gslv mk3
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More like you paid the Chinese to develop an aircraft for you.
Non sense. DM has rubbished such claims long before.
India Took a Shocking 33 Years to Develop a Jet Fighter (And It’s Still Not Ready for Combat)
- Thread starter Thunder Bolt
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More like you paid the Chinese to develop an aircraft for you.
Non sense. DM has rubbished such claims long before.
Desertfalcon
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Developing any new fighter takes, much more time than it did in the 2nd or 3rd gen fighters. Both the USA and Russia are still mostly flying fighters that are of 1970's designs. The F-35 has taken many, many, years and is only now being deployed. IOW, I am not critical of India's efforts and will wait and see.
Hassan Guy
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gslv mk3
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Keep that for yourself- a country which hasn't been able to develop one single aircraft design for itself.
see the mirror ... you will find it
Hassan Guy
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gslv mk3
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All you're capable of is posting memes ? I feel bad for you brother
well , 100 service flights do help fighter JET. fighter JET if cannot bomb or fire missile is useless... IAF do not buy useless planes which cant even bomb.
India searching For Medium weight plane, and not light weight....
Even vintage plane are better then JFT , at least they drop bombs and fire missiles....
Hassan Guy
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Sorry buddy, but arguing with someone of your IQ is as pointless as getting the Tejas operational.
The Tejas and the Gripen use THE SAME ENGINE. You already bought the Rafale.
I mean if that helps you sleep at night go at man, Not enough facepalms are enough for you
Kyusuibu Honbu
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India has been doing what Pakistan has done with J-17 since the 1980s with Russia by manufacturing fighters like Mig-27 in house.
Continued doing the same with SU-30 MKIs
LCA is more of Indian attempts to have a indigenous fighter, which had to be done some point.
The effects of these projects can be seen on each one's Aerospace industries
For 2015 Indian Aerospace exports stood at $3.7 billion
While Pakistan's stood at $14 million
http://www.trademap.org/Country_SelProduct.aspx?nvpm=1|||||88|||2|1|1|2|1||2|1|1
Pakistan exports being 264 times of value of Indian aerospace exports despite claiming superior Aerospace development capabilities than India
gslv mk3
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Pakistan exports being 264 times of value of Indian aerospace exports despite claiming superior Aerospace development capabilities than India
Number of ISO 9001/ AS9100C certified aerospace suppliers is another parameter
Kyusuibu Honbu
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Good that you brought that up, but now, this is enough
gslv mk3
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What does that have to do with the topic ?
Kyusuibu Honbu
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Demolishing Some LCA Tejas Falsehoods
“The Tejas is an old design. It has taken 32 long years to develop! And despite being in development for so long, it’s not truly indigenous. It’s heart, the engine, is of foreign origin. So are its weapons and some avionics. Furthermore, it is so deficient in it’s performance, that the Indian Air Force (IAF) wants Rafales/Su-30MKIs/F-16s instead.”
Every time the Tejas achieves some important milestone, these criticisms are repeated ad nauseum, in the popular media, on Twitter, on internet forums, and at bhel-puri stalls in Jhumritalaiyya. It’s infuriating to see an effort of this magnitude, one that has produced many successes, being panned time and again. So I’ve taken the liberty to put together this handy-dandy LCA Tejas mythbusting guide to counter them.
And without wasting your time any further, I’ll jump right in
False Argument 1: The Tejas is “late”. It has been under development for 32 years!
The figure is technically true, but deprives the narrative of much-needed context. The Tejas’ origins can indeed be traced back to 1983, when the concept of a Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was conceived. However, the IAF did not finalise its air staff requirements (ASRs) until 1985 (and kept on requesting major changes throughout the design and development phase, but more on that later) and initial funding did not come through until 1986. The project definition phase — the phase in which technical requirements are defined and a conceptual design prepared did not end until 1988. The final design was completed in 1990. Full funding was issued only in 1993, after which the development of a prototype commenced in earnest. Source.
