Indian Army News & Discussions

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Modernisation Plans of the Indian Army :: KanglaOnline ~ Your Gateway

Despite the army leadership’s best efforts, the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) had, till recently, almost completely bypassed the Indian Army. For well over a decade the army’s efforts to modernise had been thwarted due to political neglect and lack of adequate budgetary support. The funds made available for modernisation are extremely limited and a large portion of these funds is surrendered year after year. For Financial Year 2006-07, a sum of Rs 3,000 crore was surrendered as unspent. The fact that 155 mm ammunition for the Bofors howitzer had to be imported from South Africa during the Kargil conflict in 1999 tells its own tale of persistent shortages. Had the conflict not been confined to the 150 km frontage of the Kargil sector, T-72 and 130 mm medium gun ammunition too would have run short and it would have been politically embarrassing for the government as well as the army. In the plains the army would have had to fight with obsolete Vijayant tanks and several other vintage equipment that were unsuitable for combat. However, sustained efforts by Army HQ have now borne fruit and the army’s modernisation drive is once again well underway.

In the prevailing era of strategic uncertainty, while terrorism has become the primary threat, the external and internal threats and challenges faced by India are such that a large army is still required to be maintained. Also, a high degree of preparation and operational readiness is still necessary as conventional war, though improbable, cannot be categorically ruled out. At the same time, heavy capital investments in modern defence equipment are undoubtedly a drain on a developing economy that is ill-equipped to handle the burgeoning defence expenditure. Several eminent analysts have recommended that qualitative upgradation should be accompanied by quantitative downsizing of personnel strength of the army. However, given its responsibilities for border management and the manpower-intensive low intensity conflict that the army is involved in, this is easier said than done.

Future conventional conflict on the Indian s ub-continent will in all probability result from the ongoing low-intensity limited war on the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan or the unresolved territorial and boundary dispute with China and will be predominantly a land conflict. The Indian Army seriously lacks a potent firepower punch, especially in the mountain sector. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) have still to enter service in numbers large enough to make a real difference. The reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) assets necessary for the optimum exploitation of even the existing firepower assets are grossly inadequate. Automated command and control and decision support systems have been on the drawing boards for several decades but are yet to mature.

In a future conventional war that will be fought under the nuclear shadow, manoeuvre will be extremely limited. This restriction will lead to much greater emphasis being placed on firepower to achieve the laid down military aim. Hence, it is imperative that artillery modernisation is undertaken with alacrity so as to generate firepower asymmetries on the future battlefield. After a long spell of keeping the powder dry, action on modernisation of the Indian artillery is livening up once again. Since January 2008, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has issued three global tenders for 155mm guns and howitzers for the mountains, the plains and self-propelled guns for the deserts. Summer and winter trials are expected to be held over the next one year and, red tape permitting, contracts may be awarded as early as in the first half of 2010.

Artillery firepower had paved the way for victory during the Kargil conflict. Despite the lessons learnt in Kargil, modernisation of the artillery had continued to lag behind. The last major acquisition of towed gun-howitzers was that of about 400 pieces of 39-calibre 155mm FH-77B howitzers form Bofors of Sweden in the mid-1980s. This gun had proved its mettle in the Kargil conflict. Just when a contract for 120 tracked and 180 wheeled self-propelled (SP) 155mm guns was about to be concluded after years of protracted trials, South African arms manufacturer Denel, a leading contender for the contract, was alleged to have been involved in a corruption scam in an earlier deal for anti-material rifles (AMRs). The other two howitzers in contention, from Soltam of Israel and BAE (Bofors) of Sweden did not meet the laid down criteria according to the COAS and Army HQ recommended fresh trials, setting the programme back at least three to four years. Another key issue was that the howitzers that had been offered were technology demonstration models and not guns that were in actual service with the home country armies.

The probability of the next conventional war breaking out in the mountains is far higher than that of a war in the plains. With this in view, the artillery recently conceptualised a requirement for a light-weight towed howitzer of 155mm calibre for employment in the mountains. Neither the present Bofors howitzer nor its replacement will be capable of operations in the mountains. A light-weight 45-calibre 155mm howitzer weighing less than 5,000 kg, with a light but adequately powered prime mover, is ideal for the mountains. The gun-train should be capable of negotiating sharp road bends without the need to unhook the gun from the prime mover. The two British 45-calibre 155mm howitzers that competed for the US contract for a similar howitzer some years ago – the UFH (Ultra-lightweight Field Howitzer) and the LTH (Light-weight Towed Howitzer) – could be considered for licensed production with transfer of technology.

In January 2008, the MoD floated a Request for Proposal (RfP) for 140 pieces of ultra-light 39 calibre 155mm towed howitzers for use by the Indian Army’s mountain formations and, presumably, by its rapid reaction divisions – as and when these are raised as it will be easy to transport by air. 140 howitzers will be adequate to equip seven medium artillery regiments and will cost approximately Rs 3,000 crore. The RfP has been reportedly issued to UK’s BAE Systems (which now owns Bofors), for the M777 howitzer claimed to be the lightest in the world at under 4,220 kg, and to Singapore Technologies for the Pegasus SLWH.

India has floated a global tender for the purchase of 400 155mm towed artillery guns for the Army, to be followed by indigenous manufacture of another 1,100 howitzers, in a project worth a whopping Rs 8,000 crore. The RFP was issued to eight prospective bidders including BAE, General Dynamics, Nexter (France), Rhinemetall (Germany) and Samsung (South Korea). An RfP has also been issued for 180 wheeled self-propelled guns for around Rs 4,700 crore for employment by mechanised forces in the plains and semi-desert sectors.

Since the Bofors 155mm Howitzer was introduced into service, the indigenously designed and manufactured 105 mm Indian Field Gun (IFG) and its (not so) light version, the Light Field Gun (LFG), have joined the 75/24 Indian Mountain Gun, the 100mm Russian field gun and the 122mm Russian howitzer on the obsolescence list. Approximately 180 pieces of 130mm M46 Russian medium guns have been successfully “up-gunned” to 155mm calibre with ordnance supplied by Soltam of Israel. The new barrel length of 45 calibres has enhanced the range of the gun to about 40 km with extended range ammunition.

A contract for the acquisition of two regiments of the 12-tube, 300mm Smerch multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) system with 90 km range was reported to have been signed with Russia’s Rosoboronexport in early-2006. This will be a major boost for the long-range firepower capabilities of the army. If this weapon system had been available during the Kargil conflict, Pakistan’s brigade HQ and forward airfield at Skardu and other targets deep inside *** could have been hit with impunity. Extended range (ER) rockets are being introduced for the 122 mm Grad MBRL that has been in service for over three decades. The ER rockets will enhance the weapon system’s range from 22 to about 40 km. A Rs 5,000 crore contract has also been signed for the serial production of the Pinaka MBRL weapon system, another DRDO project plagued by time delays and completed with help from Larsen and Toubro and the Tatas.

The modernisation plan of tube artillery alone is likely to cost Rs 13,000 crore. The major acquisitions will be of initial lots of 400 towed howitzers of 155mm calibre, with a barrel length of 52 calibres, costing about Rs 4,000 crore, 140 ultra-light weight 155mm towed howitzers, with a barrel length of 45 calibres, costing Rs 3,000 crore and 180 SP 155mm howitzers costing Rs 5,000 crore. The “Shakti” project for a command and control systems for the artillery, called Artillery Combat Command and Control System (ACCCS), has reached the stage of maturity and is now being fielded up to the regimental level.

