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Army reworks war doctrine for Pakistan, China - India - The Times of India

NEW DELHI: The Army is now revising its five-year-old doctrine to effectively meet the challenges of a possible `two-front war' with China and

Pakistan, deal with asymmetric and fourth-generation warfare, enhance strategic reach and joint operations with IAF and Navy.

Work on the new war doctrine -- to reflect the reconfiguration of threat perceptions and security challenges -- is already underway under the aegis of Shimla-based Army Training Command, headed by Lt-General A S Lamba, said sources.

It comes in the backdrop of the 1.13-million strong Army having practised -- through several wargames over the last five years -- its `pro-active' war strategy to mobilise fast and strike hard to pulverise the enemy.

This `cold start strategy', under a NBC (nuclear-chemical-biological) overhang, emerged from the `harsh lessons' learnt during Operation Parakram, where it took Army's strike formations almost a month to mobilise at the `border launch pads' after the December 2001 terrorist attack on Parliament.

This gave ample opportunity to Pakistan to shore up its defences as well as adequate time to the international community, primarily the US, to intervene. The lack of clear directives from the then NDA government only made matters worse.

"A major leap in our approach to conduct of operations (since then) has been the successful firming-up of the cold start strategy (to be able to go to war promptly)," said Army chief General Deepak Kapoor, at a closed-door seminar on Tuesday.

The plan now is to launch self-contained and highly-mobile `battle groups', with Russian-origin T-90S tanks and upgraded T-72 M1 tanks at their core, adequately backed by air cover and artillery fire assaults, for rapid thrusts into enemy territory within 96 hours.

Gen Kapoor identified five thrust areas that will drive the new doctrine. One, even as the armed forces prepare for their primary task of conventional wars, they must also factor in the eventuality of `a two-front war' breaking out.

In tune with this, after acquiring a greater offensive punch along the entire western front with Pakistan by the creation of a new South-Western Army Command in 2005, India is now taking steps -- albeit belatedly -- to strategically counter the stark military asymmetry with China in the eastern sector. There is now "a proportionate focus towards the western and north-eastern fronts", said Gen Kapoor.

Two, the Army needs to `optimise' its capability to effectively counter `both military and non-military facets' of asymmetric and sub-conventional threats like WMD terrorism, cyber warfare, electronic warfare and information warfare.

Three, the armed forces have to substantially enhance their strategic reach and out-of-area capabilities to protect India's geo-political interests stretching from Persian Gulf to Malacca Strait.

"This would enable us to protect our island territories; as also give assistance to the littoral states in the Indian Ocean Region," said Gen Kapoor.

Four, interdependence and operational synergy among Army, Navy and IAF must become the essence of strategic planning and execution in future wars. "For this, joint operations, strategic and space-based capability, ballistic missile defence and amphibious, air-borne and air-land operations must be addressed comprehensively," he said.

And five, India must strive to achieve a technological edge over its adversaries. "Harnessing and exploitation of technology also includes integration of network centricity, decision-support systems, information warfare and electronic warfare into our operational plans," he added.

Apart from analysing the evolving military strategy and doctrines of China and Pakistan, the Army is also studying the lessons learnt from the US-launched Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and their relevance to India.
 
LiveFist - The Best of Indian Defence: Indian Army To Upgrade Vintage Ack-Ack Guns

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Thirty-two years after the first lot of them were first inducted into service with the Army's Air Defence Artillery (now the Corps of Army Air Defence), the Ministry of Defence is finally considering an upgrade for the Army's (t)rusty Soviet era ZU-23-2 twin-barrel anti-aircraft autocannons. While a total of close to 1,000 guns were inducted, an unknown number remain in service. According to the request for information (RFI) that has been sent out to firms in Israel, Poland and Russia among others, the Army is essentially looking for a rugged electro-optical fire control system (EOFCS), electro-mechanical gun drives and a new rugged power supply for all the gun's systems.
 
Armed forces modernisation on track: Defence Ministry

The government on Thursday emphasised that the process of modernising the armed forces was on track, with the Defence Ministry expecting to spend over Rs.54,824 crore on capital acquisition earmarked in the total budget of Rs.1,41,703 crore for the current financial year.

The Ministry said the expenditure for acquisitions had increased substantially over the last five years and it was expected to cross Rs.1,78,000 crore, compared to Rs.62,672 crore in 1999-2004.

In 2008-09, the Ministry spent Rs.41,000 crore that included Rs.13,424 crore for aircraft and Rs.4,000 crore for naval fleet and Rs.4,400 crore for land and accommodation for married personnel.

Major achievements in the process in 2009 included the launch of the first indigenously developed nuclear powered submarine, INS Arihant, and the commissioning of INS Airavat, the third Landing Ship Tank designed for amphibious operations.

For the Indian Air Force, the induction of first of the three Airborne Warning and Control System was a development described as a force multiplier.

