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Iran Might Be Waiting Until October To Supply Russia Deadlier Drones And Missiles For Ukraine

I honestly think that a better title for this article might well have been:
"More western wishful thinking on russian iranian arms sales"
Oh,well....... 🤔

Iran Might Be Waiting Until October To Supply Russia Deadlier Drones And Missiles For Ukraine

Paul Iddon

Jan 8, 2023,07:29am EST

Since September, Russia has launched hundreds of Iranian-supplied loitering munitions (self-detonating drones) against Ukraine's power grid. Tehran has much faster and deadlier drones and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) that it might also supply Moscow after October when a key condition in a 2015 U.N. Security Council resolution restricting Iranian missile exports is set to expire.

In December, Axios reported that Iran plans to limit the range and payload of any SRBMs it supplies Russia. Tehran wants to avoid violating U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which bans it from exporting drones or SRBMs with ranges exceeding 300 kilometers (186 miles) and payloads greater than 500 kilograms until October 2023. If Iran is caught violating that resolution, it could trigger the "snapback" of U.N. sanctions.

The resolution was introduced in 2015 as part of the Iranian nuclear deal. Under that resolution, the ban on Iran importing and exporting conventional arms expired in October 2020. Tehran has since exported hundreds of loitering munitions, mostly the Shahed-136 model, to Russia and is expected to receive Su-35 fighter jets in return sometime this year.

However, it's unclear if Iran has yet delivered any SRBMs or longer-range drones, such as the Arash-2. Tehran reportedly plans to modify the Fateh-110 SRBM, which can hit targets up to 300 km away, to ensure it doesn't violate 2231. It has also ruled out sending the Zolfagher SRBM, which has a range of 700 km range (434 miles). Significant quantities of these weapons could potentially enable Russia to continue or even expand its systematic destruction of Ukraine's electricity grid and infrastructure.

Is Tehran merely biding its time and waiting until the 2231 stipulation expires before it supplies Moscow with these more advanced and lethal loitering munitions and SRBMs?

'Sooner rather than later'

"I, like many Europeans, believe Iran is already in the breach of 2231's Annex-B, paragraph 4, because the drones, or rather cruise missiles, they have provided to Russia have a range in excess of 300 km," Farzin Nadimi, a defense and security analyst and Associate Fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told me.

"But, feeling the international pressure, Tehran might have adopted a different approach regarding ballistic missiles," he said. "And 'if' Iran has already delivered SRBMs of various types to Russia, it is possible that they have asked Moscow to refrain from using those with a range beyond 300 km for now and limit their usage to Fateh-110, which has a maximum range not more than 300 km."
"So far, we have not seen any use of Iranian-made SRBMs by Russia," he added. "Therefore, this is all conjecture based on the original U.S. intelligence reports."
Nevertheless, Nadimi also anticipates that more capable explosive drones, such as the Arash-2, will appear over Ukrainian territory "sooner rather than later."
"Regarding snapback, I believe the West can already initiate a snapback process based on my earlier argument. However, there seems to be little political will to do it," he said.

'A real stir'

Anton Mardasov, an independent Russian analyst and non-resident scholar of the Middle East Institute's Syria program, noted that Russia's infamous use of the Shahed-136s (known as Geran 2s in Russian service) against Ukraine likely means that "the delivery of missiles, even after October 2023, will cause a real stir."
Concealing their usage will also undoubtedly prove difficult for Russia. Ukrainian intelligence or other observers would certainly publicize the discovery of any remains recovered from the battlefield that point to their Iranian origin, as they have done on several occasions with the Iranian drones Russia has already used.

"Most likely, Iranian missiles cannot be used from Russian carriers, and Iranian chassis-based systems will be even more difficult to hide from satellites," Mardasov told me. "In addition, this would also be an expensive contract that would make Russia even more dependent on Iran."
"I think that the maximum option is if Iranian defense companies supply some components for more rapid production of Russian missiles with Iranian components in Russia," he said. "This may already be happening."
"Continued drone deliveries are also possible because Russian enterprises have apparently begun to manufacture something from Iranian, so to speak, machine parts on their territory," he added.

