Indo China conflict: Impact on South Asia

[Banglar Bir]

Indo China conflict: Impact on South Asia
Afsan Chowdhury, July 26, 2017

As Indo-China conflict becomes more possible by the day, South Asian media has not taken sides. It’s clear that should there actually be a conflict, nobody will come out as winners. As physical and economic neighbours to both India and China, South Asian countries run a risk of being negatively affected if the conflict descends into actual war.

The conflict is around the control of Dok la, the so called narrow corridor which sits in-between North East India hugging Bhutan and China. The discomfort has existed for long. There is a history of conflict as well going back to the 1962 war which India badly lost and has haunted its memory till now.

On the other hand, China has remembered the conflict going by regular references to that too. But the situation has changed a lot since then and what was a Indo-China war then could well become a South Asian zone of conflict now. It may damage a far more fragile South Asia than the two war participants.

The involvement of China in South Asia is a result of several factors but search for new investment zones I one. China needs to invest and South Asia minus India needs money to grow rapidly. The two interests have happily met. Hence any war will devastate that potential.

India and China are of course direct neighbors and have inter-actions that are both hostile and mutually beneficial in many sectors. Many South Asian countries have however felt hemmed in by India and the Chinese footprint has been welcomed which has restored some degree of balance and space for maneuver for the smaller South Asians vis-a –vi India.

This development has not made India very happy and relations have threatened to be strained. It has fortunately been less than what media polemics displays because India is spread all over and gains from its South Asian neighbours too. Thus an element of mutuality exist which over time will become more established and more accepted. Both India and China are neighbours to South Asia and that’s a reality. As is the reality of collateral damage due to Indo-China war.

Oh for a war
India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan have direct land border with China while Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh have with India. Thus, geography is also playing a role in determining how each of the countries will be affected. Pakistan and India are involved in low intensity active conflict with each other in which China plays a role as Pakistan’s most trusted ally. In 1971, India waited till snow fall made crossover to India impossible by Chinese troops to aid Pakistan before entering Bangladesh then under Pakistani occupation.

But what does one make of the very high pitched media war that is already on between the two. Since, there is only official media in China, its voice must be accepted as that of the Government and its indee aggressive. Global Times, which is like an official spokes person of China, has warned that in case of a conflict , depending on the US and Japan will not help India much. Its language is very strong and it reminds India of the 1962 war results.

Indian media and government also remind China that it’s not “1962’ and China will find out if war happens how much India has progressed. While the public voice is missing in China, Indian media is full of people wanting to go to war and prove China a ‘lesson’. It does seem that restraint is not exactly a priority for either country.

However, everyone else is advocating it knowing that the price of a war would be quite high for all around including the West. An Indo-China conflict is not the same as a US-N.Korea one and given China’s 20% share in global trade and India growing, the impact will be felt by all.

In case of Bangladesh, which has recently received massive Chinese investment but also is deeply connected to India in many ways, the post war scenario may be very instability generating If India’s corridor to the North East is weakened, the pressure on Bangladesh will increase to provide both access to the North East and ensure greater surveillance that NE insurgents don’t find any foothold as they have open found before. It may even be asked to reevaluate its trade and military aids relationship with China.

Bangladesh will want to continue with China as it gives some leverage with India and reduces dependence but a post war scenario is difficult to forecast. India’s blockade of Nepal shows there is no ‘soft hands’ policy around which means South Asia may well be quit negatively affected by a Sino-Indian war perhaps more than the warring parties.
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/07/26/indo-china-conflict-impact-south-asia/

 

[Baby Leone]

the credibility of the writer shows with his knowledge so according to writter Afghanistan and Sri Lanka have direct Land border with India

 

[NOWorNEVER]

Oh for a war
India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan have direct land border with China while Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bangladesh have with India

India do not have any border with Afghanistan. Please correct the fact.

 

[Banglar Bir]

India’s China War Circa 2017?
Ikram Sehgal, July 28, 2017

A month or so ago Indian troops trespassed and forcibly halted China extending a border road through Donglang plateau (called Doklam by India) at a junction between China, Sikkim (annexed by India) and Bhutan. Sourabh Gupta says it “is wholly a matter between Beijing and Thimpu (Bhutan’s capital). Until such time, Bhutan – let alone India, which has no locus standi to intervene – must respect China’s effective jurisdiction over the Doklam area.”

India fears this road will facilitate the Chinese in cutting off the strategically vulnerable 20km wide “Siliguri Corridor” (known as the “Chicken’s Neck”) linking the seven North-Eastern States (Assam, Meghalaya, Bodoland, Nagaland, Tripura, Manipur, and Mizoram) to the Indian mainland, a self-fulfilling prophecy exacerbated further by Long Xingchun, Director at the Centre for Indian Studies at China West Normal University writing in the Global Times, “Even if India were requested to defend Bhutan’s territory, this could only be limited to its established territory, not the disputed area, otherwise under India’s logic if the Pakistani government requests, a third country’s army can enter the area (Kashmir) disputed by India and Pakistan”.

The “McMahon Line” is a unilateral imaginary line between the British colonial authorities and the Tibetans without Chinese participation or consulting the Chinese govt. In “This is India’s China War – Round Two,” Maxwell writes, “Rather than let the line of actual control (LAC) mature with the passing years, India has been needling Beijing by taking such doll figures as the Dalai Lama and loud-mouthed American diplomats into the disputed border region India proclaims its state of Arunachal Pradesh, megaphoning the false claim that the McMahon alignment represents a legal boundary rather than a historical but contested claim. The McMahon Line is in fact a British diplomatic forgery. This India stance indicates that PM Narendra Modi has decided that India’s interest will be better served in an aggressive American alliance rather than in a neighbourly relationship with China”. Unquote.

The Chinese Army routed India in 1962 occupying North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and Ladakh in a short swift campaign. With little or no opposition Calcutta was theirs for the taking. Rather than advancing south of Foothills 55 kms from Tezpur on the Brahmaputra River, the Chinese unilaterally withdrew. Several hundred Indian soldiers without their weapons sought refuge in Sylhet in East Pakistan, fully 350 kms south of the Brahmaputra. As a sixteen year old student of Murari Chand College Sylhet, I personally witnessed the camps set up for them by the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR).

Flush with annexation of Goa (Operation Vijay) from the Portuguese in Dec 1961, an arrogant Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru made a grave miscalculation instituting his “Forward Policy” in 1961. With great media fanfare he ordered the Indian Army to establish (nearly 60) border outposts and patrols north of Chinese positions from Ladakh to NEFA to cut off the Chinese supply lines. Without adequate combat capability, support or backup small groups of Indian soldiers were sent to occupy disputed areas in Ladakh and NEFA, claiming these as Indian territory. Relying on flawed and inaccurate intelligence, Nehru’s “Forward Policy” provoking China into reacting by using overwhelming military force was not anticipated by him or other Indian leaders. The other key players in this fiasco were Krishna Menon (the Defence Minister) and their favourite Lt Gen B M Kaul, a most undeserving political appointee as Chief of General Staff (CGS). Commissioned into the infantry, he was soon transferred to the Army Supply Corps. His claim to fame was pleasing his political bosses by making his Infantry Division troops do manual labour making barracks.

