India's 2021-22 Defence Budget Needs Honest Financial Reckoning, Not Empty Rhetoric

[Yasser76]

India’s military faces a massive financial predicament in the fiscal year 2021-22, as it remains locked in a costly faceoff with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh.

To meet this forbidding challenge, that shows no sign of abating, all three services are believed to have already executed emergency purchases of over $2 billion since June 2020 to plug enduring equipment and ammunition shortages, adversely upsetting budgetary calculations. It is undeniable that the services will require vast sums of money in the upcoming budget on February 1 to operationally sustain them in the faceoff with China that could conceivably continue for years.

The military’s financial demands come at a time when India is deep in recession, following the serious financial downturn due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Though some green shoots are visible in the economy, these are unlikely to shore up government revenues in the coming fiscal in any substantial measure. Besides, to revive the economy, funds will need to be invested across several sectors from manufacturing to infrastructure, placing the government in a quandary over where it can possibly source funds to adequately finance the military.

Pompous pronouncements

Over decades, successive finance ministers have routinely promised that there will be no shortage of funds for the armed forces, and all additional monies which they may require will be provided. Totally disregarding reality, then defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman had unbelievingly declared in July 2018 that there was neither a shortage of funds nor of ammunition, when there was a paucity of both. The minister’s optimism, in fact, was in direct contrast to the Defence Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence (SCoD) that had publicly affirmed a shortage of funds for the military.


Sitharaman’s declaration was as ironic as it was surprising, as in the financial year 2018-19 there was a yawning gap of Rs 1,12, 137 crore between the requirement projected by the services and the funds allotted to them. Of this, Rs 76,766 crore was the shortfall in allocation for capital expenditure that largely caters for force modernisation. What the then Indian Army’s vice-chief Lieutenant General Sarath Chand had told the SCoD that year is more telling.


Prime Minister Narendra Modi with the chief of defence staff General Bipin Rawat (left) and army chief General M.M. Naravane (right) during in his visit to Ladakh in July 2020. Photo: PMO

“It (the budget) is barely enough to cater to the rise in expenses on account of inflation and does not even cater for taxes,” Lieutenant General Chand had told the Committee. He had stated that Rs 21,338 crore capital allocation for the army’s modernisation was “insufficient to cater for the committed payment” of Rs 29,033 crore for 125 ongoing schemes and for ammunition and equipment procurement”.

Also read: It Is Time to Accept That India’s Defence Planning Is Crippled by Severe Financial Woes

The vice chief had further revealed that 68% of the army’s equipment was in the ‘vintage category’, 24% in the current and 8% in the state of art grouping, and consequently, insufficient funds were certainly not going to remedy this worrying state of affairs.

The Committee’s prescient warning that the shortage of funds could lead to a default in payment for equipment to vendors, proved true in January 2019. This was when the ministry of defence (MoD) withheld payment of about Rs 20,000 crore to the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in order to pay overseas vendors and obviate punitive contractual provisions. Nobody asked, and no explanations were given, as to how the situation was managed the following year when the allocation to the services again fell short of their requirement by Rs 92,412 crore.

The recurring financial crisis to sustain the country’s military is as much on account of the government’s inability to meet the services’ financial requirement, as on account of the failure to acknowledge that finances will always be finite. Therefore, financially unviable, and disjointed expenditure plans continue to be made, with each service independently pursuing its own vision of the future.

The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat appointed exactly a year ago as head of the all-powerful department of military affairs (DMA) was expected to ensure service jointness and prioritisation in defence planning, especially with regard to financing, but the situation remains unaltered.

In fact, the DMA has floated ideas like a short tour of duty for military service and a graded pension structure to save on salaries and pensions which collectively account for almost half the annual defence outlay. But these are contentious proposals, which even if implemented, can in no way provide any immediate financial relief. Therefore, as things stand, the endless tussle by each individual service to secure a larger share of the defence budget is likely to continue unabated.

The resultant emasculation of the department of defence (DoD) too will have repercussions and add to the overall financial disarray. The DoD, for its part, continues to labour under the misconception that delegating more financial powers to the services, tweaking procurement procedures and enforcing indigenisation by banning defence imports will somehow magically solve the problem.

Reality check

The reality, however, is that procedures and policies can only produce results provided there are sufficient funds available to secure the desired military capabilities which too remain somewhat undefined and amorphous. This is also true of atmanirbharta or indigenisation, which in theory is desirable, but not always a cost-effective alternative to imported materiel.

