Indian Air Force of the future

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Indian Air Force of the future
0.511.522.533.544.55.By Air Marshal BK Pandey
Issue: Vol 24.1 Jan-Mar 2009 | Date: 23 October, 2010
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Planning for the future has always been a daunting task, especially when it concerns the military of a nation. As the military is a vital component and in fact the ultimate instrument of national security, improper assessment or gross miscalculation of its pattern of development can have catastrophic ramifications. The task of forward planning is rendered particularly difficult in a scenario where long term plans need to be evolved in a coordinated fashion amongst the three wings of the Armed Forces – the Army, Navy and the Air Force. Also, for any long term planning to be meaningful, two inputs are prerequisites for military planners – a clear long term strategic vision for the nation, and assured availability of resources commensurate with national security imperatives, in that order.

In the Indian context, the lofty and fiery rhetoric on both these aspects emanating from the highest levels of governance have rarely crystallized into reality. Over the last six decades since Independence, in the Indian Air Force (IAF) there has been piecemeal acquisition of hardware as cleared by the civilian bureaucracy to be sanctioned by the political leadership on the basis of stand alone case-by-case justification and not in conformity with any long term national plan. Possibly there has been none. The process of acquisition of new equipment has generally followed a pattern of one to one replacement with equipment procured from a source that is either the cheapest, politically expedient or both. Acquisition of hardware has often been contingent not on the availability of resources but on allocation of funds.

Obsolescence In The IAF
For decades the IAF had largely been tethered to one non-western source. Much of the inventory acquired through this route has now been overtaken by obsolescence. As a result, in recent years, there has been an alarming erosion in combat power and other capabilities. Even after prolonged and reportedly vigorous effort, the indigenous Research & Development Organisations and the Aerospace Industry have not been able to provide a respectable degree of self reliance to the IAF. The near total dependence on foreign sources for cutting edge technology and frontline equipment is potentially perhaps the most debilitating factor that often threatens to seriously undermine the capability of the IAF.

Despite the limitations, the IAF has managed to attain and project an image of a potent force capable to preserving the sovereignty of the Indian skies and in more recent times, to project power albeit limited in quantum and reach. And even in the future there appears to be no option but to procure advanced technology and hardware from abroad. There is however an attempt to indigenize products through co-development, co-production and the difficult, but innovative, concept of “Offsets”. Though not the best, this route is the most expedient under the circumstances to accord military hardware a semblance of Indian character.

Life of a modern weapon system is in the region of thirty years which is normally extendable by another 10 to 15 years after a mid-life upgrade. New equipment procured for the IAF over the next decade will remain operational up to 2050 at the very least, possibly up to 2060. As the nature of warfare itself is undergoing transformation, it is necessary to make a comprehensive reassessment of the contours of the operational scenario that the IAF will have to contend with and reconfigure its inventory accordingly. To do this at this point in time, the IAF needs to take note of India’s regional power status in the emerging world order and assess its possible role and responsibility in the new geopolitical and geostrategic environment.

The Pakistan Factor
In view of the asymmetry, Pakistan is unlikely to take the initiative for large scale conventional military operations against India. While it will continue to retain the capability to put up stout defence against any assault, as indications are, it is more likely to engage in clandestine warfare against India in a variety of ways, some of which were amply demonstrated by way of attack on the Parliament in 2001 or the raid on Mumbai in November 2008. Such operations should no longer be seen as purely internal security problems.

Our land and sea borders are extensive and quite impossible to seal through measures on the ground – such as erection of physical barriers or through the deployment of paramilitary forces/civil police that are riddled with porosity on account of corruption. In the present scenario, it is relatively easy for the well trained enemy agents or commandos collectively described by India as “terrorists”, to penetrate unsecured borders and inflict disproportionately high levels of damage and human casualties. It should not come as a surprise if the various religious, political and social divides that afflict the nation actively facilitate such operations by the enemy.

Despite the perceived success in the recently held elections in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the end to the turmoil is not in sight. There is no doubt that Pakistan will continue its campaign in the state, in all likelihood, with renewed vigour and intensity to turn the tide against India. The techniques of warfare and tactics adopted by Pakistan in J&K will be similar to those employed by other regions in India and possibly with an enhanced level of support from the local populace.

The induction of nuclear weapons in South Asia has added a new dimension to the Indo-Pak military confrontation. Pakistan is believed to have unknown quantities of Chinese supplied nuclear weapons and has the capability to deliver these using surface-to-surface missiles with adequate range to cover most important cities and targets of strategic value. India too has nuclear weapons and has one advantage over Pakistan wherein the latter lacks strategic depth. In order to neutralize the Pakistani nuclear threat and raise their threshold substantially, India needs to enlarge her own nuclear arsenal and diversify her delivery capability with bias towards surface-to-surface missiles complemented by combat aircraft in the ratio 75:25.

