India-Pakistan war games, and Cold Start

[nakodo]

Anyone of you had the opportunity to have a look at the benchmarking data collected from the Cold Start war games on the Indian side ?

Why do you think IA will publicize it? So Pakistan can pick loopholes?

 

[Justin Joseph]

Not True Justin....

Water from the Indus irrigates the plains of Punjab, Haryana as well...
that is Indus and its tributaries.....

oh really, i suggest u to just Google and learn.

Indus just flows from Tibet>>to Leh (India)>>then Pakistani occupied Kashmir, then towards Pakistani Punjab, Sindh to the sea.

who told u Indus irrigates Punjab or Haryana. We are talking about Indus not tributaries.

 

[S.U.R.B.]

I don't think there can be any cold start during the Hot hostility.

 

[Peshwa]

oh really, i suggest u to just Google and learn.

Indus just flows from Tibet>>to Leh (India)>>then Pakistani occupied Kashmir, then towards Pakistani Punjab, Sindh to the sea.

who told u Indus irrigates Punjab or Haryana. We are talking about Indus not tributaries.

Justin...

Do read what I wrote carefully.....

I clearly worded my post as "The water from the Indus........"

The water from the Indus through the tributaries of Sutlej, Beas and Rabi do irrigate the lands of Punjab and Haryana....I also specified tributaries in my post....

I wasnt wrong in my assertion....But yes if speaking purely of "Indus", it only passes through Kashmir.....

Do we concur?

 

[hillman32]

Any special reason? So long as military imbalance is in India's favour it was good then and it is good now.

offensive elements are positioned on the border, that is their usual position & there is no mobilization. The world will know about it after the first few punches have been exchanged.

The idea of strike formations died when Op Parakram fizzled.


Kargil '99 scuffle
Mumbai '08 war drums sounded

?

You have no idea - What Cold Start Strategy is

Read Rhetoric of Sunder Ji - if you can find.................

 

[nakodo]

You have no idea - What Cold Start Strategy is

Read Rhetoric of Sunder Ji - if you can find.................

Sunderji = Op Parakram = old Army thinking
He has nothing to do with cold start, but everything to do with heavily muscled strike formations.

FYI:
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers10\paper991.html

INDIA’S NEW "COLD START" WAR DOCTRINE STRATEGICALLY REVIEWED

by Dr Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations: India unveiled officially its new war doctrine on April 28, 2004 at the Army Commander’s Conference that took place last week. Obviously, the need for a new war doctrine was decades-long overdue, but it seems that the lessons of the Kargil War reinforced by the severe limitations imposed on the Indian Army in the run-up to and during Operation PRAKARAM in 2001-2002 hastened the Indian military hierarchy towards this end.

General Padmanabhan the Chief of Army Staff at the time of Operation PRAKARAM had initiated the process of formulating a new war doctrine and the fruitation now seems to have taken place after a series of major joint exercises between the Indian Army and Indian Air Force including massive live fire power demonstrations.

It seems that the new Cold War Strategy would now be discussed at various levels of three Services and fine tuned. Needless to say that in any future conflict scenario where a “blitzkrieg” type strategy is going to be followed; joint operations involving the Indian Army, Indian Air Force and Indian Navy would be an imperative.

Security requirements did not permit the spelling out of adequate details of the “Cold Start Strategy” by the Chief of Army Staff. However, it is not difficult to visualize what this new war doctrine conceptually incorporates as it is said to revolve around the employment of “integrated battle groups” for offensive operations.

Such strategy did exist in NATO and was being taught at the Royal British Army Staff College. Camberley, UK which the author attended in 1971. In NATO terminology, “integrated” groups for offensive operations existed at three levels. The highest was “ combat group” and “combat command” based on a divisional or brigade Headquarters (armoured/infantry mechanised) under which were a flexible number of “battle groups” (based on an armoured regiment/mechanized infantry battalion Headquarters) and the lowest was the “combat team” (based on an armoured squadron/mechanized infantry company Headquarters). The groupings at the each level were task-oriented in terms of varying composition of armour and infantry elements with integrated attack helicopters of the Army Aviation and the Air Force besides close support of ground attack Air Force squadrons. Also, was integrated Army Aviation surveillance helicopters. Command and control helicopters were available too.

Media, reports indicate that the new “Cold Start Strategy” visualizes the use of eight “integrated battle groups”. For the purposes of this strategic review the eight “integrated battle groups” being talked about will be taken to mean eight integrated armoured division/mechanized infantry division sized forces with varying composition of armour, artillery, infantry and combat air support- all integrated. This would be a fair assumption to be made for our discussion in case the intended aim of this new war doctrine is to be achieved.

The unveiling of a new war doctrine throws up a host of factors for discussion in terms of why a new war doctrine is required, what are the attendant factors in putting it into operation, the limiting factors that may come into play, the responses of the enemy to such a new war doctrine and a host of other associated considerations.

“Cold Start” War Doctrine-The Strategic Conceptual Underpinnings: In the absence of more details, and rightfully not spelt out due to security reasons, the strategic conceptual underpinnings of India’s new war doctrine can be envisaged as under:

* Indian Army’s combat potential would be fully harnessed. The distinction between “strike corps” and “defensive corps” in ground holding role will be gradually diminished.

* The offensive military power available with defensive corps in the form of independent armoured brigades and mechanized brigades, by virtue of their forward locations would no longer remain idle waiting to launch counterattacks. They would be employed at the first go and mobilized within hours.

* Strike Corps may be re-constituted and reinforced to provide offensive elements for these eight or so “battle groups” to launch multiple strikes into Pakistan, fully integrated with the Indian Air Force and in the Southern Sector with naval aviation assets.

* Obviously, then, India’s strike corps elements will have to be moved well forward from existing garrisons. It also means that Strike Corps would no longer sit idle waiting for the opportune moment, which never came in the last three wars. The Strike Corps remained unutilised.

On another plane that is at the politico-strategic or politico-military level this new war doctrine seems to be aiming at the following:

* Cutting out long drawn out military mobilization running into weeks.

* The above results in loss of surprise at the strategic and military level.

* The above also gives time to Pakistan’s external patrons like USA and China to start exerting coercive pressures and mobilizing world opinion against India as witnessed in Operation Prakaram.

* Long mobilization time also gives the political leadership in India time to waver under pressure, and in the process deny Indian Army its due military victories.

* The new war doctrine would compel the political leadership to give political approval ‘ab-initio’ and thereby free the Armed Forces to generate their full combat potential from the outset.

Cold Start Strategy” is Aimed at Pakistan and is Offensive Oriented- The Pakistan Army, (not the Pakistani people) has a compulsive fixation for military adventurism against India, notwithstanding the Islamabad Accord January 2004.

India in the past has been hamstrung in cutting Pakistan to size due to a combination of United States pressures coming into play in the run-up to decisive military action and the hesitancy of India’s political leadership. Military surprise was lost due to long mobilization times. The “ Cold Start Strategy” can be said to be aimed militarily at Pakistan and is offensive-operations specific.

“Cold Start Strategy”- The Indian Political Parameters That Need to Come into Play: Such an offensive strategy can only be successful if the Indian political leadership at the given time of operational execution of this strategy has:

* Political will to use offensive military power.

* Political will to use pre-emptive military strategies.

* Political sagacity to view strategic military objectives with clarity.

* Political determination to pursue military operations to their ultimate conclusion without succumbing to external pressures.

* Political determination to cross nuclear threshold if Pakistan seems so inclined.

