India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

[Joe Shearer]

Just to remind all readers of an earlier post in the thread by @PanzerKiel, here it is:

Coming to Operations Riddle and Nepal....

XI Corps attack plan was named RIDDLE.....
involved attack towards Lahore along three axis (15, 7 and 4 Mountain Divisions), they were to capture area uptill BRBLC, with a be-prepared mission to go across it in case of unexpected success...moreover, Jassar enclave was to be eliminated and its bridge capture to negate a Pakistani offensive option towards DBN.

1 Corps attack plan was named Nepal..
for which a bridgehead was planned in Bhagowal-Phillaurah area to provide a firm base for 1 Armored Division to break out towards MRLC and Daska....

Problems faced by IA...
first, owing to vast distances (international border to peacetime locations), WC was forced to stagger all these attacks...therefore all these formations had to attack right from their line of march without any rest or necessary coordination...
WC also did not have upto date maps of their area of operations....

Moreover, there was also indicators of indian reluctance to cross the international border....some reasons being...
PA's edge in armor (quantity and quality)
Superior PA artillery
F-104 (even though it was available in a limited quantity to have any major impact on the tactical battle)

GOC XV Corps, since he was hard pressed due to Gibralter and Grandslam, pressed COAS to open the international border so that PA pressure against him can be reduced. Therefore IA D Day was advanced to 6 Sep in order to relieve pressure against Akhnur..

 

[Mumm-Ra]

@waz @Jungibaaz @jaibi can we make this tread sticky please?

 

[Joe Shearer]

PRELIMINARIES TO THE BATTLE FOR THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI

If we look at how the conflict unfolded, there is a steady development of the theme visible up to a point. So we had irregulars in action in Operation Gibraltar, messing up the peace of mind of the Indian XV Corps, and getting Katoch to imitate Stephen Leacock's hero: "Lord Ronald said nothing; he flung himself from the room, flung himself upon his horse and rode madly off in all directions." Katoch managed to keep the upper hand, and even capture an important strategic feature, but not without suffering injuries; not crippling injuries, but in the context of things, given that 47-48 was 17 years before, most alarming. He successfully communicated his troubled state of mind to his Army commander, and to his Chief, during his conference with them at Srinagar, and it was actually while they were with him that news of Grand Slam broke upon them like a, well, thunderclap. General Chaudhuri immediately air dashed to Delhi (I've always wanted to use that phrase!), got permission for taking action with a free hand and issued orders for the Indian riposte; Operations Riddle and Nepal (for some reason, these names are never mentioned in Indian circles in Indian annals).

So we saw a progression; from an entire Army Corps facing a large number of irregulars (estimates differ), albeit with considerable 'sympathetic' support from heavy artillery across the line of control, fire that had its own effect in battering the Indian troops defending Chhamb-Akhnoor, we next had, in Operation Grand Slam, 7 battalions and 2 Armoured Regiments, and the artillery from a Corps, on the Pakistan side of the equation, facing 5 battalions, a light tank regiment and fairly innocuous artillery. The inevitable consequences followed; the Indian position of the newly-institutied 10 Division was opened up as if by a tin-cutter, with one segment doing a backward left wheel from a north-south orientation to a west-east orientation along the foothills, and another segment falling back before a traumatic armoured attack faced by a mountain brigade, 41 Mtn Brigade, to re-group behind the Corps reserve, 28 Brigade.

The Div. commander lost his job; very unfairly, considering that he only got a division that took up its war-time location on the very day that his enemy attacked, and considering that he was left with ad hoc formations deputed to him at the eleventh hour, including a Mountain Division that didn't have the tools to resist an armoured attack, and an armoured contingent that was frankly not fit to oppose main battle tanks in battle. But there it is; he and the CO, 15 Infantry Division, were the two divisional commanders to be removed.

Both were negligent in reporting, and tried to mislead their respective commanders, Chopra the Corps commander XV Corps General Katoch, and Niranjan Prasad, who had already two strikes against him (NEFA 4 Division, Kashmir 25 Division) the Corps commander XI Corps Joginder Dhillon.

That was the critical difference.

One last point: it was baffling to see XI Corps attacking on such a broad front. From Dera Baba Nanak to Kasur is 125 kms; we have XI Corps deploying 3 Divisions, 15 Infantry, 7 Infantry and 4 Mountain, with two brigades, 38 and 54, under the first, two brigades, 48 and 65, under the second, and 7 Mountain and 62 Mountain, under the third. In addition, 96 Brigade was pressed into service vice 29 Brigade, in the tussle over the bridge near Dera Baba Nanak.

