cultural consumer goods via satellite TV, "Hollywoodian" productions in particular, as well as the exposure to the endless streams of insalubrious smut the internet is completely littered with, and which increasingly affects children at young age, are other decisive factors feeding the assault on traditional cultural customs. Here it is clearly the Islamic Republic's relative laxity and its high degree of tolerance, not a supposed conservatism and authoritarianism on its part, which allowed some Iranians to expose themselves to these agents of decadence. If anything, one can thus regret that Iranian authorities haven't been more heavy-handed in their cultural policies, rather than evoking elements such as the dress code to conclude that they've been too strict.

Hence the necessity, after 40 years of social modernization under the Islamic Republic, to sit back and review the pros and cons of the process, given the stage reached by society. And hence also the necessity to maintain any cultural safeguard one can maintain, in particular the Islamic dress code. Given how modernization itself has an innate although indirect way of challenging traditional customs, any introduction of additional laxity in the sphere of Islamic legislation on culture will inevitably spell the definitive end of tradition within one or two generation.

Another key point is that the cultural invasion Iran has to confront is of far, far greater intensity than what other countries, including Muslim ones, are being exposed to. Indeed, the imperial enemy is concentrating the bulk of its soft war, propaganda, psy-ops and social engineering assets on Iran and Iranians. Omid Dana (who is not in line with my analysis on this particular topic) had a presentation where he compared the number of items posted on social media by the different foreign language services of the BBC. The results were staggering, as it turned out that the Persian language service of the British regime's main propaganda and psy-ops arm has an output around ten (or more) times greater than the second most prolific foreign language department of the same BBC...

This unbelievable contrast clearly shows what country imperial powers consider as the biggest challenge to their hegemony and their biggest adversary, namely none other than Islamic Iran. Iran is not only the undisputed primary geostrategic adversary to the zio-American empire and its clients, but also one that is endowed with a historically rooted civilizational of its own, influential beyond its borders. This makes Iran particularly dangerous to the empire and calls for these massive, disproportionate acts of cultural aggression we are witnessing.

For BBC Persian's programming does not merely consist of day to day political propaganda. In fact much of it is of cultural nature and constitutes downright social engineering, its target being the cultural and civilizational norms of the Iranian people, in both their Islamic and pre-Islamic dimensions (and that includes of course sustained efforts to subvert the Iranian nuclear family structure, via programs on culture, society, family, sexuality, etc).

In other terms, considering how Iran is a privileged target for cultural aggression by its imperial enemies ('tahajome farhangi'), and considering no matter how successfully Iran resists, it cannot prevent taking some hits here and there given the sheer power and cynicism of its enemies, it is not surprising in the least that some of the statistics discussed at the beginning of this analysis will be comparable for Iran and for other Muslim countries whose legislation unlike Iran does not include the Islamic dress code. Had these countries been targeted with the same vigor as Iran on the cultural level, we can be sure that they would fare far worse than Iran in the examined areas. Likewise, if it wasn't for counter-measures such as the Islamic dress code, Iran in turn would have fared much worse than them, considering that Iran is a bigger target for cultural subversion than they are.

Thus the Islamic dress code is not without effect in containing this cultural aggression. We must take into account the intensity and utter volume of culture-alienating measures implemented against Iran vs those taken against countries such as Turkey, Malaysia et al. (which of course, are far from inexistent, but do not compare with the total cultural war waged on Iran).

Lastly, as we have shown in this study, there are multiple causes to the threats faced by the nuclear family as well as other aspects of tradition in Iran. The Islamic dress code can assist in dampening the destructive effects of cultural aggression in this regard, but we did not argue that it will suffice on its own. It's just that its net effects are a positive contribution in the fight. But naturally, other domains need to be addressed as well in order to put up a more effecient Resistance.

To use an aquatic metaphor, let us suppose that a dam is leaking at three distinct points. It would hardly be logical to consider that since filling one of these holes by itself will not prevent a rupture of the dam, one could as well leave that hole open. Rather, one must try and block the two remaining leakage points, after having secured the first one. That first line of defence is upheld by the Islamic dress code.
 
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Zarif was threatening to sue Sardar Soleiani a few days before his murder:

zarif is such a punk, little v****a in every way, no wonder the party of 5 +1 gang members ravaged him behind closed doors...
 
