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Iranian Air Defense Systems

برادر من این عکس روحانی و سردار دهقان با سامانه پدافند هوایی صیاد ۵هست نه باور به اشتباه و برای رد گم کردن روس ها و امریکا این عکس را نشون دادند تا بتونند...........
تاکتیک خیلی عجیبیه اره شبیه سامانه های صیاد هست خیلی. خب پس یعنی میگی باور شبیه به این سیستمه که توی پوستر نشون داده شده؟


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برادر من این عکس روحانی و سردار دهقان با سامانه پدافند هوایی صیاد ۵هست نه باور به اشتباه و برای رد گم کردن روس ها و امریکا این عکس را نشون دادند تا بتونند...........


27O7SNU.jpg

اره متوجه شدم چی شد الان :smitten:
 
تاکتیک خیلی عجیبیه اره شبیه سامانه های صیاد هست خیلی. خب پس یعنی میگی باور شبیه به این سیستمه که توی پوستر نشون داده شده؟
بقیه سوال ها برای بعد از رونمایی هنوز تصمیم نهایی گرفته نشده که کدوم ورژن نشون داده میشه ولی بخاطر اینکه روس ها دارن سعی مکنند از امریکا و اسراییل دوباره امتیاز بگیرن سر داستان دروغ فروش اس-۴۰۰ به ایران / که همه بلند پایه های نظامی سیاسی روس و شبکه های جهانی روسیه دارن این دروغ را القاع میکنند ایران ممکن ورژن اس-۴۰۰ ایرانی را نشون بده
و بخاطر
تحویل اس ۴۰۰ به ترکیه و استقرار در شرق ترکیه
 
Man, I can barely contain my excitement as it is for this unveiling!!!! Nine years and counting for the system damn near everyone said Iran doesn't have the capability to produce (mocking Iran and Iranians every step of the way), yet here we are talking about it knowing it will showed to the world in full!!!

Unlike previous indigenous military achievements, this one feels different but I can't exactly explain why. I assume it's due to the quite advanced nature of the project plus its scope. If Bavar-373 truly does deliver on everything it promises then Iran's AD is, without question, amongst the top in the world or at the very least on the path to becoming amongst the top in the world. Nothing Trump, Polish Nazi (Netanyahu), MBS, Fat Pig (Pompeo), Bolton or any other naysayer can do to dispel it. They will concede to Iran's determination sooner or later!!

So in short, thank you to any and all Iranian engineers and possible helpers from outside of Iran for putting time, effort, blood and sweat into defending the Iranian homeland!!!
 
The S-300PT story from Janes/SOC is a whole different dimension to Irans SAM capability.
It's not a public program like the Sayyad series.
The 2010 mock-ups of a S-300 like system is one side of the story, the other is S-300P like system appearing in North Korea. Even beyond that, they hinted to a even longer ranges S-300-like SAM.

The S-300PT-Iran link came via western sources but North Korea had no known access to the S-300. Beyond a possible S-125 copy, North Koreans also had no prior extensive heavy SAM program like Irans SA-2 --> Hawk --> Sayyad-2 history.
Like with their solid fuel BM's North Koreans suddenly jumped low to S-300P level without any known access and step by step work.

So a question remains what the IRGC SSJ did with that S-300PT technology.
Develop it independently and try to copy it in a shared joint program with the North Koreans? Was the IRGC SSJ not satisfied with the S-300P level capability while North Koreans were? Did they join hands with the DIO to develop a system, way beyond S-300P series level (late S-300PMU-2 level input)?
If yes then one aspect of the Bavar-373 would be Sayyad series based and the other IRGC-S-300 based.
It then would be likely that the IRGC part of the Bavar-373 would remain a secret program likely for ABM role, while the IRIADF would get the public Bavar-373 likely with a Sayyad-5 that can take the extended range role of the S-200 and able to support a exo-atmospheric kill vehicle kinematically in the future.
Maybe that Sayyad-5 exo-atmospheric ABM capability is/will be (when ready) just for the IRGC-ASF with their ABM mission and the IRIADF will just get the anti-air-breathing variant of it.

I say this all because of this fact: The S-300P series missile is sufficient for the endo-atmospheric ABM role which won't go beyond 40km anyway (target speed issue). With a S-300P missile copy donated from the IRGC program, IRIADF Bavar-373 would get Arrow-2/Patriot PAC-3 like ABM capability and cover/replace S-200 extended range capability with a heavy Sayyad-5 missile (likely extending it to 300+km).
IRGC program would in turn get the "masterpiece" Bavar-373 engagement radar from the joint DIO/IEI program plus the Sayyad-5 platform for an exo-atmospheric THAAD/Arrow-3/S-500 like component of its classified ABM program.
The Bavar project is so large industrially that the IRGC must benefit from it too.

