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One of the most frequently cited indicators of
Indias status as a rising power is its growing
emphasis on naval modernization. Historically a
land power with a continentalist mindset, in
recent years India has started to expand its
strategic horizons and devote greater attention
toward the maritime domain. Although the
Indian Navy remains the countrys smallest
military service in terms of both personnel and
funding, its share of the national defense
budget has progressively increased (albeit
defense was cut across the board in the latest
defense budget). These added resources have
supported a number of high-profile acquisition
programs, including aircraft carriers, destroyers,
frigates, amphibious transport ships,
submarines, and surveillance aircraft. In the
words of Indias former Chief of the Naval
Staff, this additional funding also reflects an
increasing realization that the destiny of our
nation is entwined with our maritime destiny.
While Indias goals are lofty, its aspirations are
understandable. Rising powers often look to the
sea for a host of reasons: to extend their
defensive perimeters against potential
competitors, to expand and protect their
overseas commerce, to intervene abroad in
response to emerging threats or humanitarian
impulses, and to gain prestige. For its part,
New Delhi has good reasons to travel down the
path of its predecessors. Despite having little
interest in maritime power-projection for most
of its history, Indias economic growth now
depends upon seaborne commerce, particularly
imported crude oil from the Middle East and
Africa, along with exports to various countries
in East Asia. As a result, it has a natural stake
in protecting the sea lines of communication
(SLOCs) that stretch from the Arabian Sea to
the Indonesian archipelago.
In addition, Chinas growing interest in the
Indian Ocean has provided India with an
incentive to develop larger and more capable
naval forces. Given its own dependence on
commercial exports as well as imported natural
resources and raw materials, Beijing has a
strong interest in preventing any disruption to
the SLOCs that connect it to the global
economy. It is also skeptical that it can rely on
other nations to protect its overseas trade.
Today, China does not have the force structure
or overseas basing infrastructure necessary to
monitor and defend distant sea-lanes running
through the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, it is
taking steps to mitigate its Malacca dilemma,
from building up its surface naval forces and
undersea fleet, to financing deep-water
commercial ports in littoral and island nations,
to making diplomatic inroads with key actors
across the Indian Ocean basin. In the future,
these efforts could give China the ability to
sustain forward-deployed forces in greater
numbersand might upend the maritime
military balance in the region.
Of course, similar interests could be an impetus
for strategic collaboration between India and
China. In this case, however, they are just as
likely to spark a maritime security dilemma.
Capabilities that will enable New Delhi to
project power and protect SLOCs could also be
used to threaten Beijings seaborne trade,
leading China to further develop its so-called
string of pearls. Likewise, Chinas efforts to
increase its military presence in the Indian
Ocean region are already viewed as an early
form of encirclement in India, prompting
countermoves by New Delhi.
Despite these trends, efforts by India to
establish itself as a naval power to be reckoned
withnot just by weaker nations in its
neighborhood but also by extra-regional
powers such as Chinawill have to overcome a
number of serious obstacles.
First, given the enormous costs and complexity
of advanced naval platforms, any nation
attempting to build a capable blue water fleet
will confront a host of technical and financial
challenges. As the renowned strategist Colin
Gray explains, The aircraft carrier, the nuclear
submarine, and the antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) and air defense cruiser are the largest,
most complex, and inevitably most expensive,
weapon systems produced by contemporary
service-based economies. Second, these challenges are likely to be
magnified in Indias case by a variety of
domestic constraints, from excessive layers of
bureaucracy, to political gridlock, to frequent
allegations of corruption, all of which have
contributed to spiraling costs and repeated
delays in foreign and indigenous acquisition
programs.
Third, Indias turn to the sea is likely to be
tempered by its continuing focus on land-based
security challenges, including the enduring
threat of terrorism and insurgency, recurring
crises with its archival Pakistan, and,
increasingly, its longstanding border disputes
with China.
The Sino-Indian competition on land, once
relatively dormant, appears to be escalating.
Over the past several years China has been
building transportation and basing
infrastructure throughout the Tibet Autonomous
Region (TAR), which could enable it to deploy
considerable forces near contested areas in a
relatively short period of time. Incidents such
as the recent incursion by a Chinese unit
across the poorly demarcated Line of Actual
Control (LAC) dividing the two powers have
only heightened tensions between them. In
response, India has undertaken its own
infrastructure development projects , and is also
deploying combat aircraft, land-based cruise
missiles, and mountain warfare divisions to
fortify its northern borders.
