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Indo-Nepal border feud plot thickens with a new film

I am not saying we are weak at all. My point is that preparation should be keeping these things in mind. What are you saying, chinese have berthing rights in Burma. They have a listening post in Coco island. Go check the news's before commenting. What IN is doing right now? Regarding Bangladesh what are you saying. If they just fire some missiles on IN and make some damage, then. You can attack burmese airbases so chines/pakistani can't attack your bases or not. The point here is China and Pakistan will try to divide our forces as much as possible.

Again, how will the Chinese ships get there to Burma which is thousands of miles away from their home bases?

Coco Islands: you really think we don't know what they "listen" to? We haven't attacked it does not mean we haven't donme anything.

Which missile did Bangladesh fire? The one which the Chinese have sold to every Tom, Dick, and Harry; the one which, in all likelihhod, known to one and all?

If PLAAF attacks India from Myanmar, then we are at war with Myanmar and PRC. If Pakistan joins in the fun, we are at war with them too. My question is why would Myanmar join the war if it has nothing to gain and much to loose? We are their only "friend" other than the PRC.

We have been ready for a two-front war; the contention is that the countries that you have mentioned would like to stay out of a war with India. They have too much to loose; they buy these toys to ensure that we don't forget them. They are nice to us because they don't want China to forget them.
 
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Why did you left Srilanka out of it. Certainly would have helped in this self created paranoia of yours.
In present day scenario it is unimaginable to even think of a war because of the fact that today's wars are over the economic front and not military. No one in reality is threatening India infact all this hype that is being created is because India wants to justify itself in spending such huge amounts on militarily spendings.

Srilanka will not join the war, because they are already busy with there internal problems. I have given a logic behind what I said. And India' spending on military is only 2.5% of GDP.
 
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Again, how will the Chinese ships get there to Burma which is thousands of miles away from their home bases?

Coco Islands: you really think we don't know what they "listen" to? We haven't attacked it does not mean we haven't donme anything.

Which missile did Bangladesh fire? The one which the Chinese have sold to every Tom, Dick, and Harry; the one which, in all likelihhod, known to one and all?

If PLAAF attacks India from Myanmar, then we are at war with Myanmar and PRC. If Pakistan joins in the fun, we are at war with them too. My question is why would Myanmar join the war if it has nothing to gain and much to loose? We are their only "friend" other than the PRC.

We have been ready for a two-front war; the contention is that the countries that you have mentioned would like to stay out of a war with India. They have too much to loose; they buy these toys to ensure that we don't forget them. They are nice to us because they don't want China to forget them.

How does ships reach to any port, by sailing to the port right. We are not at war. And any ship military or commercial is free to sail in international waters. Hope this point is clear.
 
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How does ships reach to any port, by sailing to the port right. We are not at war. And any ship military or commercial is free to sail in international waters. Hope this point is clear.

If indeed PLAN sails a naval warship to Bangladesh, we will come to know about it. I wouldn't be surprised if we'll be sailing one of our boats behind it.

If PLAN tries to send in its troops through merchant vessels, we'll come to know about it: HUMINT. Thsis would be balant case of provocation and tantamount to saying... "I'll attack you soon buddy, real soon."
 
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If indeed PLAN sails a naval warship to Bangladesh, we will come to know about it. I wouldn't be surprised if we'll be sailing one of our boats behind it.

If PLAN tries to send in its troops through merchant vessels, we'll come to know about it: HUMINT. Thsis would be balant case of provocation and tantamount to saying... "I'll attack you soon buddy, real soon."

now you got the point Bingo. So in case we see any such thing happening we need to prepare ourselves for multi front war. That is what I am trying to say from the :cheers:.
 
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Most of the countries of the world have good relations with China and deal with it without this abstract classification of "liked". The fact that you are from India and have been brought up to look at China in a certain way clouds your judgment. The same can be said about India or for that matter Pakistan depending on whom you are talking to.

Secondly, its not a matter of any democratic country not liking China. They all deal with China and have massive partnerships. So this over-hyped democracy talk does not really mean anything in reality. The Chinese themselves are not against democracy, however they think that they will arrive at it on their own time and at their own pace. This is something that the so-called Guardians of democracy do not understand. It actually is arrogant on their part to expect everyone to follow suit and to those who receive this lecture about democracy, it sounds a lot like BS as they are closer to the ground realities than those preaching for democracy and are not aware if things are conducive for whatever reasons to bring in democracy.

Agree with much of what you said. China is too important for anyone to ignore it. It's not about democracy but the brutal disregard for any norms at all that may revolt many. e.g. making major deals with Sudan while Darfur is happening is an indirect support to the genocide.

The internal situation in terms of dealing with the minorities (e.g. Tibetans and Uguars) is hardly better. Same goes for their own population.