Radar and Aerostat acquisitions came along as did the modern business jets for ferrying VVIPs complete with self-protection suites.

Providing a broad overview of the work of the Ministry, Defence Secretary Pradeep Kumar said the process included procuring advanced jet trainers and advanced light helicopters for the forces in a year when acquisitions were put on fast track in the wake of the November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks.

Effect of inflation

Interestingly, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence, in its recent report, commented that while comparing data of different years, the rate of inflation should also be taken into account, since defence budget as percentage of the overall government spending and GDP were true indicators of its growth.

‘Constant process’

Mr. Kumar said the accent on modernisation remained a constant process.

While some work was done, some were in progress and some more were yet to be done. At no point could it be said that modernisation had come to a halt.

Acknowledging that no procurement was done for the Army’s demand for a field gun after the 1987 Bofors purchase, Mr. Kumar said the government recently allowed trials of 155 mm towed guns after getting the permission from the Central Vigilance Commission and the Law Ministry since it involved a firm from whom purchases were put on hold.

He mentioned that the trials process itself was both long and important since in the case of field guns, it is held on a particular day to test its efficacy in hot weather and cold weather. “If you miss the day, the trial date goes back.”

As for the requirement of ultra-light howitzers that has been held up after the dealing with Singapore Technologies was put on hold following a CBI inquiry, the Ministry said the option of foreign military sales was being explored.
 
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100102/jsp/nation/story_11934631.jsp?
Telegraph - Calcutta (Kolkata) | Nation | Nod to US gun purchase minus bids
New Delhi, Jan. 1: The government has authorised an outright purchase of 145 ultra-light howitzers from the US, a highly-placed defence ministry source said today.

The ultra-light howitzers are for the mountain artillery divisions of the Indian Army to be used in high-altitude frontiers opposite Pakistan and China. They can be transported slung from some helicopters.

The defence acquisitions committee has decided to take the foreign military sales route. Foreign military sales is a US programme of government-to-government sales of military hardware bypassing a lengthy system of competitive bidding. But bidders who lose out to foreign military sales orders allege that the system lacks transparency.

“We will also look at other options,” defence secretary Pradeep Kumar said.

The Indian Air Force has taken the foreign military sales route to contract six Lockheed Martin-made Hercules C130J air lifters and the army did the same to buy artillery fire-finding radars.

Two brands of ultra-light howitzers were initially in contention for the Indian Army’s estimated $2.5-billion artillery modernisation programme — ST Kinetics’ Pegasus and BAE Land Systems’ M777 made in the US.

BAE Land Systems has bought over the erstwhile Swedish firm Bofors that sold 410 155mm howitzers to India in 1986. The army has not bought a single big gun since the last of the Bofors howitzer was delivered in 1987, 22 years back.

ST Kinetics was blacklisted this year after the company figured in investigations into the deals struck by the former director general of the Ordnance Factory Board in Calcutta. The government has lifted the bar on trials in multiple-vendor situations.

If the government takes the foreign military sales route, the order is likely to go to BAE Land Systems. The source said the defence acquisitions council authorised the foreign military sales route before Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to the US last month.

The army wants to buy 145 ultra-light howitzers, 158 towed and wheeled, 100 tracked, and 180 wheeled and armoured guns in the first phase as part of its field artillery rationalisation plan, the programme to upgrade its artillery divisions.

Defence secretary Pradeep Kumar said the government has speeded up the buying of military hardware. Between 2007 and 2009, a total of 465 contracts have been signed. These are worth more than Rs 1,35,000 crore.

He said in 10 years, the defence ministry had doubled the capital expenditure for new acquisitions. The acquisitions were worth Rs 62,272 crore between 1999 and 2004. They total Rs 1,37,496 crore between 2004 and 2009. In the current year (2009-2010), Rs 41,000 crore was being spent on direct capital acquisitions.

The acquisitions have included Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control Systems, Sukhoi 30MKI fighter aircraft, aircraft for VIPs, missiles of different types and tanks.
 
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In Last Decade India has Iinked Defense Deals worth over $50 billion

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Rajat Pandit

In the decade since the 1999 Kargil conflict, India has inked deals worth over $50 billion to acquire fighters, warships, tanks, missiles, other weapon systems and platforms, the overwhelming majority of them from abroad. That is not all. India is poised to spend well over $30 billion over the next four-five years to import military hardware and software, which will only serve to reinforce its position as the developing world's biggest arms buyer.

China, of course, spends much more -- its `declared' defence budget this year is $70 billion compared to India's $30 billion -- but it's difficult to do number-crunching about its military acquisitions, hiding as it does more than revealing. Pakistan, on its part, is not too far behind. It even pipped India, for instance, in 2006 by notching up arms import deals worth $5.1 billion, compared to India's $3.5 billion.

