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India planning nuclear first strikes against Pakistan (New York Times)

Mere mention of pre _emtive strikes make pakistan desperate nevertheless

India always have advantage in calculated first strikes

Great change dynamics
 
What if i say its just a tactic on paper only...No country uses nuke on their own soil...What I understand, is the moment Indian troops crossed Pakistani border, They will be safely dealt with but however the reinforcements, still on Indian land, about to invade us, will be targeted with tactical nukes...Tactical nukes will be detonated on Indian soil...
reinforcements will be allowed to enter our soil. We love peace and sovereignity od india and won't use nuclear weapon on it's soil.

Mere mention of pre _emtive strikes make pakistan desperate nevertheless

India always have advantage in calculated first strikes

Great change dynamics
First strike is the problem. The adverery could convert it into second small strike.
 
@Shajida Khan
What is your real name?
Amit Gupta etc
Since you created this fake ID with wrong spellings of Muslims female name

Next do care

Sajida Khan.

In Important note yes there are news that Indian losing fast over Kashmir and they want to end this mess ASAP because they are thinking if CPEC complete China would be directly involve in any conflict with Pakistan against India so they have advises from military brass to attack Pakistan first so that Pakistan became a state of hunger and death.

But losers don't know we would strike back thinking end of world means if no Pakistan then no India.
India planning nuclear first strikes against Pakistan (New York Times)
Pakistan's defense planers should wake up

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/...-may-be-rethinking-nuclear-first-strikes.html

India, Long at Odds With Pakistan, May Be Rethinking ...

www.nytimes.com
India may be reinterpreting its nuclear weapons doctrine, circumstantial evidence suggests, with potentially significant ramifications for the already ...


India, Long at Odds With Pakistan, May Be Rethinking Nuclear First Strikes

www.nytimes.com
Indian leaders are thought to be pondering pre-emptive strikes against the Pakistani arsenal in the event of war. That could alter a tenuous balance of power.
India, Long at Odds With Pakistan, May Be Rethinking Nuclear First Strikes
By MAX FISHER, March 31, 2017