Over decades, watchdog bodies like the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) have detailed how costly it is to indigenously license-build platforms like fighters, light utility helicopters, main battle tanks and even assault rifles compared to directly importing them.


Representative image. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh poses for a group photo with troops who took part in para dropping and other military exercises at Stakna, in Leh, Ladakh, Friday, July 17, 2020. Photo: PTI

Indian defence planners somehow fail to realise that creating industrial facilities domestically to manufacture these platforms and equipment needs massive and sustained investment by the manufacturers and large budget outlays to buy the indigenously manufactured material. Both of these are problematic.

This continuing financial crisis has been further exacerbated by the lack of an efficacious financial management system in the MoD to ensure that funds needed for material acquisitions, alongside recurring expenditure on salaries, rations, ammunition and maintenance of infrastructure and equipment are indeed available.

Also read: Despite Advances in Strategic Arms, Country Fails ‘Make in India’ Test for Basic Equipment

This drawback is responsible for the growing mismatch between the financial requirement projected by the armed forces and the outlays allocated to them. This gap has widened from Rs 23,014 crore in 2010-11 to Rs 1,03,535 crore in 2020-21 after reaching its peak in 2018-19.


However, unfazed by this shortfall, the services formulated a five-year plan in July 2017 that envisaged an outlay of a whopping Rs 26.84 lakh crore. This projected astronomical amount would have necessitated doubling the annual defence budget that was – and remains – a virtual impossibility, considering that the decadal average increase in the country’s military outlay is merely eight to 10%. It is incomprehensible to imagine what goals are served by such outlandish planning that will, for decades, remain in the realm of fantasy.

Defence analysts argue that it is not for the government to meet the services’ requirement as security is critical and of paramount importance. That is true; but only partially, as the government is also responsible for other equally vital sectors like health, education, internal security, and infrastructure. This, in turn, will continue to compel all governments to walk a tightrope between the needs of all these other sectors and defence in the foreseeable future.

In conclusion, this can only mean that while there may be an above average hike in the defence budget for the financial year 2020-21, it is bound to fall short of the services’ desired requirement.

For this to be reversed or somewhat mitigated, financial realities need to be acknowledged and furthermore implemented practically in defence planning. The title of the 1968 Jerry Lewis Hollywood hit could provide a clue to its resolution: Don’t Raise the Bridge, Lower the River.

India's 2021-22 Defence Budget Needs Honest Financial Reckoning, Not Empty Rhetoric

Over the decades, successive finance ministers have routinely promised that there will be no shortage of funds for the armed forces, but the reality remains otherwise.

thewire.in

 

[gulli]

Do anything, increase tax slab from 2.5 lakhs to 10lakhs atleast. Tax everyone beyond..

 

[casual]

defense is the most important national spending priority and also one with the least returns.

 

[CIA Mole]

india should just pray for white man to save them

 

[gulli]

india should just pray for white man to save them

You want us to follow Pakistani financial model??

 

[The Maverick]

You want us to follow Pakistani financial model??

Love it " Pakistan model " that is hillrous

 

[Yasser76]

Chandigarh: Air Chief Marshal R.K.S. Bhadhauria’s recent declaration that the Indian Air Force (IAF) would, over the next decade, concurrently design, manufacture and licence-build over 320 aircraft of three – if not four – combat types, worth lakhs of crores, appears somewhat incredible.

At his annual press conference, three days before Air Force Day on October 8, ACM Bhadauria detailed the IAF’s plans to make good its fast depleting fighter squadrons, whose numbers had dropped to a perilous 28-29, from a sanctioned strength of 42. Over the next two to three years, these are expected to decrease even further to around 25 squadrons, as the IAF retires 4-5 squadrons of its 100-odd legacy MiG-21 ‘BIS’ ground-attack fighters, sharply reducing the force’s numerical platform superiority over Pakistan, leave alone China.

The air chief, however, conceded that the IAF would be unable meet its goal of operating 42 combat squadrons by 2030, but would manage 36-38 squadrons by then.

But he did not elaborate on how the colossal funds, technological input and industrial capability needed for these additional assets would be sourced. Bhaduria also tellingly admitted that the IAF would face budgetary constraints in ‘due course’, which under India’s enduring severe economic downturn due to the COVID-19 pandemic is, by all considerations, a gross understatement.

Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria. Photo: PTI
Besides, at a conservative estimate, the additional 320-odd fighter types that Bhadauria has planned for the IAF, would cost upwards of $ 45 billion, or around 68%, of the annual defence budget of $65.9 billion for the fiscal year 2020-21. And though, admittedly, this entire amount would not need to be discharged all at once – as it would be spread over several years – it still remains an inordinately large amount for a solitary weapon platform in a developing country’s military, especially one that badly needs a plethora of other assorted equipment.


This includes multi-role utility and attack helicopters, tanks, infantry combat vehicles, aircraft carriers, warships, submarines, minesweepers, armed and unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles and varied missiles and ammunition, amongst other critical materiel.

Also read: After Chinese Aggression, India Goes on Fast-Track Defence Equipment Import Spree

“The Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the IAF will desperately need to create additional financial, design and manufacturing capacities by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to achieve the goal of acquiring hundreds of new fighters,” said military analyst Air Marshal V.K. ‘Jimmy’ Bhatia (retired). There is no possible way this can be achieved under prevailing conditions, he added.

Other serving officers concurred, affirming that the IAF’s impecunious state militated against such ambitious future acquisition plans.

In late 2019, for instance, the IAF had sought an additional Rs 400 billion from the MoD to procure fighters and transport aircraft to upgrade its capabilities and defray payments for other previously acquired platforms. It stated that its capital allocation of Rs 393 billion in the annual budget for FY 2019-20 to acquire new platforms was ‘grossly inadequate’ to fund its long-deferred modernisation from a tactical to strategic force.

The IAF also claimed that it had a ‘committed liability’ of Rs 480 billion for FY 2019-20 for assorted equipment bought earlier, which was responsible for ‘severely depleting’ its allocation, leaving little or nothing for new programmes.

Midair refuelling of one of the five Rafale jets, which took off from France on Monday, on its way to India. The Rafale aircrafts are covering a distance of nearly 7,000 km from France to India with a single stop in UAE. Photo: PTI
It had to make advance payment for 36 Dassault Rafale fighters and five Almaz-Antei S-400 Triumf self-propelled surface-to-air missile systems, in addition to disbursing instalments for 22 Boeing AH-64(I) Apache Guardian helicopters and 15 CH-47 Chinook heavy lift rotary aircraft, acquired in 2015, along with two types of US transport aircraft procured earlier besides a host of additional kit.

In response, the MoD allocated the IAF some Rs 55 billion, or an eighth of what it had demanded. But to add to its woes a few months later in February 2020, the IAF was apportioned Rs 432.82 billion in FY 2020-21 as its capital outlay, some Rs 15.87 billion less than the Rs 448.69 it had received for the same purpose the previous year, further beggaring the force.

And though the military emergency prompted by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) occupying Indian territory in eastern Ladakh had galvanised the IAF into conducting air domination sorties over the region, greatly boosting its media profile, its future procurements outlined by Bhadauria remain hostage to a crippled economy and a problem-ridden HAL and ADA plagued by inefficiencies. “The services, including the IAF continue to reflect a disregard for fiscal reality in planning their equipment buys,” said Amit Cowshish, former defence ministry financial advisor on acquisitions.

No country in the world can possibly afford to acquire so many fighters, even over a prolonged 10-15 year period to the exclusion of all other defence equipment, he cautioned.

Also read: Will the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 Make India Self-Reliant in Defence Production?

In his presser, ACM Bhadauria declared that the force would operationalise the second No. 18 ‘Flying Bullets’ Tejas Mk1 light combat aircraft (LCA) squadron at Sulur in Tamil Nadu, equipped with full operational clearance (FoC) platforms by 2022.

This would supplement the earlier No. 45 ‘Flying Daggers’ squadron, established in 2016 with some 16 single-seat Tejas fighters, but only with Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) that was secured haltingly in two stages- IOC-1 in January 2011 and IOC-2 in December 2013 for an aircraft that had been under development since 1983 and remains little better than an advanced technology demonstrator. .

But these IOCs too were accorded with 53 waivers – of which 20 would be permanent even after the platform secured its FOC – with regard to the platforms drop tanks, airframe fatigue test and assorted weapon system configurations. Of the 40 MK1s, however, eight would be tandem-seat trainers that would subsequently join their two squadrons after all single-seat platforms had been delivered at the rate of around eight fighters per year. The IAF has been pressing HAL to double this output to 16 LCAs, but this remains a trying work in progress.