The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile (Mach 2.8 to 3.0), with a precision strike capability, very high kill energy and range of 290 km, was inducted into the army in July 2007. It is a versatile missile that can be launched from TATRA mobile launchers and silos on land, aircraft and ships and, perhaps in future, also from submarines. Fifty BrahMos missiles are expected to be produced every year. Efforts are underway to further increase its strike range. BrahMos Aerospace has orders worth Rs 3,500 crore from the army and the navy, which has opted for the anti-ship as well as the land attack cruise missile (LACM) versions. These terrain hugging missiles are virtually immune to counter measures due to their high speed and very low radar cross section and are far superior to sub-sonic cruise missiles like Pakistan’s Babur. Chile, Kuwait, Malaysia and South Africa have shown interest in acquiring this missile.

The Indian army is extensively engaged in ongoing internal security (IS) and counter-insurgency operations (CI) and simultaneously needs to prepare itself for a future border conflict that may spill over to a larger conventional war in the plains. In keeping with these twin requirements, Army HQ have apparently decided to upgrade the IS and CI capabilities of infantry battalions as well as enhance their Infantry firepower-mobility-EW (electronic warfare) punch for a possible war in the plains against Pakistan or in the mountains against China. The Army Chief’s modernisation vision is to “adapt to high-end technology, improve night-fighting capability… (and) information technology, information warfare and network centric warfare.”

Despite its large-scale employment on border management and extensive commitments in Internal Security and Counter Insurgency operations, infantry modernisation had been languishing for several decades when the Ministry of Defence (MoD) finally cleared a visionary plan to modernise the army’s infantry battalions by according “in principle” approval in the form of Modification 4B to the war establishment (WE) of a standard infantry battalion in 1998. However, no funds were specially sanctioned for this purpose till the BJP-led NDA government approved the expenditure of Rs 3,500 crore in September 2003. Thereafter, approval had to be sought on file for each new weapon system or piece of equipment on a “case-by-case” basis as has become the norm. It is by now well-known how each such case chronicles the saga of an uphill struggle to get approval first from the MoD, then MoD (Finance) and, finally, the Ministry of Finance (MoF). All this is only possible after the DRDO has first certified that the weapon system or equipment in question cannot be developed and manufactured indigenously and such a certificate is hard to come by.

While 250 Kornet-E anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) with thermal imaging sights have substantially increased the anti-tank capability of infantry battalions, most efforts to modernise the equipment held by infantry and Rashtriya Rifles (RR) units are aimed at enhancing their capability for surveillance and target acquisition at night and boosting their firepower for precise retaliation against infiltrating columns and terrorists holed up in built-up areas. About 200 hand-held BFSRs with practical ranges up to seven to eight km where clear line of sight is available, 2,000 hand-held thermal imaging devices (HHTIs) with ranges up to 2,000 metres for observation at night and stand-alone infra-red, seismic and acoustic sensors with varying capabilities have enabled infantrymen to dominate the Line of Control so completely that infiltration has come down to almost a trickle.

The newly acquired weapons, which complement these surveillance and observation devices, include: 1,500x84 mm rocket launchers, including some disposable ones; 1,000 AMRs (anti-material rifles); 8,000 UBGLs (under-barrel grenade launchers); 4,000 new generation carbines; 300 bullet proof vehicles; and, several hundred accurate sniper rifles. However, the numbers acquired and the ammunition stocks are still inadequate and need to be made up more rapidly. While the INSAS 5.56 mm assault rifles have now been in service for almost 10 years and proved to be effective, the light machine gun (LNG) version is still facing teething problems and the carbine version for close quarter battle has not found favour with the army. New 5.56 mm assault rifles of bull-pup design with an integrated laser range finder and grenade launcher are under development. Efforts are also being made to provide infantry platoons and sections with integrated GPS-based navigation system, secure light-weight walkie-talkie radio sets and better protective gear with a helmet that incorporates a built-in head-up display.

The mechanised infantry is now equipped with the BMP-2 ICV Sarath of which over 1,000 have been built since 1987. A new variant is the 81 mm Carrier Mortar Tracked Vehicle (CMTV) that is based on the chassis of the Sarath ICV and has been indigenously developed to enhance the integral firepower available to mechanised infantry battalions. Other variants include a command post, an ambulance, armoured dozer and engineer and reconnaissance vehicles. Mechanised reconnaissance and support battalions need better surveillance radars, fire-and-forget ATGMs and effective night fighting capability. However, their capabilities can be upgraded on a lower priority compared with infantry battalions that are engaged in border management and IS/CI operations.

The army’s infantry battalions also need their own mini or micro UAVs like Elbit’s Skylark or Rafael’s Skylite, among others, to partly reduce the extent of patrolling necessary in internal security environment and to improve their surveillance capability in conventional conflict. These UAVs should have a range of about 10 to 15 km, should be light-weight (less than 10 kg), hand-launched, carry a single payload, e.g. a daylight video camera or infra-red camera for night operations, and should be inexpensive enough to be dispensable. A mini ground control station should be authorized at battalion HQ for planning and control. Ideally, these should be indigenously designed and developed and locally manufactured.

A new DRDO project, that is reported to be ongoing, aims to equip future soldiers with lightweight force multipliers. Soldiers of the future will have miniaturised communication and GPS systems, small power packs, weapon platforms and smart vests with fibre-optic sensors. The soldiers will also have better and lighter combat fatigues, boots, belts, ammunition pouches, rucksacks and rations in the form of meals-ready-to-eat. Though somewhat akin to the US Army’s Land Warrior programme, the Indian Army programme for modernisation of infantry battalions will result in only incremental changes. However, these would be significant enough to make a difference on the battlefields of the Indian sub-continent. The infantryman’s average combat load is approximately 27 kg, including the 3.06 kg 5.56 mm INSAS assault rifle and its “on weapon” ammunition. If this can be reduced by even a few kg, it will enable the soldier to improve his agility in battle and counter-insurgency operations. Ultimately an infantryman has to be prepared to engage in hand-to-hand combat and agility can make a difference between life and death.

For over 350 infantry battalions, plus about 150 Rashtriya Rifles, Assam Rifles and Territorial Army battalions, these major changes will be extremely costly to implement and will spill over at least 10 to 12 years – that is, if the funds can be found. What is certain is that there is no alternative to making the financial commitment that is necessary to enhance the operational capabilities of the army’s infantry battalions. Without modernising this cutting edge of its sword, the army will soon begin to resemble the armies of India’s lesser neighbours.

The indigenously designed Arjun main battle tank (MBT) has been in the pipeline for over two decades. Though the tank has many good features, it has consistently failed to meet the army’s GSQR for an MBT and orders have been placed for only 124 tanks to be manufactured. The lack of progress on the Arjun MBT had slowed down the pace of armour modernisation. India then signed a deal with Russia to acquire 310 T-90S tanks in the year 2000. Subsequently, India began to assemble these tanks at Avadi. It has recently been reported that in addition to these, India has decided to acquire another 347 T-90S tanks and assemble them within the country.