The threat of use of force to gain territory is always round the corner. They seem to claim all the land which hypothetically belonged to the Chinese empire (or even when they were part of other's empire)! The claim on various parts of India on the basis that they were at some point part of Tibet again shows the absolute refusal to accept the current realities.
 
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Banaladesh, Bhutan, Myanmaar are small nations which do not have hostile behaviour against India. Srilanka Intervened in 1971 war by giving fuel supply to PAF planes on-way to East Pakistan, and see what RAW has done to it now.

I am sure most military planners in the above mentioned nations will think before providing logistical support to China.
 
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PS: You ever get personal again, you've had it. You still haven't countered many of my arguments in numerous threads; this speaks volumes about your intellect or the lack of it.

...

Personal? Hope you know "simile".

Countering you? Sorry, but many your arguments are not worthy countering - they are too childish. :bunny:

Only worthy questions are replied.
 
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Nepal - India

Even after India had achieved independence from Britain in 1947, Nepalese-Indian relations continued to be based on the second Treaty of Sagauli, which had been signed with the government of British India in 1925. Beginning in 1950, however, relations were based on two treaties. Under the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, ratified in July 1950, each government agreed to acknowledge and respect the other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence; to continue diplomatic relations; and, on matters pertaining to industrial and economic development, to grant rights equal to those of its own citizens to the nationals of the other residing in its territory. Agreements on all subjects in this treaty superseded those on similar matters dealt with in the previous treaties between Nepal and Britain. In the Treaty of Trade and Commerce, ratified in October 1950, India recognized Nepal's right to import and export commodities through Indian territory and ports. Customs could not be levied on commodities in transit through India.

India's influence over Nepal increased throughout the 1950s. The Citizenship Act of 1952 allowed Indians to immigrate to Nepal and acquire Nepalese citizenship with ease--a source of some resentment in Nepal. And, Nepalese were allowed to migrate freely to India--a source of resentment there. (This policy was not changed until 1962 when several restrictive clauses were added to the Nepalese constitution.) Also in 1952, an Indian military mission was established in Nepal. In 1954 a memorandum provided for the joint coordination of foreign policy, and Indian security posts were established in Nepal's northern frontier. At the same time, Nepal's dissatisfaction with India's growing influence began to emerge, and overtures to China were initiated as a counterweight to India.

King Mahendra continued to pursue a nonaligned policy begun during the reign of Prithvi Narayan Shah in the mid-eighteenth century. In the late 1950s and 1960s, Nepal voted differently from India in the UN unless India's basic interests were involved. The two countries consistently remained at odds over the rights of landlocked states to transit facilities and access to the sea.

Following the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, the relationship between Kathmandu and New Delhi thawed significantly. India suspended its support to India-based Nepalese opposition forces. Nepal extracted several concessions, including transit rights with other countries through India and access to Indian markets. In exchange, through a secret accord concluded in 1965, similar to an arrangement that had been suspended in 1963, India won a monopoly on arms sales to Nepal.

In 1969 relations again became stressful as Nepal challenged the existing mutual security arrangement and asked that the Indian security checkposts and liaison group be withdrawn. Resentment also was expressed against the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950. India grudgingly withdrew its military checkposts and liaison group, although the treaty was not abrogated.

Further changes in Nepalese-Indian relations occurred in the 1970s. India's credibility as a regional power was increased--and Nepal's vulnerability was reinforced--by the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation; the 1971 IndoPakistani War, which led to the emergence of an independent Bangladesh; the absorption of Sikkim into India in 1974; increased unofficial support of the Nepali Congress Party leadership in India; rebellions fomented by pro-Beijing Naxalite elements in 1973-74 in West Bengal State bordering Nepal; and India's nuclear explosion in 1974. Nepal adopted a cautious policy of appeasement of India, and in his 1975 coronation address King Birendra called for the recognition of Nepal as a zone of peace where military competition would be off-limits. India showed some flexibility in placating Nepal by distancing, if not disassociating, itself from the Nepalese opposition forces based in India, agreeing to a favorable trade and transit arrangement in 1978, and entering into another agreement on joint industrial ventures between Indian and Nepalese firms. The latter agreement, by opening the possibilities of India's investment, indirectly furthered India's domination of Nepal's economy. India also continued to maintain a high level of economic assistance to Nepal.

In the mid-1970s, Nepal pressed for substantial amendments to the 1971 trade and transit treaty, which was due to expire in 1976. India ultimately backed down from its initial position to terminate the 1971 treaty even before a new treaty could be negotiated. The 1978 agreements incorporated Nepal's demand for separate treaties for trade and transit. The relationship between the two nations improved over the next decade, but not steadily.