If the above are missing, as they have been from 1947 to 2004, Indian Army’s new war doctrine would not add up to anything. For more detailed views on this subject, see the authors recent book: “India’s Defence Policies and Strategic Thought: A Comparative Analysis” (reviewed on SAAG website as “Igniting Strategic Mindsets in Indians:; SAAG paper no. 657 dated 09-04-2003)

India’s National Military Directives Need Change: Indian Governments, irrespective of political hues have shied away from enunciating India’s national interests from which flows all military planning. However, what can be called as a sort of national military directive, which the Indian Army under political compulsions stands fixated is “No Loss of Territory, Not Even an Inch”. Heads have rolled in the Army on this account in past wars.

“Cold Start Strategy” with its inherent character of mobile warfare using mechanized military formations, and especially where defensive formations may be called upon to undertake such operations, may at times involve some loss of territory in plains warfare.

If the above is not acceptable then strategically and militarily the status quo needs to be maintained with Indian Army fixated on linear defences. This author had argued against this as early as 1985 in an article “India’s Linear Fixations” in the Combat Journal of what is now called the Army War College.

India’s Strategic Military Objectives Needs to be Made Clear: India’s strategic military objectives need to:

* Shift from capturing bits of Pakistan territory in small scale multiple offensives to be used as bargaining chips after the cease fire.

* Focus on the destruction of the Pakistani Army and its military machine without much collateral damage to Pakistani civilians.

All the three armed forces have to synergise operations towards destruction of the Pakistan Army as it is that which enslaves Pakistan, impedes democracy in Pakistan and indulges in military adventurism against India, including proxy wars and terrorism.

It is for nothing that the Pakistani military rulers and the Pakistani Army have hid from the Pakistani nation the causes of their military failure against India in 1971, 1999 (Kargil) and a catastrophic defeat in January 2002 if India’s political leadership had not restrained the Indian Army during Operation Prakaram. “Cold Start Strategy” should therefore be aimed at the destruction of the Pakistan Army’s military machine. India’s Army Commanders can infer what this implies.

“Cold Start” War Doctrine-The Imperatives of Dedicated Air Force Close Air Support and Dedicated Ground Attack Squadrons: The Indian Air Force (IAF) would have a very crucial and critical role to play in the successful implementation of this new war doctrine. The “Cold Start” eight or so “battle groups” cannot undertake “blitzkrieg” type military operations without an overwhelming air superiority and integrated close air support.

The IAF would therefore have to proportionately assign its combat assets to cater for the following:

* Achieve overall air superiority so as to paralyse the enemy’s Air Force or render it so ineffective as to be unable to seriously affect the area of operations of the “Cold Start” offensive “battle groups”.

* Dedicate a fair portion of its combat assets for the air defence of the Indian homeland.

* Earmark dedicated close air support and ground attack squadrons in direct support of the “battle groups”.

The IAF would be hard pressed to execute the tasks from within its existing combat assets. Earlier, the IAF could initially allocate all its combat assets to achieve air superiority as any operations by “strike corps” would hope to subsequently follow.

In the new war doctrine scenario all these tasks would have to be concurrent. It was such a visualization that made this author in his strategic papers (“ India’s Strategic and Security 2004 Imperatives”: SAAG Paper no 884 dated 06.01.2004) reiterate that the IAF needs at least 70 combat squadrons. India has the financial resources to afford them. In any case even disconnecting from the new war doctrine requirements the IAF needs 70 combat squadrons in the context of India’s revised strategic frontiers discussed in an earlier paper of this author.

Indian Navy Aviation Support for “Battle Groups”: Besides its traditional tasks of sea control, naval blockades etc. the naval aviation support for the “battle groups” operations is a welcome step in filling some of the voids of IAF combat assets besides dividing the enemy’s aerial combat strength.

The Indian Navy, more importantly should concurrently be focusing in the new war doctrine scenario on amphibious operations deep in the enemy’s rear, so that Pakistan is forced to fight on three fronts, and in the process its resistance is fragmented.

India Will Have to Use Conventional Short Range Battle Field Missiles (SRBM) and Cruise Missiles: The entire success of ‘Cold Start” war doctrine would overwhelmingly rest on the application of long range devastating fire power and this would perforce have to include conventional SRBMs and cruise missiles.

Use of SRBMs and cruise missiles will not only help in softening enemy’s ‘Vulnerable Areas’ and ‘Vulnerable Points’ but also thicken fire support assisting “battle groups” operations. These assets would more increasingly be required in support of “battle groups” operations in case of bad weather when IAF combat power cannot be applied.

Associated with this would be India’s imperatives to accelerate her ICBM development and production which is India’s sovereign right. “Cold Start” war doctrine without ICBM back up would be susceptible to external pressures.

Inventories of these weapons have to be significantly expanded and the time is now to jump-start India’s defence production apparatus to this end.

Special Forces and Air Assault Capabilities Expansion and Employment in New War Doctrine: The successful implementation of the new war doctrine for force multiplication effect, for reinforcing the offensive punch and for exploitation of fleeting apparatus in fast paced military operations would call for sizeable employment of :

* Special Forces

* Air Assault Divisions.

* Air Cavalry brigades.

* Light infantry divisions with air-transportable combat power.

In the ‘Cold Start’ war doctrine scenario widespread use of the above forces including the capture and holding of airheads behind enemy lines would confuse the enemy, divide his reaction and counterattacks and spread panic. The Indian Army’s capabilities in this direction are limited and need to be comprehensive enhanced.

Logistic Support For Cold War Doctrine: Such operations which can be expected to be swift, fluid and rapidly changing directions of attack cannot rest for logistic requirements on Indian Army’s conventional logistic support which is ground based and wheel-based and incapable of swift cross country mobility.

Indian Army’s own aviation assets and heavier utility helicopters of the IAF would need significant mustering for logistic support of “Cold Start” battle group.

India’s strategic stockpiles of fuel, ammunition and military hardware spares along with “War Wastage Reserves” will have to be maintained at full levels at all times to enable “Cold Start” war doctrines to take off. Without these at full levels ‘Cold Start’ operations may end up as cold start.

Pakistan’s Responses to India’s “Cold Start” War Doctrine Enunciation: India’s ‘ Cold Start’ war doctrine stands discussed in a recent Corps Commanders Conference of the Pakistan Army, and even amongst their strategic experts. Curiously, the discussions of the latter seem diverted to Pakistan’s special relationship with USA post 9/11 and there appears to be an implied assurance that the “special Pakistan-USA military relationship” would take care of the challenges posed to Pakistan by India’s new war doctrine. Pakistani strategic analysts view the enunciation of India’s “Cold Start” war doctrine as :

* Putting pressure on Pakistan prior to peace talks.

* The growing Pakistan-Bangladesh nexus is also curiously drawn in as an Indian concern requiring new war doctrines.

Surprisingly, no major military analysis has emerged so far Probably, it would take time to digest and come up with responses.

Pakistan’s Military Challenges Arising From India’s “Cold Start” War Doctrine: Strategically and militarily, it can be visualized that Pakistan would be faced with a number of military challenges arising from India’s new war doctrine, namely:

* India’s “surprise” factor in terms of when, where and how “Cold Start” battle group would be launched.

* Fighting the air-battle in an environment where the IAF has a significant superiority in numbers and quality of numerical strength.

* Devising a credible anti-ballistic missile defence.

* Re-constitution of Pakistan’s “strike corps” and its three ‘Army Reserve’ formations which were so far configured and located to take on India’s three “Strike Corps”.

* When and how does Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent and its doctrine of “First Use” comes into play.

* How to offset India’s overwhelming long range artillery fire support.

