What's new

India's Nuclear Agreement

Actually, only US and China are opposed to India with Veto powers.
France, Russia and Britain have no problems as such.

Putin backtracked once. But, he was brought in line by a foreign ministry visit.

We actually lost our chance of entering the P5 by joining the group of 4. Alone, we had a better chance.

The way I see it is all the P5 members are arrogant powers when it comes to veto privelage because that is what separates them from other nations. Similar to a VIP factor.

If more veto powers are granted, this would dilute their VIP status. In regards to France, Russia and Britain, my take is that they would support any country for veto power openly but inside they know atleast one of the other P5 members would object. So in theory, they say what the requested nations wants to hear and knowing fully well they will not get it.

Aslong as one veto power objects, the whole plan is scuttled.
 
The way I see it is all the P5 members are arrogant powers when it comes to veto privelage because that is what separates them from other nations. Similar to a VIP factor.

If more veto powers are granted, this would dilute their VIP status. In regards to France, Russia and Britain, my take is that they would support any country for veto power openly but inside they know atleast one of the other P5 members would object. So in theory, they say what the requested nations wants to hear and knowing fully well they will not get it.

Aslong as one veto power objects, the whole plan is scuttled.


Maybe so. But France and Russia were the only 2 countries in the world that supported the indian nuclear test. Both, France and Russia are tired of US hegemony over the world and also the EU.

They did provide support to india over UNSC membership.
Note: France is the first country to sign the nuke deal with india. They were also the only countries along with germany to oppose the US invasion of Iraq. Germany backed off after sometime. But, France was calling the war illegal even after war was over. Jaques Chirac was adamant that US withdraw. They dont like US policies very much.

If a country like India were to join the UNSC. The pressure would simply be too great for the US to have free reign over the UN.
 
Maybe so. But France and Russia were the only 2 countries in the world that supported the indian nuclear test. Both, France and Russia are tired of US hegemony over the world and also the EU.

They did provide support to india over UNSC membership.
Note: France is the first country to sign the nuke deal with india. They were also the only countries along with germany to oppose the US invasion of Iraq. Germany backed off after sometime. But, France was calling the war illegal even after war was over. Jaques Chirac was adamant that US withdraw. They dont like US policies very much.

If a country like India were to join the UNSC. The pressure would simply be too great for the US to have free reign over the UN.

The war with Iraq was obviously a miscalculation by the US, we should have never gone into Iraq. But no point crying about it now. US hegemony is a nuisance because we are too obsessed with the status we have now and we are not going to give way to anyone.

The US only has interests for themselves even if it means upsetting our allies. That won't change anytime soon. So it is understandable that other nations would want a more multi-polar world.

We see China as the next superpower to challenge us in all fields, this has alarm bells ringing. This shows our typical arrogance that we cannot accept a nation standing with us side by side.

So it's natural for us to not dilute the veto power. China objects India's veto power for obvious reasons, that is expected.
 
Indo-US nuclear deal and the subversion of democracy

It is necessary to ask why democratic dissent in India lacked the robustness to defeat the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s determination to keep his nuclear tryst with President Bush,

writes Radha Surya

THE India-US agreement for civilian nuclear cooperation is now a done deal. Over a period of less than three months the nuclear deal proponents, supporters and fanatics have scored an unbroken succession of victories —the trust vote in the Indian parliament (July 21-22), the vote in the Nuclear Suppliers Group granting India an exemption from the NSG’s export regulations (September 6), and finally US Congressional ratification of the agreement and the signing of the bill into law by President Bush (October 8). Each of these events, especially the last, has generated the predictable round of celebrations among the nuclear deal’s prime movers on the Indian and American side as well as lobbyists, state functionaries, facilitators and backers. Tired clichés about the history making nature of the deal have been trotted out and repeated ad nauseum. US-based NRI (non-resident Indian) lobbying groups whose political clout has been on display through the various stages of the deal’s progress have hailed the nuclear agreement’s ‘successful’ culmination by proclaiming their loyalty and pride in their Indian-American national affiliations and expressing their hopes for a future in which India and the US will bestride the global stage as close-knit allies.

NRI gloating over the nuclear deal has been echoed by some (highly publicised) sections of the Indian public as well as several of India’s leading English-language newspapers. NRI lobbying on behalf of the deal was undeterred by the release in September—as the deal raced toward the finish line—of a procession of Bush administration statements that highlighted the existing gulf between Indian and US interpretations of the 123 agreement, the bilateral document that was reached by negotiators on both sides after months of wrangling over the precise wording of such issues as penalties that would go into effect if India were to conduct a nuclear test. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is apparently completely unfazed by a steady stream of official declarations that have resulted in concerns being aroused in India about bad faith negotiations on the US side. The Bush administration statements have caused even the ardently pro-nuclear deal Times of India to wonder whether Bush misled India. Cumulatively, these statements have undermined the solemn assurances that the prime minister gave the Indian parliament on such contentious issues as securing uninterrupted fuel supplies as well as reprocessing rights for spent fuel. The historical prime ministerial sulks of June 2008 which led to Dr Manmohan Singh’s breaking faith with the Left parties, his former coalition allies, and precipitating the events leading to the operationalisation of the India-US nuclear cooperation deal were subsequently succeeded by prime ministerial imperturbability in the face of mounting evidence that the American side was determined to disregard the Indian point of view and enforce the US understanding of the bilateral 123 document. Taking their cue from the prime minister, the external affairs ministry and principal nuclear negotiators responded by asserting that India is bound only by the 123 agreement and that the India-specific Hyde Act of 2006 which imposes stringent restrictions on nuclear cooperation is irrelevant to dealings between India and the US. They have persisted in iterating this face-saving fiction even though the US has repeatedly declared that the bilateral 123 agreement must conform to the stipulations of the Hyde Act.