Australian Neville Maxwell’s “India’s China War” challenged the Indian narrative of Chinese “aggression” by revealing how India had provoked Beijing into the war. Maxwell’s primary source was a copy of the top secret “Henderson Brooks Report” investigated by Lt Gen Henderson Brooks and Brig Premindra Singh Bhagat in 1963, a scathing indictment of the intelligence failures and political miscalculations of India’s Congress-led government that led to India’s military debacle. The Henderson Brooks Report remains classified in India because of “national security” reasons, the truth being very inconvenient Maxwell’s book was banned in “democratic” India.

Anticipating quick victory and glory (shades of Kargil), Kaul manipulated command of 4 Corps at his own request on the eve of war. The Henderson Brooks Report slammed BM Kaul for failing as Chief of General Staff to advise the govt of “our weakness and inability to implement the ‘Forward Policy”. The Report highlights Kaul’s lack of military qualifications and combat experience besides his cultivating a clique within the officer cadre including Deputy CGS (Maj Gen J S Dhillon) and the DMO (Brig Monty Palit). In searching for glory those without combat experience who rise in rank are those who most thirst for war, they have no qualms sending men they command to die. Most generals who made money in Pakistan were loudmouths who had never seen combat.

India played the innocent “rape” victim to the hilt. Sensing an opportunity 55 years ago to wean supposedly non-aligned India away from the Soviet Camp, US Ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith convinced President John Kennedy to mount a massive US arms and equipment airlift to Calcutta to equip 3-4 mountain divisions expeditiously. However even the US balked giving to the Indian “wish list” requesting “three submarines” to fight the Chinese (in the Himalayas?).

Bangladeshis should read Long Xingchun’s article with interest, “This incursion reflects that India fears China can quickly separate mainland India from Northeast India through military means, dividing India into two pieces. The northeast might take the opportunity to become independent” Unquote. Sometime in 1946 our visionary Quaid-i-Azam quietly explored the possibility of an independent muslim majority country in the east comprising united Bengal and Assam (the Northeast) with Calcutta at its main port. How the British helped Congress prevent this is another story. The Association of the Eastern States of South East Asia (AESSA) concept (my article “Bangladesh and Lebensraum – The AESSA Concept” of Mar 26, 1990) may yet happen.

Reminiscent of the 1962 Menon-Kaul bellicose attitude exposed by the Henderson Brooks Report, India’s Army Chief General Bipin Rawat recently boasted that India can fight and win on “two and a half” fronts simultaneously. Consider Wu Qian, Spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Defence, demanding that India vacate unconditionally, “abandoning any impractical illusions and should not cling to any fantasy to intrude into Chinese territory which will be intolerable”. Will Modi and the “two and a half front” Gen Rawat put up or shut up?

(the writer is a defence and security analyst).
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/07/28/indias-china-war-circa-2017/

 

[Banglar Bir]

Standoff with China calls for re-casting of India’s Bhutan policy
P K Balachandran, July 31, 2017

Narendra Modi with Tshering Tobgay
The on-going Sino-Indian military confrontation in Doklam is taking place on land claimed by Bhutan and China. Officially, India is not party to the dispute, and yet it is there ostensibly on the basis of the revised 2007 Indo-Bhutanese treaty which sanctions close cooperation to protect each other’s national interest.

But what is intriguing is Bhutan’s silence on the Indian intervention and China’s heated reaction to it. Tiny and powerless Bhutan may well be allowing Big Brother India to handle the matter with mighty China directly and entirely. But its silence may also be hiding issues with India which could surface any time to India’s discomfiture and China’s advantage.

Thanks to the indifference of the Indian media to issues relating to tiny Bhutan, New Delhi has been hiding from public view several issues it has had with Thimphu in the last decade and a half.

These are likely to surface and get articulated if the standoff at Doklam continues. In fact, the basic contours of a future Bhutan-India political standoff have already appeared in commentaries in the Indian and foreign media.

Therefore, New Delhi would do well to realize that the ground under its feet is shifting and take corrective steps to put its relations with Bhutan on a different and sustainable footing. New Delhi would have to adopt a strategy that would keep Bhutan within its fold in the face of China’s rising global economic and military power and its eagerness to spread its tentacles across frontiers through muscular military means (as in the South China Sea) and through economic means, as the US$ 1 trillion One Belt One Road (OBOR) global communication infrastructure project would suggest.

Time has come for New Delhi to shed its patronizing attitude to Bhutan. It should also shed its belief that giving billions of dollars in aid and executing massive projects will necessarily bring political support or subservience. New Delhi will have to identify the warts in its relations with Bhutan, attend to the blemishes expeditiously, and be more sensitive to the client state’s multifarious needs. New Delhi must keep in mind the fact that China is capable of attracting Bhutan with unrivalled blandishments and also wield the big stick, if necessary.

Bhutan has already been moving away from India steadily though subtly. According to former Indian diplomat M.K.Bhadrakumar, Bhutan’s one and only statement on Doklam, dated June 29, did not say anything to the effect that Thimpu had sought Indian help to tackle Chinese intransigence in Doklam, or that it consulted the Indian government. It has also come to light that Bhutan was unaware that the Indian military was crossing the border into Bhutan on June 18, he said.

Clearly, Bhutan had been kept in the dark. It is probable that there is disquiet in Thimphu about this, as past incidents show. Anticipating objections and trouble from India, Bhutan had had 24 rounds of border talks with China behind India’s back. In these talks, Bhutan had routinely given in to China’s demands without getting the concurrence of India, thus violating the 2007 Indo-Bhutanese accord in spirit.

It was the fear that Bhutan might acquiesce to China’s bid to take over Doklam also, which made India bypass it to militarily thwart China’s road building effort in Doklam. India was aware that China had offered Bhutan a “package deal” to settle the entire border issue, under which, China would give up a number of claims in other places if Bhutan would drop its claim to Doklam.

If Bhutan had acquiesced on Doklam too, India’s security would have been in jeopardy, given the fact that China’s sitting on the Doklam plateau, at the tri-junction of India, China and Bhutan, would have seriously threatened the Siliguri corridor in India. Known as the chicken neck, the Siliguri corridor is the only link mainland India has with its North-Eastern states of Assam, Tripura, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, which apart from being insurgency affected, share borders with either China, Myanmar or Bangladesh.

Even before the standoff over Doklam began on June 16, Bhutan had been looking for friendly relations with China despite getting loads of aid from India. According to Indian official figures, Bhutan had got Rs. 31,587 crore (US$ 5.8 billion) from India between 2000-2001 and 2016-2017, to be the top most recipient of Indian aid in South Asia.

India-Bhutan economic ties have been exceptionally close. 84% of Bhutan’s exports go to India, and India accounts for 64% of its imports. Hydro power generated by Indian companies accounts for 40% of Bhutan’s GDP and is also the main item of export to India. But the heavy economic dependence on India in trade and investment has led to apprehensions in Bhutan and some real problems too. Hydro-electric power has also been a cause of tension because of changes in Indian policy to the detriment of Bhutan.

