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India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

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Btw isn't it interesting that we went, within a decade from officers like Yahya, Peerzada, Hamid khan, AAK to highly professional and brilliant generals like K.M Arif, Akhtar abdur Rehman, Kallue, Shah Rafi Alam, Shamin Alam and many more who really made India dance to their tune. From Brasstacks to trident and from Afghan Jihad to Nuclear program these man had gained near perfection in National policy making, Diplomatic and strategic affairs, guerilla warfare, operational planning in conventional warfare and nuclear brinkmanship.
 
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PanzerKiel said:
Replacement of the commander was just one of the reasons...others included the permanent affiliations of brigade commanders with old / new commanders, personal rivalries, old affiliations of PA / IA officers (afterall, they were part of the same army hardly 18 years back)....
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8-)
These factors are certainly the printable, admissible factors......perhaps it is best to leave it at that.
 
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Found this while reading Sajjad Haider's "Flight of the Falcon"

Ayub Khan’salleged decision to travelto Saidu Sharifafter theISI warning ofan Indian attack and his remaining there during allthecrucial battles
being fought inKashmir maywell have been to stay thefarthestaway fromthe dangers ofthe battle. Such behaviour wasan enigmaeven for Ayub
Khan’scoterie of generalsand hiscabinetmembers but he had madesurethere were no courageousand morally uprightmen around himto advise
himcorrectly. But in reality, thefear ofthe battle ground was not newfor the Field Marshal; rather it was reminiscent of his widely known removal
fromcommand ofthe 1st AssamRegiment fromthe Dagger Division byGeneralTW ReeseinBurmafor wavering to lead his troops. Lt Col
Parsons had been ordered to take over fromAyub Khanwho had,according to Lt ColSteve Parson,“chickened out”fromleading his battalion in
thefamous Battle ofKohima. According to Lt ColSteve Parsons, during his presentation on the‘Battle ofKohima’ in 1984, whichwas reported
by the Press Trust ofIndiaand published in the Daily Telegraph fromCalcuttaas wellas reported in the Daily News fromKarachi(reproduced
inAppendix ‘B’). Ayub Khan had displayed “alack ofcourage”.
In the Battle ofKohima when the 19 British-India Dagger Divisionwas dashing for thecapture ofMandalay, Ayub Khanwas removed fromthe
command ofthe 1st Assambattalion, for dithering to lead his men in theensuing battle, whereafter he had stayed in a‘forty pounder’ (tent) with a
Risaldar Major MAshrafKhan also fromHazara, till he wasevacuated and sent to ShagaiFort near Peshawar to Command 15th Punjab
Battalion group comprising old veterans fromWW-Iand some medically unfitsoldiers fromWW-II
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. Ayub Khan’s behaviourasajunior
commander on the battlefront wasalso confirmed in aletter byLt ColMohatramwho had been an eye witness to this unflattering dramatic
episode(also reproduced as part ofAppendix ‘C’).
Ayub Khanwas later superseded byBrigadiers Nazir, Iftikharand Nasir,alljunior to him. Ayub Khan’s being superseded was reportedly by the
orders of none other than the Quaid-Azamhimself. Thereason for the Quaid-e-Azamto havetaken such a decision had an explicit basis. Ayub
Khan had been appointed as thesenior officer-in-charge ofthe Pakistanicontingent,a part ofthe Punjab Boundary Force, ironically under the
command ofthesame GeneralReese ofDagger Division inBurma. Ayub Khan’s mandate was to provide protection to the Muslimrefugees
migrating fromAmritsarand nearby areas. The Sikh carnage ofMuslimmen, women and childrenwasachilling horrorand thefailure ofAyub
Khan to protect the victims ofSikh slaughter wereallegedlymaking terrifying headlines in the Nawa-e-Waqt and Pakistan Times . Thesereports
had reached the Quaid-e-Azamwho had reportedly placed it on record that Ayub Khanwas not to be promoted any further. He would have
retired in that rank had the Quaid lived alittlelonger. That was not to be and Ayub Khan gifted himselftherank ofa Field Marshal as if to defy the
Quaid, GenReese ofDagger Division and GenMesservy, thefirst C-in-C ofthe PakistanArmywho had also declared himunfit for promotion
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PanzerKiel said:
It is true, unfortunately. Brigadier Azmat Hayat, 10 Brigade.
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Almost the same case was with Brig Zafar bde cmdr 25 bde?
I've also read that MG Akhtar also begged to act as a subordinate commander of Yahya after change of command so that all the praise (if he desired it) would be Yahya's but Yahya walked out.
 