The strength of lobby

The NRI lobbyist has chosen to turn a blind eye to the holes that have appeared in the bilateral agreement. For the most part perceptions of the nuclear deal among home-grown Indians—including some in official circles—have been far more nuanced than that of the NRI. Even as the India-US nuclear agreement maintained its forward momentum in September, rumblings of discontent were heard in the ministry of external affairs among officials who were unable to emulate the prime minister’s insouciance or that of the NRI lobbyist. Their reservations stemmed from a presidential declaration which downgraded the legal status of the bilateral 123 document by calling it a framework agreement. Revelations of the hardening of the American stance on the bilateral agreement followed on the heels of a blunt State Department letter which clarified that the US would cease its cooperation if India were to conduct a nuclear test. The presidential statement also called into question what was once hailed as a major triumph of Indian diplomacy, namely securing US guarantees of uninterrupted fuel supply for imported, civilian-use reactors. Hitherto the calculated ambiguities in the 123 document had provided the Indian side with the basis for believing that the bilateral agreement contained built-in assurance of American support for obtaining nuclear fuel from other NSG vendors even if the US were to break off cooperation. When this assumption was undermined, India announced but did not follow through on its intention of seeking a clarification from the Bush administration. And since the monsoon session of parliament was frozen in July—not to be re-convened until October 17—the prime minister has conveniently avoided having to take parliament into his confidence or being taken to task on the issue of facing up to the Bush administration. Late in September, the Manmohan Singh government’s intention of purchasing US reactors capable of generating 10,000 MW of nuclear energy became known. The Indian public—the party most concerned in such purchases—learned about this upcoming bonanza for the US nuclear industry when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was informed by Nicholas Burns, under secretary of state for political affairs, of the contents of the letter of intent provided by the Indian government. In vain have sober analysts pointed out the folly of making a commitment of this magnitude given the risks inherent in the absence of fuel supply guarantees for the lifetime of US-provided reactors and the technological superiority of French and Russian manufacturers.

International critique

The international critique of the nuclear deal has been conducted by activist groups and political thinkers whose primary concerns have to do with arms control, nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament. As a result not much scrutiny has been given—at the global level—to the undermining of democratic norms and procedures on the Indian side for the purpose of bringing off the deal with the United States. That Indian democracy is one of the principal casualties of the deal has been obscured amid the gloating, on the one hand, by Indian elites and US-based NRIs over the attainment of nuclear nirvana and, on the other hand, the dismay felt across the world over the undermining of the nuclear nonproliferation regime at the behest of the US. The nuclear deal with America has encountered a range of opposition in India from responsible political formations and civil society and has been critiqued by scientists, strategic thinkers, intellectuals and observers. Misgivings over the nuclear compact have been present at every stage of the deal’s progress and these became particularly evident as the (at the time) stalled deal picked up momentum back in July. The parliamentary Left’s disagreement with the policies of the Manmohan Singh regime is well known because as a constituent of the ruling coalition the Left was placed in the media spotlight. Concomitantly the Left became the target of every form of excoriation including the vilest aspersions merely on account of its principled questioning of the India-US strategic partnership and the nuclear deal in particular.

The parliamentary Left however is not alone in its distrust of the nuclear bargain. Many Indian scientists and analysts have questioned the wisdom of making the country’s energy security dependent on imported technology. Prior to the prime minister’s engineered victory in the trust vote of July 21-22, a public call was issued to desist from rushing headlong into the nuclear deal, and an appeal was made for a debate on the role of nuclear energy in the national energy security policy. The statement was signed by academics from India’s premier institutions of higher learning, the well-known Right to Information activist Aruna Roy, former officials of the Atomic Energy Commission and other distinguished individuals. In September, even as plans were in the works for a joint signing of the bilateral 123 agreement by both heads of state, Lalit Mansingh, former ambassador to the US, said that India should not sign the document if the US insisted on reneging on its fuel supply assurances. According to him it would be unworthy of the prime minister to sign a treaty which was already declared as being non-binding. Writing in the Hindu, MK Bhadrakumar declared that Russian resurgence as demonstrated by the Transcaucasus conflict signalled the beginning of a new era—one in which the India-US strategic partnership must be considered to have lost its utility. The former ambassador and expert commentator on the politics of the Caucasus and greater Asia has consistently called on the Manmohan Singh regime to look beyond its myopic fixation with the US.

