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Indian Air Forceââ¬â¢ blues
Columnist S.M. HALI studies Indian Air Forceââ¬â¢s frustration on losing out to PAF.
The Indian Air Force (IAF) has lately taken to airing its woes in public. Two air chiefs and some senior air force officers have expressed their opinion on a number of sensitive issues. Their views are worth examining. Keeping with protocol, let us begin with the current air chief. Air Chief Marshal Shashindra Pal Tyagi, Chief of Air Staff of Indian Air Force has chosen to air his despondency openly and fall back on a chief's last resort after years of asking the Indian Ministry of Defence in every forum, through every channel, for new fighter planes like the Sukhoi-30 MKI to strengthen the Indian Air Force. Exasperated after the confirmation of the US-Pakistan F-16 deal, he sent a three-page letter of warning to Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee, raising serious concerns over the declining combat force level of the IAF. Pointing towards the impending crisis that has been brewing in the Indian Air Force and is about to blow up in the face of the government, the dejected Air Chief writes: ââ¬ÅPAF is being beefed up with 44 F16s from America. They have a clearly defined goal of attaining parity with the IAF. With China supplying J-10 and JF-17 aircraft (fitted with Russian engines), PAF force levels of combat squadron will increase. Unless steps are taken to move ahead with procurement, the IAF's combat strength will deplete to a level, which would entirely neutralize the conventional superiority held by IAF since our Independence. PAF will have 19 to 26 squadrons by 2011-12, while the IAF could reduce to 26.5 by 2015."
In a secret letter addressed directly by him to Indiaââ¬â¢s Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee, the Air Chief has spoken as bluntly as he can. If the MoD delays any more, says the chief, India's Air Force will no longer be superior to Pakistanââ¬â¢s. The letter is detailed and the figures are chilling for their viewpoint:
o Even the government admits that India needs 40 squadrons of fighters (there are 20 aircraft in each squadron)
o The figure today is down to 34 squadrons, six squadrons short, that is 120 planes
o As old planes like the MIG-21s are phased out, by 2012 there will be barely 31.5 squadrons
o And by 2018 India will have 26.5 squadrons, about the same as Pakistanââ¬â¢s 26 squadrons.
"The government has sanctioned 40 squadrons. These are required for covering two fronts. India and China, and also maritime duties in the Indian Ocean," But unlike India where the government has done nothing to buy the 126 planes that the Air Force has urgently requested, Air Chief Marshall Tyagi says Pakistanââ¬â¢s Air Force is getting plenty of brand new hi-tech aircraft. Boosting the 26 fighter squadrons that Pakistan already has will be two more squadrons of state-of-the-art F-16s.
China is giving more J-10 fighters equipped with Russian engines to Pakistan. And Chinaââ¬â¢s co-developing with Pakistan the ultra-modern JF-17 Thunder. Pakistan is likely to buy 7-8 squadrons. That adds ten more squadrons to Pakistan Air Force. Supplementing these aircraft with new ones, says the Air Chief, is not a quick fix. The aircraft take time to come in.
A squadron of upgraded MIG-29s is already on order for the navy's aircraft carrier. They will only start arriving in 2008.
The Mirage 2000, a tried and tested IAF favourite, is no longer in production. It's only the Sukhoi-30 MKI that is available for supply and Russia only produces 35 a year including for its own needs.
Air Chief Marshall SP Tyagi paints a grim picture but it's not surprising.
For years, the Indian Air Force has been asking the government to put out a global tender for the urgent supply of 126 Multi-role Combat Aircraft. The IAF air chief makes three requests at the end of his letter:
ââ¬Â¢ Buy 40 additional Sukhoi 30 MKIs from Russia on a fast track;
ââ¬Â¢ Quickly put out a global tender for 126 fighters that's been delayed for years; and
ââ¬Â¢ Urge Russia to stop China from selling Pakistan J-10 and JF-17 fighters that have Russian engines.
Cabinet Secretary BK Chaturvedi called a high-level meeting of the security establishment for a detailed review of modernization and force levels in the three armed forces as against perceived build-ups in the Pakistani armed forces and Islamabadââ¬â¢s prospective modernization plan over the next decade. The meeting was attended by the intelligence chiefs, Army chief General Jogindar Jaswant Singh, Air Chief SP Tyagi, Navy Vice Chief Vice Admiral Venkat Bharathan (Naval Chief Admiral Arun Prakash was away in Kochi), Defence Secretary Shekhar Dutt and senior officials from the Indian Ministry of Defence. The meeting understood to have included presentations and classified intelligence briefings on Pakistanââ¬â¢s arms build-up over the last decade and near-term acquisitions for its three armed forces, reviewed the modernization process being undertaken for the Indian armed forces. Apart from the purchase of F-16 fighters and a constituent upgrade package by Islamabad from Washington, its smaller purchases have struck as equally significant.
