Indian Army "Faked" Battle of Laungewalla

[EagleEyes]

The question is Mr.Webmaster, if the Indian soldiers were cowards, why couldn't the pakistani battle force neutralize the Indian position and advance on instead of waiting till morning for the IAF to bomb them?
Even the IAF acknowledges that their hunter jets did not have night fighting capabilities.

Are you slow or you cannot read?

Dont ever call me out again especially when your in no position to do so!

 

[Tiki Tam Tam]

Mig-Ace,

You missed my post---a one liner---pakistani tankers had the 2nd world war habbit of not operating the tanks at night---that is what they were doing---resting for the night---cost themsleves the initiative, their machinery and ultimately their lives.

Operating tanks at night is still difficult even though these days there is II or IR.

I wonder if the tanks had night vision devices then.

 

[MastanKhan]

Salim,

I believe the americans have been using night vision since the 50's---troops, tanks etc.---at that time the IR version was more popular I believe.

 

[Tiki Tam Tam]

Indians did not have IR.

I think Pattons had, but it was a later version; or so I learnt at WAB.

I really do not know.

 

[Myth_buster_1]

Can somebody tell me why weren’t PAF Mirages used against the hunters>?
They had longer range then F-86 F-6 or F-104.. or why didn’t the southern air command scrambled its fighters??

 

[BATMAN]

War hero files defamation suitPublished:

NEW DELHI: Controversy over the authenticity of the famous battle of Longewala in India’s western sector in 1971 refuses to die down. The war hero credited with the splendid victory at that time has gone to court saying people were trying to tarnish his image.
Brig (retd) Kuldip Singh Chandpuri, who has filed a defamation suit of Re1 against Air Marshal (retd) M S Bawa and Maj Gen (retd) Atma Singh, says “the two of them were not there” while he was fighting the war.
“My only ground for filing the suit is that I was there fighting the war and the two of them were not there. I do not want their money - that is why I have demanded Re1 as compensation. I just want justice,” Chandpuri said in Chandigarh.
A local court issued a notice to the defendants on July 19. “Bawa made scandalous and malicious statements, tarnishing the image of not only the plaintiff but also the entire Alpha Company,” Chandpuri said in the petition.
The Longewala battle was fought in the western sector - in Rajasthan - during the India-Pakistan war in 1971.
Chandpuri, at that time a major who was leading just 100 men, had frustrated a formidable attack by a Pakistani brigade (some 2,800 troops) backed by an armoured regiment of 45 tanks. Chandpuri was given the Maha Vir Chakra. His company 23 Punjab won six gallantry awards.
However, a controversy was sparked off in February this year after Maj Gen Atma Singh, who won the Vir Chakra at Longewala, alleged that no ground battle was fought and the army had merely rehearsed it on a sand model after the ceasefire to cover up the incompetence of senior military commanders.
He also claimed that it was the Indian Air Force (IAF) that actually crushed the enemy forces.
Air Marshal Bawa, who was commanding the Jaisalmer base from where IAF Hunter fighter aircraft operated in the battle, also contested the army’s claim and reportedly said: “The services were the only organisation with some credibility. The army has turned that apart by faking the entire operation.”
According to army records, Chandpuri and his men - equipped with recoilless guns, medium machine guns, 81mm mortars and small arms - had engaged enemy armour at the post of Longewala in Rajasthan on the intervening night of December 4 and December 5, 1971.
The battle is part of the curriculum taught to senior officers in the higher command course at the Army War College and has been immortalised by the Bollywood super-hit film ‘Border’.
Taking note of this, Chandpuri said in his petition: “For over two decades, from 1971 to 1997 (when the film ‘Border’ was released), no controversy was ever raised on the battle by anyone...Perhaps the limelight given to me created heartburn with the defendant (Air Marshal Bawa).
“In order to give vent to this heartburn, he in the year 1997 made malicious and scandalous statements against me and the Alpha Company, doubting the factual status regarding the battle.”
According to the petition, Bawa and Singh repeated their “malicious and scandalous remarks” against Chandpuri and Alpha Company regarding the battle in February following the commemoration given to Chandpuri by Defence Minister A K Antony. – IANS

 

[Dark Angel]

 

[Xeric]

To add further.....