Zarif was threatening to sue Sardar Soleiani a few days before his murder:

که چی . دو نفر اختلاف نظر دارند و یکی میگه میخواهد از مجرای قانونی اقدام کند.
 
Population growth figures for 2018 based on World Bank statistics:

Turkey: 1.5%
Iran: 1.4%
Malaysia: 1.4%
Indonesia: 1.1%

Fertility rates as per 2017 World Bank numbers:

Indonesia: 2.34 births per woman
Iran: 2.12 births per woman
Turkey: 2.08 births per woman
Malaysia: 2.02 births per woman

In Turkey's case, bear in mind that the recent massive influx of Syrian nationals and the sizeable Kurdish minority, both of which have significantly higher fertility rates than the Turkish average, give that figure a boost.

As for Scandinavian nations, here are their 2018 population growth figures as given by the World Bank:

Finland: 0.2%
Denmark: 0.6%
Norway: 0.7%
Sweden: 1.2%

So with the exception of Sweden, they have considerably inferior growth rates compared to Iran. Plus, their population growth is first and foremost driven by immigrants from developing countries with high fertility rates, not by their native peoples.

Therefore when it comes to this topic, it is erroneous to state that the other three Muslim countries are doing better than Iran, or that Iran is getting close to Scandinevian levels. In fact all four Muslim countries named above have very comparable figures, and when it comes to both population growth and fertility rate, Iran is second best among the four. As for Scandinevian countries, they are in a desperate situation compared to Iran.

Regarding the population's comparative adherence to and reverence for Islam, I would recommend not to take political cliches, amplified by enemy-controlled media at face value. Most studies and surveys in this regard are conducted by mainstream sources that follow propagandistic guidelines set by the zio-American empire, or by institutes linked to or funded by hostile intelligence agencies. In short, they are political instruments more than objective scientific assessments. More realistic surveys applying sounder methods yield very different results. One such survey, the link to which I cannot find right now, even came to the conclusion that Iranians are the most religous people in the world.

I recently discussed this in another topic. For more information, see:

The thing is also that sometimes, Iranians will tend to establish somewhat flawed comparisons to other countries (including the non-Arab Muslim ones you cited) based on subjective experience and individual empirical observation of their own society coupled with lesser knowledge of the socities they compare Iran with. In fact, if you go looking for it, you will find lots of expressions of irreligiosity and even in some cases hostility towards Islam in Turkish, Indonesian, Malaysian societies too (but probably less so in Pakistan).

Another aspect to take into account here are the differences in political culture between these countries, particularly on the level of identity politics, including from a historical perspective. In Iran, the modern period has seen the emergence of a brand of nationalism focused on Iran's pre-Islamic history and identity, some of whose currents tend to delve into islamophobia. This has evolved into a feature of Iranian political life since the 1920's and has no comparable equivalent in the other Muslim countries mentioned. Less religious segments of society in Iran will thus have a greater tendency to find in Iran's pre-Islamic civilization a readily available substitute-identity to Islamic culture, whereas in the other Muslim countries cited, irreligiosity will more often be accompanied by ongoing adherence to Islam as a cultural identity rather than a religious practice, simply because in the political culture of those societies, no major political current has historically been focusing to the same extent on the pre-Islamic era and identity.

Now of course, this doesn't mean that all those who take pride in Iran's pre-Islamic heritage and civilization are destined to oppose Islam or vice versa - we also have many political and identitarian currents in Iran which reconcile the two dimensions instead of systematically contrasting them.

At any rate, when some distanciate themselves from Islam in favor of pre-Islamic identity, this is not so much a consequence of the dress code than of pre-existing patterns of political culture and identity.

At this point another observation can be made. Indeed, it is noticeable how many of those Iranians who tend to consider the religious cultural policies of the Islamic Republic, in particular the dress code, as responsible for what they perceive as a regression of tradition, are either (and I'm not saying it applies to you in person, please don't misunderstand):

* Not particularly attached to tradition themselves, seeing how they fully adhere to western liberalism in the social-cultural area. Their own lifestyles are largely westernized, yet they lament challenges to tradition allegedly induced by rebellious reactions to the Islamic Republic's non-secular, Islamic legislation.

* Naive to the point of believing that a government can tolerate and legalize every source and agent of moral corruption without directly jeopardizing deeply rooted cultural traditions in society. Or even assuming that as with a vaccine, the inoculation of a certain dosis of the nefarious element is going to generate a counter-reaction by the social body thanks to the resilience of cultural traditions, thereby ensuring that decadence will remain marginal.