The nuclear warfare capability needs to be developed to the extent necessary to obliterate most cities in Pakistan in a single strike and this capability must be clearly made known to them by direct or indirect means. With such a capability in being, there would be a high probability that Pakistan would be deterred from first use of nuclear weapons. Although the President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari has proclaimed a “no first use” policy, it would not be prudent to take this assurance at face value and neglect or delay the build up of own capability. We need to bear in mind the principle that nuclear weapons are not meant to win but to prevent wars.

Against the traditional enemy with whom India has fought three major conventional wars since Independence and who now is engaged in aggressive subversion in different parts of the country, it should be clear that in the future, the traditional military posture will progressively become less relevant as the clandestine warfare of the future will have no clearly defined fronts. This would necessitate redefined doctrines and restructured inventory. First and foremost, there has to be a profound qualitative change in the capability of surveillance and communication intelligence through extensive employment of aerial platforms.

Surveillance platforms parked at medium to high altitudes must be capable of providing resolution of a few centimeters with all-weather capability through cameras in the optical and infrared frequency range, Synthetic Aperture Radar or other new generation sensors to be introduced in the future. These advanced sensors need to be mounted on new generation Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) with continental range and high endurance capable of being controlled and operated thousands of miles away from parent base through satellite based data link.

The nuclear warfare capability needs to be developed to the extent necessary to obliterate most cities in Pakistan in a single strike and this capability must be clearly made known to them by direct or indirect means.
Such a system can provide round-the-clock cover of any part of land and sea frontiers as also inland areas of the nation. This will obviate the need to reposition the bulky control infrastructure in different parts of the country. The airborne platforms must also carry powerful and agile sensors to record, identify and pin-point the source of all radio transmissions on a wide range of frequency bands. Intelligence gathering through UAVs on continuous patrol would have to be supported by high speed, possibly automated intelligence data processing and analysis systems, which should include capability of integration with intelligence inputs from other agencies.

Threat thus analyzed must be available in the shortest possible time to security agencies required to respond. For swift response, an effective method is vertical envelopment through a heli-borne force with the helicopter fleet dedicated to this task, data linked with the UAV to get a real time view of the objective.

The ever increasing cost of fixed wing combat aircraft and their weapons, as also substantially enhanced lethality of enemy air defence weapon systems, would render employment of such aircraft both in the deep strike role and in the tactical battle areas, less and less cost effective in the future. It would be necessary therefore to place greater reliance on surface-to-surface missiles for deep strike against heavily defended targets in depth such as airfields. In the tactical battle area the fixed wing combat aircraft would have to be replaced by Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles (UCAV) and rotary wing platforms with stand-off weapons, both integrated with the ground forces. Fixed wing aircraft when employed would have to be effectively protected through versatile electronic warfare capability. Strategic Air Defence capability of the IAF would have to be augmented through the enlargement of the fleet of AWACS and AEW aircraft . These systems would effectively close the prevalent gaps in the low level surveillance capability of the IAF. Simultaneously, it would be necessary to induct new air defence missile systems for area and point defence and revamp electronic warfare capability across the board.

China, an Emerging Superpower
Riding the wave of stupendous economic growth, China has emerged as a major regional power and has clear aspirations to be a global power in the not too distant future. Despite prolonged dialogue, there has been no progress in the settlement of Sino-Indian border dispute and none is likely in the foreseeable future. China is a nuclear power and is currently embarked on a major upgrade of its somewhat outdated military machine. She has enlarged her sphere of influence in Asia and has effectively thrown a cordon around India through political, economic and military support to all the immediate neighbours. India’s growing proximity with and subservience to the US consequent to the Indo-US nuclear deal, has clearly pushed India on to the opposite side of the international political divide. With this development, the possibility of rapprochement with the emerging superpower has practically receded into oblivion. In the long term perspective, China is potentially a greater military threat to India than Pakistan is.

Thus it would be unwise for India to depend solely on diplomacy or support of the US to secure the nation against the awakening giant in the north. The limitations of diplomacy without the backing of military power have so clearly been exposed in the confrontation with Pakistan in the wake of 26/11. If India’s diplomatic demarche has not succeeded against Pakistan which is relatively a weak state, it would be naive to assume that it will be effective against China. The character and level of threat from China is qualitatively different and the nation’s armed forces must be geared to meet the long term threat beginning to loom over the horizon. Finally it would be the armed forces that would have to face the consequences of diplomatic failure and bear the brunt of a Chinese offensive in any form.

First and foremost, the IAF must have the capability to counter China’s nuclear capability through a missile based credible nuclear deterrence. Simultaneously, the Sino-Indian borders need to be kept under surveillance through satellites and unmanned platforms. The IAF must also acquire the capability to launch precision attack in mountainous areas from high altitude using advanced precision guided munitions. In addition, it must have the capability to neutralize targets with mobile units of surface-to-surface missiles with conventional warheads in coordination with target data obtained from UAVs.