Following several years of delay in the development process — delays that can at least partly be traced backto US sanctions on India following the 1998 nuclear tests — the Tejas had its first flight in 2001. From then, the project proceeded at a pace that is not too different that of comparable fighter aircraft development programmes worldwide. Consider this: the Tejas is slated to achieve final operational clearance (FOC), the stage at which an aircraft is considered fully ready for squadron service, in early 2016; fifteen years from the date of the first flight. At this time, the Tejas’ is expected to be ready to carry out every role required of it: beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air combat, short-range dogfighting, and precision ground attack with a variety of guided and unguided weaponry.
That compares well with contemporary fourth-generation fighters like the Eurofighter Typhoon and the JAS-39 Gripen. The Typhoon first flew in 1986. The definitive version with an AESA radar is still not in service today, 30 years down the line. The Tranche-2 version, which can drop precision bombs and fire BVR missiles, wasn’t available until 2008. Another European fighter, the Swedish Gripen-C, with full-spectrum capabilities, started entering service in 2002, also fourteen years after its first flight.
The Tejas is about to FOC with all of these capabilities in late 2016. The fact that ADA managed to achieve similar or better timelines with the Tejas after its first flight, that too without the benefit of half a century of experience in building advanced fighters or the industrial ecosystem that enables such high-technology to proceed swiftly, is an achievement that is not given enough credit.
False Argument 2: Because of the inordinate delays in development, the Tejas is now deficient.
Just because the development was delayed doesn’t mean that the design is the same one from 1983. The IAF updated its requirements quite often and kept demanding additional capabilities of the design. It was a Catch-22 situation: the constant change in requirements kept the design up-to-date, but it also led to several years of delays because of the need to re-design, re-test, and re-certify the aircraft after every minor change. Off the top of my head, I can remember that the IAF demanded the following modifications pretty late into the program:
False Argument 3: The LCA falls short on several performance parameters like empty weight, range, turn rates, etc. The IAF has allowed 53 concessions/permanent waivers in the design.
Like the 32-year delay, this too is a scary looking that paints a false picture of how fighter aircraft programmes work.
First off, it is important to remember that the Tejas can carry out most of the tasks intended of it quite competently. It can fight other aircraft at beyond visual range (when equipped with an AESA radar and Derby/Derby-ER missiles, it could end up becoming the most capable BVR platform in IAF service. Better than the Su-30MKI and Mirage-2000). The addition of an Israeli helmet-mounted sight coupled to missiles whose seekers had a wide field of view (R-73 and Python IV/V) make it a fearsome dogfighter and compensate for minuscule shortfalls in aerodynamic performance. It can drop laser-guided bombs on ground targets with great precision. It is very easy to fly. In the words of the IAF, the fighter’s “control harmony is comparable to the best in the world… The intuitive cockpit layout and highly reliable life support systems provide for comfort as well as excellent situational awareness.” There are many such triumphs; too many, in fact, to recount here.
Secondly, every fighter project concludes with specifications that aren’t met, or a few deficiencies in performance. It’s never that big of a roadblock to induction in service. And all said and done, 53 is a very small number as far as design concessions go; a pretty small portion of the entire range of capabilities. Even simpler aircraft (like the C-17) enter service with more deficiencies. These are either compensated with using technologies in other areas to offset performance shortfalls, or accepted in the interest of availability for combat.
Again, I’ll go back to the Eurofighter Typhoon to illustrate my point. Remember I mentioned that it first flew in 1986? Twenty-two years later, it couldn’t independently drop a laser-guided bombon a target with any precision. Basic BVR combat capability was not available until Tranche 2 models were procured in 2008, 14 years after the first flight. Even in close air combat, its capabilities were decidedly limited. The helmet mounted sight (HMS) — a system that allows the pilot to cue weapons onto an enemy aircraft by simply turning his head and offers a quantum jump in dogfighting capabilities — did not enter service until 2010.
The F-35 was hobbled by similar issues (and terrible program management) for several years. It didn’t begin to turn a corner until 2012 or so, after which it began rapidly demonstrating some of the capabilities that were expected of it.