The Buk-M3 system of Russia, now has got a second missile component added to it, namely the smaller missile component of the S-300V (primarily for ABM purpose). We should expect such a component for the 3rd Khordad in future too, maybe based on the twin launchers of Fateh and Zolfaghar BM's.

We may also only see a very public/insensitive display with Sayyad-3 and Sayyad-4 as Bavar-373 missile components that bring it on pair with the S-400, probably with lower ABM capability (lack of visible TVC so far).
I'm optimistic that Rohanis "test against Shahab-3" claim will lead to something great to be shown.
 
Hehe an analysis of the structure of the IRIADF after they will start to receive the Bavar-373 in two weeks.

Today the SAM system force looks like this:

HAWK --> Mersad-1 level --> Mersad 2 Shalamcheh level --> "Mersad 3" (Kamin?) level.
Transforming it to a fully mobile, multi-target capable, ECM hardned, low-RCS capable SAM system with the last "Mersad 3" level.
This is the backbone, highest number of systems

S-200 --> Talash-1 Sayyad-2 level --> Talash 2 level --> Talash 3 Sayyad-3 level
Transforming it to a multi target, mobile-radar, with two added missile layers, ECM hardened, low-RCS capable SAM system.
Only the well known 5 systems received back in the 90's

S-300PMU-2, 4 known systems

If the Bavar-373 enters service, it can replace HAWKs used for protection of the nuclear sites. It can start to be deployed close to borders and contested regions like the straight of Hormuz.
If numbers increase, it can start to form a chain around sensitive and ultimately all border regions.

So as Bavar-373 enters service, redundant multi-layer HAWK sites become free, HAWK protected regions get covered by the Bavar-373.
If tasks are efficiently shared with the IRGC-ASF, the IRIADF can cease its massive presence in Tehran and Esfahan. The numbers of HAWK/Mersad-3 sites freed by such a structural reform could be used to create protection for smaller cities currently unprotected or just by the far envelope of Talash-3/S-300PMU-2.
Major missile bases near larger cities could also be protected by the IRGC Sayyad-2.

Slowly the somewhat desperate tactic to use multi-layerd HAWK sites to protect critical sites, can be changed and assets freed. At Mersad-3 level each of those sites will become much more survivable + effective against LO targets + multi-target capable.
In that way currently less important larger cities such as Ardebil, Yazd, Kerman, Zahedan would get a Mersad-3 site, freed by the reforms (initiated by the Bavar-373) from its current duty.

Similarly Bushehr and Bandar Abbas S-200/Talash-3 sites could be moved to less protected eastern parts of Iran when replaced by highly survivable Bavar-373 batteries.

Added to all of this is a complete other dimension: The IRGC-ASF: It needs to protect Tehran, its offensive missile bases and its offensive ground forces.

The key issue with such defensive fortification concepts is that the enemy will concentrate its offensive forces to one point in order to break the wall at one of its weak points. Here is where assets such as interceptors would come to counter the enemy's concentrated attack. If there is really a long range Sayyad-5 missile in the Bavar-373 structure, such a 300km+ missile could also be used to cover and support a sector that is exposed to a massive concentrated attack.
So a key goal is to have strong enough defenses to defend until some sort of support arrives. Alternatively another goal is to defend sufficiently long until all offensive missile assets are spent on the enemy.

The 10x10 Zoljanah hints to a very large and heavy missile, the container seems to be 9 meters long and able to support a 600-700mm diameter missile. Such a Fateh sized SAM would offer sufficient kinematic performance for future exo-atmospheric ABM tasks and a would also be sufficient for an ARH seeker equipped LR-SAM. This capability comes at a higher cost per SAM, to be used in "emergency" or "confirmed-high-value" situations.
 
Hehe an analysis of the structure of the IRIADF after they will start to receive the Bavar-373 in two weeks.