Disclosing the defence ministry's official figures on Thursday, top sources said India spent Rs 62,672 crore on `direct capital acquisitions' in the 1999-2004 timeframe. "This has more than doubled in the last five years (2004-2009) to Rs 1,37,496 crore. It becomes Rs 1,78,496 crore if one adds the Rs 41,000 crore earmarked for net capital expenditure this fiscal,'' said a source.

The scorching pace set can be gauged from the fact that the defence ministry inked as many as 465 arms contracts worth Rs 1,35,000 crore in just the last three years. Russia continues to lead the pack of defence suppliers to India, with annual sales worth around $1.5 billion, followed by Israel, which adds $1 billion or so to its kitty every year.

Then come others like France and UK. But it's actually the US which is now increasingly muscling into the lucrative Indian arms market, having already bagged the $2.1 billion contract for eight Boeing P-8I long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft and the $962 million deal for six C-130J Super Hercules planes.

There is, however, quite a bit of disquiet over whether India actually gets the biggest bang for its buck, given the lack of concrete long-term strategic planning to systematically build military capabilities in tune with the country's growing geo-political aspirations.

Nevertheless, the sharp upward trajectory in modernising the armed forces is considered imperative since India is the only country with long unresolved borders with two nuclear-armed, largely hostile neighbours. Then, of course, there is the deadly threat of unconventional warfare, as was underlined by the 26/11 terror attacks.

Big defence deals inked

* US: 6 C-130J Super Hercules aircraft for $962 million (2007); 8 Boeing P-8I planes for $2.1 billion (2009)

* Israel: 3 Phalcon AWACS for $1.1 billion (2004); Rs 10,075 crore project to jointly develop medium-range surface-to-air missile systems (2009)

* France: 6 Scorpene submarines in a Rs 18,798 crore project (2005)

* Russia: Admiral Gorshkov and 16 MiG-29Ks in $1.5 billion package deal (inked in 2004 but aircraft carrier's refit to zoom up to $2.5 billion now from original $974 million); 230 Sukhoi-30MKIs for $8.5 billion

* UK: 66 Hawk AJTs in a Rs 8,000 crore project (2004)

Big projects in offing

* Rs 42,000 crore project for 126 multi-role combat aircraft

* Rs 30,000 crore project for 6 new-generation submarines after Scorpenes

* Rs 20,000 crore artillery modernisation programme to acquire 1,580 towed guns, 814 mounted gun systems, 180 self-propelled wheeled guns, 100 self-propelled tracked guns and 140 air-mobile ultra-light howitzers

* Rs 20,000 crore for around 800 helicopters, ranging from VVIP and heavy-lift to attack and light utility

TIMES OF INDIA
 
That means 145 M777 for india... World's finest..

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Does not know if it is worlds best but 99% it is coming to India. Looks like we are heading for lot of American stuff, hope we can pull a long friendship with them.

My gut feeling says f-18 is going to selected for MRCA.
 
I think Arjun has done well against the T-90 tank,That's why there is no noise so far from Army ..

Here is the article...

May be we can see further order in coming months..

FORCE - A Complete News Magazine on National Security - Defence Magazine

Also under construction at HVF are 124 units of the Indian locally-designed Arjun MBT, which recently underwent comparative trials with the T-72 and T-90S. These desert trials, it is learned, were fairly successful which has pushed the army to raise the initial order to 250 enough for six regiments with a possible product improved order for another 250 as Mark II version.

Adding to the haphazard and somewhat ad hoc plethora of armour, procurement programme, ministry of defence in 2008 concluded a fresh contract with Russia to supply an additional 347 T-90S in complete sets of components for local assembly. However, these supplementary T-90S kits are not expected to impinge on the agreed scope of the license program to locally construct 1,000 MBTs with production that was to have begun in 2007, but was postponed. In all, the army’s armour profile through 2015-2020 could comprise of approximately 1700 T-90S, 1800-2000 upgraded T-72M1s, and 250–500 Arjuns.


:cheers:
 
I don't under stand that what is the problem with Arjun?

It's batter protected then T-90 and mind that it's fire control and 120mm Rifled gun is batter hitting enemy tank then t90.

It's current 1400hp engine is problem but still it's faster on road and with it's Hydropnumatic suspention it's batter and faster on off-road. While DRDO is developing 1500Hp Engine.

Then what's the hell is the Problem? Why not produce more then 2000-3000Arjun?

This will give our people work and pump that Defence money in to the our Manufaturing sector.

Feel free to disagree.
 
I don't under stand that what is the problem with Arjun?

It's batter protected then T-90 and mind that it's fire control and 120mm Rifled gun is batter hitting enemy tank then t90.

It's current 1400hp engine is problem but still it's faster on road and with it's Hydropnumatic suspention it's batter and faster on off-road. While DRDO is developing 1500Hp Engine.

Then what's the hell is the Problem? Why not produce more then 2000-3000Arjun?

This will give our people work and pump that Defence money in to the our Manufaturing sector.

Feel free to disagree.