This all happened despite the likes of Boeing, EADS, and Lockheed in charge of these projects. How then do you expect the ADA, which has never developed a fighter in its entire existence, to deliver a more capable product before inducting any into operational service?
Heck, even the IAF works with deficient designs all the time. They happily flew the short-legged, limited-payload Gnat and even procured it in great numbers. Ditto with the Su-7. The MiG-21, when initially inducted, was underwhelming. Its range was limited and its missiles didn’t work. The Bison is still riddled with issues. The Jaguar had a deficient nav-attack suite. It was practically useless in the long range strike until the IAF and HAL developed and implemented the DARIN upgrades. The MiG-27’s navigation system never worked well, and its reliability was terrible; at night especially, it was no better than dead weight. But none of this troubled the IAF. Why then is the LCA failing to achieve a handful design parameters something to raise a huge hue and cry about?
False Argument 4(a): The LCA isn’t really indigenous. Many of its subsystems are of foreign origin.
But many more of its critical subsystems are of Indian origin too! The first one that comes to mind is the carbon-fibre composite airframe. It is a very high-tech product that reduces weight (thus permitting the carriage of a substantial external payload), aids maintenance, brings down manufacturing time, and so on. The fact that some of the technology involved has been exported to Airbus is a testament to its success.
Another example is the digital fly-by-wire (FBW) system, developed from scratch by ADA scientists in India after their work, notes, and equipment was impounded by Lockheed Martin in 1998. No country on earth, none, has developed such a complex system and gotten it to work perfectly on the first try. How well does it work, you ask? Well, the system was first tested on an F-16XL in the US (this was before the nuclear tests). Much to the amusement of everyone involved, the software actually improved the handling qualities of the XL in several flight regimes! No wonder the IAF says that the Tejas one of the easiest and friendliest aircraft to fly.
There are many other examples. The avionics. The mission computers. The navigation equipment, displays, and human-machine interface. The EW systems. This stuff isn’t trivial by any yardstick.
Now coming to the foreign components aboard the aircraft. With the exception of the Americans, and to an extent the Russians, every country has used foreign subsystems extensively in its aircraft designs. The Gripenhas an American engine, a British airframe design, Swiss carbon-fibre, an Italian radar, an American flight control system, a cockpit with critical components purchased from Britain, etc. etc. This in spite of the Swedes having an industrial base that is far more advanced than India’s and extensive experience in the form of the Draken and Gripen. The Rafale and Typhoon both use American ejection seats. Their FBW uses actuators from Moog, an American company. The Russians were buying Damocles podsfor the Su-35s before the French stopped military exports after they invaded Crimea. Nearly every Chinese fighter in service today uses a Russian engine, a Russian ejection seat, and a slew of Russian weaponry. If these aircraft all qualify as “indigenous”, then surely the Tejas does too?
The choice the design agency faces is quite stark: do they try to build every little component, thus reinventing the wheel at every step? Or do they use what is available easily in the market in the initial stages and then make an attempt to indigenise over the life-cycle of the product? The latter is always the more sensible way to go.
In the final analysis, the Tejas is an aircraft that has been designed by Indians in India, and is tailored to Indian requirements. If that doesn’t make it indigenous, I don’t know what does.
“The Tejas is an old design. It has taken 32 long years to develop! And despite being in development for so long, it’s not truly indigenous. It’s heart, the engine, is of foreign origin. So are its weapons and some avionics. Furthermore, it is so deficient in it’s performance, that the Indian Air Force (IAF) wants Rafales/Su-30MKIs/F-16s instead.”
Every time the Tejas achieves some important milestone, these criticisms are repeated ad nauseum, in the popular media, on Twitter, on internet forums, and at bhel-puri stalls in Jhumritalaiyya. It’s infuriating to see an effort of this magnitude, one that has produced many successes, being panned time and again. So I’ve taken the liberty to put together this handy-dandy LCA Tejas mythbusting guide to counter them.
And without wasting your time any further, I’ll jump right in
False Argument 1: The Tejas is “late”. It has been under development for 32 years!