Space
A completely new dimension in future wars would be the employment of space-based assets for reconnaissance, surveillance and communication. There has been some progress in this area but much more needs to be done. However, the new problem that is emerging is the security of the space-based assets. There appears to be no clear solution at this point in time except for multiple redundancy which may be expensive and impractical. In addition to space-based assets, the IAF needs to acquire the capability to neutralize space-based capability of the enemy through hard or soft kill techniques with weapon systems located on the ground or mounted on airborne platforms.

Power Projection Capability
A major responsibility of the IAF in the future would be in the area of strategic airlift. Internal security compulsions will place growing demand for the movement of quick reaction as also regular security forces within the country on short notice.

To provide effective air defence of the homeland, the IAF needs to acquire a fleet of AWACS and AEW aircraft over and above the few already on order to enhance surveillance capability at low level.
Given its emerging regional power status and the newly forged strategic partnership with the US if not abrogated by the incoming administration, India may be called upon to project power in the region which may involve airlift of large military forces to areas of interest of either of the partners in the region outside our borders and to provide sustained logistic support. Strategic airlift capability of the IAF would therefore need to be built up practically from scratch as the existing fleet is fast approaching the end of its total technical life.

At the tactical level, the IAF should be equipped with a fleet of medium tactical transport aircraft and helicopters capable of speedy response with special forces over shorter ranges.

The IAF has taken some baby steps towards acquiring the capability of projecting combat power in the region. At this point in time, the capability is limited to a token force and cannot be described as significant. However, while steps are in hand to augment the existing fleet of long range combat aircraft as also to acquire a new fleet, the capability of power projection would in the ultimate analysis be limited by the size of the fleet of in-flight refuelling aircraft. This fleet would have to be suitably enlarged for any meaningful power projection that is capable of making an impact.

Summary
To summarise, the IAF needs to enhance some of the force multipliers already on the inventory as also to develop a range of new capabilities both in the strategic and tactical regimes. At the strategic level, the IAF must be able to provide the nation with credible nuclear deterrence against Pakistan and China. Also, it should be capable of power projection in its perceived area of national security interests and those of our ally in the region beyond the national borders with combat aircraft, in-flight refuelling and strategic airlift capability. These forces should be geared to provide swift response to a crisis situation and be able to provide logistic support to sustain forces for significant length of time. For strategic strike deep into enemy territory, the IAF needs to have a combination of missile based and airborne platforms, the latter with powerful electronic warfare equipment to suppress and defeat enemy air defence systems. Tactical roles may be transferred to UCAVs and helicopters.

To provide effective air defence of the homeland, the IAF needs to acquire a fleet of AWACS and AEW aircraft over and above the few already on order to enhance surveillance capability at low level. New generation area and point defence missile systems need to be inducted to replace the ageing and obsolete systems currently deployed. For strategic and tactical intelligence, the IAF must have its own satellite systems and a fleet of UAVs with a range of advanced sensors to provide all weather day and night capability. The fleet of UAVs should be adequately supported by appropriate ground infrastructure for automated and speedy processing of intelligence information, and fleet of tactical transport aircraft and helicopters for quick response with special forces.

It goes without saying that in future wars, the IAF must be geared to operate in a network-centric environment. But perhaps most important of all, there is the imperative need for the IAF to shed the defensive mindset.


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Air Marshal BK Pandey, former AOC-in-C Training Command, IAF.

 

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ref:Indian Air Force 2020

Indian Air Force 2020
0.511.522.533.544.55.By Air Marshal BK Pandey
Issue: Net Edition | Date: 30 October, 2010
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Planning for Modernisation of the IAF
Festivity during the 73rd anniversary of the Indian Air Force in October 2005 was overshadowed by the concern over its depleting combat power. Obsolescence appears to be overtaking the IAF as several components of its combat and supporting assets are reaching the end of technical or calendar life and need replacement very soon. The Government appeared to be seized of the problem as a few days later at a Combined Commanders` Conference held in South Block, came the assurance from the highest level that modernisation of the armed forces was a matter of high priority and that the required resources would be made available.

Modernisation of the IAF involves acquisition of expensive capital equipment that has a life span of three to four decades. Acquisition of equipment for the IAF in the past has generally been characterised by slow decision making and complex procurement procedures leading to delays in the operational integration of the equipment with the organisation.

The procurement process is long drawn and in the best case may take seven to ten years to fructify. As such, plans drawn up today must remain valid in the decade of the twenties by which time changes in the operating environment could well render decisions of today irrelevant.

Modernisation plans must therefore take in to account the challenges of the evolving scenario in the geo-political, geo-strategic, technological and operational environment in the region and the world as these would impact on the role and responsibility of the IAF as also its shape and size.

It is therefore necessary to reflect on the historical perspective of regional equations and visualise the scenario that is likely to prevail in the twenties before undertaking plans for modernisation of the IAF.