In 2009, India said it would help step up power generation to 10,000 MW by 2020, and purchase all the surplus power. However, Shripad Dharmadhikary of the Manthan Adhyayan Kendra quotes the New Delhi-based Vasudha Foundation to say that the commissioning of new projects was delayed while costs went up.

The cost of the 1,200 MW Punatsangchhu-I had gone up from US$ 510 million to US$ 1.46 billion. In the case of the 1,020 MW Punatsangchhu –II project, it went up to US$ 1.1 billion from US$ 570 million. And in the case of the 720 MW Mangdechhu, the cost went up to US$D 675 million from US$ 435 million.

India was to finance the entire project with a 60% grant component and 40% loan component. But this was reversed, due to financial difficulties. The loan component now comprises 60 to 70%. Interest rates have also gone up.

Economic analysis has revealed that the net profit per unit of electricity sold has fallen sharply since 2007, the Vasudha Foundation report said. Moreover, hydropower has contributed to a steep rise in Bhutan’s debts, and the report notes that Bhutan is “among 14 other countries that are fast heading towards a debt crisis.”

At the same time hydropower projects are causing massive environmental damage and jobless growth, the study pointed out.

According to former Indian diplomat P. Stobdan, on the international front, Bhutan started taking a divergent approach, especially after democratization in 2007. It sided with China and others on Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge issue at the NAM’s Havana Summit in 1979; didn’t follow India’s stance on the status of landlocked nations at the UN; signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferatio Treaty in 1985; and supported Pakistan’s Nuclear Free Zone South Asia proposal. It is yet to accede to the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal Motor Vehicle Agreement (BBIN) for the regulation of passenger, personal and cargo vehicular traffic signed under SAARC in June 2015.

Bhutan’s first democratically elected government led by Prime Minister Jigme Yozer Thinley extended diplomatic ties from 25 nations in 2011 to 53 in 2013. It is now close to establishing diplomatic ties with China as China wants to discuss the border and other issues directly with it. Prime Minister Thinley met Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012, setting off alarm bells in New Delhi.

“Uncomfortable about the increasing coziness between Bhutan and China, India looked for an opportunity to punish Thinley. In the days leading up to the Bhutanese General Election in July 2013, New Delhi, in an unambiguous signal, abruptly cut subsidies on gas and kerosene sales (among other tough measures) to Bhutan. Some critics inferred the move was simply meant to rock the election campaign. Others saw a clear message from New Delhi to the Bhutanese – be prepared to face sanctions if Thinley is voted back to power.,” Stobdan noted.

Scathing criticism of India’s meddling in the Bhutanese election outcome poured in from Bhutan, India and abroad.

Perhaps sensing the disquiet in Bhutan, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made it a point to go to Bhutan first. But in shaping India’s policy towards Bhutan he would do well to go beyond economic aid and look at the relationship from multiple angles to redress Bhutan’s articulated and unarticulated grievances and apprehensions in view of its strategic location.
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/indo-china-conflict-impact-on-south-asia.508946/#post-9710616

 

[Bilal9]

the credibility of the writer shows with his knowledge so according to writter Afghanistan and Sri Lanka have direct Land border with India

Chhorr do yaar. Probably a little senile......have some tolerance........

 

[Tshering22]

China would give up a number of claims in other places if Bhutan would drop its claim to Doklam.

They don't give up.

They only buy time and then for any issue, will rattle it up again.

Basically any negotiation from a point of weakness with China ends up with the other country being at a disadvantage of some form.

 

[Banglar Bir]

The India Doctrine
Difference between Powers must be kept in mind.
ক্ষমতার ব্যবধানকে মনে রাখতে হবে

হিমালয়ে চীনের সাথে বর্ধিত সামরিক সঙ্কটের সমাধান করলেও ভারত মহাসাগরে বেইজিংয়ের সামুদ্রিক অবস্থানের প্রতি তার দৃষ্টি না রেখে পারবে না ভারত । গত সপ্তাহান্তে শ্রীলংকা অনেক টানাপড়েনের পর হামবানতোতা বন্দর একটি চীনা কনসোর্টিয়ামকে হস্তান্তর করেছে। ভারতীয় মহাসাগরের যোগাযোগের সমুদ্রের লাইনগুলোকে যুক্ত করতে এর বিশেষ গুরুত্ব রয়েছে।

একইভাবে মিয়ানমারের বেইজিংয়ের উপর অতি অর্থনৈতিক নির্ভরতা সম্পর্কে বেশ রাজনৈতিক উদ্বেগ থাকা সত্ত্বেও দেশটির সরকার বঙ্গোপসাগর উপকূলের কিউকপিউ দ্বীপের বাণিজ্যিক উন্নয়নের জন্য চীনা কোম্পানির সাথে একটি চুক্তি করছে। ইয়াংগুন যখন এই চুক্তিতে স্বাক্ষর করবে তখন চীনা কোম্পানি গভীর সমুদ্র বন্দর নির্মাণ, বিশেষ অর্থনৈতিক অঞ্চল ও একটি শিল্প পার্ক নির্মাণ শুরু করবে। বঙ্গোপসাগর এর পরেও আগের মতো একইরকম থাকবে মনে করার কারণ নেই।

শ্রীলঙ্কা এবং মায়ানমারের সাথে চীনের দুটি বন্দর চুক্তির তুলনায় ভুটানে এক খন্ড ভূমির জন্য আধকাঁচা সংঘাতের তুলনার কোন মানে হয় না। যদিও এই অঞ্চলে ভূখন্ডের প্রতিযোগিতা প্রকৃতপক্ষে অনেক বেশি গুরুতর, তবে তারা সামরিক দ্বন্দ্বের খরচ এবং দুই এশিয়ান জায়ান্টের এমনকি ছোট সামরিক সংঘাতের মুখোমুখি হবার সম্ভাব্য ক্ষতিও নিয়ন্ত্রণ করতে চায়। অথচ এর বিপরীতে বন্দর চুক্তি ভারতের আশপাশের দেশগুলোতে চীনের দীর্ঘমেয়াদী অর্থনৈতিক প্রভাব বিস্তারের জন্য ভিত্তি তৈরি করবে।

চীনের কোম্পানিগুলির প্রতিশ্রুতি হলো এই দুটি গভীর সমুদ্রবন্দর বিশ্ব বাণিজ্য ও উৎপাদন নেটওয়ার্কের সাথে শ্রীলঙ্কা ও মিয়ানমারকে সংযুক্ত করবে। দুই চুক্তিতে চীনের কোম্পানির জন্য ৮০ শতাংশের বেশি অংশীদারিত্ব এবং দীর্ঘমেয়াদী লিজের যে প্রকৃতি রয়েছে তাতে এর প্রভাব বোঝা যায়। হামবানতোতায় ৯৯ বছর এবং কিউকপিউ ৫০ থেকে ৭৫ বছর সময়ের জন্য লীজ দেয়া হতে পারে।