In the meantime, Bhadauria said the IAF would sign a deal with HAL for an additional 83 upgraded Tejas M1A fighters that remain under development and would not be ready for series production till 2022-23, as two prototypes have still to undertake some 200 test flights. The Mk1A is expected to feature several capability enhancements over the Mk1 model that include an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, modern electronic warfare systems and aerial refuelling capability.

Also read: IAF Lore: When Those Magnificent Men Took their Flying Machines to Delhi for ‘Jollies’


It would also be around 1,000-kg lighter than the Mk1, weighing 6,500 kg, and feature modified internal systems, under a ‘panel-in-panel’ arrangement, for easier maintainability. The 83 Mk1A deal- that includes 10 dual-set trainers-is costed at round Rs 390 billion, negotiated down over two years from Rs 500 billion that HAL had initially demanded for the tender.

But like the Mk1 model, the Mk1A variant too would be powered by USA’s General Electric F404-GE-IN20 engines that generate 80-85 kN (kilonewtons) thrust, which restricts the fighters angle of attack to around 21°, limits their range to 350-400km and weapons-carrying capability, to around three tonnes.

Meanwhile, to bridge the shortfall of fighters, till the indigenously Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) joins the fleet 2029 onwards, Bhadauria stated that the IAF would pursue its long awaited procurement of 114 Multi-role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA).

IAF fighter jet flies in the Ladakh region, amid the prolonged India-China face off, in Leh district, Wednesday, September 23, 2020. Photo: PTI
Under the long-pending proposal, one of seven shortlisted single or twin-engine fighters would be manufactured domestically under the Strategic Partnership (SP) model outlined in the newly released Defence Acquisition Procedure, 2020. Under the SP model, a domestic private sector company would partner an overseas original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to deliver the selected platform.

The IAFs April 2018 request for information or RFI for these fighters had elicited responses from seven OEMs: Eurofighter (Typhoon), France’s Dassault Aviation (Rafale F3R), Sweden’s Saab (Gripen-E), Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation and Sukhoi Corporation (MiG-35 and Su35) and USA’s Boeing and Lockheed Martin (F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-21).

The deadline for this programme, costing not less than $ 20 billion, is unspecified, as a not even a request for proposal or tender has yet been issued. This will be eventually succeeded by a technical evaluation of the responses, followed by user trials and complex price and technology transfer negotiations lasting, at a conservative estimate 3-5 years. This, in turn, would be followed by the domestic company creating manufacturing facilities and developing a product support system. Thereafter, all else being equal, the first of the 96 licence built fighters could roll out around 2029-30 at the earliest, said officials associated with the project, expressing little or optimism for the project’s future.

Also read: It Is Time to Accept That India’s Defence Planning Is Crippled by Severe Financial Woes

In tandem, the IAF also aims to begin inducting the first of seven indigenously designed and built squadrons of 125 twin-engine AMCAs 2029-30 onwards. Of these, the IAF envisages the first two squadrons would be powered by the US General Electric GE-414 engine with a 98 kN thrust, and the remaining five by a locally designed engine with enhanced 125kN thrust developed in collaboration with a foreign OEM.

If that were not enough the ADA-HAL combine plans on simultaneously developing a twin-engine LCA Mk2 variant powered by the more powerful General Electric F414 GE-INS6. Envisaged as an eventual replacement for the IAFs upgraded Mirage-2000H fighters, HAL aims on series building some 200-odd LCA Mk2’s, making it eventually a grand total of some 324 LCA variants alone for IAF induction.

The IAF is also in advanced negotiations with Russia for 21 additional second-hand MiG 29 ‘Fulcrum’ fighters and 12 Sukhoi-“Flanker’ Su-30 MKI’s multi-role combat aircraft which HAL will licence build, once it has completed the 272 it is currently constructing. The twin engine MiG-29 fighters that were lying in an ‘unassembled and mothballed’ state in Russia were being acquired for around $850 million and would supplement three squadrons of 60 similar platforms inducted into the IAF 1986 onwards.


With such an embarrassment of combat aircraft riches proposed by ACM Bhadauria at such tremendous cost, it appears as if only the IAF has a monopoly on the lion’s share of India’s declining defence budget.