My dear friend, everybody knows why politicians lobby hard to become a minister in India.:hitwall:

I just give u a hint Mulayam Sing Yadav was the defense minister who have finalized the deal. Who is Mulayam singh what are his credensials every indian knows that.

Remember DRDO/HAL are govt. organisations they can't give kickbacks to anybody.:hitwall:
 
India-Russia T-90 Deal: An Analysis

by Rajesh Kumar Mishra

It is not our intention to muddy the waters further when Tehelka exposures are rocking the government. This T-90 deal may kill the indigenous MBT-project Arjun, but what is surprising is that no one knows except a fortunate few in the Defence ministry, about the expected military advantages and the actual price being paid for the final product. Is it more than for what we bargained for and if so why? Director

Today in India, the philosophy behind the culture of maintaining secrecy in defence matters has come under considerable public scrutiny. It may take heavier tolls than what the country had experienced. Its spin off might further affect the morale of the army.

In the light of the present defence demands, the rationale to get the best of the utilised resources needs three important points of reference prioritisation of demands, selection of the best available competitive price compliant goods and services under a specified category, and the management of resources. Taking these aspects into account, does the agreement to acquire T-90 main battle tanks (MBT) justify the deal?

The recent expose has raised a fairly good number of questions ranging from the individual values to the preparedness of the national defence. Today, a nation wide debate is needed on all the relevant issues pertaining to the weakening endemic systems whatsoever in past and present. Analytically, it is good and bad both. It is good that its urgency has been realized at a time when the countrys military strength is undergoing tremendous resurrection. Bad because the legitimacy of the governance itself is under severe criticism, when the country is busy in looking for some headway in Kashmir like volatile situation, and pressing hard to find a responsible position in the global political and strategic systems. Also, one needs to take into account that, at the international front, India is yet to convince and thoroughly justify the world community of Indias ongoing missile and nuclear development programmes.

Every year, the size of budgetary allocations for the defence reflects governments concern towards defence needs and demands. In the Budget for 2001-2002, there is an increment of 13.8 percent over the last years defence spending. However, is the financial allocation based on judicious conclusions for acquisition and procurement needs? Do all the defence spending justify the rationale behind them?

No doubt, military hardware has collectively been reaching obsolescence after decades of service. Consequently, timely upgradation and modernisation of defence assets are long overdue. Even the Standing Committee on Defence in its Third Report (2001), referring the Kargil conflict of 1999 as a wake-up call, justified the 20.79 per cent increase over the revised estimate of last years budget for essential requirements for modernising the armed forces.

At the same time, it also acknowledges that poor planning results in wasteful purchases which are a drain on the scarce resources of the country. Even the Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Padmanabhan, in an interview with the Janes Defence Weekly (Vol.35, Issue No.3, 17January,2001, p.32) has suggested an encouragement to efficient and transparent procurement policy.

Differing reports on the T-90 Deal

It is reported through government documents that Russia in December1997 first offered the T-90 tanks. In December 1998, the Cabinet Committee on Security approved the proposal for the acquisition by the technical delegation that had evaluated the tanks in Russian conditions. Then, after three trials as recommended by the Price Negotiation Committee (PNC) in peak summers in Rajasthan during May-July1999 and a subsequent protection trial during October-November1999 in Russia, the Army headquarters prepared a General Staff Evaluation Report and recommended the induction of T-90s into the services. Since then, negotiations continued to finalise the price tag and the procurement of the tanks.

* Josy Joseph an analyst explained the minor problems with regard to the summer trials in 1999 as - The T-90S tanks brought to India for summer trials had shown a heating problem at temperatures above 44 degrees Celsius. The summer trials were conducted in the Pokhran desert in June. But the senior officer said these were "minor problems that can in no way undermine the combat worthiness of the tank". (http//www.rediff.com/news/1999/sep/20tank-htm )

* An another source on the Indian purchase of T-90, Associated Press of Pakistan, News Summary (05-11-1999), quoting Asian Age reported that India will soon purchase around 300 T-90 tanks from Russia for around Rs 10.50 crores each, for deployment in offensive formations in Rajasthan and Punjab by next year. T-90 tank will swiftly " kill" Arjun, the main battle tank developed locally after 25 years.

* The report quoting military sources mentioned that T-90 purchase would also render India vulnerable to an unreliable supplier of spares and backup support; the paper quoted military sources. Military sources said the decision for the outright purchase of T-90s to equip four to five armoured regiments, despite its lukewarm performance" during the summer trials at Pokhran, have been "pushed forcefully" by "influential sections "within the army. They also said the T-90s- broadly compatible with T-72s, the army's current MBT-that are being finalised for purchase by India, are reportedly being offered minus at least six critical assemblies, including night vision and navigation systems that give it the decisive edge.---But the paper again quoting military sources said the T-90 missile system performed "poorly" during summer trials in the desert where it will eventually be deployed. Initially, the tank engines worked well, as the trials were being conducted at night. Problems, however, emerged once daytime trials began, with the power packs de-rating and at least one of three tank engines suffering extensive damage in high desert temperatures. Official sources said officials at army headquarters, inexplicably desperate to acquire the T-90s, reportedly dismissed the overheating as teething problems.