উভয় দেশের জনপ্রতিবাদের বিরুদ্ধে চীনের অত্যন্ত অনুকূল শর্তে তাদের অর্থনৈতিক সুবিধার একটি বড় অংশের উপর কর্তৃত্ব হস্তান্তরের ব্যাপারে এই দু’টি চুক্তি স্বাক্ষর আমাদের প্রতিবেশীদের ক্ষমতাসীন অভিজাতদের জন্য কতটা কঠিন হয়ে উঠে তা স্পষ্ট। কলম্বো আর ইয়াংগুনের সঙ্গে আলোচনার মধ্যে দৃশ্যত চীনের রাজনৈতিক প্রভাব প্রদর্শিত হয়েছে। সময়ের সঙ্গে সঙ্গে চীনের এই শক্তির উত্থান ঘটেছে বলে মনে হয়।

ভারত উপমহাদেশে এক সময় চীনা কৌশলগত আক্রমণের প্রতিদ্বন্দ্বিতা করার চিন্তা ছিল একবারে বিলাসিতার মতো। আর এখন ভারতীয় সেনাবাহিনী ডোকলাম মালভূমির গর্তে আটকে আছে আর এর কূটনীতিকরা কলম্বোতে হামবানতোতায় ভারতের উদ্বেগ নিরসনে কাজ করছে। কলম্বোতে ভারতের কিছু উদ্বেগের বিষয় নিরসন করা হলেও, দিল্লি মিয়ানমারের কিউকপিউতে আলোচনার কোন পক্ষই নয়। অথচ এটা হওয়া উচিত ছিল।

সর্বোপরি, ভারত কিউকপিউ থেকে অদূরে সিটওয়েতে একটি ছোট বন্দর নির্মাণ করছে এবং দ্বীপটির তাৎর্য সম্পর্কে সচেতনও রয়েছে। বঙ্গোপসাগরের মধ্য দিয়ে চালিত দ্বৈত তেল ও গ্যাস পাইপলাইন ব্যবস্থার মাধ্যমে পশ্চিম চীনে পেট্রোলিয়াম আমদানির জন্য জ্বালানি গেটওয়ে হতে চলেছে কিউকপিও। কিন্তু ১০ বিলিয়ন ডলারের কিউকপিউ প্রকল্পের ব্যাপারে চীনের সাথে প্রতিদ্বন্দ্বিতা করার ক্ষমতা দিল্লির নেই। অন্যান্য আন্তর্জাতিক খেলোয়াড়রাও কিউকপিউতে চীনের বিকল্প প্রস্তাব প্রদান করেনি।

চীন যদি কিউকপিউকে সিঙ্গাপুর ও হংকংয়ের মতো বাণিজ্যিক হাব বানানোর কথা রাখে তাহলে ভারতের নীতি নির্ধারকদের আগামী বছরগুলোতে দ্বীপটি নিয়ে চিন্তাভাবনায় অনেক সময় ব্যয় করতে হবে। বিশেষ করে যেহেতু বেইজিং কিউকপিউতে তার সম্প্রসারিত বাণিজ্যিক স্বার্থ সুরক্ষিত করার জন্য যথেষ্ট নৌ এবং সামরিক শক্তি বিস্তৃত করতে বাধ্য হবে সেহেতু ভারতকেও এ বিষয়ে ভাবতে হবে।

চীনের বহুমুখি অগ্রগতি দিল্লিতে একটি জনপ্রিয় ধারণাকে শক্তিশালী করার প্রবণতা দেখা যায়। এটি হলো চীন ভারতকে “কৌশলগত অবরুদ্ধ” করার জন্য কাজ করছে। আসলে এ ধারণা বিভ্রান্তিকর। প্রকৃতপক্ষে চীনা উত্থানের কারণে ভারতের কৌশলগত অবস্থানে সংকোচন ঘটছে। বেইজিং ইচ্ছাকৃতভাবে ভারতকে ঠেকিয়ে রাখার জন্য সদা সক্রিয় বিষয়টি এ রকম নয়। বেইজিং অর্থনৈতিক ও সামরিক উভয়ক্ষেত্রে তার সর্বজনীন জাতীয় শক্তিকে সুসংহত করতে চাইছে। এর একটি প্রয়োগগত প্রভাব অবশ্যম্ভাবীরূপে পড়বে। সহজভাবে দেখুন, প্রশ্নটা চীনা অভিপ্রায় সম্পর্কে নয়, কিন্তু তার ক্ষমতা ব্যাপকতর করার ক্ষেত্রে।

ভারতের সমস্যায় আরো চারটি কারণ যোগ হয়েছে। শি জিনপিংয়ের নেতৃত্বে চীন জাতীয় শক্তি সম্প্রসারণের সাথে রাজনৈতিক ইচ্ছার সমন্বয়কে পরিত্যাগ করেছে। চীন মনে করে যে, অন্য জাতিগুলির সংবেদনশীলতার জন্য বসে থাকার চীনা যুগ শেষ হয়ে গেছে। শির মত অনুসারে, এখন এশিয়ার মধ্যে সর্বাধিক শক্তি হিসাবে বেইজিং এর উত্থানের সাথে অন্যদের অভিযোজন করে নিতে হবে।

দ্বিতীয়টি হচ্ছে চীন ও ভারতের মধ্যে কৌশলগত ব্যবধান বিস্তৃত হওয়া। যদিও ১৯৯১ সাল থেকে ভারত যথেষ্ট ভাল করেছে এবং বিশ্বের বৃহত্তম অর্থনীতিগুলির মধ্যে একটি হিসাবে আবির্ভূত হয়েছে। তবে চীনের সাথে দূরত্বটি অদূর ভবিষ্যতে দূর হবে এমনটি দেখা যায় না। চীনের বর্তমান জিডিপি ভারতের তুলনায় পাঁচ গুণ বড় এবং তার প্রতিরক্ষা ব্যয় চারগুণ বড়। এমনকি ভারত যদি আগামী বছরগুলোতে চীনের তুলনায় অধিক দ্রুত বিকাশ লাভ করে এরপরও চীনের সঙ্গে বিশাল দূরত্ব থেকে যাবে দিল্লির।

তৃতীয়ত, চীনের উত্থান দিল্লির জন্য কি প্রভাব বয়ে আনবে সেটি নিয়ে নিম্ন ধারণায় ভোগেছে ভারত । চীন ও ভারতকে নিয়ে বিশ্বের বড় বড় কথা বলার ফলে পরিবর্তনের শক্তি ভারসাম্য বেইজিংয়ের পক্ষে থাকার বিষয়টি চীনের সাথে ভারতের দীর্ঘ ও বিতর্কিত সীমান্তের গতিশীলতা যে পরিবর্তন আনতে পারে সেটি ভাবা হয়নি। ভারত নিজেই বিশ্বাস করে যে সীমান্তের বিরোধ সীমাবদ্ধ করার জন্য পর্যাপ্ত শক্তিশালী ব্যবস্থা দেশটি তৈরি করেছে। চীন-ভারত সীমান্তে যে শান্তি ও স্থিতি ছিল তা ভিন্ন ভিন্ন পরিস্থিতির কারণে ছিল। যখন চীন বিশ্বের সাথে নিজেকে সংহত করা শুরু করে তখন তারা চীনের সক্রিয়তাবাদী পররাষ্ট্র নীতি নিয়ে টিকে থাকতে পারত না।