* How to counter India’s force projection capabilities deep in Pakistan’s rear.

Pakistan cannot combat the Indian challenges by the oft-repeated bravado statement that “One Pakistan Soldier is equal to ten Indian Soldiers” leading to strategic wags countering “what happens when the Eleventh Indian Soldier emerges”.

If the “Cold Start” doctrine is applied in its purist form, then in terms of military operations it does not become a game of military numbers but a game in terms of military technological superiority in terms of weapon systems, firepower and aerial combat assets besides the force multiplication effects of the Indian Navy.

Pakistan would have to divert sizeable financial resources for its weapon systems build-up to counter this doctrine. Of course, it can look to its external strategic patrons like USA and China for assistance and military largesse, but there is a limit here.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrent and the Myth of Pakistan’s Low Nuclear Threshold: The Indian political leadership and its national security establishment fed on US academia planted stories (probably officially inspired) of Pakistan nuclear deterrent and Pakistan’s low nuclear threshold have been inordinately awed by its fearful consequences.

Though this aspect is a subject of detailed analysis in a separate paper the following observations can be made:

* Pakistan has declared that it will go for nuclear strikes against India when a significant portion of its territory has been captured or likely to be captured. Secondly, when a significant destruction of the Pakistani military military machine has taken place or when Pakistani strategic assets (read nuclear deterrent) are endangered.

* India’s “Cold Start” war doctrine does not seem to be allowing Pakistan to reach at the above conclusions by indulging in deep long range penetrative strikes.

* The Indian doctrine seems to be aimed at inflicting significant military reverses on the Pakistan Army in a limited war scenario short of a nuclear war.

* Nuclear war fare is not a “commando raid” or “command operation” with which its present military ruler is more familiar. Crossing the nuclear threshold is so fateful a decision that even strong American Presidents in the past have baulked at exercising it or the prospects of exercising it.

* Pakistan cannot expect that India would sit idle and suffer a Pakistani nuclear strike without a massive nuclear retaliation.

* Pakistan’s external strategic patrons can coerce or dissuade both sides to avoid a nuclear conflict, but once Pakistan uses a nuclear first strike no power can restrain India from going in from its nuclear retaliation and the consequences for Pakistan in that case stand well discussed in strategic circles. Pakistan would stand wiped out.

When the obvious intention of India’s new war doctrine is not to cross the nuclear threshold, and it seems declaratory in content, then a higher responsibility rests on Pakistan’s external strategic patrons that their wayward protégé does not charge foolishly and blindly into the realms where even fools or the devil do not dare.

Pakistan’s crossing the nuclear threshold has crucial implications for USA and China too. In fact a USA-China conflict can be generated which may have its own nuclear overtones. Therefore it is incumbent on both USA and China to strategically declare that they would not countenance any Pakistani first nuclear strike against India i.e. crossing the nuclear threshold.

Pakistan proclivities to threaten nuclearisation of an Indo-Pakistan conventional conflict is more of a blackmail to force USA and China’s intervention. And if sincerely both USA and China are interested in South Asian peace and global security then Pakistan’s nuclear proclivities have to be pre-empted now with a strategic declaration against Pakistan as above.

India, in any case, has to be prepared militarily, eitherway, notwithstanding any such caution that may be imposed on Pakistan.

Concluding Observations: From the Indian perspective, enunciation of a new war doctrine was long overdue and it is significant for the following reasons:

* India now plans and is ready to act offensively against Pakistan for any perceived acts of strategic destabilization of India and proxy war and terrorism

* India moves away from its defensive mindset of last 50 year plus.

* India will now prepare to undertake offensive military operations at the out set.

* India has in declaratory tones enunciated that it will undertake offensive operations short of the nuclear threshold

The Indian Army, despite any limitations in its hierarchy of not being forceful to make the political leadership in the last 50 years plus to adopt strategies which are strategically desirable but may be politically distasteful, has done well this time to bring India’s war doctrine in public debate. The vast majority of the Indian public will be in support of any war doctrine that puts Pakistan into place and forces it to desist from proxy war and terrorism against India.

From the Pakistani perspective the following needs to be recognized with the enunciation of India’s new war doctrine:

* India will undertake offensive operations against Pakistan without giving Pakistan time to bring diplomatic leverages into play against India.

* India has declaratorily implied that in such offensive operations against Pakistan it will not cross the nuclear threshold nor prompt Pakistan into crossing it. Should Pakistan opt for crossing the threshold the onus lies squarely on Pakistan.

The United States and China have not come out with any response so far. Nor should they since national security interests of India need to be respected, as those of a responsible, politically stable and a mature regional power which has exercised restraint even to the extent of being ridiculed for its restraint.

Since a nuclear conflict initiated by Pakistan has global overtones and has the potential to bring them to conflict with each other, both the United States and China need to strategically declare that they will not countenance Pakistan, initiating a nuclear conflict in South Asia. Alternatively both USA and China, as Permanent Members of the UN Securing Council initiate steps jointly, to bring Pakistan’s (failed state WMD proliferator) nuclear assets under international control to be released only in the event of a nuclear threat.

Lastly, it needs to be reiterated that India may never have to put into effect its new “Cold Start” war doctrine if the United States and China restrain their wayward military protégé i.e. Pakistan from military adventurism and military brinkmanship. Also if United States and China wish to add value to their relationships with India, they need to desist from equating India with Pakistan when it comes to the prospects of the nuclear conflict in South Asia. India’s strategic maturity is not in doubt; it is Pakistan’s strategic maturity, which is in doubt. A nuclear conflict will take place in South Asia, only if the United States wants it and lets Pakistan permissively cross the nuclear threshold.

 

[Old School]

Why do you think IA will publicize it? So Pakistan can pick loopholes?

Bad students get no advantage even you allow them to carry books during exams. Same principle applies to PA which never learns. They don't see loopholes.
I asked the initial question to those who are taking part in the thread discussion. Many are posting comments on Cold Start without having idea about it's force projection methodology, command structure and other aspects of the mission command. Using words like only 'offence and defence' is not enough for this sort of discussion.

 

[desiman]

Bad students get no advantage even you allow them to carry books during exams. Same principle applies to PA which never learns. They don't see loopholes.
I asked the initial question to those who are taking part in the thread discussion. Many are posting comments on Cold Start without having idea about it's force projection methodology, command structure and other aspects of the mission command. Using words like only 'offence and defence' is not enough for this sort of discussion.

well said, first logical comment here lol

 

[Bill Longley]

Sunderji = Op Parakram = old Army thinking
He has nothing to do with cold start, but everything to do with heavily muscled strike formations.

FYI:
INDIA’S NEW COLD START WAR DOCTRINE STRATEGICALLY REVIEWED

INDIA’S NEW "COLD START" WAR DOCTRINE STRATEGICALLY REVIEWED

by Dr Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations: India unveiled officially its new war doctrine on April 28, 2004 at the Army Commander’s Conference that took place last week. Obviously, the need for a new war doctrine was decades-long overdue, but it seems that the lessons of the Kargil War reinforced by the severe limitations imposed on the Indian Army in the run-up to and during Operation PRAKARAM in 2001-2002 hastened the Indian military hierarchy towards this end.

General Padmanabhan the Chief of Army Staff at the time of Operation PRAKARAM had initiated the process of formulating a new war doctrine and the fruitation now seems to have taken place after a series of major joint exercises between the Indian Army and Indian Air Force including massive live fire power demonstrations.

It seems that the new Cold War Strategy would now be discussed at various levels of three Services and fine tuned. Needless to say that in any future conflict scenario where a “blitzkrieg” type strategy is going to be followed; joint operations involving the Indian Army, Indian Air Force and Indian Navy would be an imperative.