General Harbaksh Singh has an explanation, and we will go into that later. It was not a terribly convincing explanation, having to do with this being originally a plan that would have deployed 1 Armoured Division along one of the captured bridges, and looking a bit pointless after the COAS had diverted 1 Armoured Division to his pet new 1 Armoured Corps, and made a joke of the entire plan. That does not explain why, having found that this was going through, the XI Corps plan had not been changed to strengthen one of the four access points to Pakistani territory.

 

[Cuirassier]

THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI: 15 DIV

If we look at how the conflict unfolded, there is a steady development of the theme visible up to a point. So we had irregulars in action in Operation Gibraltar, messing up the peace of mind of the Indian XV Corps, and getting Katoch to imitate Stephen Leacock's hero: "Lord Ronald said nothing; he flung himself from the room, flung himself upon his horse and rode madly off in all directions." Katoch managed to keep the upper hand, and even capture an important strategic feature, but not without suffering injuries; not crippling injuries, but in the context of things, given that 47-48 was 17 years before, most alarming. He successfully communicated his troubled state of mind to his Army commander, and to his Chief, during his conference with them at Srinagar, and it was actually while they were with him that news of Grand Slam broke upon them like a, well, thunderclap. General Chaudhuri immediately air dashed to Delhi (I've always wanted to use that phrase!), got permission for taking action with a free hand and issued orders for the Indian riposte; Operations Riddle and Nepal (for some reason, these names are never mentioned in Indian circles in Indian annals).

So we saw a progression; from an entire Army Corps facing a large number of irregulars (estimates differ), albeit with considerable 'sympathetic' support from heavy artillery across the line of control, fire that had its own effect in battering the Indian troops defending Chhamb-Akhnoor, we next had, in Operation Grand Slam, 7 battalions and 2 Armoured Regiments, and the artillery from a Corps, on the Pakistan side of the equation, facing 5 battalions, a light tank regiment and fairly innocuous artillery. The inevitable consequences followed; the Indian position of the newly-institutied 10 Division was opened up as if by a tin-cutter, with one segment doing a backward left wheel from a north-south orientation to a west-east orientation along the foothills, and another segment falling back before a traumatic armoured attack faced by a mountain brigade, 41 Mtn Brigade, to re-group behind the Corps reserve, 28 Brigade.

The Div. commander lost his job; very unfairly, considering that he only got a division that took up its war-time location on the very day that his enemy attacked, and considering that he was left with ad hoc formations deputed to him at the eleventh hour, including a Mountain Division that didn't have the tools to resist an armoured attack, and an armoured contingent that was frankly not fit to oppose main battle tanks in battle. But there it is; he and the CO, 15 Infantry Division, were the two divisional commanders to be removed.

**

Who replaced Gen Chopra?

 

[Joe Shearer]

@Cuirassier

I don't know. I only have this brutally direct piece of narration by Harbaksh Singh:

In the meanwhile, a message came from 39 Medium Battery of Artillery (this was part of a Sikh Battalion converted into a Medium Artillery Regiment and the message was meant for me as Colonel of the Sikh Regiment) that the personnel of the 161 Artillery Regiment, deployed next to them, had deserted enmass, leaving their guns, with stacked ammunition, and wagon-line (vehicles) behind.They wanted them collected, lest they fall into enemy hands. Despite the desertion, they averred that the Medium Battery, in position, would continue to support the forward Brigade. Upon receipt of this message, I ordered the Divisional Commander, Major General Chopra, in the presence of his Corps Commander, to muster as much manpower and as many electrical mechanical engineers from his Division, as he could, and arrange to collect the guns, the ammunition and the vehicles. Having done so, he could then order 41 Mountain Brigade to withdraw that night. The orders for withdrawal were to get to the Brigade by 2 o’clock that afternoon, so that the Brigade Commander could plan his withdrawal properly. Thereafter, General Kashmir Katoch arid I left Akhnoor, by the same helicopter in which we had come, and flew back to our respective Headquarters.

The next morning, the 5th of September, my Chief of Staff was rung up by General Officer Commanding 10 Division to say that the Brigade had come back safely, with all its equipment and ammunition. But before congratulating the General Officer Commanding for this successful operation, I asked my Chief of Staff to check up from the General Officer Commanding if the guns had also been brought back. His reply that they could not be brought back made me furious. I ordered his Corps Commander to hold a Court of Inquiry for this lapse. As a result of this inquiry, General Chopra was sacked from his appointment.