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PanzerKiel said:
In short, maybe, Indians are trying to achieve opposite of TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE... Which is... Too much in a very short time.... Once this occurs, then the gaps widens between mass and quality.... And battlefield performance suffers, and then reluctance for prolonging a tactical action for own desired results creeps in... 27 Feb may fit in here.... Indians failed to use their one, ultimate trump card which is superiority in numbers.... Even if IAF had lost a couple maybe, but then following it, the skies should have been filled with IAF aircraft for potential fighter sweeps and CAPs busting.... But IAF showed no inclination of pressing their quantity advantage.....

Again.... Brings us to the same thing.... India always feels reluctant to bring in its quantity advantage... Maybe it tries for QUALITY advantage like USA does, but then Indians don't have this corresponding military assets to match their doctrine.... Yet.
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Is that something inherent within the Indian military mind-set, or have they calculated that besides public declarations, Pakistan has capabilities they respect and recognise, consciously or unconsciously, therefore are unwilling to take their chances by bringing the full force to the field.

They are a professional bunch, they go through all the training, they are educated to a respectable degree, so I find it difficult to believe they are blind to the ground realities. I suppose against a lesser opponent, they could think quality will payoff, without having to rely on quantity. But, perhaps they have concluded at least in private that Pakistan is not a lesser opponent. The resulting conclusion being that rather then start a war they cannot control, and create a situation in which they cannot be certain of a victory, let's rely on quality, if it gets results, great, otherwise play on patriotism to blind the entire nation.
 
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The Terminator said:
We have a powerful military department which India lacks ie ISPR. ISPR played a vital role by motivating the public and shape the mindset towards war on terror and brutal within borders fight against TTP, BLA etc. We constantly heard the voice of our hearts being propagated through ISPR and the famous phrases of giving surprise to our arch rival and be a dominant side in escalation ladder felt melody to the ears for the general public as their heart's voice was constantly been suppressed by the traditional political leadership.

ISPR wields the power to shake the Earth. But when you try to mixup foreign office with ISPR then matters quickly turn from serious to hilarious. It doesn't suite a uniformed person to say that we don't want to fight or we don't wish for war. Whatever the circumstances may come but when a senior military official globally relaying that message turns lion into sheep, at least in perception.

This is the Era of hybrid warfare where usually perception (either within our own nation or globally) matters a lot, sometimes more than the actual capability. IMHO ISPR should only represent the true defenders and warriors of the nation and let foreign office guys handle the sweet talking and diplomatic conversations.
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Let's remember, only recently an American general called China to tell them, don't worry, we wont be nuking you. Militaries play the peace maker and the sharp shooter roles all over the world, we just don't hear about it, but it happens.

I do understand your point, but in todays world of public relations with 2 second attention for news, two different branches of the government speaking at the same time, with completely different message is a recipe for disaster.

Our foreign office also did a good job, but the clearest message came from the ISPR, it was a new style, but it worked, it only worked because the message got through.
As a patriot, you may have heard that message differently to the rest of the world. But, please remember, that message had three audience's, you the citizen, the Indians, and most importantly the World.

The message was clearly understood by all, if you want a fight, OK, let's go, but the choice is yours, India refused to take that option. It was the right message, but that message had to come from a single source, otherwise it would have created confusion. Especially in light of the stupid and misunderstood civil/military drama, the last thing we needed at the time was a confused message of any kind.

To my memory, it was the first time Pakistan actually won the battle of narratives, which we always seem to lose, irrespective of the facts. Please, let's take away the correct lessons, otherwise we might fail next time.
Another lesson that many of us seem to forget, the effectiveness of ISPR was magnified by Imran Khan, this is not political, but a grounded fact, anyone else, and I highly doubt the message would have been that effective, not by a mile.
 
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peagle said:
Let's remember, only recently an American general called China to tell them, don't worry, we wont be nuking you. Militaries play the peace maker and the sharp shooter roles all over the world, we just don't hear about it, but it happens.

I do understand your point, but in todays world of public relations with 2 second attention for news, two different branches of the government speaking at the same time, with completely different message is a recipe for disaster.