চতুর্থত, ভারত এই দশকগুলোতে আঞ্চলিক অগ্রগতির জন্য মনোনিবেশ করেছে। চীন এই ধারণাটি কখনোই গ্রহণ করেনি যে উপমহাদেশ ভারতের একচেটিয়া প্রভাবের অধীনে থাকবে। চীন এখন একটি রুটিন ভিত্তিতে সে অবস্থাকে চ্যালেঞ্জ করার জন্য তার ইচ্ছা এবং সম্পদকে কাজে লাগাচ্ছে। এটিই এ অঞ্চলে ভারতের অর্থনৈতিক ও কৌশলগত কেন্দ্রিয়তাকে চ্যালেঞ্জের মুখে ফেলেছে।

নিশ্চিতভাবেই দিল্লি এখন সৃষ্ট অস্তিত্বশীল চ্যালেঞ্জের ব্যাপারে বেইজিংয়ের তুলনায় ক্ষমতার ভারসাম্যে অনেক পেছনে। তবে এই সচেতনতার মাধ্যমে সরকারের মধ্যে জরুরি কোন তৎপরতার অনুভূতি দেখা যায় না। এক্ষেত্রে নিম্নলিখিত বিষয় বিবেচনা করতে হবে: গত কয়েক বছর ধরে চীন শ্রীলঙ্কা এবং মায়ানমারের পশ্চিমাঞ্চলীয় সমুদ্রপৃষ্ঠের রূপান্তর করেছে। কিন্তু দিল্লি বঙ্গোপসাগরে তার ভুলে যাওয়া জাতীয় সম্পদ আন্দামান ও নিকোবর দ্বীপপুঞ্জে কিছু করার জন্য প্রয়োজন অনুভব করতে পারে নি।

দীর্ঘমেয়াদে দিল্লি তার সীমান্ত অঞ্চলের উন্নয়ন, সামরিক আধুনিকীকরণ এবং আঞ্চলিক অর্থনৈতিক একীকরণে জোরালোভাবে কাজ করেছে। ভারতের সামনে বড় জটিলতাটি হবে চীনের উত্থান এবং ভবিষ্যত ডোকলাম, হামবানতোতা এবং কিউকপিউ পরিস্থিতির সাথে নিজেকে মানিয়ে নেয়া।
http://bn.southasianmonitor.com/2017/08/03/12106

 

[Banglar Bir]

Thu Aug 3, 2017 | 11:16 AM EDT
China says India building up troops amid border stand off

China accuses India of "concocting excuses" over border dispute

(Reuters) - China's Foreign Ministry on Thursday said India has been building up troops and repairing roads along its side of the border amid an increasingly tense stand-off in a remote frontier region beside the Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan.

The stand-off on a plateau next to the mountainous Indian state of Sikkim, which borders China, has ratcheted up tension between the neighbors, who share a 3,500-km (2,175-mile) frontier, large parts of which are disputed.

"It has already been more than a month since the incident, and India is still not only illegally remaining on Chinese territory, it is also repairing roads in the rear, stocking up supplies, massing a large number of armed personnel," the foreign ministry said in a statement.

"This is certainly not for peace."

Early in June, according to the Chinese interpretation of events, Indian guards crossed into China's Donglang region and obstructed work on a road on the plateau.

The two sides' troops then confronted each other close to a valley controlled by China that separates India from its close ally, Bhutan, and gives China access to the so-called Chicken's Neck, a thin strip of land connecting India and its remote northeastern regions.

India has said it warned China that construction of the road near their common border would have serious security implications.

Despite China's numerous diplomatic representations, its foreign ministry said, India has not only not withdrawn its troops but has also been making "unreasonable demands" and is not sincere about a resolution.

"If India really cherishes peace, it ought to immediately withdraw its personnel who have illegally crossed the border into the Indian side."

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China's defense ministry last month warned India not to harbor any illusions about the Chinese military's ability to defend its territory.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is to visit China early in September for a summit of BRICS leaders.

Indian officials say about 300 soldiers from either side are facing each other about 150 meters (yards) apart on the plateau.

They have told Reuters that both sides' diplomats have quietly engaged to try to keep the stand-off from escalating, and that India's ambassador to Beijing is leading the effort to find a way for both sides to back down without loss of face.

Chinese state media have warned India of a fate worse than the defeat it suffered in a brief border war in 1962. China's military has held live fire drills close to the disputed area, they said last month.

(Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Clarence Fernandez)
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/amp/idUSKBN1AJ1TP

 

[Banglar Bir]

Doklam standoff: China warns India, says ‘our restraint has a bottom line’
China said it has shown utmost goodwill and sought to communicate with India through diplomatic channels to resolve the incident, but added that goodwill has its principles and restraint has its bottom line.

India Updated: Aug 04, 2017
Press Trust of India, Beijing

A Chinese soldier and an Indian soldier at the Nathu La border crossing between India and China in Sikkim. A border standoff has heightened tension between the two neighbours. (AFP File Photo / Representational)

China has said that it has shown “utmost goodwill” over the prolonged military standoff with India in the Sikkim sector but warned that its “restraint” has a “bottom line”.

The reaction from the Chinese defence ministry late Thursday night came a day after India’s external affairs ministry in a statement said the peace and tranquillity of the India-China boundary constitutes the important prerequisite for the smooth development of bilateral relations.

External affairs minister Sushma Swaraj last month made clear India’s position on the over-a-month-long standoff in the Doklam area, saying both sides should first pull back their troops for any talks to take place, favouring a peaceful resolution.

The standoff began on June 16 after Chinese troops began constructing a road near the trijunction with Bhutan, which India says was a unilateral action by Beijing to change the status quo in the area.

New Delhi fears the construction of the road would allow China to cut off India’s access to its northeastern states.

Ren Guoqiang, a spokesperson of the Chinese defence ministry, in a statement called on the Indian side to swiftly address the situation in a proper manner to restore peace and tranquillity in the border region.

Read more
Doklam standoff: China says if India cherishes peace, it will withdraw troops
War not a solution, issue can be resolved through talks: Sushma on Doklam standoff with China
“Since the incident occurred, China has shown utmost goodwill and sought to communicate with India through diplomatic channels to resolve the incident. Chinese armed forces have also shown a high level of restraint with an eye to the general bilateral relations and the regional peace and stability,” Ren said, according to report in the state-run Xinhua news agency.

“However, goodwill has its principles and restraint has its bottom line,” Ren added.

The spokesperson urged the Indian side to give up the “illusion of its delaying tactic, as no country should underestimate the Chinese forces’ confidence and capability to safeguard peace and their resolve and willpower to defend national sovereignty, security and development interests”.