Perhaps, the army and navy too have an opinion.

IAF's Fanciful Ambitions Now Risk Exceeding India's Declining Defence Budget

IAF's buying plans reflect a disregard for fiscal reality, and in fact, effective thinking.

thewire.in

 

[Hephaestus]

Chandigarh: Air Chief Marshal R.K.S. Bhadhauria’s recent declaration that the Indian Air Force (IAF) would, over the next decade, concurrently design, manufacture and licence-build over 320 aircraft of three – if not four – combat types, worth lakhs of crores, appears somewhat incredible.

At his annual press conference, three days before Air Force Day on October 8, ACM Bhadauria detailed the IAF’s plans to make good its fast depleting fighter squadrons, whose numbers had dropped to a perilous 28-29, from a sanctioned strength of 42. Over the next two to three years, these are expected to decrease even further to around 25 squadrons, as the IAF retires 4-5 squadrons of its 100-odd legacy MiG-21 ‘BIS’ ground-attack fighters, sharply reducing the force’s numerical platform superiority over Pakistan, leave alone China.

The air chief, however, conceded that the IAF would be unable meet its goal of operating 42 combat squadrons by 2030, but would manage 36-38 squadrons by then.

But he did not elaborate on how the colossal funds, technological input and industrial capability needed for these additional assets would be sourced. Bhaduria also tellingly admitted that the IAF would face budgetary constraints in ‘due course’, which under India’s enduring severe economic downturn due to the COVID-19 pandemic is, by all considerations, a gross understatement.

Air Chief Marshal Rakesh Kumar Singh Bhadauria. Photo: PTI
Besides, at a conservative estimate, the additional 320-odd fighter types that Bhadauria has planned for the IAF, would cost upwards of $ 45 billion, or around 68%, of the annual defence budget of $65.9 billion for the fiscal year 2020-21. And though, admittedly, this entire amount would not need to be discharged all at once – as it would be spread over several years – it still remains an inordinately large amount for a solitary weapon platform in a developing country’s military, especially one that badly needs a plethora of other assorted equipment.


This includes multi-role utility and attack helicopters, tanks, infantry combat vehicles, aircraft carriers, warships, submarines, minesweepers, armed and unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles and varied missiles and ammunition, amongst other critical materiel.

Also read: After Chinese Aggression, India Goes on Fast-Track Defence Equipment Import Spree

“The Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the IAF will desperately need to create additional financial, design and manufacturing capacities by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to achieve the goal of acquiring hundreds of new fighters,” said military analyst Air Marshal V.K. ‘Jimmy’ Bhatia (retired). There is no possible way this can be achieved under prevailing conditions, he added.

Other serving officers concurred, affirming that the IAF’s impecunious state militated against such ambitious future acquisition plans.

In late 2019, for instance, the IAF had sought an additional Rs 400 billion from the MoD to procure fighters and transport aircraft to upgrade its capabilities and defray payments for other previously acquired platforms. It stated that its capital allocation of Rs 393 billion in the annual budget for FY 2019-20 to acquire new platforms was ‘grossly inadequate’ to fund its long-deferred modernisation from a tactical to strategic force.

The IAF also claimed that it had a ‘committed liability’ of Rs 480 billion for FY 2019-20 for assorted equipment bought earlier, which was responsible for ‘severely depleting’ its allocation, leaving little or nothing for new programmes.

Midair refuelling of one of the five Rafale jets, which took off from France on Monday, on its way to India. The Rafale aircrafts are covering a distance of nearly 7,000 km from France to India with a single stop in UAE. Photo: PTI
It had to make advance payment for 36 Dassault Rafale fighters and five Almaz-Antei S-400 Triumf self-propelled surface-to-air missile systems, in addition to disbursing instalments for 22 Boeing AH-64(I) Apache Guardian helicopters and 15 CH-47 Chinook heavy lift rotary aircraft, acquired in 2015, along with two types of US transport aircraft procured earlier besides a host of additional kit.

In response, the MoD allocated the IAF some Rs 55 billion, or an eighth of what it had demanded. But to add to its woes a few months later in February 2020, the IAF was apportioned Rs 432.82 billion in FY 2020-21 as its capital outlay, some Rs 15.87 billion less than the Rs 448.69 it had received for the same purpose the previous year, further beggaring the force.