The first Indian assembled T-90S (Bhishma) rolled off the production line on January 8, 2004. While T-90S Russian tanks have provided new teeth to India’s strike formations in the plains and corrected the imbalance that had resulted from Pakistan’s acquisition of T-80 UD from Ukraine and the Al Khalid tanks jointly designed with China, a large number of T-72 (Ajeya) tanks are still awaiting modernisation. The lack of a suitable fire control system and night fighting capability are major handicaps. As soon as the obsolescent Vijayanta tanks are phased out of service, it will be time to also discard the old T-55s as well as they can no longer be either upgraded or modernised. Armour modernisation is now proceeding apace and can be classified as a success story.

The air defence (AD) of mechanised forces is another area that is crying for attention. The Kvadrat missile system that has been the backbone of AD for strike formations since the early 1970s are now ageing and need urgent replacement. With the DRDO’s indigenous Akash medium-range and Trishul short-range missile projects not making major headway, it is time to start looking at import substitutes. In fact, the assets of Army Air Defence corps of the army are grossly inadequate to provide effective protection against enemy aircraft during war. This young corps requires substantial capital infusion to really come into its own.

Another DRDO project that is way behind schedule is the Nag anti-tank missile system. The antiquated Jonga-mounted SS-11 B1 anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) system has been replaced in missile battalions by MILAN shoulder-fired ATGMs. However, a vehicle-mounted missile system like the Nag is definitely necessary for reconnaissance and attrition tasks. The experimental Plan AREN tactical communications system for strike formations needs early replacement. The ability to carry broadband data needs to be enhanced in particular. Even the more recent static communications network called ASCON lacks ISDN capability for the real-time transmission of maps and streaming video.

While some Stentor long-range BFSRs have been in service for over a decade, medium-range radars are still to be acquired. At least about 30 to 40 weapon locating radars (WLRs) are required for effective counter-bombardment, especially in the plains, and only a few have been procured so far. Israeli Searcher-I unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been introduced into service but these are few in number and it will be a long time before these will really make a difference by providing a real-time surveillance capability so that ground forces can initiate action even as a fresh input is received. Only a small number of Searcher – II UAVs, with an upper ceiling that makes them suitable for the mountains, have been acquired.

An automated command and control and decision support system for use by the General Staff is still a far cry and so are supporting systems like the battlefield surveillance system and air space management system. The urgent requirement of real-time satellite reconnaissance systems has still not been accepted despite the nuclear overhang under which the armed forces now operate. Even though the cameras on India’s remote sensing and cartographic satellites now have sharply enhanced resolutions, less than one metre, military-grade photographs of still better resolution are needed to be purchased from the open market. These sources may dry up quickly during war.

A “system of systems” approach must be followed so that scarce RSTA and communications resources can be synergistically configured and optimally exploited. The war in Iraq fought in March-April 2003 was based on the concept of “network-centric warfare” in which surveillance sensors, targeting systems and “shooters” are fused together in a seamless “system of systems” that reduced response time between the acquisition of a target and its destruction to 15 to 20 minutes. While such a system may take over a decade to establish, a beginning must be made right away.

PGMs are increasingly gaining currency as weapons of choice in conflict on land, both to accurately destroy critical hard targets quickly as well as to avoid or at least minimise collateral damage. During the Gulf War I in 1991, despite all the CNN-generated hype of smart bombs flying unerringly through ventilators, PGMs formed less than 10 percent of the total high explosive dropped over Iraq and were rather inaccurate. The “collateral” destruction of an air raid shelter harbouring women and children has been too well documented to bear recounting. The coalition forces did not destroy a single Iraqi Scud missile launcher. In Kosovo, PGMs accounted for about 30 per cent of the ordnance dropped and accuracies had improved considerably by 1999. In the post-September 11, 2001 retribution inflicted on the Taliban militia and its al Qaeda supporters in Afghanistan, the share of PGMs had risen to nearly 60 percent. In Gulf War II in Iraq, the ratio of PGMs went up to nearly 70 per cent. The Indian artillery does not have any PGMs worth the name. Only limited quantities of the Russian Krasnopol PGM have been imported for the Bofors 155 mm howitzer. Among others, the Bofors Bonus PGM is a suitable candidate, subject to successful trials in the deserts and the mountains.

Finally, the approach to army modernisation must be more focused; the priorities must be clearly established and then adhered to. The government must give a firm commitment in terms of funds and the Ministry of Defence must streamline its procedures and processes for speedy procurement of high priority weapons and equipment. It is time to institute a rolling, non-lapsable defence modernisation fund of Rs. 25,000 crores as a viable method of ensuring that defence procurement is not subjected to the vagaries of annual budgets. The present situation is disturbing and, if allowed to go on indefinitely, will seriously compromise the army’s preparedness to fight the next border war that inimical neighbours like Pakistan can be expected to thrust on India.

 

[Rank]

@above

kool funny essay thank u soo much i tel my brother kindly read and learn this (above one) essay for English A level paper thanks eek cheez ki tu tyari mukamal hoi uske lol

 

[aanshu001]

Modernisation Plans of the Indian Army :: KanglaOnline ~ Your Gateway

Despite the army leadership’s best efforts, the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) had, till recently, almost completely bypassed the Indian Army. For well over a decade the army’s efforts to modernise had been thwarted due to political neglect and lack of adequate budgetary support. The funds made available for modernisation are extremely limited and a large portion of these funds is surrendered year after year. For Financial Year 2006-07, a sum of Rs 3,000 crore was surrendered as unspent. The fact that 155 mm ammunition for the Bofors howitzer had to be imported from South Africa during the Kargil conflict in 1999 tells its own tale of persistent shortages. Had the conflict not been confined to the 150 km frontage of the Kargil sector, T-72 and 130 mm medium gun ammunition too would have run short and it would have been politically embarrassing for the government as well as the army. In the plains the army would have had to fight with obsolete Vijayant tanks and several other vintage equipment that were unsuitable for combat. However, sustained efforts by Army HQ have now borne fruit and the army’s modernisation drive is once again well underway.

In the prevailing era of strategic uncertainty, while terrorism has become the primary threat, the external and internal threats and challenges faced by India are such that a large army is still required to be maintained. Also, a high degree of preparation and operational readiness is still necessary as conventional war, though improbable, cannot be categorically ruled out. At the same time, heavy capital investments in modern defence equipment are undoubtedly a drain on a developing economy that is ill-equipped to handle the burgeoning defence expenditure. Several eminent analysts have recommended that qualitative upgradation should be accompanied by quantitative downsizing of personnel strength of the army. However, given its responsibilities for border management and the manpower-intensive low intensity conflict that the army is involved in, this is easier said than done.

Future conventional conflict on the Indian s ub-continent will in all probability result from the ongoing low-intensity limited war on the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan or the unresolved territorial and boundary dispute with China and will be predominantly a land conflict. The Indian Army seriously lacks a potent firepower punch, especially in the mountain sector. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) have still to enter service in numbers large enough to make a real difference. The reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) assets necessary for the optimum exploitation of even the existing firepower assets are grossly inadequate. Automated command and control and decision support systems have been on the drawing boards for several decades but are yet to mature.

In a future conventional war that will be fought under the nuclear shadow, manoeuvre will be extremely limited. This restriction will lead to much greater emphasis being placed on firepower to achieve the laid down military aim. Hence, it is imperative that artillery modernisation is undertaken with alacrity so as to generate firepower asymmetries on the future battlefield. After a long spell of keeping the powder dry, action on modernisation of the Indian artillery is livening up once again. Since January 2008, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has issued three global tenders for 155mm guns and howitzers for the mountains, the plains and self-propelled guns for the deserts. Summer and winter trials are expected to be held over the next one year and, red tape permitting, contracts may be awarded as early as in the first half of 2010.