Security requirements did not permit the spelling out of adequate details of the “Cold Start Strategy” by the Chief of Army Staff. However, it is not difficult to visualize what this new war doctrine conceptually incorporates as it is said to revolve around the employment of “integrated battle groups” for offensive operations.

Such strategy did exist in NATO and was being taught at the Royal British Army Staff College. Camberley, UK which the author attended in 1971. In NATO terminology, “integrated” groups for offensive operations existed at three levels. The highest was “ combat group” and “combat command” based on a divisional or brigade Headquarters (armoured/infantry mechanised) under which were a flexible number of “battle groups” (based on an armoured regiment/mechanized infantry battalion Headquarters) and the lowest was the “combat team” (based on an armoured squadron/mechanized infantry company Headquarters). The groupings at the each level were task-oriented in terms of varying composition of armour and infantry elements with integrated attack helicopters of the Army Aviation and the Air Force besides close support of ground attack Air Force squadrons. Also, was integrated Army Aviation surveillance helicopters. Command and control helicopters were available too.

Media, reports indicate that the new “Cold Start Strategy” visualizes the use of eight “integrated battle groups”. For the purposes of this strategic review the eight “integrated battle groups” being talked about will be taken to mean eight integrated armoured division/mechanized infantry division sized forces with varying composition of armour, artillery, infantry and combat air support- all integrated. This would be a fair assumption to be made for our discussion in case the intended aim of this new war doctrine is to be achieved.

The unveiling of a new war doctrine throws up a host of factors for discussion in terms of why a new war doctrine is required, what are the attendant factors in putting it into operation, the limiting factors that may come into play, the responses of the enemy to such a new war doctrine and a host of other associated considerations.

“Cold Start” War Doctrine-The Strategic Conceptual Underpinnings: In the absence of more details, and rightfully not spelt out due to security reasons, the strategic conceptual underpinnings of India’s new war doctrine can be envisaged as under:

* Indian Army’s combat potential would be fully harnessed. The distinction between “strike corps” and “defensive corps” in ground holding role will be gradually diminished.

* The offensive military power available with defensive corps in the form of independent armoured brigades and mechanized brigades, by virtue of their forward locations would no longer remain idle waiting to launch counterattacks. They would be employed at the first go and mobilized within hours.

* Strike Corps may be re-constituted and reinforced to provide offensive elements for these eight or so “battle groups” to launch multiple strikes into Pakistan, fully integrated with the Indian Air Force and in the Southern Sector with naval aviation assets.

* Obviously, then, India’s strike corps elements will have to be moved well forward from existing garrisons. It also means that Strike Corps would no longer sit idle waiting for the opportune moment, which never came in the last three wars. The Strike Corps remained unutilised.

On another plane that is at the politico-strategic or politico-military level this new war doctrine seems to be aiming at the following:

* Cutting out long drawn out military mobilization running into weeks.

* The above results in loss of surprise at the strategic and military level.

* The above also gives time to Pakistan’s external patrons like USA and China to start exerting coercive pressures and mobilizing world opinion against India as witnessed in Operation Prakaram.

* Long mobilization time also gives the political leadership in India time to waver under pressure, and in the process deny Indian Army its due military victories.

* The new war doctrine would compel the political leadership to give political approval ‘ab-initio’ and thereby free the Armed Forces to generate their full combat potential from the outset.

Cold Start Strategy” is Aimed at Pakistan and is Offensive Oriented- The Pakistan Army, (not the Pakistani people) has a compulsive fixation for military adventurism against India, notwithstanding the Islamabad Accord January 2004.

India in the past has been hamstrung in cutting Pakistan to size due to a combination of United States pressures coming into play in the run-up to decisive military action and the hesitancy of India’s political leadership. Military surprise was lost due to long mobilization times. The “ Cold Start Strategy” can be said to be aimed militarily at Pakistan and is offensive-operations specific.

“Cold Start Strategy”- The Indian Political Parameters That Need to Come into Play: Such an offensive strategy can only be successful if the Indian political leadership at the given time of operational execution of this strategy has:

* Political will to use offensive military power.

* Political will to use pre-emptive military strategies.

* Political sagacity to view strategic military objectives with clarity.

* Political determination to pursue military operations to their ultimate conclusion without succumbing to external pressures.

* Political determination to cross nuclear threshold if Pakistan seems so inclined.

If the above are missing, as they have been from 1947 to 2004, Indian Army’s new war doctrine would not add up to anything. For more detailed views on this subject, see the authors recent book: “India’s Defence Policies and Strategic Thought: A Comparative Analysis” (reviewed on SAAG website as “Igniting Strategic Mindsets in Indians:; SAAG paper no. 657 dated 09-04-2003)

India’s National Military Directives Need Change: Indian Governments, irrespective of political hues have shied away from enunciating India’s national interests from which flows all military planning. However, what can be called as a sort of national military directive, which the Indian Army under political compulsions stands fixated is “No Loss of Territory, Not Even an Inch”. Heads have rolled in the Army on this account in past wars.

“Cold Start Strategy” with its inherent character of mobile warfare using mechanized military formations, and especially where defensive formations may be called upon to undertake such operations, may at times involve some loss of territory in plains warfare.

If the above is not acceptable then strategically and militarily the status quo needs to be maintained with Indian Army fixated on linear defences. This author had argued against this as early as 1985 in an article “India’s Linear Fixations” in the Combat Journal of what is now called the Army War College.

India’s Strategic Military Objectives Needs to be Made Clear: India’s strategic military objectives need to:

* Shift from capturing bits of Pakistan territory in small scale multiple offensives to be used as bargaining chips after the cease fire.

* Focus on the destruction of the Pakistani Army and its military machine without much collateral damage to Pakistani civilians.

All the three armed forces have to synergise operations towards destruction of the Pakistan Army as it is that which enslaves Pakistan, impedes democracy in Pakistan and indulges in military adventurism against India, including proxy wars and terrorism.

It is for nothing that the Pakistani military rulers and the Pakistani Army have hid from the Pakistani nation the causes of their military failure against India in 1971, 1999 (Kargil) and a catastrophic defeat in January 2002 if India’s political leadership had not restrained the Indian Army during Operation Prakaram. “Cold Start Strategy” should therefore be aimed at the destruction of the Pakistan Army’s military machine. India’s Army Commanders can infer what this implies.

“Cold Start” War Doctrine-The Imperatives of Dedicated Air Force Close Air Support and Dedicated Ground Attack Squadrons: The Indian Air Force (IAF) would have a very crucial and critical role to play in the successful implementation of this new war doctrine. The “Cold Start” eight or so “battle groups” cannot undertake “blitzkrieg” type military operations without an overwhelming air superiority and integrated close air support.

The IAF would therefore have to proportionately assign its combat assets to cater for the following:

* Achieve overall air superiority so as to paralyse the enemy’s Air Force or render it so ineffective as to be unable to seriously affect the area of operations of the “Cold Start” offensive “battle groups”.

* Dedicate a fair portion of its combat assets for the air defence of the Indian homeland.

* Earmark dedicated close air support and ground attack squadrons in direct support of the “battle groups”.

The IAF would be hard pressed to execute the tasks from within its existing combat assets. Earlier, the IAF could initially allocate all its combat assets to achieve air superiority as any operations by “strike corps” would hope to subsequently follow.