General JJ Singh informed that the Indian armyââ¬â¢s combat ratio has fallen to 1.22:1 against Pakistan from 1.75:1 in 1971 and 1.56:1 in 1991. Then, slippages in developing an indigenous main battle tank (MBT) Arjun had forced the army to import the Russian T-90s in the 1990s as a stopgap arrangement but these too are now nearing the end of their service life. The army is also woefully short of heavy artillery as the government has been able to take a decision on replacing some 200 of the 400-plus Bofors 155 mm howitzers that were purchased in the mid-1980s. The gun was at the centre of a bribery row that cost then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is job. Even though the Bofors Company is now under a different management and the gun it has offered has repeatedly cleared field trials, the Indian government is reportedly pressing its army to opt for a replacement from another manufacturer. It is only the Indian Navy that has a distinct advantage over its Pakistani counterpart but here too, it is concerned over its ageing submarine fleet. A contract was signed two years ago to acquire six Scorpene submarines from France but these are expected to be inducted around 2012-17, by which time the bulk of its existing fleet would have been phased out.
In view of the past scandals in defence purchase, Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee has shot down the proposed shortcuts to speed up the process for the purchase of the fighter aircraft.
Coming out officially for the first time against DRDOââ¬â¢s Akash air defence missile programme, Air Chief Marshal Tyagi blamed its persistent delays for upsetting his plans for national air defence. He announced that, as a consequence, India is forced to conclude a Rs 1,800-crore deal with Israel for buying 18 Spyder quick reaction air defence missile systems. Around 50 Hawks and three AWACS, built by Israel on Russian platforms, would be delivered next year. In addition, India is also planning to purchase six new flight-refueling aircraft and is also awaiting delivery of 80 medium-size helicopters from next year. IAF was also looking at buying 20 Jaguars. He also notified that to maintain effective airpower strength as an interim measure in the wake of delays in finalizing the contract for buying 126 multi-role Combat Aircraft, negotiations had been revived with Qatar for purchase of 12 used Mirage fighters.
The IAF is in a hopeless situation thanks to the combined mess of the LCA (Tejas) badly driven by ADA/DRDO and HAL and stone walling by the Government. The token order by IAF for 20 LCA has kept the project barely alive. The LCA project has consumed Rs 6,000 crore, 22 years and with no further hiccups will deliver the first operational squadron only by 2012. No one believes this will be possible unless the first two squadrons use imported fire control radars and engines. Not surprisingly, that decision has not been made so far.
Ashok Mehta, in his article titled: ââ¬ËAir Force in a tailspinââ¬â¢ carried by the Pioneer of October 5, 2006, writes: ââ¬ÅIt is not known if the (ACM Tyagiââ¬â¢s) letter has referred to the exceptionally mismanaged LCA project and lack of Government directive. While the ADA has arrogated to itself the triple role of funding, managing and monitoring LCA, it is time the burden of labour is rationalized. ADA could draw a lesson from Pakistan's own LCA JF 17 which was commissioned much after Tejas but will become operational next year. Clearly, Tyagi is now urging the Government for some fire brigade action to maintain both numbers and quality of aircraft.ââ¬Â
Meanwhile, the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has been in a tail spin of its own. One wonders what it is taking more seriously: The Chief of Air Staff's letter written to the Defence Minister and leaked to the media; or, its contents that the IAF is losing its cutting edge which has been public for some time now. An investigation has been ordered to enquire into the leak.
The Indian air chiefââ¬â¢s gloom is understandable. Indian Air Force has traditionally enjoyed a 3:1 to 2.5:1 numerical superiority over Pakistan Air Force with nearly 7:1 superiority in the hi-tech weapons systems. For the first time this edge is likely to be neutralized and with obsolescence setting in fast and air weapon systems not being available off the shelf, Indian Air Force is likely to concede this ascendancy to PAF. Indian economy may have grown at an impressive 8.9 per cent in the first quarter of 2006-07, but its national security which is only quantifiable in terms of operational capabilities is in serious decline. The most seriously impaired of its three services is the most potent - air power. The IAF has obviously failed to effectively project its declining regional deterrence because Governments and Ministers in charge of defence and national security do not take their service chiefs seriously till a crisis has erupted. In 1996, a frustrated Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) Admiral Shekhawat, unable to draw the attention of the Indian Government to the dangerous decline in the fleet strength of the Navy was forced to go public that order books in shipyards had gone dry and that the operational decline of the Navy would adversely affect maritime security. Both the Indian Prime Minister and Defence Minister of the day reacted instantly but building security capacities is not an ad hoc business.
The IAF's story is no different from the Navy's. It had to virtually abandon its long-term re-equipment plan as the Five-Year Defence Plans of the combined services, though good on paper, never took off. It is not a well-kept secret that the IAF has slumped from an operational strength of 39.5 squadrons in 1999 to just 27 in 2007 and Pakistan close the gap with a 24-squadron strength. For long the IAF has enjoyed a decisive 2.5:1 advantage in air power over PAF specifically in numbers and quality of aircraft. It is now willfully surrendering that advantage to Pakistan.
This is a very serious challenge for Indian national security. In 1999, Air Chief Marshal Anil Tipnis is known to have first informed his Government about the problem of declining numbers of operational squadrons. Now it is the turn of outgoing Air Chief Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi to remind his Government that the decline in the operational capability of IAF is assuming criticality. Soon after he wrote the letter to the Defence Minister, he told the media, "The 126 new fighters will take 15 years. We cannot afford to wait that long. Numbers are falling. Our only option is to get something in a hurry." He warned the Government that the Air Force will nosedive to below the red line of minimum number of combat squadrons.