And though the military emergency prompted by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) occupying Indian territory in eastern Ladakh had galvanised the IAF into conducting air domination sorties over the region, greatly boosting its media profile, its future procurements outlined by Bhadauria remain hostage to a crippled economy and a problem-ridden HAL and ADA plagued by inefficiencies. “The services, including the IAF continue to reflect a disregard for fiscal reality in planning their equipment buys,” said Amit Cowshish, former defence ministry financial advisor on acquisitions.

No country in the world can possibly afford to acquire so many fighters, even over a prolonged 10-15 year period to the exclusion of all other defence equipment, he cautioned.

Also read: Will the Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020 Make India Self-Reliant in Defence Production?

In his presser, ACM Bhadauria declared that the force would operationalise the second No. 18 ‘Flying Bullets’ Tejas Mk1 light combat aircraft (LCA) squadron at Sulur in Tamil Nadu, equipped with full operational clearance (FoC) platforms by 2022.

This would supplement the earlier No. 45 ‘Flying Daggers’ squadron, established in 2016 with some 16 single-seat Tejas fighters, but only with Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) that was secured haltingly in two stages- IOC-1 in January 2011 and IOC-2 in December 2013 for an aircraft that had been under development since 1983 and remains little better than an advanced technology demonstrator. .

But these IOCs too were accorded with 53 waivers – of which 20 would be permanent even after the platform secured its FOC – with regard to the platforms drop tanks, airframe fatigue test and assorted weapon system configurations. Of the 40 MK1s, however, eight would be tandem-seat trainers that would subsequently join their two squadrons after all single-seat platforms had been delivered at the rate of around eight fighters per year. The IAF has been pressing HAL to double this output to 16 LCAs, but this remains a trying work in progress.

In the meantime, Bhadauria said the IAF would sign a deal with HAL for an additional 83 upgraded Tejas M1A fighters that remain under development and would not be ready for series production till 2022-23, as two prototypes have still to undertake some 200 test flights. The Mk1A is expected to feature several capability enhancements over the Mk1 model that include an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, modern electronic warfare systems and aerial refuelling capability.

Also read: IAF Lore: When Those Magnificent Men Took their Flying Machines to Delhi for ‘Jollies’


It would also be around 1,000-kg lighter than the Mk1, weighing 6,500 kg, and feature modified internal systems, under a ‘panel-in-panel’ arrangement, for easier maintainability. The 83 Mk1A deal- that includes 10 dual-set trainers-is costed at round Rs 390 billion, negotiated down over two years from Rs 500 billion that HAL had initially demanded for the tender.

But like the Mk1 model, the Mk1A variant too would be powered by USA’s General Electric F404-GE-IN20 engines that generate 80-85 kN (kilonewtons) thrust, which restricts the fighters angle of attack to around 21°, limits their range to 350-400km and weapons-carrying capability, to around three tonnes.

Meanwhile, to bridge the shortfall of fighters, till the indigenously Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) joins the fleet 2029 onwards, Bhadauria stated that the IAF would pursue its long awaited procurement of 114 Multi-role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA).

IAF fighter jet flies in the Ladakh region, amid the prolonged India-China face off, in Leh district, Wednesday, September 23, 2020. Photo: PTI
Under the long-pending proposal, one of seven shortlisted single or twin-engine fighters would be manufactured domestically under the Strategic Partnership (SP) model outlined in the newly released Defence Acquisition Procedure, 2020. Under the SP model, a domestic private sector company would partner an overseas original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to deliver the selected platform.

The IAFs April 2018 request for information or RFI for these fighters had elicited responses from seven OEMs: Eurofighter (Typhoon), France’s Dassault Aviation (Rafale F3R), Sweden’s Saab (Gripen-E), Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation and Sukhoi Corporation (MiG-35 and Su35) and USA’s Boeing and Lockheed Martin (F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-21).

The deadline for this programme, costing not less than $ 20 billion, is unspecified, as a not even a request for proposal or tender has yet been issued. This will be eventually succeeded by a technical evaluation of the responses, followed by user trials and complex price and technology transfer negotiations lasting, at a conservative estimate 3-5 years. This, in turn, would be followed by the domestic company creating manufacturing facilities and developing a product support system. Thereafter, all else being equal, the first of the 96 licence built fighters could roll out around 2029-30 at the earliest, said officials associated with the project, expressing little or optimism for the project’s future.

