Hindu Nationalism’s History and Tactics
B. Communal Violence as a Political Strategy
Source: Overlooked Danger: The Security and Rights Implications of Hindu Nationalism in India, published in
Harvard Human Rights Journal
As Hindu nationalism gains legitimacy abroad, recent electoral wins by the BJP have emboldened its sangh parivar affiliates to continue to pursue their communally divisive strategies at home. In December 2002, the BJP won a decisive victory in state-assembly elections in Gujarat, handing the political party its only conclusive win in recent years. Employing a hardline Hindutva platform, the BJP gained the most seats in areas that were affected by communal violence in February and March 2002, and in which members of the BJP were implicated. The elections were considered critical to the political future of the party that had suffered a series of election losses in key states.
Soon after the Gujarat win, VHP International General Secretary Praveen Togadia asserted that the experiment of the “Hindutva lab” would be repeated elsewhere in the country, raising concerns that violence would again be deployed as a political strategy. Togadia went on to state that “[a] Hindu Rashtra [state] can be expected in the next two years . . . . We will change India’s history and Pakistan’s geography by then.”[21] Nine states were set to go to the polls in 2003, followed by national elections in 2004 in which the BJP hopes to gain enough seats to rule outside the constraints of a coalition government.
While Gujarat could be the harbinger of things to come, it is also the end result of years of grassroots rabble-rousing by the sangh parivar. The centerpiece of its strategy is a campaign to build a temple to the Hindu God Ram at the site of the destroyed sixteenth-century Babri Masjid (mosque) in the city of Ayodhya in the north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. The temple campaign, the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, is led by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. The VHP claims that the site of the mosque was actually the birthplace of Ram and that a temple at that site had been destroyed in order to build the mosque.[22]
On December 6, 1992, the mosque was destroyed. In the months preceding the demolition, the BJP, the RSS, the VHP, and the Shiv Sena[23] had called for the construction of a temple on the site of the mosque as integral to their struggle to achieve Hindu rule in India. Over 150,000 supporters converged on Ayodhya, and, using hammers and pick-axes, reduced the mosque to rubble. The police did not intervene. The incident sparked violence across the country in which at least 1700 people were killed, thousands were injured, and an unknown number of women and girls were raped. The majority of the victims were Muslim. The focal point of the violence was the city of Bombay, the capital of Maharashtra state. For the ten days following December 6, much of the violence took place between the police and Muslims protesting the destruction of the mosque. Police fired on demonstrators, entered and burned Muslim homes, and fired on their residents. Hindus marching in support of the destruction of the mosque were left alone. In the latter days of the violence, members of the Shiv Sena attacked Muslim households alongside the police.[24]
The Srikrishna Commission was established in response to the violence in Bombay. The Commission’s report, presented to the government of Maharashtra in February 1998, more than five years after the violence took place, determined that the attacks were the result of a deliberate and systematic effort to incite violence against Muslims. It singled out Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackeray and Chief Minister Manohar Joshi as responsible. The Shiv Sena-BJP-led government refused to adopt the Commission’s recommendations, and instead labeled the report “anti-Hindu.”[25] The campaign to build the Ram temple is ongoing and continues to raise the specter of further violence in the country. The recent revival of the campaign in 2002, corresponding to BJP election losses in key states, centered on the March 15, 2002 deadline set by the VHP to bring stone pillars to the site in order to initiate the temple’s construction.[26] In the weeks preceding the violence in Gujarat, Hindu activists had been traveling to and from Ayodhya on the Sabarmati Express train. On February 27, 2002, following weeks of rising tensions between Hindu activists and Muslim vendors at the train station, a Muslim mob attacked Hindu activists riding in a train car of the Sabarmati Express. Two train cars were set on fire, killing at least fifty-eight people, including women and children.
Between February 28 and March 2, 2002, a three-day retaliatory killing spree by Hindus left hundreds of Muslims dead and tens of thousands homeless and dispossessed throughout Gujarat, marking the country’s worst religious bloodletting since the Bombay riots a decade earlier. The looting and burning of Muslim homes, shops, restaurants, and places of worship was also widespread. Tragically consistent with a longstanding pattern of attacks on minorities, tribals, and Dalits in India, and with previous episodes of large-scale communal violence, scores of Muslim girls and women were brutally raped before being mutilated and burnt to death.
Numerous Indian and international human rights organizations, as well as the Indian media, reported that the attacks were planned well in advance of the Godhra incident, with extensive support from state officials. A report released by Human Rights Watch in April 2002 stated that the Hindu mobs were guided by computer printouts listing the addresses of Muslim families and their properties, information obtained from the Ahmedabad municipal corporation among other sources, and em-barked on a murderous rampage confident that the police was with them. In many cases, the police led the charge, using gunfire to kill Muslims who got in the mobs’ way. A key BJP state minister is reported to have taken over police control rooms in Ahmedabad on the first day of the carnage, issuing orders to disregard pleas for assistance from Muslims. Portions of the Gujarati language press meanwhile printed fabricated stories and statements openly calling on Hindus to avenge the Godhra attacks.[27]
The police and various state officials were implicated in many of the attacks, in some cases as passive observers and in others as participants in the burning and looting of shops and homes and the killing of Muslims. In many cases the police came ahead of the mobs, aiming and firing at Muslim youth that got in the way.[28] In July 2002, results of an official investigation by the Ahmedabad-based Forensic Science Laboratory stated that the fire on the Sabarmati Express in Godhra could not have been set by the mob from the outside as had been alleged; the fire, it claimed, was set from inside the train.[29] Allegations have also emerged that the Godhra victims may not have all been Hindu activists, whose deaths were allegedly avenged in the retaliatory killing of Muslims. Railway authorities have also consistently refused to publish the list of passenger names.[30] These and other reports have cast a shadow on the events of February 27. Investigations into the attack were ongoing at this writing.