Today the SAM system force looks like this:

HAWK --> Mersad-1 level --> Mersad 2 Shalamcheh level --> "Mersad 3" (Kamin?) level.
Transforming it to a fully mobile, multi-target capable, ECM hardned, low-RCS capable SAM system with the last "Mersad 3" level.
This is the backbone, highest number of systems

S-200 --> Talash-1 Sayyad-2 level --> Talash 2 level --> Talash 3 Sayyad-3 level
Transforming it to a multi target, mobile-radar, with two added missile layers, ECM hardened, low-RCS capable SAM system.
Only the well known 5 systems received back in the 90's

S-300PMU-2, 4 known systems

If the Bavar-373 enters service, it can replace HAWKs used for protection of the nuclear sites. It can start to be deployed close to borders and contested regions like the straight of Hormuz.
If numbers increase, it can start to form a chain around sensitive and ultimately all border regions.

So as Bavar-373 enters service, redundant multi-layer HAWK sites become free, HAWK protected regions get covered by the Bavar-373.
If tasks are efficiently shared with the IRGC-ASF, the IRIADF can cease its massive presence in Tehran and Esfahan. The numbers of HAWK/Mersad-3 sites freed by such a structural reform could be used to create protection for smaller cities currently unprotected or just by the far envelope of Talash-3/S-300PMU-2.
Major missile bases near larger cities could also be protected by the IRGC Sayyad-2.

Slowly the somewhat desperate tactic to use multi-layerd HAWK sites to protect critical sites, can be changed and assets freed. At Mersad-3 level each of those sites will become much more survivable + effective against LO targets + multi-target capable.
In that way currently less important larger cities such as Ardebil, Yazd, Kerman, Zahedan would get a Mersad-3 site, freed by the reforms (initiated by the Bavar-373) from its current duty.

Similarly Bushehr and Bandar Abbas S-200/Talash-3 sites could be moved to less protected eastern parts of Iran when replaced by highly survivable Bavar-373 batteries.

Added to all of this is a complete other dimension: The IRGC-ASF: It needs to protect Tehran, its offensive missile bases and its offensive ground forces.

The key issue with such defensive fortification concepts is that the enemy will concentrate its offensive forces to one point in order to break the wall at one of its weak points. Here is where assets such as interceptors would come to counter the enemy's concentrated attack. If there is really a long range Sayyad-5 missile in the Bavar-373 structure, such a 300km+ missile could also be used to cover and support a sector that is exposed to a massive concentrated attack.
So a key goal is to have strong enough defenses to defend until some sort of support arrives. Alternatively another goal is to defend sufficiently long until all offensive missile assets are spent on the enemy.

The 10x10 Zoljanah hints to a very large and heavy missile, the container seems to be 9 meters long and able to support a 600-700mm diameter missile. Such a Fateh sized SAM would offer sufficient kinematic performance for future exo-atmospheric ABM tasks and a would also be sufficient for an ARH seeker equipped LR-SAM. This capability comes at a higher cost per SAM, to be used in "emergency" or "confirmed-high-value" situations.
How do these sites communicate with each other to pass the data. surly they can not rely on civilian networks to exchange data. I also assume any networking will be fiber based for added security ..a smart enemy will try to destroy/degrade this command and control network rather that tackling each individual site..just my thoughts..
 
it seems that Bavar 373 is going to surprise us by its radar components, I can not wait to see. Another rumor is that the Kowsar fighter would have a link with Bavar 373. Is this possible? False rumor? Maybe Kowsar could be the direct defender of the system but maybe it's not true? I do not know ?? Wacky rumor?
 
How do these sites communicate with each other to pass the data. surly they can not rely on civilian networks to exchange data. I also assume any networking will be fiber based for added security ..a smart enemy will try to destroy/degrade this command and control network rather that tackling each individual site..just my thoughts..

Primary secure long range communication would be via Irans mobile troposcatter systems. Data-rate, range, jamming-proofness and security are high enough. Novel concepts like the recent IRGC HF band system could provide a additional layer in future.
Part of C3 system is either hardened inside mountains or mobile on trucks.
So mobile assets like the Bavar-373 will primarily use troposcatter communication fixed objects will use fiber optics to connect to communication assets.
 
Hehe an analysis of the structure of the IRIADF after they will start to receive the Bavar-373 in two weeks.

Today the SAM system force looks like this:

HAWK --> Mersad-1 level --> Mersad 2 Shalamcheh level --> "Mersad 3" (Kamin?) level.
Transforming it to a fully mobile, multi-target capable, ECM hardned, low-RCS capable SAM system with the last "Mersad 3" level.
This is the backbone, highest number of systems

S-200 --> Talash-1 Sayyad-2 level --> Talash 2 level --> Talash 3 Sayyad-3 level
Transforming it to a multi target, mobile-radar, with two added missile layers, ECM hardened, low-RCS capable SAM system.
Only the well known 5 systems received back in the 90's

S-300PMU-2, 4 known systems

If the Bavar-373 enters service, it can replace HAWKs used for protection of the nuclear sites. It can start to be deployed close to borders and contested regions like the straight of Hormuz.
If numbers increase, it can start to form a chain around sensitive and ultimately all border regions.