Now this is a profoundly mistaken and highly dangerous belief. Because aforementioned agents of moral corruption appeal to primal biological instincts of man, and that culture and civilization cannot act as counter-weights to this unless they are backed by a measure of legal coercion.

Secondly, because national culture and civilization do not stand the slightest chance against "mafia"-like heavyweight multinational corporations (for example the pornographic "industry") propping up and making a living off these commercialized agents of moral corruption. The sheer power of the underlying capitalist logic will neutralize any resistance from society and devour those who dare to resist, as seen in the west - and make no mistake about it, the west too used to follow different cultural norms some time ago, although perhaps not as strict ones as the Islamic world. But in western society too, capitalists first needed to methodically dismantle any and all cultural obstacles, before being able to subject more and more areas of human life and interaction to the alienating process of commodification.

Let me also add a word or two about the divorce rate you mentioned. To begin with, the very notion of "divorce rate" is an extremely multi-faceted one, because it is very far from having a single universally admitted or even dominant acception. The Census Bureau of the US regime, for instance, uses two definitions:

- Crude divorce rate, that is the number of divorces per 1000 people, usually over a given year.
- Refined divorce rate, i.e. the number of divorces per 1000 married women.

In addition to this, there are many other ways of evaluation the prevalence of the phenomenon of divorce in a given society. For instance:

- "Divortiality" rate or reduced sum of divorces, meaning the number of divorces pronounced for each 1000 marriages within a given population over a year.

Each of these measures inform about slightly different aspects of the prevalence of divorce in a given society.

Now let us examine where Iran really stands, alarmist media reports massively relayed by hostile foreign-based Persian language media notwithstanding.

A ranking based on figures from the United Nations Statistical Division, Eurostat as well as national statistical institutes, places Iran in 92nd position of out 102 countries when it comes to "divortiality" rates in 2017. With a rate of 14,29 per 1000, Iran is among the 10% of countries with the lowest "divortiality" rates in the world. Many Muslim-majority countries, including Turkey, Algeria, Azarbaijan, the UAE, Qatar, Libya, Bangladesh, Qatar or Kuwait are worse off.

Source: https://atlasocio.com/classements/s...ment-etats-par-taux-de-divortialite-monde.php

Looking at the crude divorce rate, Iran with a figure of 1,6 per 1000 in 2016 may not be as well positioned as it is in terms of "divortiality", but the figure for Turkey is the same, there are still various Muslim countries faring worse than Iran (such as Egypt, Kazakhstan, Jordan, Kuwait). One ranking puts Iran in 72nd position out of 135, which is stil in the lower half of the table, i.e. the majority of countries are doing worse than Iran.

Source: https://atlasocio.com/classements/societe/divorce/classement-etats-par-taux-de-divorce-monde.php

Another ranking, of 104 countries this time, places Iran 56th with its 2017 crude divorce rate of 1,6, i.e. in the worldwide average. Here again, Muslim majority countries such as Jordan, Kuwait, Algeria fare worse and in some cases far worse, while figures for others such as Lebanon and Turkey are very close to Iran's.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divor..._country/region_(per_1,000_population_/_year)

I'm not sure what the cited 50% figure was exactly referring to, but given the above it would in any case still place Iran in an average to favorable position on the global scale.

Also I must reiterate, as concerns divorce rates and statistics and survey results in general, please always be aware of biased and sometimes even faked numbers spread by sources with political interests linked to Iran's existential enemies, namely regimes such as the US and its European vassals, as well as the network of NGO's that oftentimes serve as a cover for propaganda, psy-ops, spying, sabotage and hostile social engineering activities by those same regimes. Many of these stats about Iran are plain untrustworthy, especially when encountered on or relayed by mainstream news platforms (the usual suspects, BBC, VOA, Manoto, Saudi International, plus anti-IR propaganda accounts on Instagram and Telegram etc).