In the aftermath of the violence, Muslim victims have been denied equal protection of the law and equal treatment in the disbursement of relief and rehabilitation services. An estimated 100,000 people, a majority of them Muslim, were internally displaced in the state following the massacres. For months they lived in makeshift relief camps throughout Gujarat. The state failed to provide them with adequate security or relief. The burden of providing much needed food and medical supplies rested largely with Muslim charities and nongovernmental organizations.[31] By October 2002, most of the camps had been closed, forcing Muslims to return to what was left of their homes or seek shelter elsewhere, fearing ongoing violence at home.[32]
Perpetrators continue to enjoy ongoing impunity for the attacks. The Human Rights Watch report adds:Eyewitnesses filed numerous police First Information Reports (FIRs), the initial reports of a crime recorded by the police, that named local VHP, BJP, and Bajrang Dal leaders as instigators or participants in the attacks. Few if any of these leaders have been arrested as the police, reportedly under instructions from the state, face continuous pressure not to arrest them or to reduce the severity of the charges filed. In many instances, the police have also refused to include in FIRs the names of perpetrators identified by the victims. Police have, however, filed false charges against Muslim youth arbitrarily detained during combing operations in Muslim neighborhoods that have been largely destroyed. The state government has entrusted a criminal probe into the deadliest of attacks in Ahmedabad, in the Naroda Patia and Gulmarg Society neighborhoods, to an officer handpicked by the VHP, the organization implicated in organizing and perpetrating these massacres.[33]
By February 2003, almost a year since the violence began, not a single trial related to the events had resulted in a conviction. Lawyers representing Muslim victims were losing faith that justice could be served in a state where the BJP was in power. Eyewitnesses, still under continuous threat, had bartered their security and the security of their loved ones in exchange for turning “hostile” as witnesses, or simply not showing up when the case went to trial. Even when witnesses would take the stand, the public prosecutor and the judge, in league with the defendants, ensured that the cases ended in acquittal.[34] The justice machinery has, in effect, been stacked against Muslims, a process that began years before the massacres.
The BJP first came to power in Gujarat in 1995. The state has since been dubbed a Hindutva “laboratory.” Through years of intense political, social, and even educational activity, the BJP has sought to infiltrate the state’s law enforcement, civil, and judicial administration with those sympathetic to the Hindutva cause. A ten-day spate of violence against Christians in Dangs district, Gujarat, between December 25, 1998 and January 3, 1999, gave some indication of the extent of this infiltration. Members of the RSS, the VHP, the Bajrang Dal, and the Hindu Jagran Manch (“HJM”
[35] were responsible for the attacks. Local police refused to register complaints by Christian victims.[36]
Christian leaders, individuals, and institutions nationwide came under attack in India soon after the BJP came to power at the federal level in March 1998. While a majority of the reported incidents that year occurred in Gujarat, attacks were also reported in Maharashtra, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Haryana, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Manipur, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, and New Delhi. Attacks included the killing of priests and missionaries and the raping of nuns. Christian institutions, including schools, churches, colleges, and cemeteries, were also destroyed.[37] The intensity and frequency of attacks increased in September and October 1999, just before national parliamentary elections. Corresponding closely to particular electoral contests in which Hindu nationalist groups pursued major strategic goals, the attacks also continued in the periods following electoral victory. Years later, these attacks are still ongoing.[38]
In part, Christian institutions and individuals have been targeted for their role in promoting health, literacy, and economic independence among Dalit and tribal community members. With upper-caste Hindu economic privilege at stake, keeping Dalits and tribals in a state of economic dependency is a motivating factor in anti-Christian violence and propaganda. As a result, the sangh parivar has also accused Christians of converting Dalits and tribals by coercion or force. Many tribals and Dalits have converted to Christianity in an effort to escape their impoverished state and abusive treatment under India’s caste system.[39] India’s National Commission for Minorities has found no evidence to back up the charges that Dalits and tribals are being converted by force.[40] Animists or spirit worshippers by nature, many tribals do not practice Hinduism. Much like Dalits, they traditionally fall outside the Hindu fold and are the prime targets of the VHP’s “reconversion” campaigns.[4gislation in all other states.[42] Moves to ban religious conversions, the increased recruiting of Dalits and tribals into the RSS fold, and the “reconversion” of Dalits and tribals to Hinduism are parts of a broader strategy to recast these traditionally marginalized groups into a Hindu identity and deploy them in anti-Christian and anti-Muslim violence. They have succeeded in part: Dalit and tribal groups were also implicated in some of the attacks against Muslims in Gujarat. Politically, the vilification of Christians and Muslims is also a synthesizing feature of Hindutva that helps to consolidate the Hindu vote bank while stemming the tide of defecting Dalit and tribal voters to opposition parties. The vilification is also seeping into mainstream discourse—most powerfully, through the medium of education.