India continued to support the Nepalese opposition and refused to endorse Nepal as a zone of peace. In 1987 India urged expulsion of Nepalese settlers from neighboring Indian states, and Nepal retaliated by introducing a work permit system for Indians working in Nepal. That same year, the two countries signed an agreement setting up a joint commission to increase economic cooperation in trade and transit, industry, and water resources.

Relations between the two countries sank to a low point in 1988 when Kathmandu signed an agreement with Beijing to purchase weapons soon after a report that China had won a contract for constructing a road in the western sector to connect China with Nepal. India perceived these developments as deliberately jeopardizing its security. India also was annoyed with the high volume of unauthorized trade across the Nepalese border, the issuance of work permits to the estimated 150,000 Indians residing in Nepal, and the imposition of a 55 percent tariff on Indian goods entering Nepal.

In retaliation for these developments, India put Nepal under a virtual trade siege. In March 1989, upon the expiration of the 1978 treaties on trade and transit rights, India insisted on negotiating a single unified treaty in addition to an agreement on unauthorized trade, which Nepal saw as a flagrant attempt to strangle its economy. On March 23, 1989, India declared that both treaties had expired and closed all but two border entry points.

The economic consequences of the trade and transit deadlock were enormous. Shortages of Indian imports such as fuel, salt, cooking oil, food, and other essential commodities soon occurred. The lucrative tourist industry went into recession. Nepal also claimed that the blockade caused ecological havoc since people were compelled to use already dwindling forest resources for energy in lieu of gasoline and kerosene, which came mostly via India. To withstand the renewed Indian pressure, Nepal undertook a major diplomatic initiative to present its case on trade and transit matters to the world community.

The relationship with India was further strained in 1989 when Nepal decoupled its rupee from the Indian rupee which previously had circulated freely in Nepal. India retaliated by denying port facilities in Calcutta to Nepal, thereby preventing delivery of oil supplies from Singapore and other sources.

A swift turn in relations followed the success of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in early 1990. In June 1990, a joint Kathmandu-New Delhi communiqué was issued pending the finalization of a comprehensive arrangement covering all aspects of bilateral relations, restoring trade relations, reopening transit routes for Nepal's imports, and formalizing respect of each other's security concerns. Essentially, the communiqué announced the restoration of the status quo ante and the reopening of all border points, and Nepal agreed to various concessions regarding India's commercial privileges. Kathmandu also announced that lower cost was the decisive factor in its purchasing arms and personnel carriers from China and that Nepal was advising China to withhold delivery of the last shipment. The communiqué declared that Kathmandu and New Delhi would cooperate in industrial development, in harnessing the waters of their common rivers for mutual benefit, and in protecting and managing the environment.
 
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Personal? Hope you know "simile".

Countering you? Sorry, but many your arguments are not worthy countering - they are too childish. :bunny:

Only worthy questions are replied.

Yeah... only unworthy questions are not replied... and also questions that CCP's propaganda does not cover.
 
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Nepal - India

Even after India had achieved independence from Britain in 1947, Nepalese-Indian relations continued to be based on the second Treaty of Sagauli, which had been signed with the government of British India in 1925. Beginning in 1950, however, relations were based on two treaties. Under the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, ratified in July 1950, each government agreed to acknowledge and respect the other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence; to continue diplomatic relations; and, on matters pertaining to industrial and economic development, to grant rights equal to those of its own citizens to the nationals of the other residing in its territory. Agreements on all subjects in this treaty superseded those on similar matters dealt with in the previous treaties between Nepal and Britain. In the Treaty of Trade and Commerce, ratified in October 1950, India recognized Nepal's right to import and export commodities through Indian territory and ports. Customs could not be levied on commodities in transit through India.

India's influence over Nepal increased throughout the 1950s. The Citizenship Act of 1952 allowed Indians to immigrate to Nepal and acquire Nepalese citizenship with ease--a source of some resentment in Nepal. And, Nepalese were allowed to migrate freely to India--a source of resentment there. (This policy was not changed until 1962 when several restrictive clauses were added to the Nepalese constitution.) Also in 1952, an Indian military mission was established in Nepal. In 1954 a memorandum provided for the joint coordination of foreign policy, and Indian security posts were established in Nepal's northern frontier. At the same time, Nepal's dissatisfaction with India's growing influence began to emerge, and overtures to China were initiated as a counterweight to India.

King Mahendra continued to pursue a nonaligned policy begun during the reign of Prithvi Narayan Shah in the mid-eighteenth century. In the late 1950s and 1960s, Nepal voted differently from India in the UN unless India's basic interests were involved. The two countries consistently remained at odds over the rights of landlocked states to transit facilities and access to the sea.