Tehelka - India's Independent Weekly News Magazine

The Truth Of Courage

The army picked up a rich haul of gallantry awards for the fable defence of Longewala in the 1971 war. But its own documents concede it was the Air Force that won the battle for India. HARINDER BAWEJA unearths the facts


THERE IS often a wide chasm between the heat of battle and the calm manoeuvrings of gallantry awards and official retellings. It is in this gap that the facts of true valour dangerously sink. This is a shameful loss that can fester in times of peace and come back to haunt in times of war. Such an unhappy rumble is today being heard across India’s famously disciplined armed forces, demanding that the truth of courage be firmly established.

The Battle of Longewala is part of army folklore. Its inspiring tale of courage in the face of insurmountable odds is held out as a shining example to students preparing to graduate from the military academy. The ultimate underdog victory against a vastly superior force ran to packed halls when captured on celluloid. Why wouldn’t it have? The film Border, after all, celebrated the grit of the Indian soldier and the steely resolve with which an entire Pakistani brigade, backed by an armoured regiment of 45 tanks, was forced to retreat. It depicted the near-unreal story of how a single Company (120 men) stalled the Pakistani enemy (close to 3000 in number) from its avowed aim of cutting deep into Indian territory.The battle of Longewala is indeed an unbelievable account, one that does not cease to amaze even 37 years after it played out in the sandy terrain of the Thar desert in 1971.

Trouble was not even expected on this Western part of the border. The plausibility of an entire Pakistani tank regiment crossing the line of control and driving into Indian territory was not one that military strategists had been willing to entertain in their war games scenario. On the contrary, India’s brass hats had laboured over an extensive counter-offensive plan, according to which they were going to cross the line of control and go all the way up to Rahimyar Khan in Pakistan.That the opposite happened is well documented. That India snatched victory from the jaws of defeat is a story oft told. The badges of honour were distributed soon enough: the army picked up a Maha Vir Chakra and six Vir Chakras; the Indian Air Force, which targeted Pakistani tanks with deadly precision, earned its medals too, picking up an AVSM and 10 Vir Chakras.

THE VERSIONS

The battle of Longewala had many high moments and they have been told and retold in military journals. One of the most narrated is the sheer valour displayed by
Sharpshooters in the skies The IAF’s Hunter aircraft were deadly accurate

Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri — the role played by Sunny Deol in Border — and how he motivated his 100-odd Alpha company, drawn from 23 Punjab, after the Pakistani tanks had advanced right up to the post of Longewala.The thought of being totally run over by the enemy had made Chandpuri’s men edgy. For several hours before the Pakistanis arrived at their doorstep, Chandpuri had been calling his seniors at the Brigade and Divisional Headquarters but the response he got was this, “Kuldip, it is simply ridiculous. We are going to advance, not him. They have no offensive capability, just a squadron of rickety, run down, Sherman tanks. You are just scared and hence are having illusions.”

The scant moonlight was playing tricks in the darkness of the desert, but Chandpuri was under no illusion. The post had been surrounded and there was no way of escaping, even if the men wanted to. He tried to motivate his colleagues saying, “Anyone who is afraid to face the enemy is free to run away now but remember that it will bring shame to the battalion and remember that I plan to stand and fight to the last.” So when a Pakistani soldier shouted in the stillness of the night, “Sikhon, tayyar ho jao, assi aa gaye haan! (Sikhs, get ready, we have come), one of Chandpuri’s havaldars responded saying, “We have been waiting for you for two hours, you have been late in coming.’’ The Alpha Company apparently had just one recoilless gun, which was used to hit and destroy a Pakistani tank.