Indeed, fake statistics have historically been a weapon of choice for social engineering. They are employed in the framework of the propagation of self-fulfilling statistical falsehood (a term I coined). In fact, the imperial oligarchy used this very same method of social engineering to bring about the decadence of sexual norms in the US, soon followed by western Europe and the rest of the western world. Bogus experiment results are exactly what a scientist by the name of Alfred Kinsey, bankrolled by the capitalist (and probably zionist) publisher of erotic magazines Hugh Hefner, used to kickstart a process by which the remnants of traditional sexual morality were undermined and progressively eliminated in post-WW2 America. To this effect a targeted, elaborate scheme of social engineering was implemented.

At the core of this scheme is the effort to make the audience believe they are more decadent than they actually are, so as to dismantle the last bullwarks of resistance to immorality, to discourage people from resisting the upcoming onslaught of amoral cultural consumer goods though the generation of a virtual, suggestive and subliminal form of group think imposed from outside. The starting point is always to make people believe they are more degenerate than they really are.

Once again I would recommend taking a brief look at a previous commentary of mine which expands upon the subject in greater detail:


Hence my stern warning against all these dubious statistics and figures Iranians are flooded with on a daily basis, both by hostile foreign-based media and possibly by domestic agents of influence ('nofoozis'). I'm not saying that every figure published is always wrong, mind you. But that some will definitely be, while others will be used in specific contexts to serve as a basis for biased and erroneous conclusions, and that this entire, permanent, relentless bombarding of the Iranian public with seemingly negative figures and findings is clearly part of a comprehensive psychological operation by the enemies of the Iranian nation and of the Islamic Republic.

The political goals pursued by this sustained psy-ops endeavour are both to challenge the legitimacy of Iran's current Islamic ruling system because it is resisting zio-American imperial oppression and inviting others to join in, as well as to propagate false and counter-productive explanations regarding the actual sources of moral corruption, that if acted upon (i.e. through a progressive liberalization of Iran's legislation on cultural affairs, including but not restricted to the dress code) will only accelerate the decay of moral norms in society, instead of containing it.

Another point we need to pay attention to is social modernization sui generis as a factor of pressure on the viability of the traditional family structure. The Islamic Republic did not oppose modernization of society as long as it didn't go directly against Islamic customs. However, such processes are still fraught with indirect hazards that may negatively affect cultural traditions.

To give an example, both the phenomenon of urbanization (concerning over 70% of the Iranian population nowadays), and increased integration and participation of Iranian women in economic life, as well as the strong progress in the education levels of women, have been double-edged swords unfortunately. All of which were allowed to if not encouraged by successive administrations of the Islamic Republic (as well as the former regime, which however was far less concerned about conformity with Islamic sharia and theological principles).

Any "emancipatory" evolution of traditional gender roles of women, any accelerated urbanization, however confined within formal respect of Islamic norms, will inevitably lead to a heightened average age of marriage, to a decrease of fertility, which in turn will more or less of a challenge to the traditional family structure.

So prior to taking issue with the dress code as an alleged factor of adverse reaction to tradition, one should ask oneself what one's priorities and goals really are - if one wishes to preserve the traditional nuclear family, then one cannot remain oblivious to the way in which general social modernization and greater participation of women in education and the economy threatens said family structures. If we do everything in our might to ensure that Iranian women make up 60% or more of university graduates, if we encourage women to work, then we will hardly be in a position to lament the relative decline of fertility rates in Iran - Islamic dress code or Islamic no dress code.

The exposure to western cultural consumer goods via satellite TV, "Hollywoodian" productions in particular, as well as the exposure to the endless streams of insalubrious smut the internet is completely littered with, and which increasingly affects children at young age, are other decisive factors feeding the assault on traditional cultural customs. Here it is clearly the Islamic Republic's relative laxity and its high degree of tolerance, not a supposed conservatism and authoritarianism on its part, which allowed some Iranians to expose themselves to these agents of decadence. If anything, one can thus regret that Iranian authorities haven't been more heavy-handed in their cultural policies, rather than evoking elements such as the dress code to conclude that they've been too strict.

Hence the necessity, after 40 years of social modernization under the Islamic Republic, to sit back and review the pros and cons of the process, given the stage reached by society. And hence also the necessity to maintain any cultural safeguard one can maintain, in particular the Islamic dress code. Given how modernization itself has an innate although indirect way of challenging traditional customs, any introduction of additional laxity in the sphere of Islamic legislation on culture will inevitably spell the definitive end of tradition within one or two generation.