Conflict and the Developing World
In the first half of the 20th century the world went through the convulsions of two major wars that apart from wreaking widespread death and destruction, divided the world in to two distinct camps hostile to each other and ushered in an era of cold war and global peace, essentially on account of a balance of power arising out of superpower rivalry. While the two superpowers maintained a balance of terror, conventional proxy wars continued to rage and were confined largely to the developing world. These wars served the political and economic interests of the superpowers as they helped perpetuate strategic relationships and turn the wheels of the military industrial complex of the developed world.

Sino Indian Relations
Emerging as a dismembered but independent nation in the middle of the 20th century, India inherited several thousand kilometres of land borders that had a potential for conflict whose origins lay in the flawed policies of the British Government. The border between India and Tibet had been defined unilaterally by the British Government during their reign in India without any formal agreement with China who constantly maintained that in the first place, there was no need for a redefinition of borders as the traditional boundaries were well known and that there was no need to indulge in the exercise at all. At no stage did the Chinese endorse or accept the British action with regard to the delineation of the border with Tibet. The alignment of the traditional boundaries perceived by China were also not universally known except perhaps to the Chinese themselves.

The unresolved legacy inherited from the past left an unwary nation traumatised in 1962. More than four decades later, efforts are now on to resolve the fundamental dispute and notwithstanding the inspiring rhetoric emanating from the political establishment of both India and China and the somewhat regimented bonhomie at the military outpost at Nathu La beamed on the visual media occasionally, the ground situation has not changed in favour of India. In fact, in some ways it has indeed worsened as in the intervening years, the Chinese have only consolidated their gains of 1962 in Ladakh and are continuing to develop regions bordering Arunachal on a scale that cannot be justified for economic reasons alone.

China has played a key role in transforming Pakistan in to a nuclear weapon state, a step that has only accentuated the tension and served to complicate the security equations in the sub-continent.
It would be imprudent to believe that it is possible only through dialogue to alter the age old position held by China regarding the alignment of international borders between India and Tibet. But in the absence of any other option, the dialogue must continue. We ought not to ignore the fact that it is more important for us to come to an amicable settlement of the border dispute than it is for China. As per a renowned Chinese leader, it may be desirable to shelve the problem for now and leave it to the future generations who may be wiser to find a solution. A politically weak position combined with a visibly weak military posture on our part therefore could seriously undermine the process of the ongoing dialogue as also impinge on the fragile relationship that we believe to have succeeded in building in the recent past.

Apart from the ongoing border dispute, the economic rivalry that is building up slowly but surely between the two of the fastest growing economies in the region, has the potential for conflict arising out of clash of vital interests. While India aspires to emerge as a regional power, China is emerging as a global economic power house and her sights are set on superpower status. China would not have failed to notice the shift in India`s foreign policy aimed at strengthening the strategic relationship between the two largest democracies in the world. China acquired nuclear power status several years ahead of India to achieve a credible deterrent against a perceived threat from a superpower.

China has also successfully completed her second space mission and in the next decade and a half, is planning to despatch a manned mission to moon as also build a space station. Clearly, China is ahead in the race with India. Then there is the long standing relationship with Pakistan wherein apart from supply of conventional military equipment, China has played a key role in transforming Pakistan in to a nuclear weapon state, a step that has only accentuated the tension and served to complicate the security equations in the sub-continent.

Indo-Pak Confrontation
On the western front, the status of Jammu and Kashmir, truly the only cause of conflict, is a legacy of the colonial past. In the wake of super-power rivalry, Britain was replaced in the region by the USA, and while Pakistan was drawn quite readily in to the American camp, India adopted a philosophy of non alignment opting for a diverse inventory of military equipment i.e. British and French. However for strategic, economic and political reasons India had to subsequently lean heavily on the Soviet Union for military hardware to meet with the demands of national security. Even though formally not allied with the USSR, India was seen by the USA as being squarely in the Soviet camp and was treated with extreme suspicion and unconcealed disdain.

Nearly six decades and four major conflicts later, there appears to have been some qualitative change in the equation between India and Pakistan. People to people contact, exchange programmes in a variety of fields, restoration of rail and road transport, liberalisation of visa regimes, trade both official and unofficial and cooperation in the wake of the disastrous earthquake in the recent past have rekindled hopes for peace between the two adversaries. The media has also by and large played a very constructive role in exposing the reality of India to the several brainwashed and misled generations of Pakistanis. All these developments have served to weaken the anti-each-other platforms that the political establishment on both sides have so far thrived upon.

However, there are other factors and deep seated ant-India sentiments that militate against normalisation of relations. In the Pakistani mindset, India is a hegemonic power that poses a constant and potent threat to her very survival. The corporate aim of the Pakistani establishment has been to exploit the vulnerabilities of India, weaken her from the inside and `to bleed her with a thousand cuts`.