THIS IS the exact point at which the famed battle of Longewala starts retreating into the realm of controversy. This is the point at which the Army and the Air Force are now locked in fresh battle, the latter asserting that it was their show all the way, that if India was saved from humiliation, it was because of the four Hunters that flew sortie after sortie, destroying and incapacitating the Pakistani tanks. That there was no ground battle at all.There have been some claim and counterclaim skirmishes between the veterans who fought in 1971 but it has never been taken up seriously by the Chiefs, perhaps because of the “gentlemanly” service code of conduct.

The story the Air Force likes to recall speaks of its valour. It too has been recounted in military journals and Air Marshal MS Bawa (a Wing Commander in 1971 and base commander, Care and Maintenance unit of 122 Squadron, Jaisalmer) is emphatic in his recollection: “The Pakistani thrust was blunted entirely by air action alone. In the early hours of 5th December 1971, a radio called the base commander, “This is Tiger here (Maj Gen Khambata, GOC 12 Div). I suspect that an enemy armoured column is making rapid headway for Ramgarh. Our post at Longewala has heard tank noises throughout the night and seen tanks go past it with full headlights towards Ramgarh. I want your boys to investigate as early as possible.” The Division Com mander’s voice on the radio was grave with anxiety.


IN BAWA’S recounting, the situation at Longewala was deteriorating rapidly. Enemy tanks carrying infantry elements had placed a ring around the post and begun shelling it. Severely outnumbered and up against an armoured assault, Chandpuri could at best appraise the Division of the magnitude of the threat and clamour for help. He was advised to await the friendly Air Force at first light. Chandpuri kept low in his trench; a thin veil of darkness separated life from death for all those besieged at this lonely outpost in the desert.

When the first two Hunters of the IAF arrived on the scene, the enemy was still shelling the post, but was yet to hit any worthwhile target. The Hunters came low, scanning the road from Ramgarh; their eyes peeled, guided by an Air Observation Post Aircraft, Flt Lt DK Dass and Flying Officer RC Gosain found the enemy’s T-59 tanks. The fight between the IAF and the Pakistani armour began.

THEY PICKED on a tank that was closest to the area, not even 50 metres from Chandpuri’s besieged post. ‘01 Alpha’ got into the dive, put his aiming index on the tank and fired half his rockets. The tank lumbered a few meters in the sand and ignited. “Bravo” yelled with joy. “You have got him Alpha! He is burning, the bastard!” He himself was getting into firing range. He had picked on a tank near the helipad close to the post. He pressed the trigger for a short time and...that tank shattered into splinters!

But even as these two aircraft were picking up and making their kills, the enemy on the ground was advancing. A few tanks had already reached the helipad, situated at the base of Longewala post. Mission 01 was running short of fuel and ammunition. If the small, but tactically important, post at Longewala was to be held, the killing would have to continue. The kill could only be made from the air. The Indian armour was nowhere the scene, and Chandpuri had only one RCL shell.

‘This is my challenge. There was no contact between the enemy and the army. When I landed at Longewala on December 5, Chandpuri was hiding in the trench. I called out to him and he was relieved to see a Sardar. He thought they were going to be captured. Let us not fake battles to earn medals’

AIR MARSHAL MS BAWA

It was now a race against time. Back at the base (almost 100 km by road, but only a few minutes by air), every available skilled man was released from other duties to help launch aircraft and then turn them around in the shortest time possible. This was the only course of action open to the IAF. As many tanks as possible had to be destroyed during the daylight hours, because if the enemy thrust was not completely foiled in the daytime, the threat could assume menacing proportions at night. If the tanks had gone past Ramgarh, they could have overrun Jaisalmer. There were no ground anti-tank defences provided to the airbase.

Even as Mission 01 was turning towards home, another pair of aircraft flown by Bali and Yadav was on its way to the target area. The first pair claimed two tanks destroyed and five others damaged. The second mission engaged the men on the ground and continued till it had dropped its war load, claiming two tanks destroyed and six damaged. Any tanks set ablaze were claimed as destroyed and those crippled as damaged. The tanks were moving around in circles on the ground, trying mainly to offer a moving target to the enemy fighters and to find protection in the cloud of dust that their movement raised. The effort was futile since the Indian fighter/bombers had complete and unchallenged control of the air. Every pilot had to wait for his turn. “This was the only sore point among the aircrew at Jaisalmer,” says Bawa.