Another festering sore with the Indian Air Force is the uncertainty over who the next air chief will be, with a whispering campaign under way to deny the job to the officer currently next in line on grounds that he is not a fighter pilot.
Air Chief Marshal S.P. Tyagi retires March 31, 2007. The next in line is Air Marshal F.H. Major, a highly decorated helicopter pilot who now heads the Shillong-based Eastern Air Command.
In keeping with past practice, Major heads the list of four senior-most officers whose names have been forwarded to the cabinet committee on appointments that will take a final decision on the issue. In the past, this decision has invariably been a formality, with the senior-most officer getting the nod.
This has been the practice in the case of the other two wings of the armed forces too, the only exception being made in the case of the army in 1973.
However, this time around, much is sought to make of the fact that with Major not being a fighter pilot, he would be at a disadvantage if he were to be put in command of the technological-intensive force and that one of the other three officersââ¬âAir Marshals P.K. Mehra, B.N. Gokhale and P.S. Ahluwaliaââ¬âon the list be considered for the top job.
However, an off-the-cuff remark by a defence ministry official that seniority is not the only factor for promotion indicated the issue was wide open. Itââ¬â¢s quite another matter that ignoring the principle of seniority would be unprecedented in the 75-year annals of IAF.
It is also being pointed out that Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, who commanded IAF during the 1971 Indo Pak War, started his IAF career as a Navigator and later converted to become a pilot. He trained at Risalpur and later returned there as a Navigation instructor. From 01 September 1978 to 31 August 1981, it was a transport pilot - Air Chief Marshal Idris Hassan Latif - who headed the IAF and that too with considerable panache that is remembered even now. To which the riposte is that Latif converted to transports after flying Spitfires during World War II.
ââ¬ËIf flying Spitfires made Latif a fighter pilot, then Major also qualifies as he has flown the Mi-35 (helicopter gunship),ââ¬â¢ an IAF officer pointed out.
ââ¬ËIn fact, piloting a gunship requires a greater degree of skill and courage since it is a much slower machine than a fighter and has to be flown at low heights to enable it perform its role effectively - which makes it more susceptible to enemy fire,ââ¬â¢ the officer pointed out.
A critical factor in Majorââ¬â¢s favour is that he is a recipient of the Shaurya Chakra, Indiaââ¬â¢s second highest gallantry award during peacetime.
Meanwhile Air Chief Marshal (retired) Anil Yashwant Tipnis, who commanded IAF during the Kargil War, also mourns his blues. Breaking his silence for the first time, about what went on at the top echelons of the armed forces during the Kargil war in the summer of ââ¬Ë99. Coming after the memoirs of then army chief, General V.P. Malik, and then foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, Tipnisââ¬â¢s observations may lead to recriminations. In an interview to the magazine FORCE, Tipnis has made some damning comments on the Indian army's handling of the conflict. He has claimed: an embarrassed army played down intrusion, sought wrong firepower and Army Chief General Malik got touchy and lost his cool; there was utter lack of co-ordination between the Army and the Air Force. The Army did not tell the Ministry of Defence about the Pakistani intrusions until very late, "Possibly because it was embarrassed to have allowed the present situation to develop".
Tipnis held, "I observed the ground situation was grave. The army needed IAF help to evict the intruders. But it was not amenable to the air headquarters' position to seek government approval for use of air power offensively as the army was reluctant to reveal the gravity of the situation to the MoD."
He has also criticized the army for not communicating intelligence to air headquarters. "There had been no call for a joint briefing, leave alone joint planning. The army just made repeated requests for helicopter fire support," said Tipnis, who had been against deploying helicopters, believing they would be too vulnerable.
He said the then army chief General V.P. Malik "appeared to get agitated on my reluctance to use helicopters". In fact, if Tipnis is to be believed, a livid Malik stormed out of a meeting of the three service chiefs on May 24 saying, "If that is the way you want it, I will go it alone."
Tipnis had explained to Malik that helicopters would not be able to mask their approach while heading for enemy locations on the LoC ridge line and would be picked up by the enemy. Tipnis recalled Malik's response: "Do you think in my 40 years of service, I have learnt nothing about helicopter operations?" Tipnis claimed too that in the second week of May 1999 the air force had had repeatedly offered to help the army, "but they said they could handle the situation".
He also mocked the army's decision to use "egg-shell-strong" Cheetah choppers in offensive action against hostile fire, saying it was like presenting a chicken for an animal sacrifice ritual.
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, in his article: ââ¬ËKargil rewind: air chief vs. army chiefââ¬â¢ published in The Indian Express of October 10, 2006, comments on the disclosure: ââ¬Åthere apparently was a mindset problem: the thinking in the army that all it needed from the IAF was attack/armed helicopters (or ââ¬Ëflying artilleryââ¬â¢), a demand the army had been fighting to acquire integrally over three decades of peace. The air chief is categorical that he told the army that he would support its demand for aerial fire-support; and he would go along with the officiating army chief to the defence minister to say this. But he insisted that political authorization was a prerequisite. Unfortunately, long-held misperceptions led to public expression from many quarters that the IAF had ââ¬Ërefusedââ¬â¢ to support the army, which had resulted in avoidable casualties!