Of Russian and Iranian missiles​

For months, there has been widespread speculation that Russia is acquiring large quantities of surface-to-surface weaponry from Iran since it has depleted most of its missile stockpiles. Nevertheless, just before New Year's Eve, Russia launched one of its largest missile barrages since the war began last February.
Mardasov is highly skeptical of claims that Russian stockpiles of advanced missiles and precision-guided munitions are becoming depleted.
"All public calculations of the remaining high-precision weapons are meaningless or erroneous since such stockpiles are a military secret," he said. "For at least an approximate calculation, it is necessary to know a lot of data: the number of electronics available, the amount of previous peacetime production of ground, air, and naval missiles, and the amount of current missile production when personnel at the plants work in several shifts, etc."
He also pointed out that Russian military counter-intelligence is "always trying to confuse a potential enemy, throwing some data into the public domain in the interests of the Kremlin."
"So, this data is top secret information of strategic importance because the carriers of high-precision weapons must be deployed in other directions, even where the threat of conflict is highly unlikely," he said. "It is clear that Russia will not deploy Iranian missiles in these directions. It is also clear that Russia has some reserve of missiles for contingencies in other directions."
"Again, even Russian analysts who dared to publicly voice the number of cruise or quasi-ballistic missiles in service, measuring the production volume at 100-150 missiles per year, are wrong," he added. "Their calculations are understated and do not even match the official information, which (Russian Minister of Defense) Sergei Shoigu disclosed at the height of the war in Syria."
"Russian military-industrial complex enterprises, which previously suffered from underfunding, now receive large orders, and their capacities allow them to produce dozens or hundreds of missiles."


 
.
I honestly think that a better title for this article might well have been:
"More western wishful thinking on russian iranian arms sales"
Oh,well....... 🤔

Iran Might Be Waiting Until October To Supply Russia Deadlier Drones And Missiles For Ukraine

Paul Iddon

Jan 8, 2023,07:29am EST

Since September, Russia has launched hundreds of Iranian-supplied loitering munitions (self-detonating drones) against Ukraine's power grid. Tehran has much faster and deadlier drones and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) that it might also supply Moscow after October when a key condition in a 2015 U.N. Security Council resolution restricting Iranian missile exports is set to expire.

In December, Axios reported that Iran plans to limit the range and payload of any SRBMs it supplies Russia. Tehran wants to avoid violating U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which bans it from exporting drones or SRBMs with ranges exceeding 300 kilometers (186 miles) and payloads greater than 500 kilograms until October 2023. If Iran is caught violating that resolution, it could trigger the "snapback" of U.N. sanctions.

The resolution was introduced in 2015 as part of the Iranian nuclear deal. Under that resolution, the ban on Iran importing and exporting conventional arms expired in October 2020. Tehran has since exported hundreds of loitering munitions, mostly the Shahed-136 model, to Russia and is expected to receive Su-35 fighter jets in return sometime this year.

However, it's unclear if Iran has yet delivered any SRBMs or longer-range drones, such as the Arash-2. Tehran reportedly plans to modify the Fateh-110 SRBM, which can hit targets up to 300 km away, to ensure it doesn't violate 2231. It has also ruled out sending the Zolfagher SRBM, which has a range of 700 km range (434 miles). Significant quantities of these weapons could potentially enable Russia to continue or even expand its systematic destruction of Ukraine's electricity grid and infrastructure.

Is Tehran merely biding its time and waiting until the 2231 stipulation expires before it supplies Moscow with these more advanced and lethal loitering munitions and SRBMs?

'Sooner rather than later'

"I, like many Europeans, believe Iran is already in the breach of 2231's Annex-B, paragraph 4, because the drones, or rather cruise missiles, they have provided to Russia have a range in excess of 300 km," Farzin Nadimi, a defense and security analyst and Associate Fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told me.