After finishing the narration of the battle for the bridge at Dograi, and for the bridge at Barki (by 7 Div in the second case), when we come to the actions of 4 Mtn Div. I plan to share some relevant extracts from several different accounts. I do not have the book written by Major General Joginder Singh*, who seems to have been a thorough-going pain in the, erm, elbow, which is a pity.

Please bear with me till then.

* There were two general officers named Joginder Singh.
One was Major General Joginder Singh, Chief of Staff to Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh; the other was Lieutenant General Joginder Singh Dhillon, GOC-in-C XI Corps.

 

[meghdut]

@PanzerKiel @Joe Shearer , Gentlemen could you kindly include a bibliography to this thread for us to read? It would be highly appreciated .

 

[Joe Shearer]

THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI: 15 DIV.

In keeping with the broad vision of capturing all 4 bridges across water obstacles that the PA had planned to use to defend itself and its territory minus what lay on the Indian side, the Indian 15 Infantry Div had been set the objective of reaching the bridge at Dograi, only a few kms from Lahore, and within shelling distance of the Lahore International Airport. The division had the 38 and 54 Brigades, and we have seen that 38 Brigade was busy with the bridge at Bhaini Dhilwan (that was ultimately captured on 14th September). That left Brigadier Rikh and his three battalions to deal with the bridge at Dograi.

The plan was simple.

3 Jat would take up position at the villages of Gosal and Dial, just 4 kms from the border at Wagah, and establish a firm base at Milestone 14 on the Lahore Road. 15 Dogra would leapfrog that position and attack the actual bridge another 3.5 kms on. Simultaneously 13 Punjab would make a right hook and capture another bridge that lay a little further south on the Dograi (or Dograe Kalan, as Google Maps prefers to call it) and Jallo.

With this, four out of five bridges that might be used for a break-out by the Pakistan Army would have been bottled up.

Plans last, according to military officers, until the moment of contact with the enemy. Quite in keeping with this aphorism, nothing went according to plan for this plan. It started off very well, with 3 Jat achieving its objectives and settling down to its well-earned rest and vantage point for the rest of the struggle. 15 Dogra faced problems from its kick-off point itself, and had to use 14 Horse to see off their unwanted company. By the time they reached the 3 Jat, they claimed they had suffered too many casualties to go on and take their objective, the bridge. 13 Punjab also got into a corner at Jallo Railway Station, on their way to their objective, suffered heavy casualties, and were stopped in their tracks.

[I am sorry to report that another set of notes taking this forward, through the delegation of the operation to capture the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal to 3 Jat, their crossing of the Canal, their inability to hold the position due to lack of support and finally an order to withdraw, and their return to the same object and capture of the east bank of the canal around the 22nd has been lost; it is not clear how.

While I will obviously re-write it, readers may please forgive the repetitive inclusion of new passages, and saving this note incrementally; as each section gets written, it will be placed on the body of this note, and saved.]

THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI – DELEGATION TO 3 JAT AND THE ATTACK ON THE EAST BANK

With the failure of the designated units to take up their assignments, Brigadier Rikh came up to Milestone 14 to confer with Lt. Col. Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. He asked 3 Jat if they would take up the task of 15 Dogra, to attack the east bank of the Icchogil Canal. Hayde agreed. By then a squadron of 14 Horse had arrived at Milestone 14, so they were roped in; it was agreed that one troop would go along with the Jats, and the other would follow after the settlement of Dograi had been cleared. With all this cleared and agreed all around, 3 Jat moved into action around 09:00 HRS on the 6th. They walked straight into an air attack, and lost men; in addition, they lost their recoilless rifles as well, and were left helpless against armour. This was to have critical consequences later.

As the leading company of 3 Jat collected themselves after the air attack, and moved forward on the GT Road, at this point running east-west, they came under heavy fire. Hayde then ordered the party to swing to the north and circle around the settlement. At the outset of this looping advance, they faced artillery fire while they were on the open field, got through it, and then attacked the fortifications on the east bank of the Canal.

The attack was successful. 3 Jat managed to clear the defences that they attacked on the east bank, and forced the troops stationed there to retreat to the west bank.

THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI – BATAPORE AND ATTOKE AWAN

On inspecting the scene, Hayde realised that the bridge had been demolished by the defenders, but had fallen down neatly along its foundations, meaning that it could still be crossed as it had fallen. He led two companies across in the teeth of defending fire, and stationed them to north and south of the GT Road beyond the canal, in Attoke Awan and in Batapore respectively.