The figure is technically true, but deprives the narrative of much-needed context. The Tejas’ origins can indeed be traced back to 1983, when the concept of a Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was conceived. However, the IAF did not finalise its air staff requirements (ASRs) until 1985 (and kept on requesting major changes throughout the design and development phase, but more on that later) and initial funding did not come through until 1986. The project definition phase — the phase in which technical requirements are defined and a conceptual design prepared did not end until 1988. The final design was completed in 1990. Full funding was issued only in 1993, after which the development of a prototype commenced in earnest. Source.
Following several years of delay in the development process — delays that can at least partly be traced backto US sanctions on India following the 1998 nuclear tests — the Tejas had its first flight in 2001. From then, the project proceeded at a pace that is not too different that of comparable fighter aircraft development programmes worldwide. Consider this: the Tejas is slated to achieve final operational clearance (FOC), the stage at which an aircraft is considered fully ready for squadron service, in early 2016; fifteen years from the date of the first flight. At this time, the Tejas’ is expected to be ready to carry out every role required of it: beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air combat, short-range dogfighting, and precision ground attack with a variety of guided and unguided weaponry.
That compares well with contemporary fourth-generation fighters like the Eurofighter Typhoon and the JAS-39 Gripen. The Typhoon first flew in 1986. The definitive version with an AESA radar is still not in service today, 30 years down the line. The Tranche-2 version, which can drop precision bombs and fire BVR missiles, wasn’t available until 2008. Another European fighter, the Swedish Gripen-C, with full-spectrum capabilities, started entering service in 2002, also fourteen years after its first flight.
The Tejas is about to FOC with all of these capabilities in late 2016. The fact that ADA managed to achieve similar or better timelines with the Tejas after its first flight, that too without the benefit of half a century of experience in building advanced fighters or the industrial ecosystem that enables such high-technology to proceed swiftly, is an achievement that is not given enough credit.
False Argument 2: Because of the inordinate delays in development, the Tejas is now deficient.
Just because the development was delayed doesn’t mean that the design is the same one from 1983. The IAF updated its requirements quite often and kept demanding additional capabilities of the design. It was a Catch-22 situation: the constant change in requirements kept the design up-to-date, but it also led to several years of delays because of the need to re-design, re-test, and re-certify the aircraft after every minor change. Off the top of my head, I can remember that the IAF demanded the following modifications pretty late into the program:
- Open avionics architecture.
- Precision bombing capabilities.
- Heavier A2A missiles (R-73 vs R-60).
- Internal EW suite that included a self-protection jammer.
- Inflight refueling
- More capable radar and missiles (LCA Mk-1A)
False Argument 3: The LCA falls short on several performance parameters like empty weight, range, turn rates, etc. The IAF has allowed 53 concessions/permanent waivers in the design.
Like the 32-year delay, this too is a scary looking that paints a false picture of how fighter aircraft programmes work.
First off, it is important to remember that the Tejas can carry out most of the tasks intended of it quite competently. It can fight other aircraft at beyond visual range (when equipped with an AESA radar and Derby/Derby-ER missiles, it could end up becoming the most capable BVR platform in IAF service. Better than the Su-30MKI and Mirage-2000). The addition of an Israeli helmet-mounted sight coupled to missiles whose seekers had a wide field of view (R-73 and Python IV/V) make it a fearsome dogfighter and compensate for minuscule shortfalls in aerodynamic performance. It can drop laser-guided bombs on ground targets with great precision. It is very easy to fly. In the words of the IAF, the fighter’s “control harmony is comparable to the best in the world… The intuitive cockpit layout and highly reliable life support systems provide for comfort as well as excellent situational awareness.” There are many such triumphs; too many, in fact, to recount here.
Secondly, every fighter project concludes with specifications that aren’t met, or a few deficiencies in performance. It’s never that big of a roadblock to induction in service. And all said and done, 53 is a very small number as far as design concessions go; a pretty small portion of the entire range of capabilities. Even simpler aircraft (like the C-17) enter service with more deficiencies. These are either compensated with using technologies in other areas to offset performance shortfalls, or accepted in the interest of availability for combat.
