1. Why was no full-fledged mobilization carried out in Armenia, and no full-fledged military units were deployed to the conflict area?
Despite loud patriotic statements, no real mobilization was carried out in Armenia. The permanent number of the Armenian army - about 50 thousand people - was increased only by volunteers. While the conditions of hostilities demanded to increase the number of people defending Karabakh to at least 80-100 thousand people. At the same time, very soon the shortage of specialists (for example, artillery and missile defense systems) began to affect the front in the Armenian army. There was no one to replace those who left.
It is inexplicable for what reason Yerevan did not begin to carry out real mobilization. The Armenian leadership simply avoids talking on this topic. If there was a mobilization plan, no one tried to fulfill it. As a result, there was no rotation of servicemen on the first line, in some areas people were sitting in trenches for a month without changing. On the front line there were 18-20-year-old guys, and at some point young people who were not shot made up 80% of the personnel. The Karabakh detachments, made up of professionals and veterans, suffered heavy losses in the very first week, which there was no one and nothing to replace, since there were simply no reinforcements.
Volunteer units in Armenia were formed according to party lines. The scandal was caused by an attempt to form a separate detachment of the "Prosperous Armenia" party named after the oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan - now Pashinyan's main opponent. The two have been in conflict for over ten years. Now the prime minister openly calls Tsarukyan “the culprit of the fall of Shushi,” since his phantom squad allegedly was not enough at the front to win. These conflicts could have been avoided simply by having a mobilization plan and a desire to implement it.
The main military forces of Armenia did not move to Karabakh. But in order to relieve the tension created by the Azerbaijani UAVs, it was enough just to redeploy early detection radars to Goris. And one army corps would have been quite enough to cover the southern direction even at the stage when the Azerbaijanis languidly stomped in front of the first line of defense. The proper supply was not organized, and after a month of fighting this led to a shortage of missiles for missile defense systems and shells for cannon artillery. And without the support of artillery, the infantry can only die heroically.
All this borders on sabotage, although it can be partially explained by local slovenliness and unwillingness to weaken the defense of Armenia proper. The latter is a very controversial position and it looks like the Armenian leadership has simply abandoned Karabakh to its fate.
2. Why did the northern front behave so strangely?
In the north and north-east of Karabakh, in the Madagiz region, there was a large fortified area of the Armenian defense, which included very combat-ready units. And they really put up serious resistance to the advancing Azerbaijani group and in the end actually stopped it (although they lost several positions and iconic villages).
But after that, the elite battalion "Yehnikner" suddenly retreated, although its commander managed to get the "Hero of Artsakh". Moreover, since October 3, neither Yekhnikner, nor any military unit in general from the northern front was withdrawn and was not transferred to the aid of the burning south. At the same time, the Azerbaijanis only once decided to imitate an offensive in the north again, clearly for distracting purposes. There was no need to keep up to 20 thousand people in the north.
The Karabakh leadership informally explains all this by the lack of resources. But now the “lack of resources” in Karabakh explains everything.
3. Why did the southern front collapse?
The fact that the Azerbaijanis were striking the main blow in the south, in the steppe zone, was already visible with the naked eye in the first few days of the war. Nevertheless, resources - human and technical - began to arrive on the southern front when this front was essentially gone. The steppe zone was lost, and the front stopped along the edge of the mountains from the Red Bazaar to Martuni. As a result, up to 30 thousand people have accumulated in this area, defending Karabakh. They were threatened with complete encirclement and death, which was one of the reasons for the signing of the ceasefire agreement. At the same time, before the occupation of Jabrayil, Azerbaijani troops advanced very slowly, disrupting their own pace of the offensive. This gave the Armenians a small, but still a head start in order to understand the situation and start relocating.
After the occupation of Jebrail, the front began to fall apart, and the advance of the Azerbaijanis sharply accelerated. The moment was lost.
For what reason did the Armenian command not decide to transfer additional resources to the southern front? This is another mystery.