Chinas actions are likely motivated by a
variety of factors. Given its persistent concerns
over the security of its SLOCs, however, one
goal may be keeping India on guard, off-
balance, and focused on the land rather than
the sea. If so, Chinese complaints about Indias
recent buildup on its side of the border suggest
that Beijing may be getting a bit more than it
bargained for. Nevertheless, should India
redress the imbalance of military power near its
disputed boundaries, China could still adopt
countermeasures to distract India from its
maritime ambitions, for example bolstering
military support to Pakistan to exacerbate and
exploit New Delhis longstanding fear of a two-
front war.
From an American perspective, this type of
continental security dilemma between India and
China might actually have unexpected benefits
while Beijing might not want New Delhi to
focus more on the sea, Washington might like
Beijing to focus more on the land. Yet this
dynamic will almost certainly hinder Indias
aspirations to become a major naval power.
Barring a dramatic change in New Delhis
security environment, the Indian Army and
Indian Air Force are likely to remain the
nations dominant military services, potentially
drowning out calls for continued naval
modernization.
Despite these issues, New Delhi does have an
alternative option for securing its interests in
the maritime domaina possible back-up plan
that might look increasingly attractive if its
aspirations outpace its capabilities. Rather than
emphasizing blue water naval forces, it could
take a page from Chinas playbook. Although
Beijing has been investing in maritime power-
projection forces such as surface combatants
and aircraft carriers, a core element of its
military modernization effort has been the
development of anti-access/area denial (A2/
AD) capabilities, including sea-based systems
such as missile boats and submarines, as well
as land-based systems such as maritime-
strike aircraft and its highly publicized (but still
unproven) DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile.
For China, which seems intent on deterring or
countering any American military intervention in
a local crisis or conflict, A2/AD capabilities
could be used to hold at risk the forward
military bases and extended supply lines that
the United States relies upon to deploy and
sustain its forces far from home. In a potential
Sino-Indian conflict in the Indian Ocean region,
however, India would be the side with the home
field advantage, while China would confront the
tyranny of distance. As a result, India might
look to develop its own anti-access option. At the center of this option would be the island
territories along Indias maritime flanks, namely
the Lakshadweep Islands off of its southwest
coast and especially the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands to the southeast. These territories,
which overlook critical Indian Ocean sea-lanes,
give New Delhi a toehold in the Arabian Sea
and the Bay of Bengal. Not surprisingly, then,
India has already taken steps to bolster its
military presence on these strategically
positioned islands. In 2001, for example, it
established a joint Far Eastern Naval Command
for its Andaman and Nicobar territories. Since
then, it has opened additional port facilities and
naval air stations throughout the island chain,
upgraded local infrastructure, and reportedly
deployed amphibious assault forces, fighter
aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. In
addition, New Delhi recently opened a
permanent naval base in the Lakshadweep
Islands to support counter-piracy operations,
prevent infiltration by extremists, and monitor
sea-lanes.
Looking ahead, India could further reinforce
these territories to bolster its strategic position
in the Indian Ocean, take advantage of Chinas
dependence on distant SLOCs, and
counterbalance efforts by Beijing to increase its
presence in the region. Rather than considering
the islands as simple hubs for surveillance
activities or launching points for amphibious
operations, New Delhi might come to view them
as the epicenters of denial zones. The larger
Andaman and Nicobar island chain could prove
particularly important by allowing India to
monitor and, if necessary, interdict maritime
traffic exiting or entering the Strait of Malacca.
With a combination of maritime-strike aircraft,
diesel-electric submarines, and hardened or
mobile anti-ship cruise missile batteries , India
could hold at risk ships approaching or leaving
the South China Sea. This could, in turn, limit
the ability of forward-deployed Chinese naval
forces to escort commercial ships the entire
length of their journey, isolate those forces from
potential reinforcements, or compel civilian and
military vessels to circumvent denial zones by
traveling through the southern Indian Ocean
and around Australiaat significant cost in
both time and money.
In the end, New Delhis naval capabilities may
never match its ambitions. If it recognizes its
limitations and takes advantage of its
opportunities, however, India could still exercise
significant influence in the maritime domain.
The question, then, is how others might
respond.