"But, feeling the international pressure, Tehran might have adopted a different approach regarding ballistic missiles," he said. "And 'if' Iran has already delivered SRBMs of various types to Russia, it is possible that they have asked Moscow to refrain from using those with a range beyond 300 km for now and limit their usage to Fateh-110, which has a maximum range not more than 300 km."
"So far, we have not seen any use of Iranian-made SRBMs by Russia," he added. "Therefore, this is all conjecture based on the original U.S. intelligence reports."
Nevertheless, Nadimi also anticipates that more capable explosive drones, such as the Arash-2, will appear over Ukrainian territory "sooner rather than later."
"Regarding snapback, I believe the West can already initiate a snapback process based on my earlier argument. However, there seems to be little political will to do it," he said.

'A real stir'

Anton Mardasov, an independent Russian analyst and non-resident scholar of the Middle East Institute's Syria program, noted that Russia's infamous use of the Shahed-136s (known as Geran 2s in Russian service) against Ukraine likely means that "the delivery of missiles, even after October 2023, will cause a real stir."
Concealing their usage will also undoubtedly prove difficult for Russia. Ukrainian intelligence or other observers would certainly publicize the discovery of any remains recovered from the battlefield that point to their Iranian origin, as they have done on several occasions with the Iranian drones Russia has already used.

"Most likely, Iranian missiles cannot be used from Russian carriers, and Iranian chassis-based systems will be even more difficult to hide from satellites," Mardasov told me. "In addition, this would also be an expensive contract that would make Russia even more dependent on Iran."
"I think that the maximum option is if Iranian defense companies supply some components for more rapid production of Russian missiles with Iranian components in Russia," he said. "This may already be happening."
"Continued drone deliveries are also possible because Russian enterprises have apparently begun to manufacture something from Iranian, so to speak, machine parts on their territory," he added.

Of Russian and Iranian missiles​

For months, there has been widespread speculation that Russia is acquiring large quantities of surface-to-surface weaponry from Iran since it has depleted most of its missile stockpiles. Nevertheless, just before New Year's Eve, Russia launched one of its largest missile barrages since the war began last February.
Mardasov is highly skeptical of claims that Russian stockpiles of advanced missiles and precision-guided munitions are becoming depleted.
"All public calculations of the remaining high-precision weapons are meaningless or erroneous since such stockpiles are a military secret," he said. "For at least an approximate calculation, it is necessary to know a lot of data: the number of electronics available, the amount of previous peacetime production of ground, air, and naval missiles, and the amount of current missile production when personnel at the plants work in several shifts, etc."
He also pointed out that Russian military counter-intelligence is "always trying to confuse a potential enemy, throwing some data into the public domain in the interests of the Kremlin."
"So, this data is top secret information of strategic importance because the carriers of high-precision weapons must be deployed in other directions, even where the threat of conflict is highly unlikely," he said. "It is clear that Russia will not deploy Iranian missiles in these directions. It is also clear that Russia has some reserve of missiles for contingencies in other directions."
"Again, even Russian analysts who dared to publicly voice the number of cruise or quasi-ballistic missiles in service, measuring the production volume at 100-150 missiles per year, are wrong," he added. "Their calculations are understated and do not even match the official information, which (Russian Minister of Defense) Sergei Shoigu disclosed at the height of the war in Syria."
"Russian military-industrial complex enterprises, which previously suffered from underfunding, now receive large orders, and their capacities allow them to produce dozens or hundreds of missiles."


As we all, know the decision makers in Iran are very concerned and held back by UN security council resolutions when it comes to what they can and can't export..


Meanwhile;
37234-Houthi-military-parade-600_384.jpg



To think Iran will wait till October, or as they say limit the range to under 300km, while Houthis carry missiles with 1000km range, and purportedly Iraqi armed groups are also in possession of 300km+ missiles. Of course, these won't be "exported". They would be "built by Russia themselves, under a new name, while suspiciously looking identical in dimensions and aesthetics. Of course this system was sold to Russia before the war."