But the war also demonstrated that this fixation had not led to a serious study of air power (the Indian Army maintains the second largest air force in the country) and its attributes, looking at helicopters more as flying artillery than a component of air power.ââ¬Â
Lamenting Indiaââ¬â¢s thrashing at the hands of China in 1962; Air Vice-Marshall A K Tewary has made a rather tall claim in an article in the Indian Defence Review. Asserting that India could have defeated China in the 1962 war had the combat power of its air force been used, the erudite air marshal asserts that the then political- bureaucratic combine had sought the US Air Force's help but had not even consulted the Indian Air Force chief on the issue.
"In the final analysis, the use of combat air power would have turned the tables on the Chinese and the 1962 war could well have been a debacle for China."
Quoting top military and bureaucratic leaders of that time, he said the "costly and catastrophic omission" of not using the combat air arm of the IAF was a result of several factors that "impinged on the decision-making process at the highest level," including the "influence" on then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of Prof P M S Blackett, the then advisor for defence who was a Britisher, as well as the counsel of then US Ambassador John K Galbraith, who "overestimated the capability of the Chinese Air Force in the absence of proper air defence infrastructure in India.".
Another factor was the analysis of then Director of Intelligence Bureau (DIB) B N Mullick, a close confidant of Nehru that Chinese bombers would bomb Indian cities in response to the use of Indian Air Force combat jets, Tewary said.
He pointed out that "since the IB did not have the firsthand knowledge (on Chinese air force capabilities), they sought help from `our good friends' (the CIA)" which exaggerated the threat perception.
Tewary quoted top defence analyst George Tanham and said that while the political-bureaucratic combine "pleaded to US President John F Kennedy for 12 squadrons of Star fighters (F-104) and four squadrons of B-47 bombers as an immediate USAF help to stem the Chinese advance, they did not deem it fit to even consult the Indian Air Force chief."
The IAF officer said the then army commander responsible for NEFA, Lt Gen B M Kaul, had conceded in his book that "we made a great mistake in not employing our air force in a close support role during these operations."
Tewary also quoted the late National Security Advisor J N Dixit, who was then undersecretary in the China division of India's External Affairs Ministry, as saying that by the time Nehru was coming round to the suggestion of using air power, the Chinese had declared a unilateral ceasefire.
Dixit, the IAF officer said, had pointed out that the Chinese logistical arrangements and supply lines were too stretched and that it did not have sufficient air power in Tibet at that point of time.
"India's air strikes would stop the Chinese advance and neutralize the military successes which they had achieved," Dixit had said, adding that this suggestion was rejected on the grounds that it had come from officers who were not military experts.
Making a comparison between the then Chinese and Indian Air Forces and the number and types of their aircraft fleet, Tewary said the IAF, which was used only to dropping supplies, could have been "employed for interdiction, battlefield air interdiction, attack on areas captured by the Chinese, attack as a retribution on deeper targets." He also made a detailed point-by-point rebuttal of the advice and analysis of the IB at that time regarding the threat perceptions which led the government not to deploy air power.
The issues included location of Chinese airfields at the time, availability of night interceptors like the IAF's Vampire fighter squadron, the quantum of Chinese air effort and the theory of escalation of the war.
He concluded that the IAF could then carry more bomb loads than the Chinese, could attack major cities like Lhasa, Chengdu and Kunming as well as Chinese airfields and that the IAF had more modern and capable aircraft to carry out all these tasks successfully.
These public disclosures by senior most IAF personnel only expose the frustration and exasperation that has set in. PAF can take solace from the fact that it appears to be gaining but there are hard lessons to be learnt from IAFââ¬â¢s predicament.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Group Captain S M Hali has served in Pakistan Air Force for thirty years and has flown over 4500 hours and worked on various command and staff appointments, which include the command of a squadron, duties as Air and Naval Attaché and Director Public Relations for PAF.
He is a Graduate of PAF Staff College, Joint Services Staff College, has Honors degree in Business Administration and Masters in Mass Communication and is currently pursuing an M Phil degree leading to PhD in Mass Communication. He is a member of the prestigious International Public Relations Association (IPRA) of UK.
He was a member of the pioneering team that established Indus Vision TV Channel and has set up numerous FM Radio Channels and produced over three thousand hours of programming content. He provides services as a Visiting Faculty for Mass Communication in a number of Universities. He has produced numerous drama serials and documentaries for TV and Radio and hosted a number of Talk shows. He has authored over five hundred articles for various national and international dailies and magazines. He writes a regular weekly column in daily Nawa-i-Waqt and The Nation and contributes to Defence Journal as a defence and political analyst.
He is currently working as Managing Editor of a news agency, Independent News-Pakistan (INP), which is a multi-dimensional establishment in Pakistan providing news service in English, Urdu, Sindhi and Arabic languages as well as quality news pictures and video clips to hundreds of subscribers in Pakistan and abroad.
For his meritorious services, the Government of Pakistan has conferred on him Sitara-e-Imtiaz (Military).