India may be reinterpreting its nuclear weapons doctrine, circumstantial evidence suggests, with potentially significant ramifications for the already tenuous nuclear balance in South Asia. New assessments suggest that India is considering allowing for pre-emptive nuclear strikes against Pakistan's arsenal in the event of a war. This would not formally change India's nuclear doctrine, which bars it from launching a first strike, but would loosen its interpretation to deem pre-emptive strikes as defensive.
It would also change India's likely targets, in the event of a war, to make a nuclear exchange more winnable and, therefore, more thinkable. Analysts' assessments, based on recent statements by senior Indian officials, are necessarily speculative. States with nuclear weapons often leave ambiguity in their doctrines to prevent adversaries from exploiting gaps in their proscriptions and to preserve flexibility. But signs of a strategic adjustment in India are mounting.
This comes against a backdrop of long-simmering tensions between India and Pakistan — including over state-sponsored terrorism and the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir — which have already led to several wars, the most recent in 1999. The new interpretation would be a significant shift in India's posture that could have far-reaching implications in the region, even if war never comes. Pakistan could feel compelled to expand its arsenal to better survive a pre-emptive strike, in turn setting off an Indian buildup.
This would be more than an arms race, said Vipin Narang, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor who studies nuclear powers. "It's very scary because all the 'first-strike instability' stuff is real," Mr. Narang said, referring to a dynamic in which two nuclear adversaries both perceive a strong incentive to use their warheads first in a war. This is thought to make nuclear conflict more likely.
Hidden in Plain Sight
Hints of a high-level Indian debate over the nuclear doctrine mounted with a recent memoir by Shivshankar Menon, India's national security adviser from 2011 to 2014. "There is a potential gray area as to when India would use nuclear weapons first" against a nuclear-armed adversary, Mr. Menon wrote. India, he added, "might find it useful to strike first" against an adversary that appeared poised to launch or that "had declared it would certainly use its weapons" — most likely a veiled reference to Pakistan.
Mr. Narang presented the quotations, along with his interpretation, in Washington last week, during a major nuclear policy conference hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "There is increasing evidence that India will not allow Pakistan to go first," he told a gathering of international government officials and policy experts. Mr. Menon's book, he said, "clearly carves out an exception for pre-emptive Indian first use in the very scenario that is most likely to occur in South Asia."
The passage alone does not prove a policy shift. But in context alongside other developments, it suggests either that India has quietly widened its strategic options or that officials are hoping to stir up just enough ambiguity to deter its adversaries. After Mr. Narang's presentation generated attention in the South Asian news media, Mr. Menon told an Indian columnist, "India's nuclear doctrine has far greater flexibility than it gets credit for."
Mr. Menon declined an interview request for this article. When told what the article would say, he did not challenge its assertions. India's Foreign Ministry did not respond to a request for comment. Whether these signals indicate a real shift or a strategic feint, analysts believe they are intended to right a strategic imbalance that has been growing for almost a decade.
The Pakistan Problem
Should India sustain a nuclear attack, its doctrine calls for a major retaliation, most likely by targeting its adversary's cities. When this policy was announced in 2003, it fit the threat posed by Pakistan's arsenal of long-range, city-destroying weapons. Since then, Pakistan has developed smaller warheads designed for battlefield use. These were meant to address Pakistan's India problem: The Indian military is much larger, virtually ensuring its victory in an all-out war.
Such weapons could be used against invading Indian troops, halting a war before it could be lost. This would exploit a gap in India's doctrine: It is hard to imagine that India would escalate to total nuclear war, as its doctrine commands, over a small battlefield strike on Pakistani soil. This created a Pakistan problem for India: Its chief adversary had made low-level nuclear war thinkable, even potentially winnable. Since then, there have been growing hints of debate over modifying the Indian doctrine.
B. S. Nagal, a lieutenant general who led India's nuclear command from 2008 to 2011, argued in a 2014 article for a policy of "ambiguity" as to whether India would launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike. Also that year, the Bharatiya Janata Party said it would consider changing India's doctrine, but then abandoned this position. It took power in national elections a few weeks later.
Last November, Manohar Parrikar, then the defense minister, said India's prohibition against nuclear first use was too restrictive, though he added that this was only his opinion. Another reason analysts suspect change: India's doctrine initially served to persuade the United States to drop economic sanctions it had imposed over nuclear tests. Given President Trump's softer stance on proliferation, that impetus may no longer apply.
'The Seductive Logic'
Mr. Menon, in his book, seemed to settle on an answer to India's quandary: "Pakistani tactical nuclear weapon use would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive first strike against Pakistan," he wrote. The word "comprehensive" refers to a nuclear attack against an adversary's arsenal, rather than its cities. It is meant to instigate and quickly win a nuclear exchange, leaving the other side disarmed.
Taken with a policy of pre-emption, these two shifts would seem to address India's Pakistan problem, in theory persuading Pakistani leaders that a limited nuclear war would be too dangerous to pursue. For India, Mr. Narang said, "you can really see the seductive logic" to such an approach. This would be "really the only pathway you have if you're going to have a credible nuclear deterrence."
It is impossible to know whether statements like Mr. Menon's are intended to quietly reveal a policy shift, while avoiding the crisis that would be set off by a formal change, or merely stir doubt. Either way, the intent appears the same: to create just enough uncertainty in the minds of Pakistani leaders that they become restrained by the potential threat of pre-emptive Indian strikes. But if that threat is plausible, then the distinction between a real threat and a feint blurs.
Use It or Lose It
Shashank Joshi, a fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, said he suspected that Mr. Menon was signaling something subtler: a warning that India's strategy could adapt in wartime, potentially to include first strikes. That distinction may be important to Indian officials, but it could be lost on Pakistani war planners who have to consider all scenarios. Mr. Joshi, in a policy brief for the Lowy Institute, an Australian think tank, tried to project what would happen if India embraced such a policy, or if Pakistan concluded that it had.
First would come the arms race. The fear of a first strike, Mr. Joshi wrote, "incentivizes Pakistan to undertake a massive nuclear buildup, in order to dispel any possibility of India disarming it entirely." India, whatever its strategy, would feel compelled to keep pace. Second comes the tightening of nuclear tripwires, Mr. Joshi warned, as "this reciprocal fear of first use could pull each side in the direction of placing nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert."
Finally, in any major armed crisis, the logic of a first strike would pull both sides toward nuclear escalation. "If Pakistan thinks India will move quickly, Pakistan has an incentive to go even quicker, and to escalate straight to the use of the longer-range weapons," Mr. Joshi wrote. This thinking would apply to India as well, creating a situation in which the nuclear arsenal becomes, as analysts dryly put it, "use it or lose it."
'That Can Blow Back Real Quick'
The most optimistic scenario would lock South Asia in a state of mutually assured destruction, like that of the Cold War, in which armed conflict would so reliably escalate to nuclear devastation that both sides would deem war unthinkable. This would be of global concern. A 2008 study found that, although India and Pakistan have relatively small arsenals, a full nuclear exchange would push a layer of hot, black smoke into the atmosphere.
This would produce what some researchers call without hyperbole "a decade without summer." As crops failed worldwide, the resulting global famine would kill a billion people, the study estimated. But nuclear analysts worry that South Asia's dynamics would make any state of mutually assured destruction less stable than that of the Cold War.
For one thing, Pakistani leaders view even conventional war with India as an existential threat, making them more willing to accept nuclear risks. For another, a large-scale terrorist attack in India could be perceived, rightly or wrongly, as Pakistan-sponsored, potentially inciting war. The disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, where conflict sometimes boils over, adds a troubling layer of volatility.
"Maybe it is this Reaganesque strategy," Mr. Narang said, comparing India's potential strategic shift to President Ronald Reagan's arms race with the Soviet Union. "But Pakistan has a much bigger security problem than the Soviet Union did. And that can blow back real quick."