Artillery firepower had paved the way for victory during the Kargil conflict. Despite the lessons learnt in Kargil, modernisation of the artillery had continued to lag behind. The last major acquisition of towed gun-howitzers was that of about 400 pieces of 39-calibre 155mm FH-77B howitzers form Bofors of Sweden in the mid-1980s. This gun had proved its mettle in the Kargil conflict. Just when a contract for 120 tracked and 180 wheeled self-propelled (SP) 155mm guns was about to be concluded after years of protracted trials, South African arms manufacturer Denel, a leading contender for the contract, was alleged to have been involved in a corruption scam in an earlier deal for anti-material rifles (AMRs). The other two howitzers in contention, from Soltam of Israel and BAE (Bofors) of Sweden did not meet the laid down criteria according to the COAS and Army HQ recommended fresh trials, setting the programme back at least three to four years. Another key issue was that the howitzers that had been offered were technology demonstration models and not guns that were in actual service with the home country armies.

The probability of the next conventional war breaking out in the mountains is far higher than that of a war in the plains. With this in view, the artillery recently conceptualised a requirement for a light-weight towed howitzer of 155mm calibre for employment in the mountains. Neither the present Bofors howitzer nor its replacement will be capable of operations in the mountains. A light-weight 45-calibre 155mm howitzer weighing less than 5,000 kg, with a light but adequately powered prime mover, is ideal for the mountains. The gun-train should be capable of negotiating sharp road bends without the need to unhook the gun from the prime mover. The two British 45-calibre 155mm howitzers that competed for the US contract for a similar howitzer some years ago – the UFH (Ultra-lightweight Field Howitzer) and the LTH (Light-weight Towed Howitzer) – could be considered for licensed production with transfer of technology.

In January 2008, the MoD floated a Request for Proposal (RfP) for 140 pieces of ultra-light 39 calibre 155mm towed howitzers for use by the Indian Army’s mountain formations and, presumably, by its rapid reaction divisions – as and when these are raised as it will be easy to transport by air. 140 howitzers will be adequate to equip seven medium artillery regiments and will cost approximately Rs 3,000 crore. The RfP has been reportedly issued to UK’s BAE Systems (which now owns Bofors), for the M777 howitzer claimed to be the lightest in the world at under 4,220 kg, and to Singapore Technologies for the Pegasus SLWH.

India has floated a global tender for the purchase of 400 155mm towed artillery guns for the Army, to be followed by indigenous manufacture of another 1,100 howitzers, in a project worth a whopping Rs 8,000 crore. The RFP was issued to eight prospective bidders including BAE, General Dynamics, Nexter (France), Rhinemetall (Germany) and Samsung (South Korea). An RfP has also been issued for 180 wheeled self-propelled guns for around Rs 4,700 crore for employment by mechanised forces in the plains and semi-desert sectors.

Since the Bofors 155mm Howitzer was introduced into service, the indigenously designed and manufactured 105 mm Indian Field Gun (IFG) and its (not so) light version, the Light Field Gun (LFG), have joined the 75/24 Indian Mountain Gun, the 100mm Russian field gun and the 122mm Russian howitzer on the obsolescence list. Approximately 180 pieces of 130mm M46 Russian medium guns have been successfully “up-gunned” to 155mm calibre with ordnance supplied by Soltam of Israel. The new barrel length of 45 calibres has enhanced the range of the gun to about 40 km with extended range ammunition.

A contract for the acquisition of two regiments of the 12-tube, 300mm Smerch multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) system with 90 km range was reported to have been signed with Russia’s Rosoboronexport in early-2006. This will be a major boost for the long-range firepower capabilities of the army. If this weapon system had been available during the Kargil conflict, Pakistan’s brigade HQ and forward airfield at Skardu and other targets deep inside *** could have been hit with impunity. Extended range (ER) rockets are being introduced for the 122 mm Grad MBRL that has been in service for over three decades. The ER rockets will enhance the weapon system’s range from 22 to about 40 km. A Rs 5,000 crore contract has also been signed for the serial production of the Pinaka MBRL weapon system, another DRDO project plagued by time delays and completed with help from Larsen and Toubro and the Tatas.

The modernisation plan of tube artillery alone is likely to cost Rs 13,000 crore. The major acquisitions will be of initial lots of 400 towed howitzers of 155mm calibre, with a barrel length of 52 calibres, costing about Rs 4,000 crore, 140 ultra-light weight 155mm towed howitzers, with a barrel length of 45 calibres, costing Rs 3,000 crore and 180 SP 155mm howitzers costing Rs 5,000 crore. The “Shakti” project for a command and control systems for the artillery, called Artillery Combat Command and Control System (ACCCS), has reached the stage of maturity and is now being fielded up to the regimental level.

The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile (Mach 2.8 to 3.0), with a precision strike capability, very high kill energy and range of 290 km, was inducted into the army in July 2007. It is a versatile missile that can be launched from TATRA mobile launchers and silos on land, aircraft and ships and, perhaps in future, also from submarines. Fifty BrahMos missiles are expected to be produced every year. Efforts are underway to further increase its strike range. BrahMos Aerospace has orders worth Rs 3,500 crore from the army and the navy, which has opted for the anti-ship as well as the land attack cruise missile (LACM) versions. These terrain hugging missiles are virtually immune to counter measures due to their high speed and very low radar cross section and are far superior to sub-sonic cruise missiles like Pakistan’s Babur. Chile, Kuwait, Malaysia and South Africa have shown interest in acquiring this missile.

The Indian army is extensively engaged in ongoing internal security (IS) and counter-insurgency operations (CI) and simultaneously needs to prepare itself for a future border conflict that may spill over to a larger conventional war in the plains. In keeping with these twin requirements, Army HQ have apparently decided to upgrade the IS and CI capabilities of infantry battalions as well as enhance their Infantry firepower-mobility-EW (electronic warfare) punch for a possible war in the plains against Pakistan or in the mountains against China. The Army Chief’s modernisation vision is to “adapt to high-end technology, improve night-fighting capability… (and) information technology, information warfare and network centric warfare.”

Despite its large-scale employment on border management and extensive commitments in Internal Security and Counter Insurgency operations, infantry modernisation had been languishing for several decades when the Ministry of Defence (MoD) finally cleared a visionary plan to modernise the army’s infantry battalions by according “in principle” approval in the form of Modification 4B to the war establishment (WE) of a standard infantry battalion in 1998. However, no funds were specially sanctioned for this purpose till the BJP-led NDA government approved the expenditure of Rs 3,500 crore in September 2003. Thereafter, approval had to be sought on file for each new weapon system or piece of equipment on a “case-by-case” basis as has become the norm. It is by now well-known how each such case chronicles the saga of an uphill struggle to get approval first from the MoD, then MoD (Finance) and, finally, the Ministry of Finance (MoF). All this is only possible after the DRDO has first certified that the weapon system or equipment in question cannot be developed and manufactured indigenously and such a certificate is hard to come by.