Columnist S.M. HALI studies Indian Air Forceââ¬â¢s frustration on losing out to PAF.
The Indian Air Force (IAF) has lately taken to airing its woes in public. Two air chiefs and some senior air force officers have expressed their opinion on a number of sensitive issues. Their views are worth examining. Keeping with protocol, let us begin with the current air chief. Air Chief Marshal Shashindra Pal Tyagi, Chief of Air Staff of Indian Air Force has chosen to air his despondency openly and fall back on a chief's last resort after years of asking the Indian Ministry of Defence in every forum, through every channel, for new fighter planes like the Sukhoi-30 MKI to strengthen the Indian Air Force. Exasperated after the confirmation of the US-Pakistan F-16 deal, he sent a three-page letter of warning to Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee, raising serious concerns over the declining combat force level of the IAF. Pointing towards the impending crisis that has been brewing in the Indian Air Force and is about to blow up in the face of the government, the dejected Air Chief writes: ââ¬ÅPAF is being beefed up with 44 F16s from America. They have a clearly defined goal of attaining parity with the IAF. With China supplying J-10 and JF-17 aircraft (fitted with Russian engines), PAF force levels of combat squadron will increase. Unless steps are taken to move ahead with procurement, the IAF's combat strength will deplete to a level, which would entirely neutralize the conventional superiority held by IAF since our Independence. PAF will have 19 to 26 squadrons by 2011-12, while the IAF could reduce to 26.5 by 2015."
In a secret letter addressed directly by him to Indiaââ¬â¢s Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee, the Air Chief has spoken as bluntly as he can. If the MoD delays any more, says the chief, India's Air Force will no longer be superior to Pakistanââ¬â¢s. The letter is detailed and the figures are chilling for their viewpoint:
o Even the government admits that India needs 40 squadrons of fighters (there are 20 aircraft in each squadron)
o The figure today is down to 34 squadrons, six squadrons short, that is 120 planes
o As old planes like the MIG-21s are phased out, by 2012 there will be barely 31.5 squadrons
o And by 2018 India will have 26.5 squadrons, about the same as Pakistanââ¬â¢s 26 squadrons.
"The government has sanctioned 40 squadrons. These are required for covering two fronts. India and China, and also maritime duties in the Indian Ocean," But unlike India where the government has done nothing to buy the 126 planes that the Air Force has urgently requested, Air Chief Marshall Tyagi says Pakistanââ¬â¢s Air Force is getting plenty of brand new hi-tech aircraft. Boosting the 26 fighter squadrons that Pakistan already has will be two more squadrons of state-of-the-art F-16s.
China is giving more J-10 fighters equipped with Russian engines to Pakistan. And Chinaââ¬â¢s co-developing with Pakistan the ultra-modern JF-17 Thunder. Pakistan is likely to buy 7-8 squadrons. That adds ten more squadrons to Pakistan Air Force. Supplementing these aircraft with new ones, says the Air Chief, is not a quick fix. The aircraft take time to come in.
A squadron of upgraded MIG-29s is already on order for the navy's aircraft carrier. They will only start arriving in 2008.
The Mirage 2000, a tried and tested IAF favourite, is no longer in production. It's only the Sukhoi-30 MKI that is available for supply and Russia only produces 35 a year including for its own needs.
Air Chief Marshall SP Tyagi paints a grim picture but it's not surprising.
For years, the Indian Air Force has been asking the government to put out a global tender for the urgent supply of 126 Multi-role Combat Aircraft. The IAF air chief makes three requests at the end of his letter:
ââ¬Â¢ Buy 40 additional Sukhoi 30 MKIs from Russia on a fast track;
ââ¬Â¢ Quickly put out a global tender for 126 fighters that's been delayed for years; and
ââ¬Â¢ Urge Russia to stop China from selling Pakistan J-10 and JF-17 fighters that have Russian engines.
Cabinet Secretary BK Chaturvedi called a high-level meeting of the security establishment for a detailed review of modernization and force levels in the three armed forces as against perceived build-ups in the Pakistani armed forces and Islamabadââ¬â¢s prospective modernization plan over the next decade. The meeting was attended by the intelligence chiefs, Army chief General Jogindar Jaswant Singh, Air Chief SP Tyagi, Navy Vice Chief Vice Admiral Venkat Bharathan (Naval Chief Admiral Arun Prakash was away in Kochi), Defence Secretary Shekhar Dutt and senior officials from the Indian Ministry of Defence. The meeting understood to have included presentations and classified intelligence briefings on Pakistanââ¬â¢s arms build-up over the last decade and near-term acquisitions for its three armed forces, reviewed the modernization process being undertaken for the Indian armed forces. Apart from the purchase of F-16 fighters and a constituent upgrade package by Islamabad from Washington, its smaller purchases have struck as equally significant.