In the new war doctrine scenario all these tasks would have to be concurrent. It was such a visualization that made this author in his strategic papers (“ India’s Strategic and Security 2004 Imperatives”: SAAG Paper no 884 dated 06.01.2004) reiterate that the IAF needs at least 70 combat squadrons. India has the financial resources to afford them. In any case even disconnecting from the new war doctrine requirements the IAF needs 70 combat squadrons in the context of India’s revised strategic frontiers discussed in an earlier paper of this author.

Indian Navy Aviation Support for “Battle Groups”: Besides its traditional tasks of sea control, naval blockades etc. the naval aviation support for the “battle groups” operations is a welcome step in filling some of the voids of IAF combat assets besides dividing the enemy’s aerial combat strength.

The Indian Navy, more importantly should concurrently be focusing in the new war doctrine scenario on amphibious operations deep in the enemy’s rear, so that Pakistan is forced to fight on three fronts, and in the process its resistance is fragmented.

India Will Have to Use Conventional Short Range Battle Field Missiles (SRBM) and Cruise Missiles: The entire success of ‘Cold Start” war doctrine would overwhelmingly rest on the application of long range devastating fire power and this would perforce have to include conventional SRBMs and cruise missiles.

Use of SRBMs and cruise missiles will not only help in softening enemy’s ‘Vulnerable Areas’ and ‘Vulnerable Points’ but also thicken fire support assisting “battle groups” operations. These assets would more increasingly be required in support of “battle groups” operations in case of bad weather when IAF combat power cannot be applied.

Associated with this would be India’s imperatives to accelerate her ICBM development and production which is India’s sovereign right. “Cold Start” war doctrine without ICBM back up would be susceptible to external pressures.

Inventories of these weapons have to be significantly expanded and the time is now to jump-start India’s defence production apparatus to this end.

Special Forces and Air Assault Capabilities Expansion and Employment in New War Doctrine: The successful implementation of the new war doctrine for force multiplication effect, for reinforcing the offensive punch and for exploitation of fleeting apparatus in fast paced military operations would call for sizeable employment of :

* Special Forces

* Air Assault Divisions.

* Air Cavalry brigades.

* Light infantry divisions with air-transportable combat power.

In the ‘Cold Start’ war doctrine scenario widespread use of the above forces including the capture and holding of airheads behind enemy lines would confuse the enemy, divide his reaction and counterattacks and spread panic. The Indian Army’s capabilities in this direction are limited and need to be comprehensive enhanced.

Logistic Support For Cold War Doctrine: Such operations which can be expected to be swift, fluid and rapidly changing directions of attack cannot rest for logistic requirements on Indian Army’s conventional logistic support which is ground based and wheel-based and incapable of swift cross country mobility.

Indian Army’s own aviation assets and heavier utility helicopters of the IAF would need significant mustering for logistic support of “Cold Start” battle group.

India’s strategic stockpiles of fuel, ammunition and military hardware spares along with “War Wastage Reserves” will have to be maintained at full levels at all times to enable “Cold Start” war doctrines to take off. Without these at full levels ‘Cold Start’ operations may end up as cold start.

Pakistan’s Responses to India’s “Cold Start” War Doctrine Enunciation: India’s ‘ Cold Start’ war doctrine stands discussed in a recent Corps Commanders Conference of the Pakistan Army, and even amongst their strategic experts. Curiously, the discussions of the latter seem diverted to Pakistan’s special relationship with USA post 9/11 and there appears to be an implied assurance that the “special Pakistan-USA military relationship” would take care of the challenges posed to Pakistan by India’s new war doctrine. Pakistani strategic analysts view the enunciation of India’s “Cold Start” war doctrine as :

* Putting pressure on Pakistan prior to peace talks.

* The growing Pakistan-Bangladesh nexus is also curiously drawn in as an Indian concern requiring new war doctrines.

Surprisingly, no major military analysis has emerged so far Probably, it would take time to digest and come up with responses.

Pakistan’s Military Challenges Arising From India’s “Cold Start” War Doctrine: Strategically and militarily, it can be visualized that Pakistan would be faced with a number of military challenges arising from India’s new war doctrine, namely:

* India’s “surprise” factor in terms of when, where and how “Cold Start” battle group would be launched.

* Fighting the air-battle in an environment where the IAF has a significant superiority in numbers and quality of numerical strength.

* Devising a credible anti-ballistic missile defence.

* Re-constitution of Pakistan’s “strike corps” and its three ‘Army Reserve’ formations which were so far configured and located to take on India’s three “Strike Corps”.

* When and how does Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent and its doctrine of “First Use” comes into play.

* How to offset India’s overwhelming long range artillery fire support.

* How to counter India’s force projection capabilities deep in Pakistan’s rear.

Pakistan cannot combat the Indian challenges by the oft-repeated bravado statement that “One Pakistan Soldier is equal to ten Indian Soldiers” leading to strategic wags countering “what happens when the Eleventh Indian Soldier emerges”.

If the “Cold Start” doctrine is applied in its purist form, then in terms of military operations it does not become a game of military numbers but a game in terms of military technological superiority in terms of weapon systems, firepower and aerial combat assets besides the force multiplication effects of the Indian Navy.

Pakistan would have to divert sizeable financial resources for its weapon systems build-up to counter this doctrine. Of course, it can look to its external strategic patrons like USA and China for assistance and military largesse, but there is a limit here.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Deterrent and the Myth of Pakistan’s Low Nuclear Threshold: The Indian political leadership and its national security establishment fed on US academia planted stories (probably officially inspired) of Pakistan nuclear deterrent and Pakistan’s low nuclear threshold have been inordinately awed by its fearful consequences.

Though this aspect is a subject of detailed analysis in a separate paper the following observations can be made:

* Pakistan has declared that it will go for nuclear strikes against India when a significant portion of its territory has been captured or likely to be captured. Secondly, when a significant destruction of the Pakistani military military machine has taken place or when Pakistani strategic assets (read nuclear deterrent) are endangered.

* India’s “Cold Start” war doctrine does not seem to be allowing Pakistan to reach at the above conclusions by indulging in deep long range penetrative strikes.

* The Indian doctrine seems to be aimed at inflicting significant military reverses on the Pakistan Army in a limited war scenario short of a nuclear war.

* Nuclear war fare is not a “commando raid” or “command operation” with which its present military ruler is more familiar. Crossing the nuclear threshold is so fateful a decision that even strong American Presidents in the past have baulked at exercising it or the prospects of exercising it.

* Pakistan cannot expect that India would sit idle and suffer a Pakistani nuclear strike without a massive nuclear retaliation.

* Pakistan’s external strategic patrons can coerce or dissuade both sides to avoid a nuclear conflict, but once Pakistan uses a nuclear first strike no power can restrain India from going in from its nuclear retaliation and the consequences for Pakistan in that case stand well discussed in strategic circles. Pakistan would stand wiped out.

When the obvious intention of India’s new war doctrine is not to cross the nuclear threshold, and it seems declaratory in content, then a higher responsibility rests on Pakistan’s external strategic patrons that their wayward protégé does not charge foolishly and blindly into the realms where even fools or the devil do not dare.

Pakistan’s crossing the nuclear threshold has crucial implications for USA and China too. In fact a USA-China conflict can be generated which may have its own nuclear overtones. Therefore it is incumbent on both USA and China to strategically declare that they would not countenance any Pakistani first nuclear strike against India i.e. crossing the nuclear threshold.

Pakistan proclivities to threaten nuclearisation of an Indo-Pakistan conventional conflict is more of a blackmail to force USA and China’s intervention. And if sincerely both USA and China are interested in South Asian peace and global security then Pakistan’s nuclear proclivities have to be pre-empted now with a strategic declaration against Pakistan as above.