* Same year, the Indian Parliament witnesses an uproar in the twelfth Lok Sabha proceedings when the former Prime minister H.D. Deve Gowda and others raised the issue of T-90 tanks in the House. Referring to a letter addressed by the Chairman of the Standing Committee to then Defence Minister on 3rd November 1998, the former prime minister mentioned that all the add-ons of T-90 can be fitted into T-72S which have a tank fire control system, latest technology, 125 mm tank gun, 1000 horse power engine, anti-tank and anti-helicopter missile, SBIR and anti-tank guided missile protective system. With all these add-ons, T-72S have virtually become as good as T-90 and the cost is about Rs. 5-6 crore, whereas T-90 is about Rs. 12-13 crore. (For detail, please see Appendix-I)

* In, DEFENCE NEWS, 22 January,20001, it quoted Konstatin Makienko, the deputy head of the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, Moscow, that- Ukraines T-84 main battle tank is roughly equivalent in quality and capability to Russias T-90 and at $2.2 million, is considerably cheaper than the T-90s export price of $2.7 million. (page no.8)

The Deal

Passing through several other such hiccups the deal finally got through. India and Russia signed an agreement on 15th February 2001 on T-90 MBTs covering the tank purchase and licensing to manufacture, including the weapons systems.

* The first part of the agreement enables India to purchase 124 MBTs in ready-to-use configuration and 186 MBTs in semi-knocked down (SKD) and completely knocked down (CKD) conditions. Assembling of the 186 SKD and CKD tanks is to take place at the Heavy Vehicles Factory in Avadi in Tamil Nadu.

* The second part of the agreement includes license to manufacture MBTs in India and transfer of the associated technologies to India.

* The third part of this agreement implies production of the weapon systems of these MBTs. Bharat Dynamics is to undertake the assembling of the acquired missiles in knocked down conditions.

Media reports maintain that the acquisition of T-90 tanks with better night vision and battle survivability would provide India an edge over Pakistan which has recently acquired 300 T-80 tanks from Ukraine. Also, with the mid-life upgrade these T-90 tanks will remain in service for at least 30 years.

Technical specifications

According to the FAS military Analysis Networks description The T-90 main battle tank, the most modern tank in the army arsenal, went into low-level production in 1993, based on a prototype designated as the T-88. The T-90 was developed by the Kartsev-Venediktov Design Bureau at the Vagonka Works in Nizhniy Tagil. Initially seen as an entirely new design, the production model is in fact based on the T-72BM, with some added features from the T-80 series. The T-90 features a new generation of armor on its hull and turret. Two variants, the T-90S and T-90E, have been identified as possible export models. Plans called for all earlier models to be replaced with T-90s by the end of 1997, subject to funding availability.------- Derived from the T-72, the GPO Uralvagonzavod T-90 is the most modern tank currently in service with the Russian Army.---- Several hundred of these tanks have been produced, with various estimates suggesting that between 100 and 300 are in service, primarily in the Far East. As of mid-2000 India planned to acquire T-90 tanks, based on field trials which had already been completed. Although orders had been placed for the supply of 124 Arjun tanks through the Defence Research Development Organisation, it would be difficult to predict when these orders would be fulfilled. Until such time, T-90 tanks would serve to counter Pakistan's T-85 tanks. (For more detail, please see Appendix-II)

The Website For Defence Industries-Army, Current Projects explains about the T-90S that The T-90S is the latest development in the T-series of Russian tanks and represents an increase in firepower, mobility and protection. ..The T-90S is in service with the Russian Army and has been selected by the Indian Army, with a requirement for 250 vehicles. (http://www.army-technology.com/projects/t-90)

Pertinent inquiries

The agreement concluded does not reveal the negotiated final price tag. Taking into account the various reports, it must not be less than Rs. 2500 crore. This amount is more than approximately 10 per cent of the budget estimate of the Army for the year 2000-2001. However, in comparison to other financial demands of defence requisitions, the value of the transaction being high has to be closely scrutinised. Given the resources at hand, today, India needs the best bang for the buck.

To reach at a final price tag the PNC is reported to have had held more than seventy rounds of committee meetings. Also, before the final declaration of the agreement, defence officials were reported showing concern that the Indian dealing with M/S Rosvoorouzhenie might raise the final price tag between 15 to 20 percent as commission over and above the actual selling price of the tank, if not dealt directly from the producer- Uralvagonzavod State United Enterprises, Omsk (Belarus Republic). The official explanation for routing purchase through Rosvoorouzenie, however, is that it is the nodal agency for all defence deals with Moscow and that New Delhi has been dealing with it since its inception. (The Asian Age, T-90 tank deal hits roadblock, December11,2000). There has been no official explanation from the government on this issue.