Democratic dissent

Despite their strength and moral authority and despite including among their ranks a group of political parties on whose support the ruling coalition was dependent for its survival, the democratic forces and voices opposed to the nuclear compact could not prevail. So it is necessary to ask why democratic dissent in India lacked the robustness to defeat the prime minister’s determination to keep his nuclear tryst with President Bush. In addressing this question one needs to recognise how close the opposition came to consigning the nuclear bargain to oblivion. In fact thanks to the efforts of the Left parties, the deal remained stalled for almost a year. By June 2008, Ashley Trellis, one of the original architects of the deal, spoke of it as being almost certainly dead. The accord’s resuscitation was partly due to Dr Manmohan Singh’s willingness to dispense with democratic norms by making opportunistic alliances with parties that had hitherto been anathema and by wooing lawless elements in the Indian polity for the votes and abstinences that would yield him a victory in the parliamentary vote of confidence.
For the other half of the story—why and how the subversion of Indian democracy was accomplished—it is necessary to take into account the efforts of US-based NRI groups and their successful lobbying efforts in Congress for the passage of enabling legislation. Congressman Gary Ackerman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee probably said it best. Referring to the overwhelming presence of the Indian-American lobbyists who flocked to Washington from across the country when the 123 agreement came up for Congressional ratification in September, he made an analogy between the deal and a hospital patient surrounded by the solicitude of innumerable family members: ...thanks to you the patient is alive. In the US system of governance, the undemocratic practice of lobbying for legislative favours is treated as a legitimate activity. Having migrated to the US from distant shores, NRIs have swiftly learned and implemented the art of political organising for the purpose of gaining Congressional support for their objectives. Looking back over the various stages of the nuclear deal saga, one recognises that home-grown opposition to the nuclear deal backed as it was by mere principle, knowledge of the history of US foreign policy, sane, reasoned arguments and democratic procedures never stood a chance when pitted against the formidable clout wielded by the NRI lobbies in the corridors of power in Washington DC.

NRI lobbying on behalf of the nuclear deal has been conducted under the banner of striving for an objective which is in the best interests of India and her people. Purportedly, the Indian-American is motivated by attachment to the country of origin. Unfortunately the NRI’s activist zeal on behalf on India-US nuclear cooperation appears to be lacking in even a modicum of reasoned acknowledgement of the dubious ethics of using political and financial clout and AIPAC-inspired lobbying tactics to make an aggressive intervention in Indian politics for the purpose of defeating democratic forces and procedures in the supposedly beloved home country. The NRI lobbies are not known to have expressed any discomfort over the unconstitutional abandonment of parliament’s monsoon session in deference to the US election calendar and the goal of ramrodding the deal through relevant NSG and Congressional approvals. It’s useful to remember that the NRI does not have citizenship rights in India and is not entitled to voting rights in Indian elections. By immigrating to the US in search of greener pastures and becoming a naturalised US citizen, the NRI to use the words of the deceased writer Arvind Das, distinguished journalist and activist, has already voted with his feet and ought rightly to defer to the political views and decisions of informed Indians. For the NRI lobbies to seize piloting rights in setting the direction of India’s foreign policy is to perpetrate an obscenity that does not need to be elaborated on. Back in July, Ambassador MK Bhadrakumar had commented as follows: Any hitching of our wagons to the US global agenda at such a juncture when unprecedented fluidity has appeared in world politics will be incredibly foolhardy. The ambassador was reacting to the desire that Dr Manmohan Singh had expressed at the G-8 summit for a future in which India and the US would stand tall shoulder to shoulder. The prime minister’s obsession with the US is mirrored in the NRI lobbyist’s parochial quest of India-US closeness—at the cost of binding Indian foreign policy to the strategic interests of a desperately floundering ex-superpower and sundering or placing strain on India’s ties with Iran as well as member nations of the OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Conference) and the Non-Aligned Movement.

The saga not yet completed

The bilateral 123 agreement was signed into law by President Bush on October 8 and inked by the Indian government two days thereafter. Nevertheless, the saga of the nuclear bargain cannot be said to be concluded as long as key episodes remain shrouded in secrecy. Democratic groups in India deserve to know the origin of the commitment to purchase US reactors capable of generating 10000 MW. When and where was this largesse to the American nuclear industry conceived? Did the commitment originate in the prime minister’s office or was it made at the behest of NRI lobbyists who regarded the purchase of Congressional legislative favour and the concomitant mortgaging of India’s tax revenues as a necessary step in attaining their nuclear paradise?

Then there is the little matter of clinching the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) which will give US forces access to Indian military facilities. Although the nuclear deal has been marketed in the name of India’s energy security needs, informed observers have known all along that civilian nuclear cooperation was merely the bait dangled by the State Department for the purpose of cementing a strategic military relationship with India. Accordingly no eyebrows were raised when Defence Minister Anthony arrived in Washington on the day following the securing of the NSG waiver. The timing of the visit was recognised as being replete with significance, and it was reported that the controversial LSA, much sought after by the Pentagon, was one of the items on the table. The refusal to host military bases of either of the great powers of the Cold War era belonged with the key principles that once united the countries of the nonaligned movement. In the past, the objections of the Left parties had restrained the UPA government from signing the LSA and making a formal break with the nonaligned movement. Now that the prime minister has dissociated himself from his former coalition allies, nothing stands in the way of his inking the agreement—and driving the last nail in the coffin of India’s past history of nonalignment.