This was the furthest that Indian troops penetrated in 1965.

Unfortunately, the situation was not stable, and both companies had to retreat in about four hours, only for the battalion to be flung into battle just two weeks later, to engage with the Pakistan Army in the very hard-fought Battle of Dograi.

THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI – FOR WANT OF A NAIL

Having got to the west bank of the Ichhogil Canal, the two companies of 3 Jat found themselves totally abandoned by their brigade. The company in Attoke Awan was driven back across the canal by heavy shelling from Sherman tanks. At this point, a troop of 14 Horse arrived on the east bank (it had been planned that one troop would accompany the original attack on the east bank, and the other would follow once Dograi had been pacified, but thanks to Hayde’s northward loop around Dograi, neither troop kept up – this was the earlier troop that had proceeded cautiously a quiescent Dograi and reached the bridge). Their covering fire encouraged Hayde to cross once again, and to reoccupy positions on the north side, just as before.

He was unable to communicate with his brigade HQ, as the equipment for man-packing their radio set had failed to arrive in the morning, so he sent three messengers to the 14th Horse to message brigade HQ and ask for anti-tank equipment; finally, since he got no replies, he sent off one of his officers. There was still no response, and the situation was bad for the Attoke Awan company in its exposed position and under enemy fire. Finally, he was forced to lead this company back, crossing the canal a 4th time.

On reaching the east bank, he got a shock. Lt. Brijendra Singh informed him that he had been asked to fall back, and to bring the infantry back also.

Hayde withdrew the company that had been holding its position in Batapore and fell back as ordered. It would take several hundred lives in a bloody battle two weeks later to get back to the east bank, and the only reason for this was the indecision of Brig. Rikh, and the panicky state of mind of the divisional commander, Major General Niranjan Prasad.

 

[PanzerKiel]

One last point: it was baffling to see XI Corps attacking on such a broad front. From Dera Baba Nanak to Kasur is 125 kms; we have XI Corps deploying 3 Divisions, 15 Infantry, 7 Infantry and 4 Mountain, with two brigades, 38 and 54, under the first, two brigades, 48 and 65, under the second, and 7 Mountain and 62 Mountain, under the third. In addition, 96 Brigade was pressed into service vice 29 Brigade, in the tussle over the bridge near Dera Baba Nanak.

From a military point of view, the broad front front plan of XI was a necessity as well as beneficial....
...there are three approaches from Indian side towards lahore ---Amritsar-Lahore (shortest), Harike-Khalra-Barki and via Kasur....

XI Corps attack along these approaches, with a Division each, had the advantage of a converging attack (since all these approaches converge on Lahore)....which would make it difficult for PA 10 and 11 Division to hold....converging attack also meant that the more XI Corps advanced, the problem of inter Divisions (7, 15, 4 MD) support in terms of shifting of schwerpunkt would get easier...
....However, conversely, from PA view, the more XI attack came inside Pakistan, the more compact PA defences would become...its just like you may have a 100 men against 1, but due to geo constraints you have to pass through a defile or a single door, as a result, that 1 man can hold a bigger force for a long period of time....like 300 Spartans.

In order to cover the wide gap between 15 and 7 Division, IA deployed an adhoc force name RAJA TAL force.

XI also took away 96 Brigade under its own direct command in order to protect Amritsar against any PA attempt to take it..


Just a point of trivia....the presence of PA 11 Division was NOT KNOWN to Indian int orgs before the war.....they came to know about it once they came face to face with it


Coming specifically to Lahore and PA 10 Division

Main advantages enjoyed by PA 10 Division were....
BRB....already running parallel to IB, a ready made defence line.....ideally located at a distance from IB which allow PA to sufficiently attrite IA attack before the battle of BRB starts....
1/5 of 10 Division front in the north, almost 9000 yards......IA will have to face twin obstacles in the form of BRB and Ravi both...
Two approaches from Indian side towards Lahore...IA force to advance wide apart from IB, which allow 10 Division to respond to both thrusts separately without facing the joint power of 2 IA divisions....

THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI: 15 DIV.

In keeping with the broad vision of capturing all 4 bridges across water obstacles that the PA had planned to use to defend itself and its territory minus what lay on the Indian side, the Indian 15 Infantry Div had been set the objective of reaching the bridge at Dograi, only a few kms from Lahore, and within shelling distance of the Lahore International Airport. The division had the 38 and 54 Brigades, and we have seen that 38 Brigade was busy with the bridge at Bhaini Dhilwan (that was ultimately captured on 14th September). That left Brigadier Rikh and his three battalions to deal with the bridge at Dograi.