4. Why did the Armenian side confine itself to only passive defense?
During the entire war, the Armenian side made only two attempts to counterattack against the forward units of Azerbaijanis who were running far ahead. Both times this happened opposite Lachin in a narrow gorge, with the extreme vulnerability of the Azerbaijani battalion-tactical group (BTG). Once even successful. But these operations boiled down simply to the massive delivery of MLRS strikes against enemy clusters. Operations to close the gorge and encircle the enemy in other sectors of the southern front suggested themselves. But not a single Armenian unit moved from its place. An amazing war in which one of the parties did not conduct a single offensive operation on the ground, limiting itself to only and exclusively passive defense.
A successful counterattack in the gorge in front of Lachin would grind so many Azerbaijani forces in the cauldron that they would not think about attacking Shusha for at least a couple of weeks. And later it was quite possible to destroy the Azerbaijani infantry in the Averatanots gorge. But for this it was necessary to strain.
There is no explanation as to why the Armenian side did not even try to counterattack or use other methods of the operational advantage that it repeatedly gained. The lack of resources can be endlessly referred to only in the last stages of hostilities, but passive defense has been a constant tactic from the very beginning of the war.
5. Why was Shusha surrendered?
The most sensitive and incomprehensible question. The first assault on the city by the Azerbaijani infantry was extremely unsuccessful. Then, the second column of Azerbaijanis was covered by an attack by the RZSO. With some effort and assistance from Armenia, the Azerbaijani group that had broken through to the city could be destroyed. Nevertheless, a decision was suddenly made to leave the city without a fight and not to make attempts to liberate it with a favorable operational-tactical situation that remained for another day.
It is believed that the decision to abandon Shushi was made by the NKR President Arayik Harutyunyan and the NKR Security Council Secretary General Samvel Babayan, a local legend. Now, in protest against the signing of the truce, he left his post and renounced the title of Hero of Artsakh. The Armenian YouTube channel Lurer (Novosti) published a recording of the negotiations between Babayan and Harutyunyan, from which it follows that General Babayan really assessed the possibility of recapturing Shusha even after she was abandoned, but painted the future prospects of resistance very gloomily.
Fragment of conversation (not literal translation): “Let's calculate the (combat) mission. We cover Shushi with twenty, thirty volleys of "Smerch". We kill everyone there. We take the city back. What's next? The state of the army and the civilian population does not allow waging war. They fought, took Shushi, then what? (…) We cannot fight with the NATO army, with the mercenaries, fully equipped ... Yesterday I tried to organize an operation with three battalions. We have four howitzers in total. If we are not provided with artillery, then how are you going to support the offensive or cut off its tails (the enemy - approx. LOOK)? (...) Today we must finally negotiate with Russia that we are handing over these territories and leaving. Or they help us.
Imagine that we have two Grads for the whole army today, a dozen howitzers for which we have no shells. "
To summarize, General Babayan believed that resistance was useless at this stage of hostilities. We must abandon the continuation of the war and either surrender, or ask for ten days for an organized exit of the local population and the 30 thousand soldiers of the southern front who are completely surrounded. As an alternative, it was proposed to urgently ask Russia for direct military assistance in the form of PMCs or volunteers, equipment and ammunition.
But all this does not change the question why a small group of Azerbaijani infantrymen without heavy equipment, which broke through to Shusha, was not destroyed before panic began to appear in the Armenian army. The retention of Shushi created a completely different architecture of political agreements for NKR and Armenia. If this decision is political, then who actually made it?
From Russian sources
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Norwegian press: US ignored Armenia's call for help
The pro-Western orientation did not help Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in his confrontation with Azerbaijan. Again I had to call for help from Russia. The Norwegian edition of Steigan writes about it.
When Nikol Pashinyan became head of the Armenian government, he did not hide his critical attitude towards "Putin's" Russia. Voices began to be heard in Yerevan in support of the withdrawal of the Russian military base from Gyumri. The US Embassy in Armenia is the second largest among all American embassies in the world. At the same time, Pashinyan hastened to get rid of many senior officers of the army and security forces, apparently suspecting them of pro-Russian sentiments.
However, while "democracy was being built" in Yerevan, their armed forces were being strengthened in Baku. Azerbaijan, using its oil revenues and assistance from Turkey, has managed to modernize its army quite well in several years. When it came to the armed confrontation in Karabakh, it turned out that it is much better equipped and armed than the Armenian armed forces. Of course, the fighting spirit of the defenders of Karabakh cannot be questioned, but one cannot advance far from the determination to fight to the end, and even the former boundaries cannot be defended. And so it happened: Shusha and a number of important regions were lost, Stepanakert itself was under threat.