Ren said the Chinese armed forces will resolutely protect the country’s territorial sovereignty and security interests.

His comments also come after India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval met his Chinese counterpart on the sidelines of a BRICS summit of NSAs from the member countries.

http://www.hindustantimes.com/india...bottom-line/story-iCSnqBjQXJ8KKDwf7K4V8K.html

America Should Not Cheer on an India-China Fight
Lyle J. Goldstein, August 4, 2017

Soldiers drive Pakistan’s Al Khalid tanks during Pakistan Day military parade in Islamabad, Pakistan, March 23, 2017. REUTERS/Faisal Mahmood
Tensions have been building on the Himalayan frontier that separates China and India, even as a new round of political instability roils Pakistan. A recent skirmish in Kashmir, moreover, raises the stark possibility of a South Asian conflagration that involves not just two nuclear powers, but actually three (or even four). Some strategists in Washington are gleeful that Beijing confronts yet another brushfire on its flank—the more so to dissipate the energies of the resurgent Middle Kingdom. Indeed, it has long been fashionable in Washington to advocate for stirring up trouble on China’s unruly western borders in order to contain any ambitions that China might have on its eastern or maritime flank. However, such viewpoints are appallingly short sighted.

We have learned before, perhaps more than once, that playing geopolitics in South and Central Asia can have disastrous consequences for U.S. national security. Advocates for the ever-deepening U.S.-Indian strategic partnership have long been in ascendance in the Pentagon. The recent Malabar exercise has become a potent symbol of New Delhi’s prominent role alongside Tokyo and Washington as the “Three Musketeers” that will keep the fire-breathing Chinese dragon in check. Not surprisingly, Chinese commentators interpreted the Malabar exercise, yet again, as aimed squarely at Beijing. Meanwhile, the new trend in Washington is increasingly to blame Pakistan for all woes in Afghanistan. Increasingly, it looks as if South Asia will be subsumed into the larger superpower struggle—a rather familiar and dreadful scenario from the Cold War. Such an outcome is hardly good for South Asians. Nor does it accord with U.S. national interest either.

Rather than opposing the spread of Chinese influence in South Asia at every turn, Washington and New Delhi should instead objectively study the details of China-Pakistan engagement and consider how these ties, for the most part, actually benefit global security. This is not the first time that this Dragon Eye column has considered the unfolding strategic situation in the Indian Ocean, but this edition uses a cover spring 2017 story from the influential Chinese magazine Caijing (Finance and Economics) about the mystery port of Gwadar that China has been building on Pakistan’s coast near the Strait of Hormuz to elucidate a fresh perspective.

The Caijing story does not sugar coat the current situation related to developing the port of Gwadar. The challenges are readily admitted in the subtitle, which states that a project with the “hidden potential to transform the Eurasian continent’s energy and trade landscape” will require China to “cut through the brambles.” All kinds of difficulties are discussed in the piece, from the problem of electricity and fresh water shortages to the issue of illiteracy that is said to reach as high as 75 percent of the local population. Pessimists, the article notes, are doubtful that Beijing can show a return for all of its investments in the port and the whole concept of the China-Pakistan economic corridor is described as “facing a test.”

Pakistan’s internal fissures are said to hold the project “by the elbows.” “The overall deterioration of the security situation strikes a blow against investor confidence.” Indeed, it is observed that China is building its port in the most unstable part of Pakistan, the restive province of Baluchistan. To boot, the port is located very near to Iran—not exactly a darling of global investors—and is dependent on Iranian energy supplies. The article relates how the shock of a May 2004 terrorist attack against Chinese workers that killed three has not been forgotten, so that an outburst of further violence in Baluchistan in April 2015 has again rattled Chinese confidence. According to the Caijing article, Pakistan has committed to deploying 15,000 soldiers to protecting the China-Pakistan economic corridor. But the author of this assessment also laments that having armed guards everywhere also may not make investors feel completely comfortable either.

Still, the report is not all gloomy and there seems to even be some decent progress. Since the management of the port changed hands from a Singaporean owner to Chinese management, the article claims that all new equipment and machinery has been installed, including cranes, forklifts and trucks for hauling the containers. Up to now, most of Gwadar’s trade is with Pakistan’s most populous city of Karachi, which is 600 km away along a coastal highway. The planned handling capacity of the new port, at 3–400 million tons, apparently amounts to ten times that of Karachi, however, and is said to be equivalent to all of India’s ports combined. A new desalination plant is reported to be up and running to provide for the port’s basic fresh water requirements. That plant is also said to distribute some of that precious resource to nearby residents free of charge. Much more fresh water is needed, but another benefit to locals, according to this Chinese rendering, will be the opportunity for Pakistanis to develop training and experience in modern port operations. Perhaps most impressive in this report, however, is the interesting detail that a convoy of sixty-plus trucks rumbled down the 3,115 km road journey from Kashgar in the Chinese province of Xinjiang to Gwadar in fifteen days during November 2016. With export products destined for Africa and the Middle East, this convoy apparently signifies that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor “has been realized”. For China, there are the benefits that Pakistan has valuable resources in its own right, such as a major cotton export industry, or the opportunity to gain tax and tariff advantages. But the most tantalizing dream for Beijing is that coveted energy resources will be shipped almost directly via Gwadar through pipelines from the Persian Gulf into western China.

Even as China and India once more come nose to nose and eyeball to eyeball across the forbidding glaciers of the high Himalayas, the United States must resist the temptation to pour gasoline on this potentially dangerous conflagration even though more than a few U.S. (and global) arms merchants would benefit from the intensification of Sino-Indian military rivalry. Nor do more bombs and special forces for Afghanistan portend any particular progress. Indeed, the inclination in Washington to blame all of Afghanistan’s troubles on Pakistan is extremely unlikely to resolve any fundamental strategic issues and may well make the overall strategic situation highly combustible. On the other hand, China’s “Belt and Road” holds out the promise of genuine developmental progress for both Afghanistan and especially Pakistan, as discussed above. The Chinese Ambassador to Islamabad from 2002–07, Zhang Chunxiang, is quoted in the Caijing article as follows: “From 2002 to the current day . . . China has pursued commercial goals in Gwadar and there is not a single [Chinese] document to demonstrate the intention to convert Gwadar into a military port.” But whether or not Ambassador Zhang is believed or not, there is actually nothing especially alarming about the PLA Navy having a foothold near Hormuz anyways. Even the most truculent China hawks must concede that Beijing has legitimate security interests in this region.

A more mature and forward-looking approach is badly needed. That is not one that seeks to plunder Afghanistan’s mineral wealth to pay for a failed war—a farcical line of argumentation that recalls the fantasy of using Iraqi oil to compensate the United States for trillions squandered in Middle East quicksand. Rather, a responsible policy for Central and South Asia that respects the reality of limited U.S. resources (and patience) would finally withdraw all forces from Afghanistan and initiate a major effort to bring about confidence-building measures to improve the climate of relations between Beijing and New Delhi. These could involve prior notification agreements concerning major military exercises or deployments of naval task groups into sensitive areas, as well as restraint in selling arms.