India, in any case, has to be prepared militarily, eitherway, notwithstanding any such caution that may be imposed on Pakistan.

Concluding Observations: From the Indian perspective, enunciation of a new war doctrine was long overdue and it is significant for the following reasons:

* India now plans and is ready to act offensively against Pakistan for any perceived acts of strategic destabilization of India and proxy war and terrorism

* India moves away from its defensive mindset of last 50 year plus.

* India will now prepare to undertake offensive military operations at the out set.

* India has in declaratory tones enunciated that it will undertake offensive operations short of the nuclear threshold

The Indian Army, despite any limitations in its hierarchy of not being forceful to make the political leadership in the last 50 years plus to adopt strategies which are strategically desirable but may be politically distasteful, has done well this time to bring India’s war doctrine in public debate. The vast majority of the Indian public will be in support of any war doctrine that puts Pakistan into place and forces it to desist from proxy war and terrorism against India.

From the Pakistani perspective the following needs to be recognized with the enunciation of India’s new war doctrine:

* India will undertake offensive operations against Pakistan without giving Pakistan time to bring diplomatic leverages into play against India.

* India has declaratorily implied that in such offensive operations against Pakistan it will not cross the nuclear threshold nor prompt Pakistan into crossing it. Should Pakistan opt for crossing the threshold the onus lies squarely on Pakistan.

The United States and China have not come out with any response so far. Nor should they since national security interests of India need to be respected, as those of a responsible, politically stable and a mature regional power which has exercised restraint even to the extent of being ridiculed for its restraint.

Since a nuclear conflict initiated by Pakistan has global overtones and has the potential to bring them to conflict with each other, both the United States and China need to strategically declare that they will not countenance Pakistan, initiating a nuclear conflict in South Asia. Alternatively both USA and China, as Permanent Members of the UN Securing Council initiate steps jointly, to bring Pakistan’s (failed state WMD proliferator) nuclear assets under international control to be released only in the event of a nuclear threat.

Lastly, it needs to be reiterated that India may never have to put into effect its new “Cold Start” war doctrine if the United States and China restrain their wayward military protégé i.e. Pakistan from military adventurism and military brinkmanship. Also if United States and China wish to add value to their relationships with India, they need to desist from equating India with Pakistan when it comes to the prospects of the nuclear conflict in South Asia. India’s strategic maturity is not in doubt; it is Pakistan’s strategic maturity, which is in doubt. A nuclear conflict will take place in South Asia, only if the United States wants it and lets Pakistan permissively cross the nuclear threshold.

so according to kapalia cold start is pakistan centric

if its so then why same kapalia is so much moaning over Azm e Nou
which is demonstrating pakistans reply

the problem with indians is that they want to say and do any thing to damage others but if some one reply in same tone they start moaning and shivering

I feel pity on indians

 

[nakodo]

PA which never learns

Even as that may be I hope IA is alert to PA's abilities. If they are caught napping again like Kargil then IA may no longer be the national holy cow.

 

[nakodo]

Until 2004 the Indian army’s strategic thought envisaged the deployment of seven corps in defensive role and three corps in offensive role each built around an armoured division supported by mechanised infantry and artillery. After the defensive corps had blunted Pakistani attacks, the strike corps would undertake counter-offensive operations aimed at the destruction of the Pakistan Army’s two strategic reserves also built around an armoured division.

After Operation Parakaram the Indian army concluded that this doctrine was inflexible because of the huge size of the strike corps — they have long deployment times, are difficult to manoeuvre, while their concentration in the forward areas gives away the general strategic direction they would adopt. And above all, the doctrine inhibited a quick response to challenges posed by acts like the attack on the Indian parliament (and seven years later in Mumbai).

As a consequence, in 2004 the Indian army announced the development of a new limited war doctrine called Cold Start to respond to what it calls proxy wars by Pakistan. It would seek to inflict significant damage on the Pakistan Army before the international community could intervene on Pakistan’s behalf, while at the same time ensuring that the conflict did not escalate to a level where Pakistan was tempted to use nuclear weapons.

The essence of the Cold Start doctrine is reorganising the army’s offensive power that resides in the three strike corps into eight smaller division-sized integrated battle groups (IBGs) consisting of armour and mechanised infantry and artillery, closely supported by helicopter gunships, air force and airborne troops (parachute and heliborne). The IBGs are to be positioned close to the border so that three to five are launched into Pakistan along different axes within 72 to 96 hours from the time mobilisation is ordered.

Cold Start thus envisages rapid thrusts even when the defensive corps’ deployment is yet to be completed, and high-speed operations conducted day and night until the designated objectives are achieved.

In a war limited by time, mobility is the single-most important factor which if used to its full potential will help attain the political aim in the desired time and space framework. But this requires a perfect matching of the physical means of mobility with the mobility of the mind, as the value of a highly mobile force can be reduced to zero by commanders whose minds are characterised by lack of imagination, initiative and flexibility. “Adherence to dogmas has destroyed more armies and lost more battles and lives than any other cause in war. No man of fixed opinions can make a good general.” (J.F.C. Fuller)

In the 1965 war the Indian 1 Corps, spearheaded by the 1st Armoured Division, had penetrated seven miles only into Pakistani territory in Sialkot sector in 21 days, while in the 1971 war, the same corps having about eight tank units did marginally better by penetrating eight miles in 14 days, that too when opposed by light covering troops. In both wars the Indian army was schematic in its operations. Changes in dispositions such as forming a new defensive line, reassigning of objectives, switching forces not in accordance with their original plan, took time. Above all, their commanders at all levels lacked enterprise, imagination and initiative.

Given this, while Cold Start is a sound concept, though not original, the Indian war directors need to question the ability of their commanders at all levels to execute it efficiently and sustain the advantage gained from striking first. The “law of the initial advantage of the aggressor” assumes critical importance, as it is the aggressor who generally sets the pattern which operations will take. The Germans in the Second World War and the Israelis in the 1956 and 1967 wars had translated the concept of blitzkrieg, characterised by surprise, speed and concentration, with devastating results against numerically superior forces because they had a flair for conducting high-speed operations with flexibility, rapidity and less military routine.

The probable objective areas for Cold Start could be (1) Ravi-Chenab corridor from two directions, an IBG along Jammu-Sialkot-Daska axis and another across the Ravi to link up with the first IBG, and (2) in the south against Reti-Rahim Yar Khan-Kashmore complex. To counter Cold Start, the Pakistan Army will have to create more armour-dominated brigade-sized reserves from the existing resources if possible, and a more flexible military system and structure.

For Pakistan the dimensions of time and space assume paramount importance as it lacks territorial depth, is opposed by a larger adversary and lacks the resources to fight a protracted war. The strategy of pre-emption is thus imposed on Pakistan in the same way it was imposed on Israel prior to the 1967 war. The fact that the Pakistani Army can occupy their wartime locations earlier than the Indian army confers on it the ability to pre-empt Cold Start; failure to do so could lead to firing of low-yield tactical warheads at IBGs as they cross the start line or even earlier.

Cold Start would be a portent of escalation, and inevitably a disaster for both. It is a doctrine that challenges both countries. The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army.

Pakistan War Games to test Indian Cold Start Strategy|Islamabad Globe

 

[nakodo]

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers38\paper3772.html

PAKISTAN ARMY SENDS POLITICO-MILITARY SIGNALS TO INDIA THROUGH “EX AZM-E-NAU”

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

Pakistan Army’s massive war-readiness exercise codenamed “EX AZM-E-NAU III (New Resolve)” has been underway since April 10, 2010 and scheduled to culminate on May 15, 2010. The massive exercise involving more than 50,000 troops began in the Bhawalpur desert area of South Punjab and will culminate in Northern Sindh.