Our foreign office also did a good job, but the clearest message came from the ISPR, it was a new style, but it worked, it only worked because the message got through.
As a patriot, you may have heard that message differently to the rest of the world. But, please remember, that message had three audience's, you the citizen, the Indians, and most importantly the World.

The message was clearly understood by all, if you want a fight, OK, let's go, but the choice is yours, India refused to take that option. It was the right message, but that message had to come from a single source, otherwise it would have created confusion. Especially in light of the stupid and misunderstood civil/military drama, the last thing we needed at the time was a confused message of any kind.

To my memory, it was the first time Pakistan actually won the battle of narratives, which we always seem to lose, irrespective of the facts. Please, let's take away the correct lessons, otherwise we might fail next time.
Another lesson that many of us seem to forget, the effectiveness of ISPR was magnified by Imran Khan, this is not political, but a grounded fact, anyone else, and I highly doubt the message would have been that effective, not by a mile.
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You didn't get my point. I am not talking about a single incident but about a repeated single statement. I have heard may be a hundred times from almost all the DG ISPRs that we don't wanna war. That kind of statement from a uniformed person shouldn't be a norm but rather an exception like what he did after operation swift retort was a clever and right move.

Requested the enemy to plz stop we don't wanna fight, but in the same sentence, he threatened them by saying that we would keep the escalation ladder. That was a very balanced statement. That's why I love General Asif Ghafoor.

But in the past either under US pressure or our Govt policy, our DG ISPRs acted more like a foreign office spokesperson rather than a military official. You shouldn't shoot olive branches from a barrel of gun or a tank or an artillery piece.

And US saying China anything in terms of military is just time pass. We all know major nuclear powers never fight openly against each other especially the super powers. Not nuking China is as much a joke as Pakistan saying to Canada that we won't occupy you.
 
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The Terminator said:
You didn't get my point. I am not talking about a single incident but about a repeated single statement. I have heard may be a hundred times from almost all the DG ISPRs that we don't wanna war. That kind of statement from a uniformed person shouldn't be a norm but rather an exception like what he did after operation swift retort was a clever and right move.

Requested the enemy to plz stop we don't wanna fight, but in the same sentence, he threatened them by saying that we would keep the escalation ladder. That was a very balanced statement. That's why I love General Asif Ghafoor.

But in the past either under US pressure or our Govt policy, our DG ISPRs acted more like a foreign office spokesperson rather than a military official. You shouldn't shoot olive branches from a barrel of gun or a tank or an artillery piece.

And US saying China anything in terms of military is just time pass. We all know major nuclear powers never fight openly against each other especially the super powers. Not nuking China is as much a joke as Pakistan saying to Canada that we won't occupy you.
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Right, perhaps we have a different point of view, because even in this formulation I have not seen what you are describing, the shooting of olive branches from a barrel of a gun. Please remember, everyone has been at pains to paint the Pakistan army as a rogue element, historically we have been very poor in countering this, but I've not read or heard any such description for the past few years.

I do not think the people throwing false accusations have changed, but it seems our approach has, that approach may feel different siting within Pakistan, but I can assure you there is a palpable difference in how Pakistan military is viewed abroad, that has come from the change of approach you are describing. Sometimes the right approach can feel wrong, but if it gets you results, then it is the right approach.


"Not nuking China is as much a joke as Pakistan saying to Canada that we won't occupy you."

This is not about equivalence, again please, correct lessons are important. it does not matter if America was going to nuke China or not, this is not about that.
The point is, he went over the head of his chief executive, and called the enemy. He felt sufficiently confident enough to do that knowing nothing would happen to him. It is about the military over stepping its bounds, safely ignoring the constitution and entering the realm of political authority. These are the lessons, that such things do happen and more, but the world doesn't cry about it like we do, we need to stop our obsession with the military and politics.

If Bajwa had called India with that same message, it would have been front page news in Pakistan for decades to come, every discussion would have ended with, but Bajwa called India. That incident was barely news in America or anywhere else. and, it has already been forgotten. There are lessons, and we have to, we must learn those lessons.

In that phone call there are so many lessons, so many pointers. The point is that Pakistanis need to get over the obsession will the military and live their lives, this obsession creates an extremely bad image abroad, and it weakens the authority of civilians domestically and abroad, which is also bad for the country.
Perhaps we should start a new thread because I feel uncomfortable discussing this here, this is a beautiful thread that I do not wish to derail.
 
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