ZNet, October 22

http://www.newagebd.com/oped.html
 
Indo-US nuclear deal and the subversion of democracy

It is necessary to ask why democratic dissent in India lacked the robustness to defeat the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s determination to keep his nuclear tryst with President Bush,

writes Radha Surya

THE India-US agreement for civilian nuclear cooperation is now a done deal. Over a period of less than three months the nuclear deal proponents, supporters and fanatics have scored an unbroken succession of victories —the trust vote in the Indian parliament (July 21-22), the vote in the Nuclear Suppliers Group granting India an exemption from the NSG’s export regulations (September 6), and finally US Congressional ratification of the agreement and the signing of the bill into law by President Bush (October 8). Each of these events, especially the last, has generated the predictable round of celebrations among the nuclear deal’s prime movers on the Indian and American side as well as lobbyists, state functionaries, facilitators and backers. Tired clichés about the history making nature of the deal have been trotted out and repeated ad nauseum. US-based NRI (non-resident Indian) lobbying groups whose political clout has been on display through the various stages of the deal’s progress have hailed the nuclear agreement’s ‘successful’ culmination by proclaiming their loyalty and pride in their Indian-American national affiliations and expressing their hopes for a future in which India and the US will bestride the global stage as close-knit allies.

NRI gloating over the nuclear deal has been echoed by some (highly publicised) sections of the Indian public as well as several of India’s leading English-language newspapers. NRI lobbying on behalf of the deal was undeterred by the release in September—as the deal raced toward the finish line—of a procession of Bush administration statements that highlighted the existing gulf between Indian and US interpretations of the 123 agreement, the bilateral document that was reached by negotiators on both sides after months of wrangling over the precise wording of such issues as penalties that would go into effect if India were to conduct a nuclear test. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is apparently completely unfazed by a steady stream of official declarations that have resulted in concerns being aroused in India about bad faith negotiations on the US side. The Bush administration statements have caused even the ardently pro-nuclear deal Times of India to wonder whether Bush misled India. Cumulatively, these statements have undermined the solemn assurances that the prime minister gave the Indian parliament on such contentious issues as securing uninterrupted fuel supplies as well as reprocessing rights for spent fuel. The historical prime ministerial sulks of June 2008 which led to Dr Manmohan Singh’s breaking faith with the Left parties, his former coalition allies, and precipitating the events leading to the operationalisation of the India-US nuclear cooperation deal were subsequently succeeded by prime ministerial imperturbability in the face of mounting evidence that the American side was determined to disregard the Indian point of view and enforce the US understanding of the bilateral 123 document. Taking their cue from the prime minister, the external affairs ministry and principal nuclear negotiators responded by asserting that India is bound only by the 123 agreement and that the India-specific Hyde Act of 2006 which imposes stringent restrictions on nuclear cooperation is irrelevant to dealings between India and the US. They have persisted in iterating this face-saving fiction even though the US has repeatedly declared that the bilateral 123 agreement must conform to the stipulations of the Hyde Act.

The strength of lobby

The NRI lobbyist has chosen to turn a blind eye to the holes that have appeared in the bilateral agreement. For the most part perceptions of the nuclear deal among home-grown Indians—including some in official circles—have been far more nuanced than that of the NRI. Even as the India-US nuclear agreement maintained its forward momentum in September, rumblings of discontent were heard in the ministry of external affairs among officials who were unable to emulate the prime minister’s insouciance or that of the NRI lobbyist. Their reservations stemmed from a presidential declaration which downgraded the legal status of the bilateral 123 document by calling it a framework agreement. Revelations of the hardening of the American stance on the bilateral agreement followed on the heels of a blunt State Department letter which clarified that the US would cease its cooperation if India were to conduct a nuclear test. The presidential statement also called into question what was once hailed as a major triumph of Indian diplomacy, namely securing US guarantees of uninterrupted fuel supply for imported, civilian-use reactors. Hitherto the calculated ambiguities in the 123 document had provided the Indian side with the basis for believing that the bilateral agreement contained built-in assurance of American support for obtaining nuclear fuel from other NSG vendors even if the US were to break off cooperation. When this assumption was undermined, India announced but did not follow through on its intention of seeking a clarification from the Bush administration. And since the monsoon session of parliament was frozen in July—not to be re-convened until October 17—the prime minister has conveniently avoided having to take parliament into his confidence or being taken to task on the issue of facing up to the Bush administration. Late in September, the Manmohan Singh government’s intention of purchasing US reactors capable of generating 10,000 MW of nuclear energy became known. The Indian public—the party most concerned in such purchases—learned about this upcoming bonanza for the US nuclear industry when the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was informed by Nicholas Burns, under secretary of state for political affairs, of the contents of the letter of intent provided by the Indian government. In vain have sober analysts pointed out the folly of making a commitment of this magnitude given the risks inherent in the absence of fuel supply guarantees for the lifetime of US-provided reactors and the technological superiority of French and Russian manufacturers.