Ask Bawa about the Alpha Company and he is fire and brimstone. “They gave a blow by blow account to the defence minister in Longewala — when there was no blow. I landed in Longewala on December 5 after our Hunters had crippled the Pakistani tanks and Chandpuri fell at my feet and thanked us for saving their lives. They were sitting in a trench, heads down.”

So, was JP Dutta’s Border just a fictionalised account of the famed battle? Is the Army taking more credit than it deserves? Why is the Air Force so sore? Just a trip by Defence Minister AK Antony to the battlefield was enough to rake up the force rivalry over who actually won the three decade-old battle.

Ask Group Captain Bali, the then Squadron Commander, who lost control of his aircraft after it was hit by ground fire, but earned a Vir Chakra for skilfully bringing the Hunter back to base. Ask him and the fighter pilot who led three strike missions on December 5 says, “We were told a few Pakistani tanks had come in but we encountered more than 15 and I thought that, maybe, a tank battle was going on. I immediately contacted the Air Observation Post pilot on the radio and asked him to confirm if our troops were engaging the enemy and if so, what were the lines of battle. He radioed back to say that no Indian troops were engaged. In fact, we were given clearance to shoot anything, clearly implying that there was no army battle.” Truth, it is said, is often the first casualty in war. Who then is closer to the truth in this rather unbecoming war of words between the two services? Is the Air Force right in its assertions only because its officers are louder and can be heard more often? Are they right about the Army perpetuating the lie of Longewala?

THE CASE has been made curiouser because joining the controversy is a Major General of the Indian Army. Then a Major with the army’s air wing, Atma Singh Hansara has fanned the fire saying that the Army has been teaching military history to future commanders, citing accounts that have no credibility. In an interview to Hindustan Times, Hansara, who directed air support firepower towards the Pakistani tanks (he was a pilot in the Air Observation Post) said, “I dispute the ground battle completely. It is a mockery of army ethos.” Like Bawa, he too landed at Longewala by the evening of December 5 and he contests the Army’s claim that its men engaged the enemy with recoilless guns and medium machine guns. Is the army, then, guilty of cloaking the truth? Did 100-odd soldiers of the Indian Army put a brave resistance without suffering any losses at Longewala? If they had engaged the enemy — thus giving away their location — would they have survived to tell the tale? In its pursuit to fit together the pieces of an intriguing puzzle, TEHELKA sourced key documents relating to the legendary battle of Longewala.

AIR FORCE WAR DIARY
Political battle Defence Minister AK Antony on a recent visit to Ramgarh near Longewala

The War Diary of the Jaisalmer-based 14 Care and Maintenance Unit (part of 122 Squadron) recounts the details of the crucial days datewise:

December 4, 1971: … When 12 Inf Div was concentrating on their area of advance towards Rahimyar Khan, the enemy sneaked in with one regiment of armour and one brigade strength of troops from Ghabbar via BP 638 towards Longewala. The leading column of tanks bypassed Longewala post and was seen advancing towards Ramgarh past midnight. This suspected movement was passed by the Company Commander at Longewala to the Div HQ, but the same appeared to be discarded.

The column decided to turn about a few km short of Ramgarh when they found their rear not catching up. This was the first fatal mistake committed by the enemy, which subsequently changed the course of the war. Had these tanks carried on, they would have easily run over Ramgarh as there were no defences whatsoever. The return of these leading tanks towards Longewala and the noise of more tanks rolling in compelled the Company Commander to apprise GOC 12 Infantry Division again. On receipt of this message, the GOC tried to get through to the Base Cdr, but to his surprise he found that the Mujahids had already cut the telephone line at Ramgarh. This confirmed his doubts about the enemy armour thrust at Longewala. The radio relay link was established between the GOC and Base Cdr in the early hours of 5 Dec.