So as Bavar-373 enters service, redundant multi-layer HAWK sites become free, HAWK protected regions get covered by the Bavar-373.
If tasks are efficiently shared with the IRGC-ASF, the IRIADF can cease its massive presence in Tehran and Esfahan. The numbers of HAWK/Mersad-3 sites freed by such a structural reform could be used to create protection for smaller cities currently unprotected or just by the far envelope of Talash-3/S-300PMU-2.
Major missile bases near larger cities could also be protected by the IRGC Sayyad-2.

Slowly the somewhat desperate tactic to use multi-layerd HAWK sites to protect critical sites, can be changed and assets freed. At Mersad-3 level each of those sites will become much more survivable + effective against LO targets + multi-target capable.
In that way currently less important larger cities such as Ardebil, Yazd, Kerman, Zahedan would get a Mersad-3 site, freed by the reforms (initiated by the Bavar-373) from its current duty.

Similarly Bushehr and Bandar Abbas S-200/Talash-3 sites could be moved to less protected eastern parts of Iran when replaced by highly survivable Bavar-373 batteries.

Added to all of this is a complete other dimension: The IRGC-ASF: It needs to protect Tehran, its offensive missile bases and its offensive ground forces.

The key issue with such defensive fortification concepts is that the enemy will concentrate its offensive forces to one point in order to break the wall at one of its weak points. Here is where assets such as interceptors would come to counter the enemy's concentrated attack. If there is really a long range Sayyad-5 missile in the Bavar-373 structure, such a 300km+ missile could also be used to cover and support a sector that is exposed to a massive concentrated attack.
So a key goal is to have strong enough defenses to defend until some sort of support arrives. Alternatively another goal is to defend sufficiently long until all offensive missile assets are spent on the enemy.

The 10x10 Zoljanah hints to a very large and heavy missile, the container seems to be 9 meters long and able to support a 600-700mm diameter missile. Such a Fateh sized SAM would offer sufficient kinematic performance for future exo-atmospheric ABM tasks and a would also be sufficient for an ARH seeker equipped LR-SAM. This capability comes at a higher cost per SAM, to be used in "emergency" or "confirmed-high-value" situations.
hi brother, i have Q: can you tell me why these 2 Meraj-4 radars are different and what is the significance of that difference, it seems like they are 2 different version of Meraj-4 radar maybe an upgrade or second generation or maybe a IRGC-ASF and IRIADF difference???

65553063_312037593036992_4400129944960686219_n.jpg
D4qi4D_XkAE-cNZ.jpg
 
hi brother, i have Q: can you tell me why these 2 Meraj-4 radars are different and what is the significance of that difference, it seems like they are 2 different version of Meraj-4 radar maybe an upgrade or second generation or maybe a IRGC-ASF and IRIADF difference???

View attachment 573203 View attachment 573204

One is the pre-production Meraj-4, the other the optimized, more compact production variant.
On the first photo the SLC = side lobe cancellation antenna is visible to reduce ECM interference.
On the second photo, one aspect of the convection cooling system is visible.
Both have both just not visible on those photos.
SLC is a feature of more advanced radars, similar generation/style Chinese radars lacked SLC. It is a good sign that Iran pays attention to it.
 
hi brother, i have Q: can you tell me why these 2 Meraj-4 radars are different and what is the significance of that difference, it seems like they are 2 different version of Meraj-4 radar maybe an upgrade or second generation or maybe a IRGC-ASF and IRIADF difference???

View attachment 573203 View attachment 573204
Are you sure the second one is not Ghamar? The second one looks smaller considering the size of the towed trailer/transporter. I am just asking as I do not know how to differentiate these two, unless they are different versions of the same radar.

Ghamar 3D Radar during the inauguration:
A4D9D330-EA5A-4E27-B166-1ADF83887775.jpeg
 
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Are you sure the second one is not Ghamar? The second one looks smaller considering the size of the towed trailer/transporter. I am just asking as I do not know how to differentiate these two, unless they are different versions of the same radar.
they both are Meraj-4 radars the second one is optimized, more compact production variant as @PeeD said the first one is the old one i really do not know what is going on with the second one it looks smaller too and lighter than the first.
 

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