International critique

The international critique of the nuclear deal has been conducted by activist groups and political thinkers whose primary concerns have to do with arms control, nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament. As a result not much scrutiny has been given—at the global level—to the undermining of democratic norms and procedures on the Indian side for the purpose of bringing off the deal with the United States. That Indian democracy is one of the principal casualties of the deal has been obscured amid the gloating, on the one hand, by Indian elites and US-based NRIs over the attainment of nuclear nirvana and, on the other hand, the dismay felt across the world over the undermining of the nuclear nonproliferation regime at the behest of the US. The nuclear deal with America has encountered a range of opposition in India from responsible political formations and civil society and has been critiqued by scientists, strategic thinkers, intellectuals and observers. Misgivings over the nuclear compact have been present at every stage of the deal’s progress and these became particularly evident as the (at the time) stalled deal picked up momentum back in July. The parliamentary Left’s disagreement with the policies of the Manmohan Singh regime is well known because as a constituent of the ruling coalition the Left was placed in the media spotlight. Concomitantly the Left became the target of every form of excoriation including the vilest aspersions merely on account of its principled questioning of the India-US strategic partnership and the nuclear deal in particular.

The parliamentary Left however is not alone in its distrust of the nuclear bargain. Many Indian scientists and analysts have questioned the wisdom of making the country’s energy security dependent on imported technology. Prior to the prime minister’s engineered victory in the trust vote of July 21-22, a public call was issued to desist from rushing headlong into the nuclear deal, and an appeal was made for a debate on the role of nuclear energy in the national energy security policy. The statement was signed by academics from India’s premier institutions of higher learning, the well-known Right to Information activist Aruna Roy, former officials of the Atomic Energy Commission and other distinguished individuals. In September, even as plans were in the works for a joint signing of the bilateral 123 agreement by both heads of state, Lalit Mansingh, former ambassador to the US, said that India should not sign the document if the US insisted on reneging on its fuel supply assurances. According to him it would be unworthy of the prime minister to sign a treaty which was already declared as being non-binding. Writing in the Hindu, MK Bhadrakumar declared that Russian resurgence as demonstrated by the Transcaucasus conflict signalled the beginning of a new era—one in which the India-US strategic partnership must be considered to have lost its utility. The former ambassador and expert commentator on the politics of the Caucasus and greater Asia has consistently called on the Manmohan Singh regime to look beyond its myopic fixation with the US.

Democratic dissent

Despite their strength and moral authority and despite including among their ranks a group of political parties on whose support the ruling coalition was dependent for its survival, the democratic forces and voices opposed to the nuclear compact could not prevail. So it is necessary to ask why democratic dissent in India lacked the robustness to defeat the prime minister’s determination to keep his nuclear tryst with President Bush. In addressing this question one needs to recognise how close the opposition came to consigning the nuclear bargain to oblivion. In fact thanks to the efforts of the Left parties, the deal remained stalled for almost a year. By June 2008, Ashley Trellis, one of the original architects of the deal, spoke of it as being almost certainly dead. The accord’s resuscitation was partly due to Dr Manmohan Singh’s willingness to dispense with democratic norms by making opportunistic alliances with parties that had hitherto been anathema and by wooing lawless elements in the Indian polity for the votes and abstinences that would yield him a victory in the parliamentary vote of confidence.
For the other half of the story—why and how the subversion of Indian democracy was accomplished—it is necessary to take into account the efforts of US-based NRI groups and their successful lobbying efforts in Congress for the passage of enabling legislation. Congressman Gary Ackerman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee probably said it best. Referring to the overwhelming presence of the Indian-American lobbyists who flocked to Washington from across the country when the 123 agreement came up for Congressional ratification in September, he made an analogy between the deal and a hospital patient surrounded by the solicitude of innumerable family members: ...thanks to you the patient is alive. In the US system of governance, the undemocratic practice of lobbying for legislative favours is treated as a legitimate activity. Having migrated to the US from distant shores, NRIs have swiftly learned and implemented the art of political organising for the purpose of gaining Congressional support for their objectives. Looking back over the various stages of the nuclear deal saga, one recognises that home-grown opposition to the nuclear deal backed as it was by mere principle, knowledge of the history of US foreign policy, sane, reasoned arguments and democratic procedures never stood a chance when pitted against the formidable clout wielded by the NRI lobbies in the corridors of power in Washington DC.