December 5, 1971: On receipt of information regarding suspected movement of armour, the Base Cdr ordered missions to stand by at first light. Air OP was also cautioned to carry out reconnaissance in the area and render any assistance required by the Hunters. The repeated telephone calls from the GOC 12 Infantry Div left no doubt in the mind of the Base Cdr about the helplessness of the Army in Longewala, due to their scanty deployment and the preoccupation of the Div with their much planned advance towards Rahimyar Khan. Longewala Post, having come under increasing enemy pressure, made frantic calls for help from Div HQ. Div HQ had no option but to depend on the Air Force to save the day. At about 0715 hours, when the post was about to be overrun, the first Hunter mission arrived… the mission lost no time in engaging the attacks advancing towards the Longewala Post… Missions were launched one behind the other in quick succession to beat and destroy the enemy’s armoured thrust.

This turned out to be a clean battle, one of its kind. Never before in history has a more decisive battle been fought between the AIF alone and ARMOUR. With a total of four Hunter aircraft available at the disposal of the Base Cdr, the Base was able to launch 17 sorties, destroying 50 percent of the enemy’s armour. An enemy intercept by our army in the evening revealed the sagging morale of the Pakistan Armour indicating casualties in men and material. “Dushman ke hawai fauj ne naak me dam kar diya hai. Ek hawai jahaz aata hai aur bees bees minute oopar naachta hai. Aaage jaana to kya peeche mudna bhi mushkil ho gaya hai. Jaldi hawai fauj madad ke liye bhejo varna vaapas mudna namumkin hai (The enemy’s aircraft has made us miserable. Forget advance, even retreat is difficult. Send air support quickly or it’ll be impossible to even turn back).”

The War Diary confirms what its officers are saying. A message from Maj Gen RF Khambatta, GOC, 12 Infantry Division, lends credence to the Air Force’s claim. This is what the message said: “We had excellent co-operation and support today. Shooting by your boys had been most accurate, resulting in destroying number of enemy tanks and blunting his attack. Please convey my appreciation and that of my troops to pilots. Congratulations on excellent performance.”

THE FACT that the Pakistani tanks were turning circles in the sand, some of them kicking up dust to escape direct hits, has been acknowledged in books pertaining to the 1971 war authored by Pakistani officers. In one of these, The History of Pakistan Army (1966-71), by Maj Gen (Retd) Shaukat Raza, Page 207 refers to the Longewala chapter: “18 Division had the mission to defend Karachi Sector. In November, it was given an additional mission ie, ‘Capture Jaisalmer’… General Mustafa made the following plan to capture Jaisalmer: a) 51 Brigade with 22 Cavalry capture Ramgarh and b) Jaisalmer 206 Brigade with 38 Cavalry capture Longewala… The perversity of the terrain came as a shock to the troops. At first light, 5 December, they made contact with the enemy at Longewala. At this stage the enemy aircraft appeared on the scene. The tanks were out in the open without aerial protection and without any hope of friendly air cover. The Indian aircraft had a free run.”

Another book, Crisis of Leadership in Pakistan by Gen Muqeem, while recounting the Longewala battle says, “Immediately after the attack had been launched, all communication with the Div HQ broke off. One column which was supposed to go elsewhere had succeeded in capturing Longewala, six miles inside the Indian territory but the situation was grim owing to the terrain. A large number of vehicles, guns and tanks got bogged down in sand. The enemy was masters of the skies. It was very active during the day and succeeded in destroying 18 tanks and a number of other vehicles and equipment at his leisure.”

Documents and statements of the Air Force, books by Pakistani generals, and even the account of a major in the army’s air wing are all clear that it was the IAF that was the master of the skies, its Hunters saving the day for an embattled Army in Longewala. Why then, is the army simulating a very different version?


ARMY DOCUMENTS

Key army documents pertaining to the 1971 war — obtained by TEHELKA — reveal the truth about Longewala. The army may not be willing to acknowledge it today,
Encircled One of the destroyed tanks

but these documents effectively nail the controversy, even as they raise the uncomfortable question of why the army is keeping the lie alive.