If such deal is to take place, waiting 10 months is not an option for Russia, and Iran doesn't care about UN resolutions on its missiles.

As for this?
Concealing their usage will also undoubtedly prove difficult for Russia. Ukrainian intelligence or other observers would certainly publicize the discovery of any remains recovered from the battlefield that point to their Iranian origin, as they have done on several occasions with the Iranian drones Russia has already used.
"Most likely, Iranian missiles cannot be used from Russian carriers, and Iranian chassis-based systems will be even more difficult to hide from satellites,


Fateh-110 would not have any remains, since the whole system would be destroyed on impact, typically interception using a S-300 variant or any Anti-BM system would leave little evidence.
The missiles probably can't be used on Russian TELs but perhaps rapid integration is on going.
Assuming no Russia TELs, Iranian Chasis-based systems can in fact hide from satellites including long ranges ones can be disguised similarily to Geran/Shahid launches, as a civilian truck.

Example: Zolfiaqar missile TEL + Missile can all fit in a single 16 foot box truck
155cbd83b55b5ae38e3fea3d394fda86.jpg


The body of a Zolfiqar would fall to the earth after separation from the warhead. This would be the only evidence that can be used, but their is nothing unique about this aspect. It is only a high strength steel body with rear stabilization fins, solid fuel tank and an engine. Nothing distinctly "Iranian" that can't be disguised as a "new" Russian missile.

Just my 2 cents about how this would go down hypothetically. Any missile transfer would be renamed to a Russian name.
 
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However, it's unclear if Iran has yet delivered any SRBMs or longer-range drones, such as the Arash-2. Tehran reportedly plans to modify the Fateh-110 SRBM, which can hit targets up to 300 km away, to ensure it doesn't violate 2231. It has also ruled out sending the Zolfagher SRBM, which has a range of 700 km range (434 miles). Significant quantities of these weapons could potentially enable Russia to continue or even expand its systematic destruction of Ukraine's electricity grid and infrastructure.
i wonder how the writer suggest Iran can modify fateh-110 so it don't violate UNSC resolution 2231 before October ?
and after that why modify it , it won't violate any resolution then .
Is Tehran merely biding its time and waiting until the 2231 stipulation expires before it supplies Moscow with these more advanced and lethal loitering munitions and SRBMs?
2020 was the year that Iran allowed to export loitering munition .
"I, like many Europeans, believe Iran is already in the breach of 2231's Annex-B, paragraph 4, because the drones, or rather cruise missiles, they have provided to Russia have a range in excess of 300 km," Farzin Nadimi, a defense and security analyst and Associate Fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told me.
in annex-b there is nothing about range and its about ballistic missile not cruise missiles , in fact drones clearly mentioned that the restriction about them will be removed in 2020
"Most likely, Iranian missiles cannot be used from Russian carriers, and Iranian chassis-based systems will be even more difficult to hide from satellites," Mardasov told me. "In addition, this would also be an expensive contract that would make Russia even more dependent on Iran."
if Russia have scud launcher or launcher for frog-7 missiles , then Iranian missile can be fired from them
 
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i wonder how the writer suggest Iran can modify fateh-110 so it don't violate UNSC resolution 2231 before October ?
and after that why modify it , it won't violate any resolution then .
Indeed.

It doesn't seem yet that a transfer has been completed yet so, hard to say if we will ever see them in Russia. One can also say they have been already used but no announcement/leak is made from the western side yet. They should be able to tell if it was used based on its different IR signature compared to standard RU missiles.

The only reason I believe it is true is simply because RU has used 1000s of missiles and have a quick way to replenish their stocks for use while rebuilding their original stockpile. All logic points towards this acquisition.
 
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This is non sense, Iran never waits for western approval. If Russia needs it then they would have it with everything Russian written on it.

Yemen is producing 2,000 KM drones, in which universe is that possible? Well it is possible.
 