While 250 Kornet-E anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) with thermal imaging sights have substantially increased the anti-tank capability of infantry battalions, most efforts to modernise the equipment held by infantry and Rashtriya Rifles (RR) units are aimed at enhancing their capability for surveillance and target acquisition at night and boosting their firepower for precise retaliation against infiltrating columns and terrorists holed up in built-up areas. About 200 hand-held BFSRs with practical ranges up to seven to eight km where clear line of sight is available, 2,000 hand-held thermal imaging devices (HHTIs) with ranges up to 2,000 metres for observation at night and stand-alone infra-red, seismic and acoustic sensors with varying capabilities have enabled infantrymen to dominate the Line of Control so completely that infiltration has come down to almost a trickle.

The newly acquired weapons, which complement these surveillance and observation devices, include: 1,500x84 mm rocket launchers, including some disposable ones; 1,000 AMRs (anti-material rifles); 8,000 UBGLs (under-barrel grenade launchers); 4,000 new generation carbines; 300 bullet proof vehicles; and, several hundred accurate sniper rifles. However, the numbers acquired and the ammunition stocks are still inadequate and need to be made up more rapidly. While the INSAS 5.56 mm assault rifles have now been in service for almost 10 years and proved to be effective, the light machine gun (LNG) version is still facing teething problems and the carbine version for close quarter battle has not found favour with the army. New 5.56 mm assault rifles of bull-pup design with an integrated laser range finder and grenade launcher are under development. Efforts are also being made to provide infantry platoons and sections with integrated GPS-based navigation system, secure light-weight walkie-talkie radio sets and better protective gear with a helmet that incorporates a built-in head-up display.

The mechanised infantry is now equipped with the BMP-2 ICV Sarath of which over 1,000 have been built since 1987. A new variant is the 81 mm Carrier Mortar Tracked Vehicle (CMTV) that is based on the chassis of the Sarath ICV and has been indigenously developed to enhance the integral firepower available to mechanised infantry battalions. Other variants include a command post, an ambulance, armoured dozer and engineer and reconnaissance vehicles. Mechanised reconnaissance and support battalions need better surveillance radars, fire-and-forget ATGMs and effective night fighting capability. However, their capabilities can be upgraded on a lower priority compared with infantry battalions that are engaged in border management and IS/CI operations.

The army’s infantry battalions also need their own mini or micro UAVs like Elbit’s Skylark or Rafael’s Skylite, among others, to partly reduce the extent of patrolling necessary in internal security environment and to improve their surveillance capability in conventional conflict. These UAVs should have a range of about 10 to 15 km, should be light-weight (less than 10 kg), hand-launched, carry a single payload, e.g. a daylight video camera or infra-red camera for night operations, and should be inexpensive enough to be dispensable. A mini ground control station should be authorized at battalion HQ for planning and control. Ideally, these should be indigenously designed and developed and locally manufactured.

A new DRDO project, that is reported to be ongoing, aims to equip future soldiers with lightweight force multipliers. Soldiers of the future will have miniaturised communication and GPS systems, small power packs, weapon platforms and smart vests with fibre-optic sensors. The soldiers will also have better and lighter combat fatigues, boots, belts, ammunition pouches, rucksacks and rations in the form of meals-ready-to-eat. Though somewhat akin to the US Army’s Land Warrior programme, the Indian Army programme for modernisation of infantry battalions will result in only incremental changes. However, these would be significant enough to make a difference on the battlefields of the Indian sub-continent. The infantryman’s average combat load is approximately 27 kg, including the 3.06 kg 5.56 mm INSAS assault rifle and its “on weapon” ammunition. If this can be reduced by even a few kg, it will enable the soldier to improve his agility in battle and counter-insurgency operations. Ultimately an infantryman has to be prepared to engage in hand-to-hand combat and agility can make a difference between life and death.

For over 350 infantry battalions, plus about 150 Rashtriya Rifles, Assam Rifles and Territorial Army battalions, these major changes will be extremely costly to implement and will spill over at least 10 to 12 years – that is, if the funds can be found. What is certain is that there is no alternative to making the financial commitment that is necessary to enhance the operational capabilities of the army’s infantry battalions. Without modernising this cutting edge of its sword, the army will soon begin to resemble the armies of India’s lesser neighbours.

The indigenously designed Arjun main battle tank (MBT) has been in the pipeline for over two decades. Though the tank has many good features, it has consistently failed to meet the army’s GSQR for an MBT and orders have been placed for only 124 tanks to be manufactured. The lack of progress on the Arjun MBT had slowed down the pace of armour modernisation. India then signed a deal with Russia to acquire 310 T-90S tanks in the year 2000. Subsequently, India began to assemble these tanks at Avadi. It has recently been reported that in addition to these, India has decided to acquire another 347 T-90S tanks and assemble them within the country.

The first Indian assembled T-90S (Bhishma) rolled off the production line on January 8, 2004. While T-90S Russian tanks have provided new teeth to India’s strike formations in the plains and corrected the imbalance that had resulted from Pakistan’s acquisition of T-80 UD from Ukraine and the Al Khalid tanks jointly designed with China, a large number of T-72 (Ajeya) tanks are still awaiting modernisation. The lack of a suitable fire control system and night fighting capability are major handicaps. As soon as the obsolescent Vijayanta tanks are phased out of service, it will be time to also discard the old T-55s as well as they can no longer be either upgraded or modernised. Armour modernisation is now proceeding apace and can be classified as a success story.

The air defence (AD) of mechanised forces is another area that is crying for attention. The Kvadrat missile system that has been the backbone of AD for strike formations since the early 1970s are now ageing and need urgent replacement. With the DRDO’s indigenous Akash medium-range and Trishul short-range missile projects not making major headway, it is time to start looking at import substitutes. In fact, the assets of Army Air Defence corps of the army are grossly inadequate to provide effective protection against enemy aircraft during war. This young corps requires substantial capital infusion to really come into its own.

Another DRDO project that is way behind schedule is the Nag anti-tank missile system. The antiquated Jonga-mounted SS-11 B1 anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) system has been replaced in missile battalions by MILAN shoulder-fired ATGMs. However, a vehicle-mounted missile system like the Nag is definitely necessary for reconnaissance and attrition tasks. The experimental Plan AREN tactical communications system for strike formations needs early replacement. The ability to carry broadband data needs to be enhanced in particular. Even the more recent static communications network called ASCON lacks ISDN capability for the real-time transmission of maps and streaming video.

While some Stentor long-range BFSRs have been in service for over a decade, medium-range radars are still to be acquired. At least about 30 to 40 weapon locating radars (WLRs) are required for effective counter-bombardment, especially in the plains, and only a few have been procured so far. Israeli Searcher-I unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been introduced into service but these are few in number and it will be a long time before these will really make a difference by providing a real-time surveillance capability so that ground forces can initiate action even as a fresh input is received. Only a small number of Searcher – II UAVs, with an upper ceiling that makes them suitable for the mountains, have been acquired.

An automated command and control and decision support system for use by the General Staff is still a far cry and so are supporting systems like the battlefield surveillance system and air space management system. The urgent requirement of real-time satellite reconnaissance systems has still not been accepted despite the nuclear overhang under which the armed forces now operate. Even though the cameras on India’s remote sensing and cartographic satellites now have sharply enhanced resolutions, less than one metre, military-grade photographs of still better resolution are needed to be purchased from the open market. These sources may dry up quickly during war.