This is what the “restricted” document details: “At 0530 hrs on 5 December information was received that six Pak tanks had been seen in the area Kharotar near Longewala. A slipup on the part of 12 Inf Div stands out in bold relief. Although preplanned Tactical Recce was available to it throughout the war, it made no effort to recced the Ghabbar-Longeala axis, trotting out the fallacious plea that there was a paucity of Tac Recce sorties.

Had it detected the Pak thrust on Dec 4, the Division could have met and dissipated it and gone ahead with its offensive, as originally planned. As it turned out, the Divisional offensive (Op Dare Devil) was postponed, till the clouds over Longewala were dispelled. Air strikes were requested for and immediately mounted from Jaisalmer airfield. Fifteen modern Pakistani tanks were attacked in the area Longewala at 0830 hours on Dec 5 and four were effectively destroyed. Air recce reported that the advancing column, which had already crossed into Indian territory, was stretched over a distance of 20 km… The ominous development indicated that an attack on Longewala and subsequently on Ramgarh and Jaisalmer — only about 100 km from Longewala along a motorable road — was in the offing.

All available air effort was diverted to deal with the situation… The armoured columns were broken up. The major credit for this goes, of course, to the air force, which rose to the occasion on very short notice and inflicted crippling losses on the enemy tanks and vehicles. The company defending Longewala also held out tenaciously against heavy odds until reinforcements arrived…”

The document only gives credit to Chandpuri’s men for “holding out” and, in fact, gives details of how its Army Commander Lt Gen GG Bewoor got irritated with Maj Gen Khambatta, GOC, 12 Infantry Division. It further states, “Many reasons were given for 12 Div’s failure to destroy the Pakistani column near Longewala or advance towards Rahimyar Khan. It could not undertake a major thrust across the border, it is said, in the absence of support of an integral medium artillery regiment, which was surely needed for an advance by armour. The AMX tanks of 20 Lancers were not capable of offensive operation over a long distance. The radio communications too were in a poor state.” Despite repeated efforts by TEHELKA, Chandpuri was not available for comment.

THE ARMY document is liberal in its praise of the Indian Air Force: “At Longewala that day, the IAF added to its history a glorious new chapter. One Pak infantry brigade, supported by one armoured regiment, launched an attack on the Indian position at Longewala on the night of 4/5 December. The objective, it seems was no less than the capture of Jaisalmer. Their way to Ramgarh and Jaisalmer appeared clear, as the Indian troops were very thin on the ground in that area.” “Jaisalmer had a total of only four Hunters available from the temporarily and hastily raised 122 Squadron. But on the SOS being received, the Hunters were over the target area as dawn was breaking. By mid-day, fifteen tanks had been destroyed. The pressure was kept up the next day. This was a straight battle between Pak armour and the IAF Hunters. In spite of the intense small arms fire and the frantic evasive actions of the tanks, the Hunters pressed home their attacks, picking off one tank after another. The Pakistanis abandoned their offensive and started pulling out on 6 December, leaving behind 27 tanks destroyed and another ten damaged on the sand of Longewala, along with scores of trucks. The Pakistani armoured offensive at Longewala was effectively stemmed and ultimately routed by a handful of Hunters. The bulk of Pak armoured regiment was destroyed by air action alone.” Destroyed by air action alone.

Little more needs to be said of this famed, controversial battle. Far from describing a ground battle — which is clearly being simulated by commanders in army classrooms — it is the army’s own documents that truly nail the lie of Longewala. Should an independent inquiry be recommended? Ask Longewala’s air heroes and you’ll have the answer.

From Tehelka Magazine, Vol 5, Issue 10, Dated Mar 15, 2008

 

[brahmastra]

if some guy slaps you than does it matter you got slapped from left hand or right hand or even kicked.

 

[Hulk]

Venkat:

On a side note, I think this validates our assertion that your criticism of Murad's recollections, on the basis of "official" Indian records, is not completely valid, since "official records" are not necessarily all encompassing.

Simple question, if no battle took for 14 days, why did PA manage to cursh a very minute number of people with rifles when they had tanks and what not?