.
I honestly think that a better title for this article might well have been:
"More western wishful thinking on russian iranian arms sales"
Oh,well....... 🤔

Iran Might Be Waiting Until October To Supply Russia Deadlier Drones And Missiles For Ukraine

Paul Iddon

Jan 8, 2023,07:29am EST

Since September, Russia has launched hundreds of Iranian-supplied loitering munitions (self-detonating drones) against Ukraine's power grid. Tehran has much faster and deadlier drones and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) that it might also supply Moscow after October when a key condition in a 2015 U.N. Security Council resolution restricting Iranian missile exports is set to expire.

In December, Axios reported that Iran plans to limit the range and payload of any SRBMs it supplies Russia. Tehran wants to avoid violating U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which bans it from exporting drones or SRBMs with ranges exceeding 300 kilometers (186 miles) and payloads greater than 500 kilograms until October 2023. If Iran is caught violating that resolution, it could trigger the "snapback" of U.N. sanctions.

The resolution was introduced in 2015 as part of the Iranian nuclear deal. Under that resolution, the ban on Iran importing and exporting conventional arms expired in October 2020. Tehran has since exported hundreds of loitering munitions, mostly the Shahed-136 model, to Russia and is expected to receive Su-35 fighter jets in return sometime this year.

However, it's unclear if Iran has yet delivered any SRBMs or longer-range drones, such as the Arash-2. Tehran reportedly plans to modify the Fateh-110 SRBM, which can hit targets up to 300 km away, to ensure it doesn't violate 2231. It has also ruled out sending the Zolfagher SRBM, which has a range of 700 km range (434 miles). Significant quantities of these weapons could potentially enable Russia to continue or even expand its systematic destruction of Ukraine's electricity grid and infrastructure.

Is Tehran merely biding its time and waiting until the 2231 stipulation expires before it supplies Moscow with these more advanced and lethal loitering munitions and SRBMs?

'Sooner rather than later'

"I, like many Europeans, believe Iran is already in the breach of 2231's Annex-B, paragraph 4, because the drones, or rather cruise missiles, they have provided to Russia have a range in excess of 300 km," Farzin Nadimi, a defense and security analyst and Associate Fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told me.

"But, feeling the international pressure, Tehran might have adopted a different approach regarding ballistic missiles," he said. "And 'if' Iran has already delivered SRBMs of various types to Russia, it is possible that they have asked Moscow to refrain from using those with a range beyond 300 km for now and limit their usage to Fateh-110, which has a maximum range not more than 300 km."
"So far, we have not seen any use of Iranian-made SRBMs by Russia," he added. "Therefore, this is all conjecture based on the original U.S. intelligence reports."
Nevertheless, Nadimi also anticipates that more capable explosive drones, such as the Arash-2, will appear over Ukrainian territory "sooner rather than later."
"Regarding snapback, I believe the West can already initiate a snapback process based on my earlier argument. However, there seems to be little political will to do it," he said.

'A real stir'

Anton Mardasov, an independent Russian analyst and non-resident scholar of the Middle East Institute's Syria program, noted that Russia's infamous use of the Shahed-136s (known as Geran 2s in Russian service) against Ukraine likely means that "the delivery of missiles, even after October 2023, will cause a real stir."
Concealing their usage will also undoubtedly prove difficult for Russia. Ukrainian intelligence or other observers would certainly publicize the discovery of any remains recovered from the battlefield that point to their Iranian origin, as they have done on several occasions with the Iranian drones Russia has already used.

"Most likely, Iranian missiles cannot be used from Russian carriers, and Iranian chassis-based systems will be even more difficult to hide from satellites," Mardasov told me. "In addition, this would also be an expensive contract that would make Russia even more dependent on Iran."
"I think that the maximum option is if Iranian defense companies supply some components for more rapid production of Russian missiles with Iranian components in Russia," he said. "This may already be happening."
"Continued drone deliveries are also possible because Russian enterprises have apparently begun to manufacture something from Iranian, so to speak, machine parts on their territory," he added.