The official version of the Defence Secretary, on the basis of a draft contract given by the Russian side, stated before the Standing Committee that the $2.41 million was the price. Though they started with $2.65 million, it was brought down. This statement further indicated that the price could be brought even below $2.2 million. If so, one should know what was the final price. Was any commission included in the price for the nodal agency?

However, official secrecy of the negotiated final price tag is bound to raise speculations. In a democratic country, people may not be allowed to question the idea of maintaining official secrecy pertaining to national security matters beyond a limit, but how does non-disclosure of the negotiated amount of money would add to the national security anyway? After all, the people of this country have every right to know if not why and how at least how much and where?. At times, even on small matters, non-probity could cause considerable public dissent.

Judging through different variables of the defence procurements and the allegations of political corruption involved through the rank and file of functionaries, could it be possible that in discreet manner the defence demands are oversized or over stressed? Does this assumption also apply to the T-90 deal?

Defence experts question as to whose vested interests this costly deal serves to?. They dwell upon the cost-benefit analysis of such deals and subsequently raise the question that does India need them (T-90 MBTs) at all? (http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper201)

Going against the views of the government and defence circles that T-90 deal would provide supremacy to Indian armoured divisions over Pakistans acquisition of T-80 UD main battle tanks, Dr. Subhash Kapila, a senior retired army official maintains that the armoured divisions themselves are irrelevant to the Indian tactical conditions. This argument is based on the concept that armoured formations have inherent limitations in terms of geographical locations of the India-Pakistan and Sino-Indian borders. He had suggested that the resources should be utilised more toward the acquisition of advanced anti-tank weapons and missile systems to strengthen the anti-tank defence of infantry divisions. In addition, taking into account the emerging high technological environment, efficient Air Cavalry Brigades are preferred alternatives to Armoured Divisions.

Therefore, amidst the air thickened with numerous queries, India needs to tread carefully in future. Especially, as far as the main battle tanks are concerned, when three ambitious plans are in the offing, the policy makers should promote timely appraisal of the defence deals and agreements. These ambitious plans include - upgradation of existing T-72 tanks, delivery of indigenous Arjun and the procurement of T-90 tanks. After all, the country can overcome the enemies on or off territorial front, but will hardly survive the disease within.

APPENDIX-I

Following is the excerpt of DeveGowdas statement in the Parliament:

Now, I now want to deal with T-90 tanks. The hon. Raksha Mantri has mentioned about T-90 tanks and also about Vishnu Bhagwat issue. Sir, he has circulated a book, `Government of India, Ministry of Defence'. Part-I deals with Vishnu Bhagwat issue. Part-II has been reserved for T-90 tanks. Now, he tried to print in this book, which has been circulated to all the Members of the House, only one letter which I have written to the Prime Minister on the 8th November. It was very convenient for him and that is why, he has printed that letter, where certain typographical errors were there. On the 10th November, within two days, I wrote another letter making the correction.

Sir, I would like to just bring to the notice of this august House that these are the letters which I have written to the hon. Prime Minister and the Defence Minister. ... (Interruptions)----------------

SHRI H.D. DEVEGOWDA : Sir, this is a serious matter. Please allow me to speak. Otherwise, it is going to be one-sided argument, which has been advanced in this booklet circulated to all the Members.

Sir, kindly see as to what plea the hon. Defence Minister had taken. In his reply, the Defence Minister had taken the plea that this was decided by the previous Government. Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav, as the Raksha Mantri, had gone to Moscow in October 1997. In November 1997, a meeting was held in the room of the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister; so and so persons were present there. The Army Delegation evaluation performance of T-90 tanks was made in February 1998. The Technical Evaluation Report was given on the 25th of May 1998. The visit of the Defence Secretary was made in June 1998. The Cabinet Committee on Security gave the approval in principle for the procurement of T-90 tanks on the 3rd December 1998. The date of arrival of the Russian Delegation for the Price Negotiation Committee meeting for T-90 tanks was on the 20th January 1999.

I raised this issue not because I have any interest of a particular tank. This was the issue raised by the Member of the very same House, who is also the Chairman of the Standing Committee. He wrote a letter to the Raksha Mantri on the 3rd November 1998.