Also read: It Is Time to Accept That India’s Defence Planning Is Crippled by Severe Financial Woes

In tandem, the IAF also aims to begin inducting the first of seven indigenously designed and built squadrons of 125 twin-engine AMCAs 2029-30 onwards. Of these, the IAF envisages the first two squadrons would be powered by the US General Electric GE-414 engine with a 98 kN thrust, and the remaining five by a locally designed engine with enhanced 125kN thrust developed in collaboration with a foreign OEM.

If that were not enough the ADA-HAL combine plans on simultaneously developing a twin-engine LCA Mk2 variant powered by the more powerful General Electric F414 GE-INS6. Envisaged as an eventual replacement for the IAFs upgraded Mirage-2000H fighters, HAL aims on series building some 200-odd LCA Mk2’s, making it eventually a grand total of some 324 LCA variants alone for IAF induction.

The IAF is also in advanced negotiations with Russia for 21 additional second-hand MiG 29 ‘Fulcrum’ fighters and 12 Sukhoi-“Flanker’ Su-30 MKI’s multi-role combat aircraft which HAL will licence build, once it has completed the 272 it is currently constructing. The twin engine MiG-29 fighters that were lying in an ‘unassembled and mothballed’ state in Russia were being acquired for around $850 million and would supplement three squadrons of 60 similar platforms inducted into the IAF 1986 onwards.


With such an embarrassment of combat aircraft riches proposed by ACM Bhadauria at such tremendous cost, it appears as if only the IAF has a monopoly on the lion’s share of India’s declining defence budget.

Perhaps, the army and navy too have an opinion.

IAF's Fanciful Ambitions Now Risk Exceeding India's Declining Defence Budget

IAF's buying plans reflect a disregard for fiscal reality, and in fact, effective thinking.

thewire.in

The official defence budget is likely to go up to $85B this year.

 

[IndiaIsBad]

The quality of the article is so good that they forgot to state how exactly is the defence budget declining as per their headline.

 

[Cookie Monster]

The quality of the article is so good that they forgot to state how exactly is the defence budget declining as per their headline.

It's an Indian "news" source...had they claimed anti Pak fictional stuff like PAF F16 being downed, or civil war in Karachi, or 40% availability rate of JF17...u wouldn't have bothered to analyze the flaws like u are trying to do right now. It would automatically have been true in ur head.

 

[IndiaIsBad]

It's an Indian "news" source...had they claimed the fiction of PAF F16 being downed...u wouldn't have bothered to analyze the flaws like u are trying to do right now.

Please do point out where I said that it is not an Indian news source.

 

[Syed1.]

It's an Indian "news" source...had they claimed the fictional stuff like PAF F16 being downed, or civil war in Karachi, or 40% availability rate of JF17...u wouldn't have bothered to analyze the flaws like u are trying to do right now.

India's fake propaganda for their own population is so strong. A generation from now when those who themselves didn't witness the events will think it is an 'established fact' that they downed a F-16.


Similarly to how Indians today think that they won the 65 war. First time I heard an army that was retreating won the war lol.

 

[Cookie Monster]

Please do point out where I said that it is not an Indian news source.

U didn't get the point I was making...don't bother...I didn't expect much from a troll like u.

India's fake propaganda for their own population is so strong. A generation from now when those who themselves didn't witness the events will think it is an 'established fact' that they downed a F-16.


Similarly to how Indians today think that they won the 65 war. First time I heard an army that was retreating won the war lol.

I just find it amusing...
Indian media says something anti Pakistan
...Bhakt brain off...no need to check for accuracy...must be true.

Indian media says something anti India
...Bhakt brain working at 200%...all of a sudden the trash reporting standards become apparent.

 

[IndiaIsBad]

U didn't get the point I was making...don't bother...I didn't expect much from a troll like u.

My apologies. Its just that you are so good at making points that no one gets.

 

[Cookie Monster]

My apologies. Its just that you are so good at making points that no one gets.

It was written in no uncertain terms...and no one else seems to struggle grasping simple concepts written in plain English...
...u r the exception...
Either bcuz ur IQ is substantially lower than I expected...or bcuz u didn't have a response to what I said and were completely dumbfounded...so in haste u resorted to deflecting that topic.

In any case...mirror was shown to u...and ur hypocrisy was pointed out. I know very well that u have no shame...so ur response is expected.