Most critically, the new approach would accept and even embrace the long-time, but now blossoming, China-Pakistan partnership as revealed in the discussion above of Gwadar’s difficult, but steady development. Such an acceptance would be built on the stark logic that Washington and New Delhi have much to lose if Pakistan slips into violent chaos or radicalism. They each have significant gripes with Islamabad (and Beijing), to be sure. But seen in a larger context, they both also have much to gain from a more stable and prosperous Pakistan.

Lyle J. Goldstein is Professor of Strategy in the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the United States Naval War College in Newport RI.

SOURCE THE NATIONAL INTEREST
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/08/04/america-not-cheer-india-china-fight/

 

[Bilal9]

I have heard stories from our local Army elders how Indian Army literally ran away in 1962 conflict, leaving their filthy WWII surplus Lee Enfield .303 (three-not-threes) on the field. Later Chinese Army returned these dirty weapons (cleaned, oiled and burnished) after the ceasefire. Of course all erased from Indian records courtesy of Hindutva Heroes by now....

 

[The BrOkEn HeArT]

I have heard stories from our local Army elders how Indian Army literally ran away in 1962 conflict, leaving their filthy WWII surplus Lee Enfield .303 (three-not-threes) on the field. Later Chinese Army returned these dirty weapons (cleaned, oiled and burnished) after the ceasefire. Of course all erased from Indian records courtesy of Hindutva Heroes by now....

They didn't tell you story of 1967 and 1971??

 

[Banglar Bir]

Mind the power gap
C. Raja Mohan, August 3, 2017

As India settles into an extended military standoff with China in the Himalayas, it can’t afford to take its eyes off Beijing’s maritime forays in the Indian Ocean. Over the weekend in Sri Lanka, Colombo, after much internal wrangling, handed over the Hambantota port, sitting astride the sea lines of communication of the Indian Ocean, to a Chinese consortium.

Similarly in Myanmar, despite many political anxieties about economic over-dependence on Beijing, the government is reportedly close to a deal with a Chinese company for the commercial development of the Kyaukpyu island on its Bay of Bengal coast. Once Yangon signs on the dotted line, the Chinese company will start building a deep seaport, special economic zone and an industrial park. The Bay of Bengal is unlikely to be the same after that.

On the face of it, comparing the two port contracts in Lanka and Myanmar with the raw struggle for land in Bhutan seems inappropriate. While contests over territory are indeed far more serious, they tend to be contained by the costs of the military conflict and the potential loss of face for the two Asian giants from even a small military setback. In contrast, the port contracts lay the foundation for China’s long-term economic influence in India’s immediate neighbourhood.

Chinese companies are promising that the two deep sea ports will integrate Lanka and Myanmar into the global trade and production networks. The 80 per cent plus stake for the Chinese companies in the two contracts and the nature of the long-term lease — 99 years for Hambantota and 50 to 75 years for Kyaukpyu are facts that speak for themselves.

That these two contracts have been won against popular protests in both countries suggests how difficult it has become for the ruling elites in our neighbourhood to fend off Chinese demands for a big slice of their economic pie on very favourable terms. China’s political influence, so visibly demonstrated in the negotiations with Colombo and Yangon, must only be expected to rise with time.

India no longer has the luxury of contesting Chinese strategic incursions into the Subcontinent one piece at a time. While India’s army is settling down for a long haul in the Doklam plateau, its diplomats in Colombo were working overtime to get Colombo to appreciate and address India’s concerns on Hambantota. While some of India’s concerns have been addressed in Colombo, Delhi has not been a part of Myanmar’s discourse on Kyaukpyu. It should have been.

After all, India is building a small port at Sittwe not far from Kyaukpyu and is aware of the island’s significance. Kyaukpyu is all set to become the energy gateway for petroleum imports into western China through a twin oil and gas pipeline system running from the Bay of Bengal. But Delhi did not have the bandwidth to compete with China on the Kyaukpyu project worth $10 billion. Nor did other international players provide an alternative to China in Kyaukpyu.

If China keeps its word in turning Kyaukpyu into a commercial hub like Singapore and Hong Kong, Indian decision-makers are likely to spend a lot of time thinking about the island in the coming years. Especially since Beijing is bound to devote considerable naval and military energies to securing its expanded commercial interests in Kyaukpyu.

China’s multiple advances tend to reinforce the popular proposition in Delhi that China is embarked upon the “strategic encirclement” of India. But the idea is misleading. The constriction of India’s strategic space is a second-order consequence resulting from China’s rise. Beijing does not have to deliberately contain India. Beijing’s exercise of its growing comprehensive national power — economic and military — will inevitably have that effect. Put simply, the question is not about Chinese intentions, but the massive surge in its capabilities.

Four other factors add to India’s problem. China, under Xi Jinping, has brought abundant political will to match the expanded national power resources. Xi thinks the era of China deferring to other nations’ sensitivities is now over. According to Xi, it is now others’ turn to adapt to Beijing’s rise as the foremost power in Asia.

Second is the widening strategic gap between China and India. Although India has done well since 1991 and has emerged as one of the largest economies in the world, the gap with China will remain enduring for the foreseeable future. China’s current GDP is five times larger than that of India and its defence spending is four times as big. Even if India grows faster than China in the coming years, the huge gap with China will remain unbridged.

Third, India had severely underestimated the implications of China’s rise for India. Facile talk of the world being large enough for China and India masked the prospect that the changing power balance in Beijing’s favour could alter the dynamic on India’s long and disputed frontier with China. India also lulled itself into the belief that it had created sufficiently strong mechanisms to limit conflict on the border. Peace and tranquility on the Sino-Indian border were the consequence of a different set of circumstances — when China was integrating itself with the world. They may not survive the assertive phase in China’s foreign policy.

Fourth, India had taken its regional primacy for granted all these decades. China had never accepted the proposition that the Subcontinent is India’s exclusive sphere of influence. It now has the will and resources to challenge that premise on a routine basis. That leaves India scrambling to restore its economic and strategic centrality in the region.

To be sure, Delhi is now far more conscious of the existential challenges that the power gap with Beijing generates. This awareness, however, is yet to be matched by a sense of urgency across the government. Consider the following: China has been transforming the southern tip of Sri Lanka and the western seaboard of Myanmar over the last few years. But Delhi can’t seem to bestir itself into doing something with its forgotten national asset in the Bay of Bengal — the Andaman and Nicobar Island chain.

The longer Delhi takes to act vigorously on its frontier region development, military modernisation and regional economic integration, the greater will be its degree of difficulty in coping with China’s rise and future Doklams, Hambantotas, and Kyaukpyus.

http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/08/03/mind-power-gap/

China prepared for military confrontation, will annihilate all Indian troops: Chinese media warns PM Modi
SAM Report, August 5, 2017

Amid the ongoing standoff between Indian and Chinese soldiers in Sikkim, a new editorial of Chinese state daily Global Times on Friday targeted Prime Minister Narendra Modi, warning him not to push India into a “reckless conflict” with China. The editorial titled, “Modi mustn’t pull India into reckless conflict”, warned, “Indian border troops are no rival to PLA field forces. If a war spreads, the PLA is perfectly capable of annihilating all Indian troops in the border region.”