In that letter, he has categorically mentioned that T-90 tank is the state-of-the-art tank but it never came into production for reasons best known to the Russians. Therefore, the induction of these tanks cannot be done within the acceptable time frame in view of the absence of production line in Russia. To produce the same at Avadi will not be cost effective both in money and time taken for production to commence. Moreover, T-90 has never been trial evaluated in India in summer or winter. Russia has now gone to their state-of-the-art tank, `Black Eagle', which is the tank of the future. This was written by the Chairman of the Standing Committee who is also one of the officers who served in the Defence. Shri George Fernandes is not an expert. I am not an expert. Or Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav is not an expert. A person who has served in the Defence has written the letter to the Defence Minister on 3rd November 1998. I would like to again, particularly, stress one point. He says, T-72S, on the other hand, has many common features with 272M and the production of this tank can commence without much delay. It is pertinent to clarify here that all the add-ons of T-90 can be fitted into T-72S which has a tank fire control system, latest technology, 125 mm tank gun, 1000 horse power engine, anti-tank and anti-helicopter missile, SBIR and anti-tank guided missile protective system. With all these add-ons, T-72S has virtually become as good as T-90 and the cost is about Rs. 5-6 crore, whereas T-90 is about Rs.12-13 crore. This was the letter addressed by the Chairman of the Standing Committee.

In addition to that, there is one more letter written by Lieutenant-General Foley. What has he written? This is letter dated 6th June. The hon. Defence Minister should go through the letter which was written by a retired Army General whether we should go for T-90 or not. Yes, Shri Mulayam Singh went there somewhere in November 1997. Yes, I have quoted the date. Subsequently, the Principal Secretary has taken the meeting. He has tried to shift the responsibility on all these things, including the initiation made by us. Who has initiated this purchase of T-90 tanks? It is the UF Government. Have they said anywhere you should not consider T-72? (Interruptions) No, Sir, this is the issue which I cannot avoid. (http:/www.alfa.nic.in/Isdeb/Is12/ses4/0116049924.htm)

APPENDIX-II
FAS military Analysis Networks description of the T-90 main battle tanks mentions the following:

(T-90)

The T-90 main battle tank, the most modern tank in the army arsenal, went into low-level production in 1993, based on a prototype designated as the T-88. The T-90 was developed by the Kartsev-Venediktov Design Bureau at the Vagonka Works in Nizhniy Tagil. Initially seen as an entirely new design, the production model is in fact based on the T-72BM, with some added features from the T-80 series. The T-90 features a new generation of armor on its hull and turret. Two variants, the T-90S and T-90E, have been identified as possible export models. Plans called for all earlier models to be replaced with T-90s by the end of 1997, subject to funding availability. By mid-1996 some 107 T-90s had gone into service in the Far Eastern Military District.

Derived from the T-72, the GPO Uralvagonzavod T-90 is the most modern tank currently in service with the Russian Army. Of conventional layout, the T-90 represents a major upgrade to every system in the T-72, including the main gun. The T-90 is an interim solution, pending the introduction of the new Nizhny Tagil MBT which has been delayed due to lack of funding. Produced primarily mainly due to its lower cost, the T-90 it will probably remain in low-rate production to keep production lines open until newer designs become available. Several hundred of these tanks have been produced, with various estimates suggesting that between 100 and 300 are in service, primarily in the Far East.

As of mid-2000 India planned to acquire T-90 tanks, based on field trials which had already been completed. Although orders had been placed for the supply of 124 Arjun tanks through the Defence Research Development Organisation, it would be difficult to predict when these orders would be fulfilled. Until such time, T-90 tanks would serve to counter Pakistan's T-85 tanks.

Specifications

Dimensions




Length


9.53 - 6.86 meters

Width


3.78 meters

Height


2.225 meters

clearance


0.47 meters

Weight


46.5 - 50 metric tons

Armored volume


11.04 m3

Turret volume


1.85 m3

Crew


3

Engine


840 hp V-84MS diesel
1,000 hp V-84KD turbo-supercharged diesel
1,000 hp V-85 diesel
1 kW AB-1-P28 auxiliary power unit

Max Road Speed


65 km/h

Max cross-country Speed


45 km/h

Power/Weight


18 - 20.0 hp/tn

Ground Pressure


0.938 kg/sq.cm

Range


550 - 650 km

Obstacle negotiation




Fording depth


1.2 m on the move/5 m with OPVT (snorkel)

Trench width


2.8 m

Vertical obstacle


0.8 m

Maximum gradient


30

Weapons




Main Weapon


125mm 2A46M-2 smoothbore

Stabilization


2E42-4 Zhasmin

Rate of fire


6-8 rounds/min

Ammunition


43 rounds (22 in carousel)

Ammunition Types


APFSDS, HEAT, HEF

ATGM through 125mm


9M119M Refleks-M (AT-11 Sniper-B)

Machine Guns


Coaxial PKT 7.62mm (2000 rounds)
Remotely-controlled AAMG mount Utjos NSVT 12.7mm (300 rounds)

Smoke Screens


12 902B 82mm mortars with 3D17 smoke grenades
smoke discharger

Equipment




Night Vision


TO1-PO2T Agava-2 TI (target id range 2.5 km)
TPN-4-49-23 Buran-PA (target id range 1.2/1.5 km)

Fire Control


1A45T Irtysh computerized system with 9S515 missile guidance system

Onboard sights




Commander


PNK-4S sight includes TKN-4S Agat-S day/night sight (target id range 800 m (day)/700 m (night))