Please stop this BS of atomic war mongering from both side its simply a mutually assured destruction.
India will never start a nuclear war against Pakistan as pre-emptive strike because one need ball to do so which Indians don't have (only chest thumping).
Remember both will avoid using WMD'S and world powers will not allow them to escalate the situation at that height.
Pakistan has plans to use its field weapons like NASER only, if we are loosing conventional war and enemy forces have entered /crossed international border or LOC. I am not convince that either side have intention to use these atomic bombs in actual.

Let suppose there is a outbreak of war , at present, india will have to use his all or most of the strategic weapons as pre-emptive strike, and in response Pakistan don't get chance to use his single strategic weapon, which is a impossible at present with PAK capabilities of attack from land, air and sea . In such scenario India will be vulnerable to get a similar type of attack from CHINA as pre-emptive strike and no one in world will be able to stop CHINA as only conventional forces of CHINA will be able to conquer whole india, india without or with few strategic weapons in hand. or China may use a few to stop the similar thread of pre-emptive strike from india against China.

In second case if PAK use his strategic weapons all of them or only few (means 30-50% if india attack first). In this situation india will not be able to survive because they will be receiving 40 to 60 atomic bomb at least from our side. Means in case of atomic war between two countries there are chances they will together use 100-200 WMD'S and no one will survive at least in both countries and a lot of deaths in neighbouring countries, and deadly after effects of war at globe.
 
reinforcements will be allowed to enter our soil. We love peace and sovereignity od india and won't use nuclear weapon on it's soil.


First strike is the problem. The adverery could convert it into second small strike.
Probaly advisory only have 12 kt weapon at its arsenal

Propoably half of its capability is destroyed in first strike itself

Then again its waste of my time explain to a noob who don't understand how nuclear reacter works
 
no first use policy was a farse... it was always first strike...

if there is really a change in policy.... are they idiots that they will announce it internationally?????




how about a thousand years of muslim rule without any significant resistance??? Indians have long been no balls before invention of cricket even

Why you tend to forget that you were also ruled by foreigners (Turks/ Afans), there were people who stood against and there were weak who gave up their culture, language, their way of life and bowed down to invaders and adapted their way
 
There is none, Cleanest bomb will be a hydrogen bomb but even that will produce a hell lot of neutrons. Besides, Pakistan is in no position to prepare a new design and conduct a nuclear test.
did our scientist told you?
please grow up. world had similar views about Pakistan's nuclear capabilities.
 
did our scientist told you?
please grow up. world had similar views about Pakistan's nuclear capabilities.
Well, I am not doubting your ability to build nuclear weapons. Only your ability to build an almost impossible noval bomb. Besides, will you like to get sanctioned to hell if you try testing a new design?
 
What I find interesting in this thread is that the same threat was been used from Pakistan since 1998 or so but now that India considers using pre-emptive nuclear strike, all Pakistani are suddenly concerned.



We do not even know if your country is Pakistan. If you can doubt my faith and name, your own nationality is also doubtful.
I have never seen a single muslim from india favouring india to nuke Pak. That's why your ID and Religion is questionable by Pak posters here.
 
I have never seen a single muslim from india favouring india to nuke Pak. That's why your ID and Religion is questionable by Pak posters here.
You know who made Indian WMDs possible? It was a Muslim called APJ Kalaam. Is that not enough proof that Muslims in India can be pro India and somewhat 'non-pro' Pakistan?
 
i couldn't read the article. but one advise, please bring good quality cameras with you. at least your public would know that Sir-jee Kal-strike hui hai.
 
Well, I am not doubting your ability to build nuclear weapons. Only your ability to build an almost impossible noval bomb. Besides, will you like to get sanctioned to hell if you try testing a new design?
Did you ever read about cold test? Pakistan did the same in 1980's and later India give us an opportunity to actually conduct the test in 1998. Those were the cold test that Pakistan was 100% sure about its capabilities.
 
Did you ever read about cold test? Pakistan did the same in 1980's and later India give us an opportunity to actually conduct the test in 1998. Those were the cold test that Pakistan was 100% sure about its capabilities.
As I said, I do not doubt your ability to make nuclear bombs, what is being described in that post was a nuclear weapon with very very less fallout.

That will call for a design which is purely fusion or highly fusion based. We both know that calls for a full test, being a noval design.

Even pure fusion based design will produce a shit load of neutrons, inducing radioactivity in otherwise stable atoms around the blast.
 
You know who made Indian WMDs possible? It was a Muslim called APJ Kalaam. Is that not enough proof that Muslims in India can be pro India and somewhat 'non-pro' Pakistan?
Scientist only gives deterrence to nation, only politicians are retard enough to use it as WMD's.
 
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