NRI lobbying on behalf of the nuclear deal has been conducted under the banner of striving for an objective which is in the best interests of India and her people. Purportedly, the Indian-American is motivated by attachment to the country of origin. Unfortunately the NRI’s activist zeal on behalf on India-US nuclear cooperation appears to be lacking in even a modicum of reasoned acknowledgement of the dubious ethics of using political and financial clout and AIPAC-inspired lobbying tactics to make an aggressive intervention in Indian politics for the purpose of defeating democratic forces and procedures in the supposedly beloved home country. The NRI lobbies are not known to have expressed any discomfort over the unconstitutional abandonment of parliament’s monsoon session in deference to the US election calendar and the goal of ramrodding the deal through relevant NSG and Congressional approvals. It’s useful to remember that the NRI does not have citizenship rights in India and is not entitled to voting rights in Indian elections. By immigrating to the US in search of greener pastures and becoming a naturalised US citizen, the NRI to use the words of the deceased writer Arvind Das, distinguished journalist and activist, has already voted with his feet and ought rightly to defer to the political views and decisions of informed Indians. For the NRI lobbies to seize piloting rights in setting the direction of India’s foreign policy is to perpetrate an obscenity that does not need to be elaborated on. Back in July, Ambassador MK Bhadrakumar had commented as follows: Any hitching of our wagons to the US global agenda at such a juncture when unprecedented fluidity has appeared in world politics will be incredibly foolhardy. The ambassador was reacting to the desire that Dr Manmohan Singh had expressed at the G-8 summit for a future in which India and the US would stand tall shoulder to shoulder. The prime minister’s obsession with the US is mirrored in the NRI lobbyist’s parochial quest of India-US closeness—at the cost of binding Indian foreign policy to the strategic interests of a desperately floundering ex-superpower and sundering or placing strain on India’s ties with Iran as well as member nations of the OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Conference) and the Non-Aligned Movement.

The saga not yet completed

The bilateral 123 agreement was signed into law by President Bush on October 8 and inked by the Indian government two days thereafter. Nevertheless, the saga of the nuclear bargain cannot be said to be concluded as long as key episodes remain shrouded in secrecy. Democratic groups in India deserve to know the origin of the commitment to purchase US reactors capable of generating 10000 MW. When and where was this largesse to the American nuclear industry conceived? Did the commitment originate in the prime minister’s office or was it made at the behest of NRI lobbyists who regarded the purchase of Congressional legislative favour and the concomitant mortgaging of India’s tax revenues as a necessary step in attaining their nuclear paradise?

Then there is the little matter of clinching the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) which will give US forces access to Indian military facilities. Although the nuclear deal has been marketed in the name of India’s energy security needs, informed observers have known all along that civilian nuclear cooperation was merely the bait dangled by the State Department for the purpose of cementing a strategic military relationship with India. Accordingly no eyebrows were raised when Defence Minister Anthony arrived in Washington on the day following the securing of the NSG waiver. The timing of the visit was recognised as being replete with significance, and it was reported that the controversial LSA, much sought after by the Pentagon, was one of the items on the table. The refusal to host military bases of either of the great powers of the Cold War era belonged with the key principles that once united the countries of the nonaligned movement. In the past, the objections of the Left parties had restrained the UPA government from signing the LSA and making a formal break with the nonaligned movement. Now that the prime minister has dissociated himself from his former coalition allies, nothing stands in the way of his inking the agreement—and driving the last nail in the coffin of India’s past history of nonalignment.

ZNet, October 22

http://www.newagebd.com/oped.html


Mr. Munshi, If the NRI had to play a role in the nuclear agreement that is even better. That would mean that Indian NRI has a greater clout and can move and change the senario for India and the world. From your feeling you just wish that Bangledesh lobby was as strong.
 
I think this rings a bell, hope u guys are getting it. What is "low quality" of uranium? The natural uranium is of 0.7% only. He he he

'India's uranium reserves at 115,000 tonnes'- Hindustan Times

ndia's uranium reserves are estimated at 115,000 tonnes but most of this is of low quality, thus necessitating imports for the country's nuclear plants, parliament was informed on Thursday.

"We have a reserve of 115,000 tonnes. However, the quality of domestic uranium is low and this necessitates imports. Right now, we are trying to balance the mismatch between the supply and the demand," Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office Prithviraj Chavan said during question hour in the Rajya Sabha.

The response came on a question posed by N.K. Singh (Janata Dal-United) on whether India's nuclear plants were starved due to the non-availability of uranium.

Posing a supplementary, former finance minister Yashwant Sinha asked whether there were plans to exploit reserves in Andhra Pradesh, where it was estimated that there was enough uranium to generate 10,000 MW of electricity a year for 50 years.

"We have already opened a new mine in Cuddapah (district of Andhra Pradesh). This should become operational in 2010. Environmental clearance is awaited for another mine in Andhra Pradesh," Chavan said.

He also pointed out that efforts were underway since 1993 to mine for uranium in Meghalaya but environmental clearance for this had not been forthcoming due to objections raised by a number of NGOs.

"We are hopeful of resolving this issue soon. Once that happens, it will substantially augment our requirements," Chavan maintained.

India had recently secured a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to enable the resumption of nuclear commerce after a three-decade hiatus. Following this, Brazil, South Africa and Kazakhstan indicated that they are willing to sell uranium to India though no formal agreement has been signed on this.
 