India
Indias status as a rising power is its growing
emphasis on naval modernization. Historically a
land power with a continentalist mindset, in
recent years India has started to expand its
strategic horizons and devote greater attention
toward the maritime domain. Although the
Indian Navy remains the countrys smallest
military service in terms of both personnel and
funding, its share of the national defense
budget has progressively increased (albeit
defense was cut across the board in the latest
defense budget). These added resources have
supported a number of high-profile acquisition
programs, including aircraft carriers, destroyers,
frigates, amphibious transport ships,
submarines, and surveillance aircraft. In the
words of Indias former Chief of the Naval
Staff, this additional funding also reflects an
increasing realization that the destiny of our
nation is entwined with our maritime destiny.
While Indias goals are lofty, its aspirations are
understandable. Rising powers often look to the
sea for a host of reasons: to extend their
defensive perimeters against potential
competitors, to expand and protect their
overseas commerce, to intervene abroad in
response to emerging threats or humanitarian
impulses, and to gain prestige. For its part,
New Delhi has good reasons to travel down the
path of its predecessors. Despite having little
interest in maritime power-projection for most
of its history, Indias economic growth now
depends upon seaborne commerce, particularly
imported crude oil from the Middle East and
Africa, along with exports to various countries
in East Asia. As a result, it has a natural stake
in protecting the sea lines of communication
(SLOCs) that stretch from the Arabian Sea to
the Indonesian archipelago.
In addition, Chinas growing interest in the
Indian Ocean has provided India with an
incentive to develop larger and more capable
naval forces. Given its own dependence on
commercial exports as well as imported natural
resources and raw materials, Beijing has a
strong interest in preventing any disruption to
the SLOCs that connect it to the global
economy. It is also skeptical that it can rely on
other nations to protect its overseas trade.
Today, China does not have the force structure
or overseas basing infrastructure necessary to
monitor and defend distant sea-lanes running
through the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, it is
taking steps to mitigate its Malacca dilemma,
from building up its surface naval forces and
undersea fleet, to financing deep-water
commercial ports in littoral and island nations,
to making diplomatic inroads with key actors
across the Indian Ocean basin. In the future,
these efforts could give China the ability to
sustain forward-deployed forces in greater
numbersand might upend the maritime
military balance in the region.
Of course, similar interests could be an impetus
for strategic collaboration between India and
China. In this case, however, they are just as
likely to spark a maritime security dilemma.
Capabilities that will enable New Delhi to
project power and protect SLOCs could also be
used to threaten Beijings seaborne trade,
leading China to further develop its so-called
string of pearls. Likewise, Chinas efforts to
increase its military presence in the Indian
Ocean region are already viewed as an early
form of encirclement in India, prompting
countermoves by New Delhi.
Despite these trends, efforts by India to
establish itself as a naval power to be reckoned
withnot just by weaker nations in its
neighborhood but also by extra-regional
powers such as Chinawill have to overcome a
number of serious obstacles.
First, given the enormous costs and complexity
of advanced naval platforms, any nation
attempting to build a capable blue water fleet
will confront a host of technical and financial
challenges. As the renowned strategist Colin
Gray explains, The aircraft carrier, the nuclear
submarine, and the antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) and air defense cruiser are the largest,
most complex, and inevitably most expensive,
weapon systems produced by contemporary
service-based economies. Second, these challenges are likely to be
magnified in Indias case by a variety of
domestic constraints, from excessive layers of
bureaucracy, to political gridlock, to frequent
allegations of corruption, all of which have
contributed to spiraling costs and repeated
delays in foreign and indigenous acquisition
programs.
Third, Indias turn to the sea is likely to be
tempered by its continuing focus on land-based
security challenges, including the enduring
threat of terrorism and insurgency, recurring
crises with its archival Pakistan, and,
increasingly, its longstanding border disputes
with China.
The Sino-Indian competition on land, once
relatively dormant, appears to be escalating.
Over the past several years China has been
building transportation and basing
infrastructure throughout the Tibet Autonomous
Region (TAR), which could enable it to deploy
considerable forces near contested areas in a
relatively short period of time. Incidents such
as the recent incursion by a Chinese unit
across the poorly demarcated Line of Actual
Control (LAC) dividing the two powers have
only heightened tensions between them. In
response, India has undertaken its own
infrastructure development projects , and is also
deploying combat aircraft, land-based cruise
missiles, and mountain warfare divisions to
fortify its northern borders.