A “system of systems” approach must be followed so that scarce RSTA and communications resources can be synergistically configured and optimally exploited. The war in Iraq fought in March-April 2003 was based on the concept of “network-centric warfare” in which surveillance sensors, targeting systems and “shooters” are fused together in a seamless “system of systems” that reduced response time between the acquisition of a target and its destruction to 15 to 20 minutes. While such a system may take over a decade to establish, a beginning must be made right away.

PGMs are increasingly gaining currency as weapons of choice in conflict on land, both to accurately destroy critical hard targets quickly as well as to avoid or at least minimise collateral damage. During the Gulf War I in 1991, despite all the CNN-generated hype of smart bombs flying unerringly through ventilators, PGMs formed less than 10 percent of the total high explosive dropped over Iraq and were rather inaccurate. The “collateral” destruction of an air raid shelter harbouring women and children has been too well documented to bear recounting. The coalition forces did not destroy a single Iraqi Scud missile launcher. In Kosovo, PGMs accounted for about 30 per cent of the ordnance dropped and accuracies had improved considerably by 1999. In the post-September 11, 2001 retribution inflicted on the Taliban militia and its al Qaeda supporters in Afghanistan, the share of PGMs had risen to nearly 60 percent. In Gulf War II in Iraq, the ratio of PGMs went up to nearly 70 per cent. The Indian artillery does not have any PGMs worth the name. Only limited quantities of the Russian Krasnopol PGM have been imported for the Bofors 155 mm howitzer. Among others, the Bofors Bonus PGM is a suitable candidate, subject to successful trials in the deserts and the mountains.

Finally, the approach to army modernisation must be more focused; the priorities must be clearly established and then adhered to. The government must give a firm commitment in terms of funds and the Ministry of Defence must streamline its procedures and processes for speedy procurement of high priority weapons and equipment. It is time to institute a rolling, non-lapsable defence modernisation fund of Rs. 25,000 crores as a viable method of ensuring that defence procurement is not subjected to the vagaries of annual budgets. The present situation is disturbing and, if allowed to go on indefinitely, will seriously compromise the army’s preparedness to fight the next border war that inimical neighbours like Pakistan can be expected to thrust on India.

boss come in bullet points after bugging 8-12 hrs in research I don't had passions to read it.

 

[sudhir007]

1 in 3 hand grenades is a dud: Defence survey - India - NEWS - The Times of India

NAGPUR: Imagine a scenario in which an Indian soldier's life and the life of his mates depends on a grenade — may be the last one with the jawan —
to stop an advancing enemy. He takes the pin out and lobs it. But, instead of hearing an explosion, the jawans are met with a hail of bullets.

Unthinkable? Think again. A recent official survey of weaponry being used by soldiers guarding our borders reveals that about 30% of hand grenades used by jawans don't explode — which means an alarming one in three is a dud. The survey, carried out by weapons experts from the Army and defence organisations, is based on interviews with jawans posted in border areas.

Sources with access to the survey report did not share the exact figures and causes of failure citing secrecy involved with defence projects, but preliminary investigations have shown that it's not unusual for detonators used in the grenades to surpass their shelf life by the time they reach the hands of a soldier in a conflict zone.

It's the detonator that separately triggers the blast in the grenade. The grenade, a crucial weapon in a soldier's armoury, is often used as the last resort to thwart the enemy in close quarter battle. Grenades supplied to the Army are made by ordnance factories under Indian State Ordnance Factory Board.

"Soldiers said the grenades often go blind — meaning they don't explode in purely technical terms — putting them in a precarious situation," said a source. Defence experts and ex-servicemen say this is an old problem that has never been properly addressed.

Col (retd) RSN Singh of 'India Defence Review' says the figure of 30% duds is stupefying. Singh, who retired from the Infantry six months ago, says, ‘‘A soldier normally carries four grenades in a counter-insurgency operation. Even a single dud can prove disastrous as it would leave the soldier vulnerable. Such duds can shake a soldier’s confidence.’’

Defence expert Col (retd) U S Rathore says India still uses World War-II vintage hand grenades. He says there are chances that the detonators are susceptible to chemical degradation and adds that terrorists have far superior Belgian grenades that explode in 2.5 seconds compared to the four seconds it takes for the Indian grenades.

India may have made an indigenous nuclear submarine. But it appears its defence establishment is yet to make a fail-proof grenade. Incidentally, a grenade can be propelled through rifles or an under-barrel grenade launcher (UBGL). But the Insas rifles used by the army don’t have launchers for grenades; soldiers have to carry the old 7.62mm rifles for that

 

[sudhir007]

Saddled with Insas, Army wants new AK-47s - India - NEWS - The Times of India


NAGPUR: The indigenous 5.56x45mm Insas (Indian National Small Arms System) rifle has been the standard assault weapon for the Indian Army since the
late 1990s. However, the jawans using it in counter-insurgency operations find it ineffective.
As part of the new Army doctrine, the gun is meant to incapacitate the enemy, rather than kill. Insas has a smaller calibre, which means it has less power. This is because — and it’s the official view — injuring an enemy can lead to enemy soldiers getting engaged in tending the wounded, thus yielding a tactical battlefield advantage.

The technocrats who interacted with soldiers in the forward areas were told that this theory does not work with terrorists who, apart from attacking in small numbers, are never bothered about evacuating their injured. Hence, the soldiers say, they want to shoot to kill, rather than maim.

The soldiers also spoke about practical difficulties in using Insas. It’s accurate but not as rugged as the AK-47 used by terrorists, they say. Also, its sling often snaps while firing, making it fall during manoeuvres. The sling also obstructs the rifle’s sight. But most of all, the size of the sling never took into account the bullet proof jacket worn by jawans. As a result, it falls short and is uncomfortable to hold. This hampers quick reaction. Insas also does not have a rapid fire feature; it shoots only three rounds in a single burst.

‘‘The barrel overheats with continuous firing. The magazine cracks even on falling, which is common during action. Oil spillage while firing is also major trouble,’’ said a source quoting soldiers. ‘‘Zeroing (adjusting the sight for aim) has to be done each time the rifle is opened to clean or for any other reason. Lack of proper zeroing hampers the working of night vision device,’’ said the same source.

The total additional weight — around 40 kg with bulletproof jacket and signalling equipment — that a soldier carries is also a matter of concern, as is the colour of the rifle: they want it in brown which offers better camouflaging. On the positive side, Insas’s transparent magazine helps soldiers keep a count of bullets.

Former director general of infantry, Lt General Shanker Prasad, said Insas is antiquated and the Infantry needs a modern rifle. The Army has repeatedly asked for new assault weapons, but nothing has moved. It’s learnt that forces are now expecting new indigenously developed AK-47 rifle said to be an improvement on the original.

 

[Nihat]

Jammu: Two terrorists and an army officer were killed in a pre-dawn encounter on Wednesday when security personnel foiled an infiltration bid in Poonch district of Jammu and Kashmir, a senior army official said.

Major Akash Sambyal, 34-year-old valiant Army officer who hails from Jammu, downed two terrorists before he fell to the terrorists' bullets. He is survived by wife and two children.

During patrolling in forward area along Line of Control (LoC) on Wednesday troops observed movement of a group of armed terrorists along the LoC in Sonagali area of Mendhar sub-sector, and challenged them, the official said.