The situation with regard to the status of Kashmir has not changed, and like a persistent virus, resurfaces with irritating regularity, seemingly frustrating efforts at forward movement. In spite of all noble intentions, it appears difficult if not impossible for the Pakistani establishment to retreat from or significantly alter their long held position vis-à-vis Kashmir as it would amount to political suicide for the leadership whether military or civilian. As for the Indian view, it is only for Pakistan to demonstrate flexibility which the leadership is not prepared to do. And then there is the unfinished business of .

Also, as it appears, the maximum that India can concede on Kashmir is less than what would be acceptable to Pakistan. In view of the inflexible position on both sides, Kashmir will continue to be a major impediment in any effort at securing the western borders from the possibility of conflict. Nothing short of reversing the process of partition leading to the reunification of India and Pakistan can help resolve the dispute over Kashmir. Solution to the Kashmir problem will therefore remain as much in the realm of fantasy in the foreseeable future as the suggestion to reunite the two nations.

There are other factors and deep seated ant-India sentiments that militate against normalisation of relations. In the Pakistani mindset, India is a hegemonic power that poses a constant and potent threat to her very survival.
Apart from the Kashmir issue, there are problems on other fronts as well. The population of Pakistan is growing at roughly 2.6% annually and is not matched by its economic growth. Pakistan will therefore continue to be in a dysfunctional state and would have to depend heavily on foreign assistance for survival. The growing economic disparity between India and Pakistan could aggravate the sense of insecurity that a small nation perceives from a bigger and more prosperous and powerful neighbour with whom there are deep ideological differences and a long history of turbulent relationship.

The sense of insecurity may be further aggravated if our western neighbour finds her position vis-à-vis Kashmir weakening. Under such circumstances, for Pakistan, a conflict may appear to be an inevitable and desperate option. Under the shadow of the nuclear threat, in all likelihood, Pakistan may avoid an all out war and prefer to sustain low intensity conflict in the valley and undermine our interests through covert support to insurgency in other parts of the country bordering Nepal and Bangladesh. This certainly would be a more convenient and cost effective option for Pakistan.

Prospects of Peace
It should be clear from the preceding that India cannot rest on its oars and take permanent peace in the subcontinent for granted. Perhaps peace can only be ensured if one is well prepared to meet with any conceivable threat to national security by all the means at its disposal, be it political, economic, diplomatic, or military. Encouraging progress in efforts at settlement of disputes with both China and Pakistan ought not to be assumed as good enough reason for scaling down military capability. Besides, in future conflicts with either or simultaneously with both the neighbours, India needs to be prepared to manage conflicts at the conventional level as also fight and survive in a nuclear environment. In the ultimate analysis, a nation is respected for its strength, political, economic and military.

India as a Regional Power
The closing years of the 20th century witnessed a set of three major events that had a profound effect on the destiny of many nations as also on that of India. The first of these was the collapse of the Soviet Union which seemed to have severed India`s moorings to set it adrift for a while. The second major event was the un-caging of the Indian economy and the process of economic reforms and liberalisation that thrust India on to the global scene. The third and most significant event was the explicit assertion in 1998 of the nuclear status by both India and Pakistan. Thus in the new century, the situation for the nation and her armed forces is qualitatively different in a number of ways.

In the emerging scenario and the rapprochement with the USA, India could well be drawn in to a US led security arrangement for a new power balance in the region. The USA regards India as one of the power centres that can exercise a stabilising influence in the region and can be relied upon. High levels of investment notwithstanding, containment of China will remain a major concern for the USA. In her own perspective, on account of India`s energy security needs, so vital for sustained economic growth, India`s zone of interest transcend her geographical boundaries extending from South East Asia to the Central Asian Republics and the Gulf. India conveyed to the world a subtle message by of her swift response to the Tsunami in December 2004.

In the evolving geopolitical situation and economic growth sustained at 8%, conditions are favourable for India to assume the role of a regional power in not too distant a future.

India would be expected to shoulder higher levels of military responsibility consequent to her evolving regional power status. In addition, the fundamental reasons for conflict with China and Pakistan continue to linger vigorous political and diplomatic efforts notwithstanding. The search for solutions to disputes rooted deep in history, require prolonged and complex negotiations. However to be successful on the political and diplomatic fronts, one needs to negotiate from a position of strength. India is well on the way to becoming an economic power.

It is incumbent on the leadership to ensure that there is no dilution of military capability if the equation with our traditionally hostile neighbours is not to be compromised. Rhetoric, assurances and promises must not lull the nation in to complacency and risk a replay of the 1962 debacle.