Chinas actions are likely motivated by a
variety of factors. Given its persistent concerns
over the security of its SLOCs, however, one
goal may be keeping India on guard, off-
balance, and focused on the land rather than
the sea. If so, Chinese complaints about Indias
recent buildup on its side of the border suggest
that Beijing may be getting a bit more than it
bargained for. Nevertheless, should India
redress the imbalance of military power near its
disputed boundaries, China could still adopt
countermeasures to distract India from its
maritime ambitions, for example bolstering
military support to Pakistan to exacerbate and
exploit New Delhis longstanding fear of a two-
front war.
From an American perspective, this type of
continental security dilemma between India and
China might actually have unexpected benefits
while Beijing might not want New Delhi to
focus more on the sea, Washington might like
Beijing to focus more on the land. Yet this
dynamic will almost certainly hinder Indias
aspirations to become a major naval power.
Barring a dramatic change in New Delhis
security environment, the Indian Army and
Indian Air Force are likely to remain the
nations dominant military services, potentially
drowning out calls for continued naval
modernization.
Despite these issues, New Delhi does have an
alternative option for securing its interests in
the maritime domaina possible back-up plan
that might look increasingly attractive if its
aspirations outpace its capabilities. Rather than
emphasizing blue water naval forces, it could
take a page from Chinas playbook. Although
Beijing has been investing in maritime power-
projection forces such as surface combatants
and aircraft carriers, a core element of its
military modernization effort has been the
development of anti-access/area denial (A2/
AD) capabilities, including sea-based systems
such as missile boats and submarines, as well
as land-based systems such as maritime-
strike aircraft and its highly publicized (but still
unproven) DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile.
For China, which seems intent on deterring or
countering any American military intervention in
a local crisis or conflict, A2/AD capabilities
could be used to hold at risk the forward
military bases and extended supply lines that
the United States relies upon to deploy and
sustain its forces far from home. In a potential
Sino-Indian conflict in the Indian Ocean region,
however, India would be the side with the home
field advantage, while China would confront the
tyranny of distance. As a result, India might
look to develop its own anti-access option. At the center of this option would be the island
territories along Indias maritime flanks, namely
the Lakshadweep Islands off of its southwest
coast and especially the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands to the southeast. These territories,
which overlook critical Indian Ocean sea-lanes,
give New Delhi a toehold in the Arabian Sea
and the Bay of Bengal. Not surprisingly, then,
India has already taken steps to bolster its
military presence on these strategically
positioned islands. In 2001, for example, it
established a joint Far Eastern Naval Command
for its Andaman and Nicobar territories. Since
then, it has opened additional port facilities and
naval air stations throughout the island chain,
upgraded local infrastructure, and reportedly
deployed amphibious assault forces, fighter
aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. In
addition, New Delhi recently opened a
permanent naval base in the Lakshadweep
Islands to support counter-piracy operations,
prevent infiltration by extremists, and monitor
sea-lanes.
Looking ahead, India could further reinforce
these territories to bolster its strategic position
in the Indian Ocean, take advantage of Chinas
dependence on distant SLOCs, and
counterbalance efforts by Beijing to increase its
presence in the region. Rather than considering
the islands as simple hubs for surveillance
activities or launching points for amphibious
operations, New Delhi might come to view them
as the epicenters of denial zones. The larger
Andaman and Nicobar island chain could prove
particularly important by allowing India to
monitor and, if necessary, interdict maritime
traffic exiting or entering the Strait of Malacca.
With a combination of maritime-strike aircraft,
diesel-electric submarines, and hardened or
mobile anti-ship cruise missile batteries , India
could hold at risk ships approaching or leaving
the South China Sea. This could, in turn, limit
the ability of forward-deployed Chinese naval
forces to escort commercial ships the entire
length of their journey, isolate those forces from
potential reinforcements, or compel civilian and
military vessels to circumvent denial zones by
traveling through the southern Indian Ocean
and around Australiaat significant cost in
both time and money.
In the end, New Delhis naval capabilities may
never match its ambitions. If it recognizes its
limitations and takes advantage of its
opportunities, however, India could still exercise
significant influence in the maritime domain.
The question, then, is how others might
respond.
India