General JJ Singh informed that the Indian armyââ¬â¢s combat ratio has fallen to 1.22:1 against Pakistan from 1.75:1 in 1971 and 1.56:1 in 1991. Then, slippages in developing an indigenous main battle tank (MBT) Arjun had forced the army to import the Russian T-90s in the 1990s as a stopgap arrangement but these too are now nearing the end of their service life. The army is also woefully short of heavy artillery as the government has been able to take a decision on replacing some 200 of the 400-plus Bofors 155 mm howitzers that were purchased in the mid-1980s. The gun was at the centre of a bribery row that cost then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is job. Even though the Bofors Company is now under a different management and the gun it has offered has repeatedly cleared field trials, the Indian government is reportedly pressing its army to opt for a replacement from another manufacturer. It is only the Indian Navy that has a distinct advantage over its Pakistani counterpart but here too, it is concerned over its ageing submarine fleet. A contract was signed two years ago to acquire six Scorpene submarines from France but these are expected to be inducted around 2012-17, by which time the bulk of its existing fleet would have been phased out.
In view of the past scandals in defence purchase, Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee has shot down the proposed shortcuts to speed up the process for the purchase of the fighter aircraft.
Coming out officially for the first time against DRDOââ¬â¢s Akash air defence missile programme, Air Chief Marshal Tyagi blamed its persistent delays for upsetting his plans for national air defence. He announced that, as a consequence, India is forced to conclude a Rs 1,800-crore deal with Israel for buying 18 Spyder quick reaction air defence missile systems. Around 50 Hawks and three AWACS, built by Israel on Russian platforms, would be delivered next year. In addition, India is also planning to purchase six new flight-refueling aircraft and is also awaiting delivery of 80 medium-size helicopters from next year. IAF was also looking at buying 20 Jaguars. He also notified that to maintain effective airpower strength as an interim measure in the wake of delays in finalizing the contract for buying 126 multi-role Combat Aircraft, negotiations had been revived with Qatar for purchase of 12 used Mirage fighters.
The IAF is in a hopeless situation thanks to the combined mess of the LCA (Tejas) badly driven by ADA/DRDO and HAL and stone walling by the Government. The token order by IAF for 20 LCA has kept the project barely alive. The LCA project has consumed Rs 6,000 crore, 22 years and with no further hiccups will deliver the first operational squadron only by 2012. No one believes this will be possible unless the first two squadrons use imported fire control radars and engines. Not surprisingly, that decision has not been made so far.
Ashok Mehta, in his article titled: ââ¬ËAir Force in a tailspinââ¬â¢ carried by the Pioneer of October 5, 2006, writes: ââ¬ÅIt is not known if the (ACM Tyagiââ¬â¢s) letter has referred to the exceptionally mismanaged LCA project and lack of Government directive. While the ADA has arrogated to itself the triple role of funding, managing and monitoring LCA, it is time the burden of labour is rationalized. ADA could draw a lesson from Pakistan's own LCA JF 17 which was commissioned much after Tejas but will become operational next year. Clearly, Tyagi is now urging the Government for some fire brigade action to maintain both numbers and quality of aircraft.ââ¬Â
Meanwhile, the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has been in a tail spin of its own. One wonders what it is taking more seriously: The Chief of Air Staff's letter written to the Defence Minister and leaked to the media; or, its contents that the IAF is losing its cutting edge which has been public for some time now. An investigation has been ordered to enquire into the leak.
The Indian air chiefââ¬â¢s gloom is understandable. Indian Air Force has traditionally enjoyed a 3:1 to 2.5:1 numerical superiority over Pakistan Air Force with nearly 7:1 superiority in the hi-tech weapons systems. For the first time this edge is likely to be neutralized and with obsolescence setting in fast and air weapon systems not being available off the shelf, Indian Air Force is likely to concede this ascendancy to PAF. Indian economy may have grown at an impressive 8.9 per cent in the first quarter of 2006-07, but its national security which is only quantifiable in terms of operational capabilities is in serious decline. The most seriously impaired of its three services is the most potent - air power. The IAF has obviously failed to effectively project its declining regional deterrence because Governments and Ministers in charge of defence and national security do not take their service chiefs seriously till a crisis has erupted. In 1996, a frustrated Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) Admiral Shekhawat, unable to draw the attention of the Indian Government to the dangerous decline in the fleet strength of the Navy was forced to go public that order books in shipyards had gone dry and that the operational decline of the Navy would adversely affect maritime security. Both the Indian Prime Minister and Defence Minister of the day reacted instantly but building security capacities is not an ad hoc business.
The IAF's story is no different from the Navy's. It had to virtually abandon its long-term re-equipment plan as the Five-Year Defence Plans of the combined services, though good on paper, never took off. It is not a well-kept secret that the IAF has slumped from an operational strength of 39.5 squadrons in 1999 to just 27 in 2007 and Pakistan close the gap with a 24-squadron strength. For long the IAF has enjoyed a decisive 2.5:1 advantage in air power over PAF specifically in numbers and quality of aircraft. It is now willfully surrendering that advantage to Pakistan.
This is a very serious challenge for Indian national security. In 1999, Air Chief Marshal Anil Tipnis is known to have first informed his Government about the problem of declining numbers of operational squadrons. Now it is the turn of outgoing Air Chief Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi to remind his Government that the decline in the operational capability of IAF is assuming criticality. Soon after he wrote the letter to the Defence Minister, he told the media, "The 126 new fighters will take 15 years. We cannot afford to wait that long. Numbers are falling. Our only option is to get something in a hurry." He warned the Government that the Air Force will nosedive to below the red line of minimum number of combat squadrons.