The Pakistan Army has significantly gone much out of the way to highly publicise “EX AZM-E-NAU III” for both the domestic audience and the international media, more specifically India. Hence this Paper has no intention to repeat military details of EX AZM-E-NAU III which stand covered in the media already.

Massive military exercises of this magnitude are held periodically to validate war doctrines and operational strategies. However, the Pakistan Army has not conducted an exercise of this magnitude for 20 years. This draws more attention as to what impelled the Pakistan Army to go in for such a massive military exercise when at least 70,000 – 1,00,000 troops of the Pakistan Army are currently deployed in military operations in South Waziristan, Orakzai and Khyber regions. This in addition to Pakistan Army deployments in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and Baluchistan.

Pakistan Army EX AZM-E-NAU III further draws attention in that it is being held contextually in the backdrop of United States pressures on Pakistan Army to divert more troops from India’s border to the Afghanistan border.

One has also to take note that in EX AZM-E-NU a fair share of United States supplied military hardware is being employed, especially offensive strike assets like F-16 fighter aircraft and Attack Helicopters. With EX AZM-E-NAU III being publicly proclaimed as an 'India Threat-Centric' exercise it follows that despite US protestations to the contrary, US supplied military hardware would be used against India.

EX AZM-E-NAU III also incorporates the Pakistan Air Force Ex-HIGH MARK in which the entire Pakistan Air Force assets from Skardu in the North to Karachi in the South are dovetailed.

EX AZM-E-NAU III timing, magnitude, the contemporary contextual backdrop and more importantly the much publicised 'India Threat-Centric' operational orientation of this Exercise suggest that the Pakistan Army intends to send politico-military signals to India, more pointedly.

This Paper would accordingly like to examine the following issues:

*

EX AZM-E-NAU III: Operational Features are “India Threat-Centric”
*

EX AZM-E-NAU III: The Afghanistan Connection
*

Pakistan Army’s Politico-Military Signals to India through EX AZM-E-NAU
*

Strategic Reality Check for Indian Policy Establishment

EX AZM-E-NAU III: Operational Features are “India Threat-Centric”

Expectedly, the Pakistan Army cannot provide any other operational orientation to such a massive Exercise. Pakistan Army’s primacy in Pakistan’s history and its numerous coups have taken place by whipping-up anti-India hysteria.

The major operational features of EX AZM-E-NAU III that need reiteration are:

*

Pakistan Army has emphasised, directly and implicitly, that this Exercise has been designed to validate military doctrines to meet an Indian military threat and to neutralise India’s much vaunted COLD START War Doctrine. The Pakistan Army to assuage Western concerns is emphasizing that this Exercise is purely a defensive warfare exercise focussing on conventional warfare only.
*

This is misleading on both counts. It is learnt, and is logically so, that Pakistan’s use of strategic assets are built-in in the exercise. Similarly, EX AZM-E-NAU, on available information, is focussing on “counter-offensives” (offensive warfare) as opposed to “counter-attacks” (defensive warfare).
*

The geographical extent of this Exercise extending from South Punjab to Sindh with a secondary threat in the Sialkot Sector incorporated in EX AZM-E-NAU suggests that it is intended to defeat India’s multiple thrusts as part of COLD START WAR Doctrine and also an Indian diversionary Corps strike launched against Sialkot.

EX AZM-E-NAU III: The Afghanistan Connection

Strangely, one cannot but help observing that Pakistan Army’s two major and massive exercises have an Afghanistan connection.

Pakistan Army conducted EX ZARB-E-MOMIN(1989) in its first flush of victory of claiming that it was instrumental in forcing the exit of Soviet Army from Afghanistan, as the cats-paw of the United States.

Twenty years later, the Pakistan Army is now conducting EX AZM-E-NAU III with a heady sense of personal satisfaction of COAS Gen Kayani that he has single- handedly re-oriented the United States in a U-turn in favour of the Pakistan Army. In this case too the quid-pro-quo is that Pakistan Army will facilitate the US military exit from Afghanistan and the United States conceding' strategic space' in Afghanistan to the Pakistan Army.

In the present context, the conduct of EX AZM-E-NAU against the Afghanistan backdrop, the sidelining of India by the United States on Afghanistan, all carry politico-military implications for India. In both cases American military hardware and financial largesse flowed-in preceding Pakistan Army major exercises.

Pakistan Army’s Politico-Military Signals to India Through EX AZM-E-NAU

Pakistan Army’s political signals to India through EX AZM-E-NAU have to be viewed as more tangential than direct. The following need to be considered:

*

India may rejoice and revel in its infatuation with the US-India Strategic Partnership, but when the chips are down, the United States will always throw its dice in favor of the Pakistan Army.
*

Pakistan Army, its strategic sensitivities and interests in Afghanistan would be upheld by the United States, disregarding India’s objections to the contrary.
*

Pakistan Army could prevail over the United States to make India yield on the Kashmir issue.

Can one blame the Pakistan Army for having such perceptions and the claim of the Pakistan Army on priority attention and tilt of the United States? The facts speak for themselves.

Militarily, the signals that emanate from the Pakistan Army to India through EX AZM-E-NAU are more direct. These are:

*

Pakistan Army, notwithstanding its commitments on the Afghan border and a de-stabilizing internal situation is militarily capable of repelling any Indian military offensives emanating from India’s COLD START War Doctrine.
*

Pakistan Army will not confine itself to defensive “counter-attacks” in its operational doctrines. Pakistan Army will resort to “counter-offensives” against India to force it to recoil from its COLD START War Doctrine multiple trusts.
*

Overall, therefore today, Pakistan Army is operationally trained, organizationally structured, and well equipped with military hardware to fight a “one and a half front war” or even a “two front war” with India.

Strategic Reality Check for Indian Policy Establishment

The Indian policy establishment needs to recognize Pakistan Army’s EX AZM-E-NAU as a wake up call. The politico-military signals are clear.

In fact, Pakistan Army’s politico-military signalling to India is taunting in nature. It has signalled, we are prepared to effectively defeat India’s COLD START War Doctrine, but are you (India) ready with the political will to launch COLD START War Doctrine and are the Indian Armed Forces well-equipped to successfully execute this war doctrine?

Perceptions between military adversaries count and the Pakistani perception reflected in the Pakistani Newspaper DAWN Editorial of April 20, 2010 should be an eye-opener for the Indian policy establishment:


“While Cold Start does raise new and troubling questions about the possibility of war between India and Pakistan, it has not quite captured the imagination of the civilian bosses of the Indian Armed Forces. Major technical and resources questions aside, there is some uncertainly about whether the politicians and bureaucrats in India are committed to new doctrine as Pakistan side suggests.”

Reticently, on a sensitive issue that has grave implications for India’s national security, all that one can say is that the Indian policy establishment needs a strategic reality check on the following issues:

*

India’s current Pakistan policy of peace at all costs. Do such political postures prompt the above perceptions in Pakistan?
*

India’s war readiness for successful implementation of COLD START War Doctrine. Is Pakistan Army seeing glaring voids in India’s offensive warfare capabilities?
*

India’s political will for hard decisions. Has Pakistan Army drawn wrong lessons from India’s lack of strong response to Mumbai 9/11 and earlier major incidents of terrorism?
*

In the highly surcharged and current tense India-Pakistan relations, is India’s war-readiness receiving a 24X7 political scrutiny and oversight?

The answers can best be given by India’s policy establishment.