Again, I’ll go back to the Eurofighter Typhoon to illustrate my point. Remember I mentioned that it first flew in 1986? Twenty-two years later, it couldn’t independently drop a laser-guided bombon a target with any precision. Basic BVR combat capability was not available until Tranche 2 models were procured in 2008, 14 years after the first flight. Even in close air combat, its capabilities were decidedly limited. The helmet mounted sight (HMS) — a system that allows the pilot to cue weapons onto an enemy aircraft by simply turning his head and offers a quantum jump in dogfighting capabilities — did not enter service until 2010.
The F-35 was hobbled by similar issues (and terrible program management) for several years. It didn’t begin to turn a corner until 2012 or so, after which it began rapidly demonstrating some of the capabilities that were expected of it.
This all happened despite the likes of Boeing, EADS, and Lockheed in charge of these projects. How then do you expect the ADA, which has never developed a fighter in its entire existence, to deliver a more capable product before inducting any into operational service?
Heck, even the IAF works with deficient designs all the time. They happily flew the short-legged, limited-payload Gnat and even procured it in great numbers. Ditto with the Su-7. The MiG-21, when initially inducted, was underwhelming. Its range was limited and its missiles didn’t work. The Bison is still riddled with issues. The Jaguar had a deficient nav-attack suite. It was practically useless in the long range strike until the IAF and HAL developed and implemented the DARIN upgrades. The MiG-27’s navigation system never worked well, and its reliability was terrible; at night especially, it was no better than dead weight. But none of this troubled the IAF. Why then is the LCA failing to achieve a handful design parameters something to raise a huge hue and cry about?
False Argument 4(a): The LCA isn’t really indigenous. Many of its subsystems are of foreign origin.
But many more of its critical subsystems are of Indian origin too! The first one that comes to mind is the carbon-fibre composite airframe. It is a very high-tech product that reduces weight (thus permitting the carriage of a substantial external payload), aids maintenance, brings down manufacturing time, and so on. The fact that some of the technology involved has been exported to Airbus is a testament to its success.
Another example is the digital fly-by-wire (FBW) system, developed from scratch by ADA scientists in India after their work, notes, and equipment was impounded by Lockheed Martin in 1998. No country on earth, none, has developed such a complex system and gotten it to work perfectly on the first try. How well does it work, you ask? Well, the system was first tested on an F-16XL in the US (this was before the nuclear tests). Much to the amusement of everyone involved, the software actually improved the handling qualities of the XL in several flight regimes! No wonder the IAF says that the Tejas one of the easiest and friendliest aircraft to fly.
There are many other examples. The avionics. The mission computers. The navigation equipment, displays, and human-machine interface. The EW systems. This stuff isn’t trivial by any yardstick.
Now coming to the foreign components aboard the aircraft. With the exception of the Americans, and to an extent the Russians, every country has used foreign subsystems extensively in its aircraft designs. The Gripenhas an American engine, a British airframe design, Swiss carbon-fibre, an Italian radar, an American flight control system, a cockpit with critical components purchased from Britain, etc. etc. This in spite of the Swedes having an industrial base that is far more advanced than India’s and extensive experience in the form of the Draken and Gripen. The Rafale and Typhoon both use American ejection seats. Their FBW uses actuators from Moog, an American company. The Russians were buying Damocles podsfor the Su-35s before the French stopped military exports after they invaded Crimea. Nearly every Chinese fighter in service today uses a Russian engine, a Russian ejection seat, and a slew of Russian weaponry. If these aircraft all qualify as “indigenous”, then surely the Tejas does too?
The choice the design agency faces is quite stark: do they try to build every little component, thus reinventing the wheel at every step? Or do they use what is available easily in the market in the initial stages and then make an attempt to indigenise over the life-cycle of the product? The latter is always the more sensible way to go.
In the final analysis, the Tejas is an aircraft that has been designed by Indians in India, and is tailored to Indian requirements. If that doesn’t make it indigenous, I don’t know what does.
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