Another festering sore with the Indian Air Force is the uncertainty over who the next air chief will be, with a whispering campaign under way to deny the job to the officer currently next in line on grounds that he is not a fighter pilot.
Air Chief Marshal S.P. Tyagi retires March 31, 2007. The next in line is Air Marshal F.H. Major, a highly decorated helicopter pilot who now heads the Shillong-based Eastern Air Command.
In keeping with past practice, Major heads the list of four senior-most officers whose names have been forwarded to the cabinet committee on appointments that will take a final decision on the issue. In the past, this decision has invariably been a formality, with the senior-most officer getting the nod.
This has been the practice in the case of the other two wings of the armed forces too, the only exception being made in the case of the army in 1973.
However, this time around, much is sought to make of the fact that with Major not being a fighter pilot, he would be at a disadvantage if he were to be put in command of the technological-intensive force and that one of the other three officersââ¬âAir Marshals P.K. Mehra, B.N. Gokhale and P.S. Ahluwaliaââ¬âon the list be considered for the top job.
However, an off-the-cuff remark by a defence ministry official that seniority is not the only factor for promotion indicated the issue was wide open. Itââ¬â¢s quite another matter that ignoring the principle of seniority would be unprecedented in the 75-year annals of IAF.
It is also being pointed out that Air Chief Marshal PC Lal, who commanded IAF during the 1971 Indo Pak War, started his IAF career as a Navigator and later converted to become a pilot. He trained at Risalpur and later returned there as a Navigation instructor. From 01 September 1978 to 31 August 1981, it was a transport pilot - Air Chief Marshal Idris Hassan Latif - who headed the IAF and that too with considerable panache that is remembered even now. To which the riposte is that Latif converted to transports after flying Spitfires during World War II.
ââ¬ËIf flying Spitfires made Latif a fighter pilot, then Major also qualifies as he has flown the Mi-35 (helicopter gunship),ââ¬â¢ an IAF officer pointed out.
ââ¬ËIn fact, piloting a gunship requires a greater degree of skill and courage since it is a much slower machine than a fighter and has to be flown at low heights to enable it perform its role effectively - which makes it more susceptible to enemy fire,ââ¬â¢ the officer pointed out.
A critical factor in Majorââ¬â¢s favour is that he is a recipient of the Shaurya Chakra, Indiaââ¬â¢s second highest gallantry award during peacetime.
Meanwhile Air Chief Marshal (retired) Anil Yashwant Tipnis, who commanded IAF during the Kargil War, also mourns his blues. Breaking his silence for the first time, about what went on at the top echelons of the armed forces during the Kargil war in the summer of ââ¬Ë99. Coming after the memoirs of then army chief, General V.P. Malik, and then foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, Tipnisââ¬â¢s observations may lead to recriminations. In an interview to the magazine FORCE, Tipnis has made some damning comments on the Indian army's handling of the conflict. He has claimed: an embarrassed army played down intrusion, sought wrong firepower and Army Chief General Malik got touchy and lost his cool; there was utter lack of co-ordination between the Army and the Air Force. The Army did not tell the Ministry of Defence about the Pakistani intrusions until very late, "Possibly because it was embarrassed to have allowed the present situation to develop".
Tipnis held, "I observed the ground situation was grave. The army needed IAF help to evict the intruders. But it was not amenable to the air headquarters' position to seek government approval for use of air power offensively as the army was reluctant to reveal the gravity of the situation to the MoD."
He has also criticized the army for not communicating intelligence to air headquarters. "There had been no call for a joint briefing, leave alone joint planning. The army just made repeated requests for helicopter fire support," said Tipnis, who had been against deploying helicopters, believing they would be too vulnerable.
He said the then army chief General V.P. Malik "appeared to get agitated on my reluctance to use helicopters". In fact, if Tipnis is to be believed, a livid Malik stormed out of a meeting of the three service chiefs on May 24 saying, "If that is the way you want it, I will go it alone."
Tipnis had explained to Malik that helicopters would not be able to mask their approach while heading for enemy locations on the LoC ridge line and would be picked up by the enemy. Tipnis recalled Malik's response: "Do you think in my 40 years of service, I have learnt nothing about helicopter operations?" Tipnis claimed too that in the second week of May 1999 the air force had had repeatedly offered to help the army, "but they said they could handle the situation".
He also mocked the army's decision to use "egg-shell-strong" Cheetah choppers in offensive action against hostile fire, saying it was like presenting a chicken for an animal sacrifice ritual.
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, in his article: ââ¬ËKargil rewind: air chief vs. army chiefââ¬â¢ published in The Indian Express of October 10, 2006, comments on the disclosure: ââ¬Åthere apparently was a mindset problem: the thinking in the army that all it needed from the IAF was attack/armed helicopters (or ââ¬Ëflying artilleryââ¬â¢), a demand the army had been fighting to acquire integrally over three decades of peace. The air chief is categorical that he told the army that he would support its demand for aerial fire-support; and he would go along with the officiating army chief to the defence minister to say this. But he insisted that political authorization was a prerequisite. Unfortunately, long-held misperceptions led to public expression from many quarters that the IAF had ââ¬Ërefusedââ¬â¢ to support the army, which had resulted in avoidable casualties!