Lastly since the United States and Afghanistan are the predominating factors in the Pakistan Army strategic calculus, does the Indian policy establishment need to recalibrate and carry out mid-term corrections in its United States and Afghanistan policies. What perceptions are being generated when the Pakistan Army sees India being sidelined by the United States on Afghanistan and India withdrawing 30,000 troops from Kashmir, because Pakistan Army made USA prevail over India on this issue.

Concluding Observations

The Pakistan Army was badly in need of refurbishing its professional image both domestically and externally. Domestically, the Pakistan Army image was dented as till a few months back it was reluctant to take head-on the internal threats that were looming large. Externally, the reluctance of the Pakistan Army to undertake ground offensives to tackle insurgents in the frontier regions and instead rely only on F-16 fighter aircraft strikes, attacks helicopter strikes and heavy artillery bombardment spoke poorly of its professional capabilities and its propensity for ethnic genocide reminiscent of its record in then East Pakistan.

EX AZM-E-NAU III has provided an opportunity for the Pakistan Army to redeem its image. Publicizing the Exercise widely was intended to shore up its image domestically.

Publicizing it widely externally has enabled the Pakistan Army to send politico-military messages and particularly to India. The central message to India was that Pakistan Army is ready in all respects to offset India's military advantages and especially those centered on the COLD START War Doctrine.

 

[nakodo]

Pakistan Review - Indian Cold Start doctrine and strategic stability in South Asia

Indian Cold Start doctrine and strategic stability in South Asia
Thursday, April 01 2010 @ 12:59 AM PDT
Contributed by: admin
Views: 23
By: Rizwan Zeb

It was the failure of the Operation Parakram which led to a rethink in the Indian strategic community. The Indian defense establishment realized that the failure to achieve any objectives of the operation was mainly due to the long delay between the mobilization order and the actual deployment of the strike corps on the international border. Two things went against the Indians: although India had a lot of moral support in the wake of the Indian parliament attacks but by the time the Indian troops were ordered to mobilize and the mobilization, Pakistan successfully counter mobilized; and the world community intervened. Another important factor was that, first, the Indian political leadership failed to set clear objectives and second, they crumbled under intense international pressure.

This analysis necessitated a need for a new war doctrine for India. After almost two years of home work, the Indian military came up with a new war doctrine: the cold start doctrine in April 2004. The underlying theme of this limited war doctrine is that the Indian army through a conventional strike (s) would inflict considerable damage to Pakistan, keeping the level of hostilities well below the nuclear threshold and with maximum speed, minimizing the chances of international intervention before the Indian army is able to achieve its objectives. This doctrine is a clear departure from the earlier ‘Sundarji Doctrine.’ According to the cold start doctrine, the Indian army will no more try to cut Pakistan into two; instead, it will try to achieve shallow territorial gains which then will be used as a bargaining chip.

According to details, as per the cold start doctrine, Indian Army (for its war with Pakistan) instead of three large strike corps will be divided into eight smaller division-sized “integrated battle groups� ( IBGs). These integrated battle groups will have maximum air and naval support. The key elements of this doctrine are speed and surprise. And the underlying objective is to firmly take position on ground and achieve objectives before Pakistan can counter mobilize and its allies or the world powers can intervene. It is also assumed that with eight IBGs, Pakistan will face serious difficulty in gathering real time intelligence about all of them in keeping with its limited reconnaissance resources. Another important aim of this doctrine is to keep the war under the nuclear redlines of Pakistan and even if Pakistan decides to use nuclear weapons against the advancing Indian troops, provide it with smaller targets. Added to this according to the Indian calculation is that any nuclear attack if at all is conducted by Pakistan, it will be in its own territory.
There are a number of factors in this thinking that can destabilize the strategic stability in South Asia: first, Pakistan will come under tremendous pressure to retaliate and there is no way that the Indians can guarantee that the Pakistan will keep the war limited. As there will be no time for intervention, Pakistan will have to exercise its options.
With the increasing imbalance between India and Pakistan in conventional capabilities, Pakistan’s reliance on its nuclear weapons is most likely to increase. The conventional imbalance coupled with an attack as per the cold start doctrine will further lower the nuclear threshold for Pakistan. The key question in such a situation would be can the Indian be 100 % sure that a conventional attack on Pakistan will remain limited to a conventional level. Why will Pakistan play according to the Indian rules of the game? Although, Pakistan has not clearly defined its nuclear redlines, however, Lt. General (retd) Kidwai in a widely quoted interview has given certain pointers to situation under which Pakistan might contemplate using its nuclear weapons. According to General Kidwai, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons if: India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory; India destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land or air forces; India blockades Pakistan in an effort to strangle it economically.

Pakistan obviously can not ignore the cold start doctrine and will develop contingencies of its own. Pakistan will under no circumstances, will let the Indians attempt to capture its territory with out fighting with all possible means. An operational cold start will not only destabilize the region as Pakistan will take counter measures, it will also lower the Pakistani threshold to use nuclear weapons in any future war. This might also be a point where Pakistan might contemplate developing tactical nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s war doctrine revolves around the offensive defense and in any future war; Pakistan will take the war into the Indian Territory. What would the Indians do then? Will they expand the war, which then, may not remain limited?

The point which the Indian military establishment is missing is that there is no guarantee that a limited war will remain limited. Which ever side will be losing will try to salvage itself by using any mean at its disposal. There is every likelihood that a limited war will expand to an unlimited war. Two questions are very important here: what objectives will be achieved by waging a limited war? And second, what measures by the Indian military will be taken to ensure that a limited war will remain limited? Mercifully, few in the Indian establishment understand these dilemmas. According to one Indian official, “The idea that Pakistan will cooperate in a conflict and comply with India’s wishes to fight a limited war is ridiculous. It will be naturally in [Pakistan’s] interest to keep any conflagration as unlimited as possible.�

While cold start has a potential to highly destabilize the already not too stabilized nuclear south Asia, there is a civil-military dimension to it as well. The Indian civilian leadership exercises strict control over the defense matters yet they hardly provide any concrete guidance to the Indian military. This is some thing which the Indian military is critical about and this is perhaps the main reason behind the cold start doctrine. Any war waged under this doctrine will make it impossible for the Indian political leadership to retract from under international pressure which according to the Indian military was the main reason behind the unsuccessful Operation Parakram. During that, on two occasions, Indian army wanted to attack Pakistan which was not approved by the Indian leadership.

And this is why the Indian political leadership will be reluctant to own the cold start doctrine as it will give the Indian military an enhanced role in the decision-making. What ever course cold start doctrine and related debate will take in India and else where is yet to be seen but what is clear is that it will not only have adverse effect on strategic stability in South Asia but will also redefine civil-military relations in India.

 

[Old School]

The first ever implementation of something similar in nature like the Cold Start doctrine on a real battle field scenario was done by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) during the 2006 Lebanon War against the Hezbollah force which is a Hybrid Regular Military entity. Bad IPB (Intelligence Preparation for the Battlefield) inhibited IDF from achieving its strategic goals and objectives to the full extend.
To my knowledge, the success of Cold Start doctrine heavily depends on the IPB which must outmaneuver the OPSEC measures put in place by the enemy forces. Therefore, the commanders and staffs need to pay extra-ordinary attention to the IPB stage of the mission planning.

 

[pyazdani945@gmail.com]

I THINK IT IS NOT BE RIGHT SAID BECAUSE THERE IS NO SOLUTION OF WAR IT IS FULL FLEGED FINISHED AND THE SYSTEM OF WORLD WILL ALSO BE DISTURBED