Of Russian and Iranian missiles​

For months, there has been widespread speculation that Russia is acquiring large quantities of surface-to-surface weaponry from Iran since it has depleted most of its missile stockpiles. Nevertheless, just before New Year's Eve, Russia launched one of its largest missile barrages since the war began last February.
Mardasov is highly skeptical of claims that Russian stockpiles of advanced missiles and precision-guided munitions are becoming depleted.
"All public calculations of the remaining high-precision weapons are meaningless or erroneous since such stockpiles are a military secret," he said. "For at least an approximate calculation, it is necessary to know a lot of data: the number of electronics available, the amount of previous peacetime production of ground, air, and naval missiles, and the amount of current missile production when personnel at the plants work in several shifts, etc."
He also pointed out that Russian military counter-intelligence is "always trying to confuse a potential enemy, throwing some data into the public domain in the interests of the Kremlin."
"So, this data is top secret information of strategic importance because the carriers of high-precision weapons must be deployed in other directions, even where the threat of conflict is highly unlikely," he said. "It is clear that Russia will not deploy Iranian missiles in these directions. It is also clear that Russia has some reserve of missiles for contingencies in other directions."
"Again, even Russian analysts who dared to publicly voice the number of cruise or quasi-ballistic missiles in service, measuring the production volume at 100-150 missiles per year, are wrong," he added. "Their calculations are understated and do not even match the official information, which (Russian Minister of Defense) Sergei Shoigu disclosed at the height of the war in Syria."
"Russian military-industrial complex enterprises, which previously suffered from underfunding, now receive large orders, and their capacities allow them to produce dozens or hundreds of missiles."


I should probably have mentioned,tho there is a link in the article,that this article is in fact based on [ie parroting] this one:
Scoop: Iran plans to limit range of missiles sent to Russia, Israeli officials say
Needless to say this was written by an israeli
So essentially you have forbes just parroting an israeli written article....
:tsk:
 
.
I should probably have mentioned,tho there is a link in the article,that this article is in fact based on [ie parroting] this one:
Scoop: Iran plans to limit range of missiles sent to Russia, Israeli officials say
Needless to say this was written by an israeli
So essentially you have forbes just parroting an israeli written article....
:tsk:
if i only could understand from where they get the idea that there is such clause in UNSC resolution 2231
Under UN Security Council resolution 2231, which passed in 2015 as part of the nuclear deal, countries are not allowed to transfer or receive Iran ballistic missiles and drones that have a range of more than 300 kilometers and a payload of more than 500 kilograms until October 2023.
fateh-110 won't violate their imaginary limits and Iran already have fath-360 or bm-120 with that limitation why modify Fateh-110
 
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if i only could understand from where they get the idea that there is such clause in UNSC resolution 2231

fateh-110 won't violate their imaginary limits and Iran already have fath-360 or bm-120 with that limitation why modify Fateh-110
Yes,thats a bit of a funny one isnt it?.When it comes to this claim the ones making it dont bother to reference the particular clause/paragraph/sub paragraph in the resolution that would prove this claim,instead you just get the basic res #2231.

Like I said western wishful thinking.

I honestly wouldnt be surprised if at this point iranian and russian experts were working to integrate the russian glonass positioning system into the guidance systems of the 110/313/zolifiqar/dezful,or even integrating the 313/zolfiqar/dezful with the mig31 for aeroballistic launch.
 
. .
i wonder how the writer suggest Iran can modify fateh-110 so it don't violate UNSC resolution 2231 before October ?
and after that why modify it , it won't violate any resolution then .

F-110 modified Range limit is to be compliant with MTCR, nothing to do with UNSC resolution


If situation was reversed Russian wouldn't even have given Iran a single bullet.

Yep. Hopefully Iran takes advantage of this situation and gains some valuable concessions outside of just ‘hard currency’ transactions.
 
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