The terrorists opened fire on the troops and hurled grenades, the official said, adding, the army personnel retaliated and a gunbattle took place in which the two infiltrators were killed and the army officer in the rank of Major lost his life.

Bodies of the two terrorists have been recovered while a search operation has been launched for the bodies of two other infiltrators who, as per the intercepts, were killed in the operation.

Army foils infiltration bid, Major killed

 

[sudhir007]

On paper Arjun stands out quite impressive with composite armour, frequency hopping radios, ability to fire ATGMs from its main gun, but that is all on paper. In reality the Arjun is another example of cost overruns, smudged specifications and red tape. Indians it seems don’t want to learn from the experiences of others even when the lesson is obvious. When the Merkava-1 failed to live up to expectations the Israelis did not dump it and go for more M60 tanks, instead it persisted with the development of newer variants and now it has a tank that is not only world class but is completely Israeli made. India on the other hand is content to buy Russian tanks.


While India loses the opportunity to make an indigenous tank, the Pakistanis have already taken Al-Khalid into production and now are talking of exporting it. A few tanks were even sent to Saudi Arabia for evaluations. Sri Lanka almost bought 22 Al-Khalids before the finish of the Tamil war led to a reduction in defence spending. While the Pakistanis are gaining valuable experience on tank manufacture India is still debating on Arjun vs. T-90. In a few years Pakistan will be on the verge of self reliance in MBT technology while India will still be finding its feet in this area.


With the Russians getting more and more unreliable every day the need for reducing our dependence on them has become even greater. But sadly it seems that no steps are being taken in this regard. During the last trials, every soldier who got experience on the Arjun vouched for it. It proved to be capable of conducting operations in the Thar Desert flawlessly. But still the army wants to have no more than 124 tanks.


What needs to be done is an immediate ramp of production capability for the Arjun with a minimum capacity of no less than 150 tanks per year. This figure may seem astronomical by current standards but if India is to maintain a fleet of indigenous 2000 tanks, it will have to get working on ramping up the production and support infrastructure first. Simultaneously, the Army needs to come with a final specification list for the current Arjun which should be frozen. The future needs of the Army should be passed to the next Arjun iteration and the current Mk2 model should be pressed into production at once. This way the Army will have a tank and also have its future needs catered to.


Further India would do well to acquire production rights for Engines, night vision devices and tank ammunition. The expenses proposed in this document may look huge but if the Air Force deserves $10 Billion for the MMRCA, even the Army can’t do without its battle tanks.

The Need to Revive the Arjun Tank Project IDRW.ORG

 

[Gabbar]

New N-E division with eye on China?​

KOLKATA: The Army is creating a new Mountain Division for the Northeast, headquartered in central Nagaland or the adjoining areas of Upper Assam.
Although it will be stationed in an area when the Army is engaged in counter-insurgency operations, sources say the division could also have the task of keeping an eye on the Chinese border in neighbouring Arunachal Pradesh, sources indicated.

The Army brass is keeping the plan under the wraps, since there were protests from China some time ago that induction of more troops in Arunachal could lead to an arms race in the region. The Army is cagey about the role of the proposed division.

"It is nothing much,'' a senior officer based in Dimapur said. "It is not that we are going to induct 50,000 new troops.'' According to the brass, the role of a new formation can't be determined properly until it participates in a war game. The formalities are yet to be completed, said another officer, although it is learnt that the proposal was sanctioned long ago.

Nagaland earlier had a division stationed there to fight insurgency the 8 Mountain Division which was subsequently shifted to Jammu and Kashmir and played a crucial role in the Kargil operations. Insurgency in Nagaland is now on a low key, after the two National Socialist Council of Nagaland factions entered into ceasefire agreements with the Centre.

Analysts say a division stationed in central Nagaland could have a counter-insurgency role in places like Tirap and Changlang in Arunachal which are not far from the Myanmar border. It could also be mobilized rapidly to the India-China border in Arunachal in case of an emergency. Places like Lohit and Dibang valley in eastern Arunachal, bordering China, are accessible from the area.

Placing the mountain division away from Arunachal would circumvent the problem of inducting more troops near the international border in contravention of international agreements, sources said.

It is generally acknowledged that China has an upper hand in the Arunachal sector of the border. With extensive road and railway infrastructure at its disposal in the Tibet plateau, China can quickly mobilize a large number of troops to the border. Chinese claim on Arunachal, incursions across the Line of Actual Control and presence of disputed areas, like Wangdong valley, Asaphila and Madan Ridge, have heightened India's concerns. Compared with this, the road infrastructure on the Indian side of the border lags far behind, especially in the central and eastern parts of Arunachal.

Frequent Chinese incursions across the LAC have prompted the strengthening of the Army presence in Sikkim by bringing back to north Bengal a division that had moved to J&K during the Kargil conflict, the sources said.

 

[indiatech]

BOLT system to give Indian army an edge on the battlefield

City-based communication technology solutions company Transworld has developed Battle Online Tracking (BOLT) system for the Indian army, which will have tracking systems for tanks and heavy vehicles on the battlefield to ensure timely logistical support.


"The army formations will have a combination of communication capabilities like encrypted or local radio apart from GPRS and GSM. The solution will enable the officer concerned to see all his assets and it will be possible to zero-in on a particular tank or truck in the battlefield right from the army headquarters through an online platform," Transworld Compressor Technologies Limited managing director Vikram Puri told Sakaal Times.


The solution, provided through a device called Mobile Eye, has already been successfully tested at the Armoured Corps Centre and School, Ahmednagar.The Northern Command has also started implementing Mobile Eye on their convoys for security against terrorist attacks, Puri said.To win any battle, the most crucial aspect is timely and adequate logistics support. A tank division of 10,000 troops on the battlefield needs huge amount of logistics, including fuel, food, water and air support.




"A lot of time is spent on the battlefield to ascertain the exact position of assets like tanks. This is traditionally done manually. The information can be intercepted by the enemy, which could be used to block our supply routes. In this case, every device is independent of any communication system and the message is encrypted. It can't be intercepted by enemy," he said.


Moreover, since the exact location of the tanks are known, logistics support like refuelling, air and artillery cover can be provided precisely."The fuel and ration stock can be replenished without delay. This will not hamper the advancement of the troops. The reinforcements can be sent in exact numbers to the exact location. Most importantly, in case of air force or artillery cover, the exact location of our assets will not only help in preventing hitting our own troops, but also attain greater degree of accuracy in destroying the enemy," Transworld director Khursheed Panthaki said.




Even if the enemy knocks out a few tanks which have the device, the communication system would not be affected as long as two tanks having the device installed are functional. "It is a self-healing network. As long as two devices are alive, information flow will continue," Panthaki said.

 

[indiatech]

57 Moutain Division to be replaced soon

A division of Army of 3 Corps is expected to be stationed at Leimakhong in Manipur to take care of the India-Myanmar and India-Bangladesh borders.The Ministry of Defence, Government of India is learnt to have taken decision in this regard.Reliable sources said, following this decision, the Army authorities have started taking steps to raise two more divisions under the Eastern Command, located in Kolkata.Troops of 57 Mountain Division stationed at Leimakhong are likely to be shifted to Southern Assam.