Another key point is that the cultural invasion Iran has to confront is of far, far greater intensity than what other countries, including Muslim ones, are being exposed to. Indeed, the imperial enemy is concentrating the bulk of its soft war, propaganda, psy-ops and social engineering assets on Iran and Iranians. Omid Dana (who is not in line with my analysis on this particular topic) had a presentation where he compared the number of items posted on social media by the different foreign language services of the BBC. The results were staggering, as it turned out that the Persian language service of the British regime's main propaganda and psy-ops arm has an output around ten (or more) times greater than the second most prolific foreign language department of the same BBC...

This unbelievable contrast clearly shows what country imperial powers consider as the biggest challenge to their hegemony and their biggest adversary, namely none other than Islamic Iran. Iran is not only the undisputed primary geostrategic adversary to the zio-American empire and its clients, but also one that is endowed with a historically rooted civilizational of its own, influential beyond its borders. This makes Iran particularly dangerous to the empire and calls for these massive, disproportionate acts of cultural aggression we are witnessing.

For BBC Persian's programming does not merely consist of day to day political propaganda. In fact much of it is of cultural nature and constitutes downright social engineering, its target being the cultural and civilizational norms of the Iranian people, in both their Islamic and pre-Islamic dimensions (and that includes of course sustained efforts to subvert the Iranian nuclear family structure, via programs on culture, society, family, sexuality, etc).

In other terms, considering how Iran is a privileged target for cultural aggression by its imperial enemies ('tahajome farhangi'), and considering no matter how successfully Iran resists, it cannot prevent taking some hits here and there given the sheer power and cynicism of its enemies, it is not surprising in the least that some of the statistics discussed at the beginning of this analysis will be comparable for Iran and for other Muslim countries whose legislation unlike Iran does not include the Islamic dress code. Had these countries been targeted with the same vigor as Iran on the cultural level, we can be sure that they would fare far worse than Iran in the examined areas. Likewise, if it wasn't for counter-measures such as the Islamic dress code, Iran in turn would have fared much worse than them, considering that Iran is a bigger target for cultural subversion than they are.

Thus the Islamic dress code is not without effect in containing this cultural aggression. We must take into account the intensity and utter volume of culture-alienating measures implemented against Iran vs those taken against countries such as Turkey, Malaysia et al. (which of course, are far from inexistent, but do not compare with the total cultural war waged on Iran).

Lastly, as we have shown in this study, there are multiple causes to the threats faced by the nuclear family as well as other aspects of tradition in Iran. The Islamic dress code can assist in dampening the destructive effects of cultural aggression in this regard, but we did not argue that it will suffice on its own. It's just that its net effects are a positive contribution in the fight. But naturally, other domains need to be addressed as well in order to put up a more effecient Resistance.

To use an aquatic metaphor, let us suppose that a dam is leaking at three distinct points. It would hardly be logical to consider that since filling one of these holes by itself will not prevent a rupture of the dam, one could as well leave that hole open. Rather, one must try and block the two remaining leakage points, after having secured the first one. That first line of defence is upheld by the Islamic dress code.
عزیز من نشستی به جای پست مقاله نوشتی :)) کی حال داره این همه پست رو بخونه آخه؟

همین چند وقت پیش بود که گندش دراومد وزارت بهداشت از عمد آمار نرخ زادآوری رو دستکاری کرده و آمار ایران به جای 2.1 کمتر از 1.7 شده. کار به جایی رسید که خود رهبری پیگیر قضیه شد و وزارت بهداشت نامه نوشت به رهبری


یعنی کاری که جمهوری اسلامی با بنیاد خانواده تو این مملکت کرد، تو اروپا به سر خانواده نتونستن بیارن. ضمناً اگه ترکیه کلی مهاجر سوری داره، ما هم نزدیک 4 میلیون مهاجر افغان و عراقی و پاکستانی و ... داریم

جهت اطلاع شما عرض کنم که نرخ باروری در کشورهای اسکاندیناوی هم همین حدود 1.7 هست، و حتی کمی بیشتر هم هست

سوئد: 1.85
نروژ: 1.71
دانمارک: 1.79

در مورد طلاق هم که همین قدر بهت بگم که کسی همسن من نبوده که ازدواج کرده باشه و الان درگیر مشکلات خانوادگی نباشه، یا در دادگاه خانواده نباشه، یا اینکه طلاق نگرفته باشه. این در مورد 90% دوستان من که ازدواج کردن صدق می کنه
آمار هم داره می گه به ازای هر 1000 مورد ازدواج، 318 مورد طلاق ثبت می شه. یعنی 31.8% طلاق می گیرن، اون هم در پنج سال اول زندگی. به شهری مثل تهران که برسی، ازدواج کردن عملاً مثل سکه بالا انداختن هست. یا شیر میاد یا خط