Security Environment in the Twenties
•To summarise, in the geopolitical, geostrategic and security environment that is likely to prevail in the 2020s, the dictates of national security would place the following demands on armed forces of the nation:-
•To be prepared for a prolonged and widespread multi front border war with China with only a remote possibility of employment of nuclear weapons.
•To be prepared for a short and intense conflict with Pakistan with the real possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons by the adversary.
•To be prepared for simultaneous conflict with both the potential adversaries acting in collusion.
•To sustain the capability to fight a prolonged low intensity conflict in Kashmir and other sensitive regions of the country in the pursuit of internal security.
•To develop and maintain the capability for rapid strategic intervention and power projection in the region extending from the Straits of Malacca to Central Asia and the Gulf to safeguard and promote national interests.
•To play a dominant role in the management of disasters and natural calamity in the region of interest.
It is incumbent on the leadership to ensure that there is no dilution of military capability if the equation with our traditionally hostile neighbours is not to be compromised. Rhetoric, assurances and promises must not lull the nation in to complacency and risk a replay of the 1962 debacle.
While considerable progress has been made on the political, economic and diplomatic fronts, the overall security situation continues to remain fraught with uncertainties. India`s growing political and economic stature in the world and commitments of national interests necessitate a move away from the traditional defensive mindset. India must acquire the capability for power projection in the area of interest which will require a qualitative change in the operational philosophy of the armed forces especially of the IAF.

Within the broad structural framework that has evolved over the last five decades, there is a need to modify the composition and character of the various constituents of the IAF to provide extended reach and staying power. The focus must shift from the `Tactical` to the `Strategic` as also on `Force Multipliers`. The IAF must also integrate fully with the sister services as also aim to develop interoperability with other friendly powers in the region and the world for furtherance of mutual interests.

The armed forces of India have matured through a number of major conflicts with our neighbours in the last five decades. The IAF in particular has benefited from the lessons learnt in these conflicts and has been quick to absorb the technological advances witnessed elsewhere in the world. Undoubtedly, in the military dimension of national security, the IAF would be called upon to shoulder enhanced levels of responsibility and would have a critical role to play both during peace and war especially in situations demanding swift response.

Traditionally considered outside the zone of responsibility, the IAF will be drawn increasingly in to specialised roles related to internal security. The IAF therefore needs to draw up plans to acquire the wherewithal to meet with the challenges of the 2020s. As the pace of change is slow, radical change in the broad structure is neither desirable nor possible in the timeframe under consideration. However, there is imperative need to introduce qualitative change in the capabilities of the IAF driven by the technological revolution in Air Power.

Aerial Reconnaissance
In peacetime, apart from training for war, an important mission of the IAF would be the acquisition of strategic and tactical intelligence through technical means. Strategic reconnaissance by fixed wing aircraft would have to be replaced by space based platforms equipped with a wide variety of powerful sensors. Tactical reconnaissance would be assigned to a family of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) even over long range through the use of high endurance machines controlled remotely from thousands of miles away with the aid of satellite based data links. Employing a variety of photo, infra red and comint sensors, it would be possible to counter the element of surprise by maintaining continuous surveillance to assess intent through changes in enemy orbat and relocation of forces. Surveillance systems will be employed to map and update information on strategic target systems and provide in real time highly accurate data necessary for precision attacks by smart weapons particularly in the opening stages of any conflict. Assurance levels of smart weapons are contingent on the accuracy of target data and hence the critical importance of the capability of intelligence gathering platforms and airborne sensors.

Strategic & Tactical Strike Capability
To develop a credible deterrent as also meet with its commitments of power projection in the region, the IAF would have to have a fleet of potent, long range, nuclear capable, multi role strike aircraft that would have the capability to neutralise any target system in the area of interest. The strike force must have at its disposal a variety of smart weapons with sizeable stand-off range, air launched cruise missiles and versatile electronic warfare suites to defeat known detection devices and fire control systems. The IAF is in the process of inducting 190 (ten squadrons) of the state of the art, 40-ton class SU30 MKI multi role aircraft. With in-flight refuelling, this fleet would have the attributes essential to fulfil the strategic commitments of the nation. With a lifespan of at least 30 years including a mid-life upgrade of avionics, the fleet of SU30 MKI would remain in service though the 2020s. However, the IAF would have to reassess the requirement of the size of the fleet periodically vis-à-vis changing scenario and constantly upgrade its weapon systems for the fleet to retain its front line status.

The IAF would also need a fleet of medium range Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) in the 20 ton class. Moves are already afoot to acquire 126 (six squadrons) of MRCA for air defence and strike tasks of tactical nature. With in-flight refuelling this fleet could also be used to augment the long range strike force. If the IAF is able to overcome the bureaucratic and procedural impediments and make the fleet operational in the next five years, this fleet too would remain in service well beyond the 2020s.

The current fleet of MiG 21, MiG 27, MiG 29, Jaguars and Mirages will largely be obsolete by the 2020s and only a handful of upgraded aircraft may remain to undertake second tier tasks. The effective strength of the IAF is likely to deplete rapidly as we approach the 2020s. The IAF must therefore draw up concrete plans and take urgent steps to ensure that the fixed wing combat element of the IAF is restored to at least 40 squadrons if not more.