During the interchanging period of the Army troops, Assam Rifles (Central Paramilitary Force) will handle, besides guarding the Indo-Myanmar border, additional responsibility of counter insurgency operations which the Army was engaged in, the sources said.It may be noted here that sources in the Army have always maintained that the Army is taking a major role in the counter insurgency operations in Manipur, while sources in the AR have always contended that the AR are the force which are playing a significant role in countering the insurgent activities.




At the same time, two new divisions are proposed to be raised and they would be under the respective controls of the 3 Corps and 4 Corps.One which would be stationed in Arunachal to take care of the China-India-Myanmar axis has been raised while the other which would be stationed at Leimakhong, Manipur to cover the Bangladesh-India-Myanmar axis is yet to be raised.Although the two divisions together make up a Corps' strength, they would be separated and placed under the respective controls of the 3 Corps and 4 Corps, sources said.




The division at Leimakhong will be under the 3 Corps, based at Rangapahar near Dimapur in Nagaland.The one in Arunachal will be under the 4 Corps, based in Upper (eastern)Assam.Source further said that the new division at Leimakhong which would replace the existing 57 Mountain Division will be under the 3 Corps, based at Rangapahar near Dimapur in Nagaland.The one in Arunachal will be under the 4 Corps, based in Upper (eastern) Assam.During the process of raising of the two new division, army troops will be busy in moving in and out which would not be able to handled the counter insurgency operation which mainly handled by the army in Manipur.




Additional responsibilities will be given to the paramilitary force - Assam Rifles in Manipur, source said adding that in Manipur, counter insurgency operation has been handled mainly by the army.A highly reliable sources here said that move of troops of 57 Mountain Division from Manipur is as part of pulling out of army units from across the country for raising two more divisions to make up make up a Corps' strength.The necessity to strengthen the army corps in the north eastern region arises since the army sounded red alert.The army has sounded an operational alert on the India-China Line of Actual Control (LAC) after reports of a Chinese military exercise involving 50,000 troops in Tibet, where Beijing has increased its activities.




The 57 Mountain Division headquarters are at Masimpur near Silchar.The formation and units of 57 Mountain Division are deployed in some of the remotest corner of Manipur and Indo-Burmese border.As of 2004, between 57 Mountain Division, Imphal Sector of Assam Rifles, and Local Commanders of CRPF & BSF, about 16,000 to 17,000 troops deployed in Manipur, of which 5,000 troops were on patrol at any point of time.Both Army & Assam Rifles wanted clear-cut directions for an end result.This above the 73 Mountain Brigade is deployed in Bishnupur district.




The Bishnupur Brigade under the aegis of Red Shield Division has established itself firmly in the district.The steps of moving Army troops is amidst the process of shifting of BSF from the state for deployment in the state affected naxal violence states across the country.Authorities so far replaced BSF posted at Wangjing and Nongpok Sekmai in Thoubal district, at Ethai, Wangoo, Moirang INA Complex and Kwakta in Bishnupur district was withdrawn and sent to the naxal hit states.


After the withdrawal of the BSF personnel, IRB replaced the Wangjing, Moirang INA Complex, Kwakta posts while CRPF replaced Ethai and Wangoo posts.The BSF post at Nongpok Sekmai has been destroyed by insurgents before IRB take post.

 

[Lankan Ranger]

Indian Army's Director-General (Infantry) Lieutenant-General Jasbir Singh has stressed on outlining the future modernisation of that Fighting Arm, the other Arm being the Artillery.


While addressing a three-day Infantry Commanders' Conference -- which began yesterday at the Infantry School in the nearby Military Headquarters Of War (MHOW) -- the officer said, ''I am confident that the Conference will address lacunae besides honing the Infantry's mobility and striking power.'' An exhibition of weapons and defence equipment is also part of the Conference.


The Infantry School is the Army's largest and oldest training establishment. It has trained not only infantrymen but also officers and senior commanders of Indian and many foreign armies. Its alumni have risen to the highest military ranks and scripted military history in India and abroad.


The total number of army, paramilitary, police and foreign students trained annually at the School, averages approximately 7,500. The School conducts training packages and programmes for commissioned officers, junior commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers.


The Army Marksmanship Unit at the School has provided outstanding shooters of national and international calibre. The School's origins can be traced to the establishment of the School of Musketry in 1888 at Changla Gali in present-day Pakistan. Between 1888 and 1949, the School's name and location changed many times.


The School remained the principal combined arms training establishment until 1964. It conducted the Junior and Senior Commanders' courses attended by officers of all arms and services.


In 1964, the School provided the nucleus and its long experience to start the College of Combat, an institution designed to build the combined arms combat tradition in the Army.


Every Indian infantry officer starts his career at the School. It makes the most long-lasting impact on the infantryman's outlook, about the essential need and role of the infantry in war. The tactical successes of Indian infantry in battles can rightly be said to have emerged from this School.

From:ASIAN DEFENCE: Need to outline Infantry's modernisation: Lt-Gen Singh

 

[Screaming Skull]

Indian Army mulls ambitious war plan​

18 September 2009,

NEW DELHI: With instability in the neighbourhood and terrorists gaining ground in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Indian Army is considering the need to make its infantry capable of being an "expeditionary force" in case of an "out of area contingency".

This bid, in line with the US Marines engaging in battle in war theatres situated in remote locations at short notice, indicates an ambitious intent. This would still need adequate platforms like large transport aircraft and possibly naval support but shows a preparedness to think ahead.

US forces are the only ones capable of real-time power projection and India is still way behind other armed forces as well. But with a large army and an unstable neighbourhood, Indian military planners might be shedding some of the traditional reluctance to look behind the borders.

So far, India has steadfastly refused to commit its troops in Afghanistan -- where US would anyway be careful of Pakistani sensibilities -- and stuck to building roads and other infrastructure.

The top Army commanders discussed how the force can be made more "lean, agile and versatile capable of conducting operations at short notice across an entire spectrum", Army sources said.

A three-day infantry commanders' conference in Mhow, which concluded on Thursday with Army chief Deepak Kapoor and all the top commanders and battalion heads in attendance, took stock of the force's war-waging materials and deliberated on how it can be prepared for an "out of area" role.

A major part of the three-day deliberations, held at the Infantry School, was spent on discussing the future outlook of Indian Army. The commanders stressed the need to review the training of middle-level officers and the need to improve the force's future firepower and surveillance mechanism.

Senior infantry officers from operational theatres shared their personal experiences pertaining to transformation of infantry to meet new challenges. The main emphasis was on adaptation as per the changing geopolitical environment, threat perception and emergence of new technologies and dovetail the same into the transformation process, a senior officer added.

The conflict in Afghanistan with spillover of battle-hardened terrorists from the ****** theatre into India has already been engaging the armed forces considerably at home soil.

The Army has intensified its counter-insurgency operations in the higher reaches along the Line of Control in J&K with increased attempt of militants to infiltrate on the Indian side from across the border. It is estimated that about 300 militants are waiting at launch pads, a senior Army officer said here.

In the last two months, at least 10 to 12 infiltration bids have been made in each month, an Army officer said. In fact, India has taken up the matter with the US -- which is highly engaged with Pakistan with its anti-Taliban operations -- to put pressure on the latter to dismantle terrorist training camps in ***.

Terrorist handlers from across the borders have made multiple launch pads across the Line of Control (LoC) to divert attention of Indian troops while trying to push in militants inside India.

Indian Army mulls ambitious war plan - India - NEWS - The Times of India