However, the United States did not come to Pashinyan's aid, ignoring Armenia's calls for help, according to Norwegian journalists. There is no doubt that a harsh shout from Washington would have had an effect on Baku. But this did not happen: while formally condemning the military actions in Karabakh, in fact neither the United States nor "friendly" France did absolutely nothing to stop the rapid advance of Azerbaijani troops.
As a result, as the Norwegian edition writes, Nikol Pashinyan had no choice but to turn to Russia for help, to the very Putin whom he had criticized not so long ago.
The defeat in Karabakh became a tragedy for the Armenian people and an indelible stain on Pashinyan's political career. But it cannot be said that Azerbaijan and Turkey also won. Although Azerbaijan gained control over a part of the formerly ruled by the NKR regions, Putin did not give Ilham Aliyev a total victory in Karabakh. As a wise elder relative, he judged the quarrel between Yerevan and Baku and allowed the latter to take part of the territories, but did not allow the disappearance of Armenian Karabakh either. Now a 2000-strong Russian peacekeeping contingent will stand between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, which means one thing - as long as the Russian troops remain, there will be no conflict in Karabakh.
It is unlikely that the appearance of Russian armed forces in Karabakh was part of Turkey's plans, but now nothing can be done. In fact, the NKR came under the control of Moscow, in addition to the military base in Gyumri, a contingent appeared in Karabakh. In fact, Turkey's plans to create a corridor to Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea failed, which was to be expected. Actually, Recep Erdogan, with his rash policy in Syria, Libya and the Black Sea region, himself ran into a decisive response from Russia, and he received it.
A separate moment is the pro-Western forces in Armenia: they have learned a very good lesson from both Moscow and Washington. Russia showed Armenia that it is ready to help and be the guarantor of its security, but for this it is necessary to stop looking at the United States and the European Union.
In turn, the Americans have demonstrated in reality complete indifference to the Armenian people and their problems. Now only a mentally retarded person or an outspoken hireling in Armenia can call to be guided by the United States and the European Union. The war in Karabakh put an end to the question of who can help Armenia and who is completely indifferent to it.
The pro-Western orientation did not help the Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan in the confrontation with Azerbaijan. Again I had to call for help from Russia. The Norwegian edition of Steigan writes about it. When Nikol Pashinyan headed the Armenian government, he did not hide his...
en.topwar.ru
وضعیت تا تعیین تکلیف پاشینیان معطل میمونه
وارد جزییات صلح میشه
صلح نقض میشه
و دوباره جنگ شروع میشه
وقتی ارمنی ها داشتند مشق دموکراسی و مبارزه با فساد میکردند در اذربایجان مشق جنگ در کوه و جنگ پهپاد میکردند
ارمنستان شوکی رو دریافت کرد که بفهمه باید از خودش دفاع کنه و کسی برای نجاتش نمیاد
دیاسپورا ی اونها هم شوکه شد
فهمیدن باید کمک کنن
فیلمها نشون میده صدها جوان ارمنی ناراضی اند
جالبه این ناراضی ها خط اول جبهه نیستند و پشت جبهه شعار میدند
یک زمانی ایران دنبال اجاره همین مراتع ول شده در ارمنستان بود برای چرای دام
هیات ارمنی میگفت سعودی ها قیمت بیشتری میدند
سعودی ها هیچوقت نیومدند
امروز میگن ما گلوله توپ هم نداریم چه کنیم
خوب بیست سال چه گهی میخوردید
حساب کرده بودید رو روسیه
و برای محکم کاری عضو ناتو هم میخواستین بشین
عین کردهای عفرین و رژوا و کرکوک
اونها کجا حوثی ها کجا
روسها با خنجر به هم مسلک ارتودوکس کاری کردند که احدی حالا حالا عضو ناتو نشه
ایران باید خیلی حساب شده بازی کنه و ببینه تیم بایدن و مکرون چطور بازی میکنن