 

[Hulk]

Spart: you are very right,

PAF was neither deployed to cover the area nor it was informed about this adventure. It was open desert and the IAF had a Ball of a time and all the tanks were destroyed, One must remember that Army deployed AAA and supplied fuel to a base if it were to be activated. In this case Jacobabad/ Sukker were not operative. PAF knew when the PAK Army started its operation and it was to late .
The Battle of Longewala fought between assaulting Pakistani forces and Indian defences at the Indian border post of Longewala, in Thar Desert of the Rajasthan state in India. It is generally regarded to be one of the decisive battles in the two week long war.
Against considerable odds, the Indian 'A' company of 120 odd soldiers of the 23rd Border Security Forces, Punjab Regiment, managed to hold a 2000-3000 strong assault force of the 51st Infantry Brigade of the Pakistani Army- backed by the 22nd Armoured Regiment Until the army’s offensive was launched, the PAF was to maintain offensive pressure on the IAF with sustained strikes against some of its forward and rear bases, in order to inhibit – both physically and psychologically – the enemy’s ability to act against either the Pak Army in the field or other targets on Pakistani territory, including the PAF’s own air bases and other installations. During this same period, the PAF was also to provide whatever air support was needed for the Pak Army’s holding actions along the entire 3,700-kilometer border from Kashmir to Kutch. These relatively shallow penetration actions were meant to tie down as many of the enemy’s resources as possible and to try to achieve a favourable tactical posture in the process.

As war progressed, the PAF was also to provide whatever air support it could to Pak navy within the limits of its air-to-sea capability, which in real terms, was near zero. The PAF did not have a maritime recce capability of any consequence, and totally lacked any special anti-ship weapons such as torpedoes or mines. These PAF limitations had remained unchanged since before the 65 war and naval headquarters (NHQ) staff had been aware of them all.
When Pak Army knew that the guys are in trouble and there were no IAF in the vicinity they sent L-19s with fuel , water, Medi, food but it was too late .
my youngest brother who was a lt in Army Aviation did 12 missions on Bird Dog over laungwala.
supplying the above.

With due respect sir 2 questions.

Is 2 week too less time for an airforce to react at the time of war?
I was thinking couple of hours should be enough.

2nd If this battle was fake, as per your own records 2000 odd force could not beat 120 people for 14 days. Either PA was too bad or IA did a good job.

 

[Night Raven]

Bottomline : The enemy assault was crushed and beaten back across the IB.

Btw wonder what's the PA's version of this battle ......

 

[Hulk]

Bottomline : The enemy assault was crushed and beaten back across the IB.

Btw wonder what's the PA's version of this battle ......

The summary of what is said is here is as below.

1) PA could not win over 120 soldier of IA for 14 days, when they were more than 2000 in numbers and had division of tanks with them.

This happened and none of the 120 member had to do any brave act.
Now IMO when the 120 people were told to leave the post, how come they stayed at the post and still not be brave?

2) PAF felt that 2 weeks 14 days was not enough to counter IAF, they needed more time hence valid excuse for PAF to not show up.

 

[satishkumarcsc]

IMHO I think that PAF wanted to save its force for the AD of the western sector. or PA must have rushed before the PAF could allocate resources for the battle. Or there must have been considerable delay in PAF acquiring resources and the PA might have assumed that PAF would manage to come to rescue at the right time.

Some big mistake has happened in the joint command level. This can be cleared only from people who served on the other side of the border.

 

[flameboard]

The summary of what is said is here is as below.

1) PA could not win over 120 soldier of IA for 14 days, when they were more than 2000 in numbers and had division of tanks with them.

This happened and none of the 120 member had to do any brave act.
Now IMO when the 120 people were told to leave the post, how come they stayed at the post and still not be brave?

2) PAF felt that 2 weeks 14 days was not enough to counter IAF, they needed more time hence valid excuse for PAF to not show up.

America hasn't been able to beat the Taliban for almost a decade despite it's advanced weapons, there are other factors involved in a war as well.