The LCA is a possible answer but only partly. Also, the uncertainty that has plagued the LCA project over the last two decades does not inspire much confidence. Acquisition of aircraft from foreign sources is a complicated process and cannot be conducted as a fire fighting exercise. Presently there is at least a five year gap in the assessment by the IAF and the Indian Aerospace Industry of the timeframe in which to expect the LCA to be available.

In any case, the rate of production may not be adequate to close the gap of 24 squadrons in a respectable timeframe leaving the IAF with no option but to search for solutions elsewhere. Given the size of the deficit, the investment would involve an outflow of resources to the tune of billions of dollars if aircraft are to be acquired from foreign sources. The IAF may run in to affordability barriers and may be compelled to stretch the ageing fleets through expensive upgrades and suffer erosion of capability. The IAF must find answers to this challenge in the context of the security concerns and the emerging regional power status of the nation.

Air Defence
Apart from the combat fleet, the IAF would need to put in place a gap free and responsive automated air defence surveillance system comprising an overlapping integrated network of low, medium and high level radar coverage. In a nuclear environment, an air defence system must be totally impregnable as even a single aircraft or missile armed with a nuclear weapon could be catastrophic. Besides, own nuclear second strike capability must be protected against an attack by the enemy.

Efforts to acquire AWACS and Aerostats even though in small numbers, are steps in the right direction but more needs to be done. Our scientific establishments need to move ahead quickly in their ambitious project to develop a space based reconnaissance and surveillance system to cover the airspace over the entire country. The existing ground based surveillance assets are woefully inadequate for even the current level of responsibility and need total revamp.

Given the extent of our frontiers, infrastructure for total coverage solely through ground based surveillance systems would be prohibitively expensive and possibly unaffordable. The AWACS aircraft would be a more cost effective option as it would also provide low level cover deep inside enemy territory not only to direct own forces but also to track hostile aircraft departing for missions from their bases thus facilitating positive identification and increasing substantially the reaction time available to the air defence system.

While there is no debate over the necessity of AWACS aircraft, the question is that of numbers. In the event of imminent or outbreak of hostilities, AWACS aircraft would have to be `on station` round the clock in adequate numbers to cover the entire length of hostile borders.

Given the limitations of endurance of the aircraft and the crew, serviceability considerations of an infinitely complex machine and the volume of the airspace to be scanned, the IAF would have to reassess the size of the fleet required to be procured.

The fleet of Phalcon equipped IL 76 aircraft being acquired in the next two to three years, will only provide a learning experience. To meet with needs of the 2020s, the size of the AWACS fleet would have to be significantly larger and hopefully augmented by the DRDO developed Embraer based system. Integrating the AWACS in to the Air Defence System, developing the technical skills to maintain and operate the platform and finding the resources to procure these machines in the requisite numbers would be some of the major challenges for the IAF and the nation.

To exploit the advantage of extended low level cover provided by the AWACS, air defence aircraft must be armed with Beyond Visual Range missiles with range long enough to intercept hostile targets well before they are in a position to pose any threat. A network of long and short range surface to air missile systems with high kill probabilities would be required to provide the necessary defence in depth.

Strategic & Tactical Airlift Capability
The emerging regional power status requires the nation to have the capability to intervene in the region to preserve peace and stability. Action of this nature was witnessed in the late eighties on a small scale in Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Operations of this nature may have to be conducted on a larger scale in the future. The existing strategic airlift capability structured around the IL 76 fleet acquired in the mid eighties is grossly inadequate for the perceived strategic role for reasons such as fleet size, poor state of serviceability and low residual calendar life of the fleet.

The existing ground based surveillance assets are woefully inadequate for even the current level of responsibility and need total revamp.
The IAF must have strategic airlift capability to deploy at least a Brigade Group along with their combat equipment in a single wave over extended range to cover the area of interest without the need for intermediate refuelling stopover. The IAF needs to reassess the shape and size of strategic airlift fleet and plan the induction of the replacement aircraft within ten years from now. Updated versions of the American C-17 and the C 130 or the European A400 could be some of the possible options. Contingency plans must include employment of the huge civil air fleet as well. In view of their larger reaction time however, the civil air fleet will be useful not for initial response but for induction of larger formations and for supporting operations that follow.

In addition to the strategic airlift capability, the nation will also need a sizeable tactical airlift capability which must combine medium tactical transport aircraft and heavy lift helicopters. Plans by HAL to develop a medium tactical transport aircraft in collaboration with renowned international partners, is yet in a nascent stage and need to be pursued with singular focus as the AN 32 fleet will have to be phased out in a decade or so.

Tactical airlift capability will be required for inserting a battalion group directly into battle in airborne assault operations or for air mobility of ground forces for inter-theatre operational redeployment in response to rapid changes in the situation, for a variety of internal security tasks as nearly 30 % of the districts in this country are naxalite infested in addition to insurgency in J & K and the north eastern regions and the management of disaster.