China has exercised great restraint, demonstrating respect to peace and human life through its decision not to strike at Indian troops who have taken up positions in Doklam, the Global Times said but warned of ‘devastation’ if India continues to provoke its giant neighbour.

“India is concerned that the road China was building in Doklam might threaten the security of the Siliguri Corridor, but does that justify Indian troops’ incursion into another country in utter disregard of international treaties,” the newspaper queried.

Emphasising that the PLA did not strike in the past month when Indian troop trespassed into Chinese territory, the editorial warned of a mismatch in strength between India and China in the case of a military confrontation and urged India to recognize the ‘grave consequences,’ its actions could have.

“The Modi government’s hard-line stance is sustained by neither laws nor strength. This administration is recklessly breaking international norms and jeopardizing India’s national pride and peaceful development.”

It further said “India is publicly challenging a country that is far superior in strength. India’s recklessness has shocked Chinese. Maybe its regional hegemonism in South Asia and the Western media comments have blinded New Delhi into believing that it can treat a giant to its north in the way it bullies other South Asian countries.”

“Its move is irresponsible to regional security and is gambling against India’s destiny and its people’s well-being,” the Global Times said reiterating that India was being aggressive towards a country far superior in military capability.

“Over the past month, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been on the move. We believe that the PLA has made sufficient preparation for military confrontation,” the editorial further said and opined that it would be war with an ‘obvious result.’

“The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi should be aware of the PLA’s overwhelming firepower and logistics. Indian border troops are no rival to PLA field forces. If a war spreads, the PLA is perfectly capable of annihilating all Indian troops in the border region,” it said.

“The Modi government should stop lying to its people that “India in 2017 is different from India in 1962.” The gap in national strength between the two countries is the largest in the past 50 years. If the Modi government wants to start a war, at least it should tell its people the truth,” it added.

The Global Times commentary on the ongoing stand-off between China and India comes amidst statements issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry this week demanding that India immediately and unconditionally pull back the trespassing border troops.

“If the Indian side truly cherish peace, what it should do is to immediately pull back the trespassing border troops to the Indian side of the boundary,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said, describing the action of India as one of “irresponsibility and recklessness.”

He maintained that until Wednesday, there had been 48 Indian soldiers and one bulldozer in the Doklam area, calling this as an illegal intrusion into Chinese territory.
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/0...te-indian-troops-chinese-media-warns-pm-modi/

China held a massive military parade showing off its might, and it could surpass the US by 2030
Alex Lockie, August 2, 2017

China’s president, Xi Jinping, presiding over the country’s massive military parade in inner Mongolia
Chinese President Xi Jinping on Sunday presided over a massive military parade from an open-topped jeep, declaring, “The world is not peaceful, and peace needs to be defended.”

And as China’s show of force demonstrates, Beijing may have the will and the strength to replace the US as the world’s defender of peace.

“Our heroic military has the confidence and capabilities to preserve national sovereignty, security, and interests … and to contribute more to maintaining world peace,” Xi said at the parade, one day after US President Donald Trump lashed out at Beijing for its inaction regarding North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

China’s massive military modernization and increasing assertiveness have irked many of its neighbors in the region, and even as the US attempts to reassure its allies that US power still rules the day, that military edge is eroding.

China showed off new, mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles that it says can reach the US in 30 minutes, along with its J-20 stealth interceptor jets. And Xi inspected thousands of troops drawn from the 2 million-strong People’s Liberation Army’s on its 90th anniversary.

The historian Alfred McCoy estimates that by 2030, China, a nation of 1.3 billion, will surpass the US in both economic and military strength, essentially ending the American empire and Pax Americana the world has known since the close of World War II.

Soldiers marching to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the founding of China’s People’s Liberation Army
But China could achieve this goal patiently and without a violent struggle. China has employed a “salami-slicing” method of slowly but surely militarizing the South China Sea in incremental steps that have not prompted a strong military response from the US. However, the result is China’s de facto control over a shipping lane that sees $5 trillion in annual traffic.

“The American Century, proclaimed so triumphantly at the start of World War II, may already be tattered and fading by 2025 and, except for the finger pointing, could be over by 2030,” McCoy wrote in his new book, “In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of US Global Power.”

China unveiled its J-20 stealth fighter at an air show in November. China Daily/via REUTERS
China’s J-20 jet also most likely borrows from stealth secrets stolen from the US through a sophisticated hacking regime. Though China hasn’t mastered stealth technology in the way the US has, the jet still poses a real threat to US forces.

Meanwhile, the US is stretched thin. It has had been at war in Afghanistan for 16 years and in Iraq for 14, and it has been scrambling to curtail Iranian and Russian influence in Syria while reassuring its Baltic NATO allies that it’s committed to their protection against an aggressive Russia.

Under Xi, who pushes an ambitious foreign policy, China’s eventual supremacy over the US seems inevitable.
http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/0...ary-parade-showing-off-might-surpass-us-2030/

Coordinating with Bhutan on Doklam issue: India
SAM Staff, August 5, 2017

Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Gopal Baglay.
India, today, said it continues to engage with China diplomatically and has been coordinating with Bhutan to find a mutually acceptable solution to the Doklam standoff.

“We continue to engage with China through diplomatic channels to find a mutually acceptable solution,” external affairs ministry spokesperson Gopal Baglay said.

Asked about China’s claim of India reducing its troops from 400 to 40 in Doklam, he said refused to give a direct reply calling it an operational matter.

Our objective is to achieve peace and tranquillity and it will be achieved through diplomacy, Baglay said.

He also said that India has been in continuous coordination and consultation with Bhutan on the Dokalam issue.

http://southasianmonitor.com/2017/08/05/coordinating-bhutan-doklam-issue-india/

“The Modi government should stop lying to its people that “India in 2017 is different from India in 1962.” The gap in national strength between the two countries is the largest in the past 50 years. If the Modi government wants to start a war, at least it should tell its people the truth,”

 

[gslv mk3]

I have heard stories from our local Army elders how Indian Army literally ran away in 1962 conflict, leaving their filthy WWII surplus Lee Enfield .303 (three-not-threes) on the field. Later Chinese Army returned these dirty weapons (cleaned, oiled and burnished) after the ceasefire. Of course all erased from Indian records courtesy of Hindutva Heroes by now....

Just like how you heard bout sales of fancy bikes being higher in Bangladesh ?

Bilal9's fairy tales...

 

[Bilal9]

They didn't tell you story of 1967 and 1971??

Worry about the story soon to take place in Doklam.

A story to be remembered...

Our objective is to achieve peace and tranquillity and it will be achieved through diplomacy, Baglay said.

Otherwise known as objective of furious backpedaling and slinky retreat by taking our tails between our hindlegs....

Brother @Kiss_of_the_Dragon this is a bit too soon. I didn't expect the backing down to happen _this_ quick.....