از پدیده ازدواج سفید که در کلان شهرها به خصوص در بالاشهر همین الان به نرم عادی تبدیل شده هم می تونی صحبت کنی

حالا تشریف ببر همین آمار رو در کشورهای دیگه اسلامی در بیار​
 
عزیز من نشستی به جای پست مقاله نوشتی :)) کی حال داره این همه پست رو بخونه آخه؟
My apologies, I have a hard time keeping it brief on certain subjects I spent lots of time researching. Hence why I suggested to keep it at that. When presented with counter-arguments, I will rather tend to respond.

همین چند وقت پیش بود که گندش دراومد وزارت بهداشت از عمد آمار نرخ زادآوری رو دستکاری کرده و آمار ایران به جای 2.1 کمتر از 1.7 شده. کار به جایی رسید که خود رهبری پیگیر قضیه شد و وزارت بهداشت نامه نوشت به رهبری

As said in my previous reply, one really needs to be extremely careful with statistical claims, especially those made by liberal fifth-columnists of the west. In my previous comment I explained why, and why some will try to make the situation appear bleaker than it really is. Exaggerating statistics in a negative sense is the best way of making that negative fiction progressively turn into reality.

یعنی کاری که جمهوری اسلامی با بنیاد خانواده تو این مملکت کرد، تو اروپا به سر خانواده نتونستن بیارن. ضمناً اگه ترکیه کلی مهاجر سوری داره، ما هم نزدیک 4 میلیون مهاجر افغان و عراقی و پاکستانی و ... داریم
I firmly disagree with any comparisons with the west, for the situation is incomparably worse in the west. Fertility rates aren't the sole indicator for the solidity of the nuclear family structure. Various others exist such as births outside of wedlock, where Iran's record is perfect while most western nations have almost reached the bottom of the barrel.

Also the main cause behind any setbacks in this area is to be sought not in the policies of the IR, but in the cultural and psychological war waged on Iran (whose goal it is to indirectly push the Iranian nation to collective suicide), which is a thousand times more intense than similar aggressions against other nations. In fact if the IR liberalized its cultural policies today, then these setbacks would be much more pronounced.

There are only 15.000 Pakistanis in Iran. As for Iraqi and Afghan immigrants, it's true but don't forget most of them did not arrive recently, and have therefore had more time to align their social habits on the host society. As opposed to Syrians living in Turkey, whom settled there over the past 8 years only.

جهت اطلاع شما عرض کنم که نرخ باروری در کشورهای اسکاندیناوی هم همین حدود 1.7 هست، و حتی کمی بیشتر هم هست

سوئد: 1.85
نروژ: 1.71
دانمارک: 1.79
Scandinavian countries obtain these results thanks to mass immigration from developing nations with extremely elevated fertility rates. Not due to the habits of their indigeneous populations.

در مورد طلاق هم که همین قدر بهت بگم که کسی همسن من نبوده که ازدواج کرده باشه و الان درگیر مشکلات خانوادگی نباشه، یا در دادگاه خانواده نباشه، یا اینکه طلاق نگرفته باشه. این در مورد 90% دوستان من که ازدواج کردن صدق می کنه
آمار هم داره می گه به ازای هر 1000 مورد ازدواج، 318 مورد طلاق ثبت می شه. یعنی 31.8% طلاق می گیرن، اون هم در پنج سال اول زندگی. به شهری مثل تهران که برسی، ازدواج کردن عملاً مثل سکه بالا انداختن هست. یا شیر میاد یا خط

از پدیده ازدواج سفید که در کلان شهرها به خصوص در بالاشهر همین الان به نرم عادی تبدیل شده هم می تونی صحبت کنی

حالا تشریف ببر همین آمار رو در کشورهای دیگه اسلامی در بیار​

My personal experience in the west conveys a far gloomier picture than these observations made in Iran. I hardly know many people who marry in the first place, compared to unmarried couples or singles.

The rest and in particular the divorce issue I addressed at length in my aforegone post.
 
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