Following the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, the relationship between Kathmandu and New Delhi thawed significantly. India suspended its support to India-based Nepalese opposition forces. Nepal extracted several concessions, including transit rights with other countries through India and access to Indian markets. In exchange, through a secret accord concluded in 1965, similar to an arrangement that had been suspended in 1963, India won a monopoly on arms sales to Nepal.

In 1969 relations again became stressful as Nepal challenged the existing mutual security arrangement and asked that the Indian security checkposts and liaison group be withdrawn. Resentment also was expressed against the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950. India grudgingly withdrew its military checkposts and liaison group, although the treaty was not abrogated.

Further changes in Nepalese-Indian relations occurred in the 1970s. India's credibility as a regional power was increased--and Nepal's vulnerability was reinforced--by the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation; the 1971 IndoPakistani War, which led to the emergence of an independent Bangladesh; the absorption of Sikkim into India in 1974; increased unofficial support of the Nepali Congress Party leadership in India; rebellions fomented by pro-Beijing Naxalite elements in 1973-74 in West Bengal State bordering Nepal; and India's nuclear explosion in 1974. Nepal adopted a cautious policy of appeasement of India, and in his 1975 coronation address King Birendra called for the recognition of Nepal as a zone of peace where military competition would be off-limits. India showed some flexibility in placating Nepal by distancing, if not disassociating, itself from the Nepalese opposition forces based in India, agreeing to a favorable trade and transit arrangement in 1978, and entering into another agreement on joint industrial ventures between Indian and Nepalese firms. The latter agreement, by opening the possibilities of India's investment, indirectly furthered India's domination of Nepal's economy. India also continued to maintain a high level of economic assistance to Nepal.

In the mid-1970s, Nepal pressed for substantial amendments to the 1971 trade and transit treaty, which was due to expire in 1976. India ultimately backed down from its initial position to terminate the 1971 treaty even before a new treaty could be negotiated. The 1978 agreements incorporated Nepal's demand for separate treaties for trade and transit. The relationship between the two nations improved over the next decade, but not steadily.

India continued to support the Nepalese opposition and refused to endorse Nepal as a zone of peace. In 1987 India urged expulsion of Nepalese settlers from neighboring Indian states, and Nepal retaliated by introducing a work permit system for Indians working in Nepal. That same year, the two countries signed an agreement setting up a joint commission to increase economic cooperation in trade and transit, industry, and water resources.

Relations between the two countries sank to a low point in 1988 when Kathmandu signed an agreement with Beijing to purchase weapons soon after a report that China had won a contract for constructing a road in the western sector to connect China with Nepal. India perceived these developments as deliberately jeopardizing its security. India also was annoyed with the high volume of unauthorized trade across the Nepalese border, the issuance of work permits to the estimated 150,000 Indians residing in Nepal, and the imposition of a 55 percent tariff on Indian goods entering Nepal.

In retaliation for these developments, India put Nepal under a virtual trade siege. In March 1989, upon the expiration of the 1978 treaties on trade and transit rights, India insisted on negotiating a single unified treaty in addition to an agreement on unauthorized trade, which Nepal saw as a flagrant attempt to strangle its economy. On March 23, 1989, India declared that both treaties had expired and closed all but two border entry points.

The economic consequences of the trade and transit deadlock were enormous. Shortages of Indian imports such as fuel, salt, cooking oil, food, and other essential commodities soon occurred. The lucrative tourist industry went into recession. Nepal also claimed that the blockade caused ecological havoc since people were compelled to use already dwindling forest resources for energy in lieu of gasoline and kerosene, which came mostly via India. To withstand the renewed Indian pressure, Nepal undertook a major diplomatic initiative to present its case on trade and transit matters to the world community.

The relationship with India was further strained in 1989 when Nepal decoupled its rupee from the Indian rupee which previously had circulated freely in Nepal. India retaliated by denying port facilities in Calcutta to Nepal, thereby preventing delivery of oil supplies from Singapore and other sources.

A swift turn in relations followed the success of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in early 1990. In June 1990, a joint Kathmandu-New Delhi communiqué was issued pending the finalization of a comprehensive arrangement covering all aspects of bilateral relations, restoring trade relations, reopening transit routes for Nepal's imports, and formalizing respect of each other's security concerns. Essentially, the communiqué announced the restoration of the status quo ante and the reopening of all border points, and Nepal agreed to various concessions regarding India's commercial privileges. Kathmandu also announced that lower cost was the decisive factor in its purchasing arms and personnel carriers from China and that Nepal was advising China to withhold delivery of the last shipment. The communiqué declared that Kathmandu and New Delhi would cooperate in industrial development, in harnessing the waters of their common rivers for mutual benefit, and in protecting and managing the environment.

This is a far better read than the previous one.
 
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