Gunner


1V528-1 ballistic computer
1A43 rangefinder/sight
1G46 laying device
DVE-BS wind gauge

Driver


TVN-5 IR night viewer

Radio


R-163-50U
R-163-50U + R-163-50K (T-90K)

Navigation


TNA-4-3 (T-90K)

Jammers


Shtora-1 EOCMDAS
Dazzle painting

Other


NBC, 3ETs13 Inej auto-fire-fighting equipment,
self-dig-in blade,
air conditioning,
KMT-6 mine clearing equipment (optional)

Front & side armor


laminated front, side and top armor behind Kontakt-5 ERA

Front armor rating, mm RHA


Vs APFSDS: 550 mm + 250-280mm with Kontakt-5 = 800-830mm
Vs HEAT: 650 mm + 500-700mm with Kontakt-5 = 1,150-1,350mm
 
A four-member team from the army bags the first place at the International Humanitarian Law Competition


The Indian Army had till now kept itself distanced from the International Humanitarian Law and did reasonably well, so it believes. While there are reports of aberration once in a while putting the army in dock, the overall picture has been good.
However, now the armed forces have started taking baby steps towards the IHL and as a first of these, a four-member team from the army participated in the International Humanitarian Law Competition hosted by the Swiss ministry of defence and also bagged the first place in the competition. The IHL, also known as the Laws of Armed Conflict, deals with two major issues of warfare, the legality of waging a war and permissible means and methods of war fighting.

The team from India, led by Col S.C. Sharan, director HR Cell in the Discipline and Vigilance Directorate, was hand picked on the basis of their ‘aptitude’. Since the aim of the competition is to enhance the knowledge level of middle rank officers on IHL and successfully integrate its principles in the decision making process during hostilities, the team comprised commanding officers, Col Peeyush Khurana and Col Arindam Saha, both COs in Rashtriya Rifles, and Major Ajeen Kumar from JAG (Judge Advocate General) department.
 
DRDO develops 'wearable computers' for soldiers

The Indian soldier carrying a computer along with his weapons in an inhospitable terrain does not seem not far off.

The device is a compact, low power, high-performance computing platform capable of doing the functions of a desktop on the palm.

Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is working on a ?Wearable Computer? project which could be used for various applications including locating scattered team members while moving along in the most inhospitable terrain.

The prototype of the ?Wearable Computers? was displayed at the ongoing Indian Science Congress here, the personnel of Centre for Artificial Intelligence & Robotics (CAIR) under DRDO's Bangalore unit.

The device was capable of carrying out scores of applications like Situation Awareness, Command Control, Navigation, Sensor Data Processing, Video and Voice Streaming.

It could also perform Situation Assessment during disaster management.

fullstory
 
Army medical charts not revised for 50 years


In a revelation that could have serious health implications for the armed forces and on the medical classification of soldiers, charts used to define the correct weight for height and age are not only outdated, but are apparently based on data applicable to western population that is inherently different from Indian population.

A study, conducted by three armed forces medical specialists, has found that the weight for age and height calculated in the study after recording anthropometric measurements of about 1,000 healthy armed forces personnel was at considerable variance with the charts currently being used in the Army.

This, according to some medical experts, implies that all along the army may have been using inappropriate parameters to gauge the physical standards ot the troops. Further, police and para military organisations may also be affected by this.

Pointing out that the existing reference weights have not been revised in the last 50 years, the study has recommended a large-scale multi-centric study should be taken up for replacing the existing charts. The study has been published in a recent issue of the Medical Journal Armed Forces India.

The average weight for a majority of height and age category among the surveyed individuals was found to be higher than in the Indian Army chart. For example, as per the old scale, individuals in the height category of 178 cms and 28-32 years should have an ideal weight of 68.5 kg, whereas the study found the average weight to be 71.19 kg. Similarly those who should have an ideal weight of 72.5 kg were found to be 81.23 kg.

The study states that the origins of the anthropometric charts used in the Army are obscure and it is widely believed that these were obtained from life insurance tables made for British and American civilian population.

Anthropometry is an accepted method of measuring obesity, the prevalence of which has increased globally. In India alone, there are over 100 million obese people, which indicates that they are amidst an obesity epidemic.

The Indian Armed Forces, the study points out, are not immune from this epidemic and studies indicate a rising trend of obesity in the armed forces. Although armed forces personnel are subjected to periodic medical examinations, the standards for body weight used to classify individuals as overweight are very old. Overweight and obesity not only have serious health consequences, but also are a cause of lowering the medical classification in the forces, which adversely affects a soldier’s career.

Therefore, the study noted, it was imperative that reference anthropometric values related to overweight and obesity for the Indian Armed Forces should be established based upon data for the same population instead of using outdated data meant for individuals of different ethnic origins.

The Tribune, Chandigarh, India - Main News
 

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