But the war also demonstrated that this fixation had not led to a serious study of air power (the Indian Army maintains the second largest air force in the country) and its attributes, looking at helicopters more as flying artillery than a component of air power.ââ¬Â
Lamenting Indiaââ¬â¢s thrashing at the hands of China in 1962; Air Vice-Marshall A K Tewary has made a rather tall claim in an article in the Indian Defence Review. Asserting that India could have defeated China in the 1962 war had the combat power of its air force been used, the erudite air marshal asserts that the then political- bureaucratic combine had sought the US Air Force's help but had not even consulted the Indian Air Force chief on the issue.
"In the final analysis, the use of combat air power would have turned the tables on the Chinese and the 1962 war could well have been a debacle for China."
Quoting top military and bureaucratic leaders of that time, he said the "costly and catastrophic omission" of not using the combat air arm of the IAF was a result of several factors that "impinged on the decision-making process at the highest level," including the "influence" on then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of Prof P M S Blackett, the then advisor for defence who was a Britisher, as well as the counsel of then US Ambassador John K Galbraith, who "overestimated the capability of the Chinese Air Force in the absence of proper air defence infrastructure in India.".
Another factor was the analysis of then Director of Intelligence Bureau (DIB) B N Mullick, a close confidant of Nehru that Chinese bombers would bomb Indian cities in response to the use of Indian Air Force combat jets, Tewary said.
He pointed out that "since the IB did not have the firsthand knowledge (on Chinese air force capabilities), they sought help from `our good friends' (the CIA)" which exaggerated the threat perception.
Tewary quoted top defence analyst George Tanham and said that while the political-bureaucratic combine "pleaded to US President John F Kennedy for 12 squadrons of Star fighters (F-104) and four squadrons of B-47 bombers as an immediate USAF help to stem the Chinese advance, they did not deem it fit to even consult the Indian Air Force chief."
The IAF officer said the then army commander responsible for NEFA, Lt Gen B M Kaul, had conceded in his book that "we made a great mistake in not employing our air force in a close support role during these operations."
Tewary also quoted the late National Security Advisor J N Dixit, who was then undersecretary in the China division of India's External Affairs Ministry, as saying that by the time Nehru was coming round to the suggestion of using air power, the Chinese had declared a unilateral ceasefire.
Dixit, the IAF officer said, had pointed out that the Chinese logistical arrangements and supply lines were too stretched and that it did not have sufficient air power in Tibet at that point of time.
"India's air strikes would stop the Chinese advance and neutralize the military successes which they had achieved," Dixit had said, adding that this suggestion was rejected on the grounds that it had come from officers who were not military experts.
Making a comparison between the then Chinese and Indian Air Forces and the number and types of their aircraft fleet, Tewary said the IAF, which was used only to dropping supplies, could have been "employed for interdiction, battlefield air interdiction, attack on areas captured by the Chinese, attack as a retribution on deeper targets." He also made a detailed point-by-point rebuttal of the advice and analysis of the IB at that time regarding the threat perceptions which led the government not to deploy air power.
The issues included location of Chinese airfields at the time, availability of night interceptors like the IAF's Vampire fighter squadron, the quantum of Chinese air effort and the theory of escalation of the war.
He concluded that the IAF could then carry more bomb loads than the Chinese, could attack major cities like Lhasa, Chengdu and Kunming as well as Chinese airfields and that the IAF had more modern and capable aircraft to carry out all these tasks successfully.
These public disclosures by senior most IAF personnel only expose the frustration and exasperation that has set in. PAF can take solace from the fact that it appears to be gaining but there are hard lessons to be learnt from IAFââ¬â¢s predicament.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Group Captain S M Hali has served in Pakistan Air Force for thirty years and has flown over 4500 hours and worked on various command and staff appointments, which include the command of a squadron, duties as Air and Naval Attaché and Director Public Relations for PAF.
He is a Graduate of PAF Staff College, Joint Services Staff College, has Honors degree in Business Administration and Masters in Mass Communication and is currently pursuing an M Phil degree leading to PhD in Mass Communication. He is a member of the prestigious International Public Relations Association (IPRA) of UK.
He was a member of the pioneering team that established Indus Vision TV Channel and has set up numerous FM Radio Channels and produced over three thousand hours of programming content. He provides services as a Visiting Faculty for Mass Communication in a number of Universities. He has produced numerous drama serials and documentaries for TV and Radio and hosted a number of Talk shows. He has authored over five hundred articles for various national and international dailies and magazines. He writes a regular weekly column in daily Nawa-i-Waqt and The Nation and contributes to Defence Journal as a defence and political analyst.
He is currently working as Managing Editor of a news agency, Independent News-Pakistan (INP), which is a multi-dimensional establishment in Pakistan providing news service in English, Urdu, Sindhi and Arabic languages as well as quality news pictures and video clips to hundreds of subscribers in Pakistan and abroad.
For his meritorious services, the Government of Pakistan has conferred on him Sitara-e-Imtiaz (Military).