The IAF needs to build up heliborne forces trained for operating both by day and night obtaining real time intelligence information from UAVs for vertical envelopment in counter insurgency operations in all types of terrain. Action is in hand to acquire 80 helicopters of the MI 17 class which will meet with current requirements. For the 2020s, a fresh assessment would be necessary.

Battlefield Strike
The constantly rising and prohibitive cost of fixed wing combat aircraft presently to the tune of Rs 200 crore or more apiece and the increasing lethality of the battlefield, it is becoming more and more difficult to employ fixed wing combat aircraft against low value targets in the battlefield. The responsibility to engage targets in the battlefield could shift to Battlefield Support Missiles which for enhanced accuracy, will be programmed with target information obtained in real time from UAV operating over or in the vicinity of the battle area. Low value targets could be engaged more effectively, efficiently and economically by Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV). Helicopters too may be employed for battlefield support in conjunction with real time intelligence information from UAVs. But in the battlefield of the future, helicopters would be highly vulnerable.

In-flight Refuelling
A force multiplier acquired in the recent past is the fleet of six IL 78 In-flight Refuelling Aircraft. Its rapid integration in to the IAF has been a remarkable feat by any standard. In-flight refuelling capability helps enhance the radius of action of combat aircraft and given the size of the combat fleet and the intensity of operations, the fleet of force multipliers acquired recently, is clearly inadequate. In-flight refuelling can also enhance the range and radius of action of medium tactical transport aircraft as well and help augment airlift capability. Thus apart from providing support to combat elements, this capability will have a crucial role in the security of the EEZ and the island territories as also in the discharge of responsibilities related to regional power status.

Exploitation of Space
One dimension that the IAF would need to exploit is that of space. The intent to do so is evident in its pronouncement to create an IAF Aerospace Command. While the concept of using space based lethal weapon systems may yet lie in the realms of imagination, considerable progress has been made in the regime of communication and surveillance by space based platforms using optical and IR sensors or radar. The scientific establishments in India have made impressive strides in the field of space technology. It would be the responsibility of these organisations to provide the IAF with new capabilities in its drive to be an Aerospace Power.

Training
Perhaps the weakest area that afflicts the IAF today is the inadequacy of training infrastructure especially for the non-officer cadres.

The IAF needs to redefine priorities and restructure itself to upgrade to the strategic level. As technology will be the force that will drive change in the future, the IAF cannot afford to lag behind.
A fighting force equipped with the most sophisticated aircraft, smart weapon systems, complex sensors, space based surveillance & reconnaissance systems, a network centric environment needs to be supported by an equally advanced and sophisticated training environment with computer based training systems, elaborate simulation devices for all disciplines, automated distance learning and evaluation systems, all designed to train for the next war and not the last one.

In this respect, the IAF is at the bottom of the hill. Human resources must be trained well enough to be able to meet with the challenges of new technology and concepts. Not only the training systems and methodology need to be upgraded, the entry thresholds and service conditions for all cadres also need to be redefined and upgraded significantly to meet with the qualitative requirements of human resources of the future.

Technological Revolution
The closing years of the last century witnessed rapid changes in technology which will have a profound impact on the methodology of air warfare in the future. Emergence of digital and nano-technology will revolutionise military equipment by way of miniaturisation and automation.

Many of the tasks now performed by humans will shift to machines rendering it possible to reduce manpower in a technology intensive force such as the IAF. Also the pace of change in technology is increasing rapidly. The type of technological development that took ten years earlier may take perhaps two years in the future.

This also means quicker obsolescence. Advances in technology will also enhance the accuracy and lethality of weapon systems that could translate in to the overall reduction in the size of the force for the same level of commitment. Advances in Information Technology will transform the battlefield of the future in to a Network Centric Environment wherein information from a variety of ground based, airborne or space based sensors would be collected, processed and disseminated to end users in real time and easily comprehensible formats. Network Centric Environment will facilitate speedy decision making at command & control centres, quicker response by forces and better accuracy in weapon delivery.

It will be a major challenge for the IAF to remain abreast of technology and reorient doctrine, strategy and tactics to operate in and exploit fully the new environment.

Conclusion
The evolving geo-political and go-strategic situation combined with rapid economic growth has placed India on track to emerging as a regional power with consequent enhanced level of responsibility. There is however no perceptible change in the overall security situation in the subcontinent. Internal security also continues to remain a major challenge for governance. Meanwhile, on account of obsolescence which is inevitable in a rapidly changing technological environment, it is necessary for the IAF take stock and adopt appropriate measures to ensure that the IAF remains fully prepared to undertake a new range of tasks in its expanded envelope of responsibilities.

The IAF needs to redefine priorities and restructure itself to upgrade to the strategic level. As technology will be the force that will drive change in the future, the IAF cannot afford to lag behind. But most important of all, change of mindsets would be a prerequisite for any modernisation plan to be meaningful. This perhaps would be the greatest challenge for the leadership.

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.About the author

Air Marshal BK Pandey, former AOC-in-C Training Command, IAF.