Talks with French firm soon for nuclear reactors

New Delhi, October 24 : Final negotiations between the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) and French firm Areva are expected to start soon. NPCIL chief S K Jain was in Paris last week in this connection, diplomatic sources said.
Areva had the “political clearance” to negotiate on the first generation European Pressurised Reactors (EPRs) and their construction in India. This comes even as the NPCIL is engaged in talks with US companies GE and Westinghouse and a Russian nuclear firm, besides Areva, for supply of nuclear reactors to India. What is interesting in the French offer is the proposal to even “construct” nuclear reactors on Indian soil.

It is also learnt that the French Government has given the green signal to the French company to give fuel supply assurances to the Indian Government. “France does not produce uranium, but it gets uranium from other countries. The French companies have been authorised to give fuel supply commitments so that there are no apprehensions on the fuel disruption.”

Paris has also proposed an international mechanism — on the lines of an international bank — on uranium, so that the growing demand for the nuclear fuel can be well-regulated.
 
By Hiroyuki Koshoji
UPI Correspondent


Tokyo, Japan — Japan has agreed to boost economic and security cooperation with India, but has rejected a suggestion of nuclear energy cooperation. Although both countries are interested in developing nuclear energy and would be feasible partners, Japan is unlikely to agree to a nuclear deal as long as India refuses to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso and his visiting Indian counterpart, Manmohan Singh, signed a joint statement on security cooperation Wednesday in Tokyo, agreeing to enhance strategic dialogue and participate in joint military exercises to ensure the safety of maritime transportation in the Indian Ocean, a key sea lane for the transport of Middle Eastern oil.

Japan has also agreed to provide loans worth US$4.5 billion to India to help build a freight railway line between New Delhi and Mumbai.

However, the two sides failed to bridge their differences on an economic partnership agreement that they have been negotiating since early last year, and aim to conclude by the end of this year. Japan wants India to reduce duties on imported cars and car parts, while India wants Japan to simplify its import procedures on generic drugs produced in India.

At the summit talks, Singh broached the idea of nuclear energy cooperation with Japan, but Aso was not receptive. He said he wanted India to behave in a responsible manner, including agreeing to a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.

"I do recognize the sensitivities of this in Japan,” Singh told a joint press conference. “I said that we will move at a pace which the Japanese government and people are comfortable with."

The Nuclear Suppliers Group, a nuclear export control regime consisting of 45 countries including the United States and Japan, had until this year restricted the export of nuclear power technologies or nuclear-related products to India because of nuclear tests it conducted in 1974 and 1998, and its refusal to sign the NPT, which would prohibit any future tests.

However, the group withdrew its objections to such exports under pressure from the United States, which subsequently concluded a nuclear deal with India early this month.

India has also signed a civilian nuclear agreement with France. However analysts say that competition from China and Russia will make it tough for France to secure orders for nuclear technologies from India, which plans to build 40 nuclear reactors by 2032. For India, civilian nuclear power is a top priority as its current power generation is inadequate for millions of poor citizens.

It was difficult for Japan, as a member of the NSG, to go along with the group’s decision to make an exception and allow nuclear technology transfers to India. It has always supported nonproliferation post World War II because it was the target of two nuclear bombs that devastated the nation.

Japanese officials have justified their acquiescence in the NSG decision by saying that allowing exports of nuclear power technologies to India could eventually bring it to accept the nonproliferation regime. Besides, nuclear power as an alternate and clean source of energy can help India combat global warming by reducing its greenhouse gas emissions.

However, this position has raised questions and concerns among some members of Parliament, citizen groups, atomic bomb victim groups and the governor generals of Hiroshima and Nagasaki prefectures, who have called on the government to take a cautious attitude.

Some Japanese media, experts and citizen groups say there are potential risks associated with India’s nuclear program. If India is allowed to import uranium for its nuclear reactors, which would be subject to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, it would still be possible for India to use its indigenous uranium to produce more nuclear bombs. Also they warn that India, by refusing to ratify the NPT, sets a bad precedent for countries like Iran or North Korea who might wish to do the same.

Other concerns are that India could convert technology imported from the United States or France for military use. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 with deuterium oxide from the United States and a research reactor from Canada that were originally provided for peaceful civilian use and not for nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, some say that the international community should evaluate India’s nonproliferation record. Unlike Pakistan, which is alleged to have proliferated nuclear materials, India has had a clean record in the more than 30 years it has had nuclear capability.

However, the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, D.C., believes that, “important questions remain about the adequacy and implementation of India’s export controls and nuclear classification procedures.” In a report released last month it said, “India’s illicit procurement of dual-use nuclear-related items for its unsafeguarded nuclear program belies its commitment to the NSG.”

In assessing India’s nuclear procurement practices, the ISIS found several incidents where India conducted illicit nuclear trade and leaked sensitive nuclear information to corporate bidders during its procurement process.

“Before April 2003, India procured from China large quantities of tributyl phosphate (TBP), a dual-use chemical that is used in nuclear programs to separate plutonium. China enacted new end-user requirements after a 2002 sale of TBP to North Korea was criticized by the U.S. government,” the report said.

Japan has urged India to sign the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, many Japanese believe that the NSG’s approval of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal has already undermined the NPT regime.


Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with his Japanese counterpart, Taro Aso, in Tokyo, Japan on Oct. 22, 2008. India is the largest recipient of Japan's Official Development Assistance and Singh has urged Aso to encourage Japanese industry to come to India. (Photo/Indian government)

http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2008/10/23/japan_rejects_nuclear_accord_with_india/5453/
 
India's already struck deals with USA, France and Russia so Japan's refusal isn't going to hurt anyone, certainly not India.

Imho all India needs now is a deal with Australia and Canada, two of worlds largest Uranium producers.
 
Imho all India needs now is a deal with Australia and Canada, two of worlds largest Uranium producers.

True. We are still working with central asian countries like kazakhastan for uranium supplies along with US, russia and brazil. But, australia is more important, especially looking at the distance.
 
I am a little intrigued by the Japanese behavior. I know that many Asians were happy that at least one Asian state made it to the list of developed countries and even defeated a European power (Russia) at the turn of the last century.

But then they played the same colonial game with their Asian neighbors, indulged in some massive abuses in Asian countries in their neighborhood, were called the "honorary whites" by the South Africans and seem to have taken that to heart.

I think many people in the subcontinent respect Japan but Japan has mostly remained aloof. They are taking more time to come out of the cold war mindset than the Europeans and Americans. Perhaps they will take time to adjust to the fast paced changes that are happening all around us.

The spectacular change in the fortunes of Japan (they were projected to overtake the USA in economy size 2 decades back or so) and the rise of other countries is taking time to sink in, I guess. May be I am a bit out of touch and members can correct me in that case.
 
Imho all India needs now is a deal with Australia and Canada, two of worlds largest Uranium producers.

Australia chances looks slim, Ruddy is a staunch supporter of the NPT. I think he said before that he will not sell Uranium to India aslong she is not a signatory to the NPT.

Maybe be he will change, maybe he won't.
 
Australia chances looks slim, Ruddy is a staunch supporter of the NPT. I think he said before that he will not sell Uranium to India aslong she is not a signatory to the NPT.

Maybe be he will change, maybe he won't.

Eventually, business will change him/them. They cannot afford to lose such a big market.
 
Canadian firm sees scope for nuclear biz here- International Business-News-The Economic Times


Canadian firm sees scope for nuclear biz here
29 Oct, 2008, 0216 hrs IST,Ishani Duttagupta, ET Bureau

MONTREAL: Canadian engineering and construction giant SNC-Lavalin sees big business opportunities for collaboration between Indian and Canadian companies in setting up smaller nuclear plants, following the Indo-US nuclear deal.

“India has the generic design for smaller nuclear reactors of around 540 mw. The Tarapore plant is also working on a 700 mw design. Western countries such as US and Canada now have much bigger reactors with advanced design of over 1100 mw.

However, we see a big market globally for smaller nuclear reactors which can be jointly tapped by Indian and Canadian companies,” Ronald Denom, president of SNC-Lavalin International, told ET.

A top team from the company, along with the CEO of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd (AECL), is visiting Mumbai early next month for meetings with the Atomic Energy Commission of India and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India for discussions on ways to tap joint business opportunities.

Members of the delegation include Hugh MacDiarmid, president and CEO of AECL and Patrick Lamarre, executive VP, SNC-Lavalin Inc, and president, SNC-Lavalin Nuclear Inc.

“There is a big market globally, specially in the smaller countries for smaller nuclear reactors. If Indian and Canadian companies got together, they could offer the full range of reactors,” Mr Denom said. He feels that an Indo-Canadian offering in the mid-sized reactor space can take on Korean, Russian and French companies with products in the market.

“Many smaller countries around the world have powergrids which are not very robust and hence have trouble with the larger designs. For them a more practical and economical design will be between 300 and 750 mw,” Mr Denom, said.
 
So we can stockpile now from canada too, good news here.

India can buy uranium anytime and stockpile: Canada-India-The Times of India

India can buy uranium anytime and stockpile: Canada
30 Oct 2008, 1754 hrs IST, PTI

MUMBAI: Canada, one of the key members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), on Thursday said that India can order for uranium anytime and can even stockpile.

"India can place order for uranium anytime and they can also stockpile it," Gerald W Grandey, President and chief Executive Officer of Cameco Corporation of Canada (largest suppliers of uranium) told reporters on the sidelines of Homi Bhabha's Centenary celebrations' inauguration.

"We have been waiting for a long time for the Indo-US deal to come through and since IAEA India specific agreement and NSG's waiver are in place, we are keen that India buys uranium from Canada anytime," Grandey, a key person who helped in the Indo-US deal process, said.

"Now it is up to India how soon they want and how much and under what conditions," he said adding "we are ready, the decision lies with New Delhi as the customer is always right."

Grandey said, the contractual agreements are not done overnight, it takes its own time and since they had been waiting for long, they wanted India to do it fast.

Replying a query on stockpiling, Grandey said, "stockpiling is a normal thing and under the general policy, one can stockpile for one or two years. Since in Asian countries due to scarcity of supply of uranium, they can stockpile even up to three years of inventories just as Japan has done."
 

Latest posts

Pakistan Defence Latest Posts

Pakistan Affairs Latest Posts

Back
Top Bottom