The plan was simple.

3 Jat would take up position at the villages of Gosal and Dial, just 4 kms from the border at Wagah, and establish a firm base at Milestone 14 on the Lahore Road. 15 Dogra would leapfrog that position and attack the actual bridge another 3.5 kms on. Simultaneously 13 Punjab would make a right hook and capture another bridge that lay a little further south on the Dograi (or Dograe Kalan, as Google Maps prefers to call it) and Jallo.

With this, four out of five bridges that might be used for a break-out by the Pakistan Army would have been bottled up.

Plans last, according to military officers, until the moment of contact with the enemy. Quite in keeping with this aphorism, nothing went according to plan for this plan. It started off very well, with 3 Jat achieving its objectives and settling down to its well-earned rest and vantage point for the rest of the struggle. 15 Dogra faced problems from its kick-off point itself, and had to use 14 Horse to see off their unwanted company. By the time they reached the 3 Jat, they claimed they had suffered too many casualties to go on and take their objective, the bridge. 13 Punjab also got into a corner at Jallo Railway Station, on their way to their objective, suffered heavy casualties, and were stopped in their tracks.

[I am sorry to report that another set of notes taking this forward, through the delegation of the operation to capture the east bank of the Ichhogil Canal to 3 Jat, their crossing of the Canal, their inability to hold the position due to lack of support and finally an order to withdraw, and their return to the same object and capture of the east bank of the canal around the 22nd has been lost; it is not clear how.

While I will obviously re-write it, readers may please forgive the repetitive inclusion of new passages, and saving this note incrementally; as each section gets written, it will be placed on the body of this note, and saved.]

THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI – DELEGATION TO 3 JAT AND THE ATTACK ON THE EAST BANK

With the failure of the designated units to take up their assignments, Brigadier Rikh came up to Milestone 14 to confer with Lt. Col. Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. He asked 3 Jat if they would take up the task of 15 Dogra, to attack the east bank of the Icchogil Canal. Hayde agreed. By then a squadron of 14 Horse had arrived at Milestone 14, so they were roped in; it was agreed that one troop would go along with the Jats, and the other would follow after the settlement of Dograi had been cleared. With all this cleared and agreed all around, 3 Jat moved into action around 09:00 HRS on the 6th. They walked straight into an air attack, and lost men; in addition, they lost their recoilless rifles as well, and were left helpless against armour. This was to have critical consequences later.

As the leading company of 3 Jat collected themselves after the air attack, and moved forward on the GT Road, at this point running east-west, they came under heavy fire. Hayde then ordered the party to swing to the north and circle around the settlement. At the outset of this looping advance, they faced artillery fire while they were on the open field, got through it, and then attacked the fortifications on the east bank of the Canal.

The attack was successful. 3 Jat managed to clear the defences that they attacked on the east bank, and forced the troops stationed there to retreat to the west bank.

THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI – BATAPORE AND ATTOKE AWAN

On inspecting the scene, Hayde realised that the bridge had been demolished by the defenders, but had fallen down neatly along its foundations, meaning that it could still be crossed as it had fallen. He led two companies across in the teeth of defending fire, and stationed them to north and south of the GT Road beyond the canal, in Attoke Awan and in Batapore respectively.

This was the furthest that Indian troops penetrated in 1965.

Unfortunately, the situation was not stable, and both companies had to retreat in about four hours, only for the battalion to be flung into battle just two weeks later, to engage with the Pakistan Army in the very hard-fought Battle of Dograi.

THE BRIDGE AT DOGRAI – FOR WANT OF A NAIL

Having got to the west bank of the Ichhogil Canal, the two companies of 3 Jat found themselves totally abandoned by their brigade. The company in Attoke Awan was driven back across the canal by heavy shelling from Sherman tanks. At this point, a troop of 14 Horse arrived on the east bank (it had been planned that one troop would accompany the original attack on the east bank, and the other would follow once Dograi had been pacified, but thanks to Hayde’s northward loop around Dograi, neither troop kept up – this was the earlier troop that had proceeded cautiously a quiescent Dograi and reached the bridge). Their covering fire encouraged Hayde to cross once again, and to reoccupy positions on the north side, just as before.

He was unable to communicate with his brigade HQ, as the equipment for man-packing their radio set had failed to arrive in the morning, so he sent three messengers to the 14th Horse to message brigade HQ and ask for anti-tank equipment; finally, since he got no replies, he sent off one of his officers. There was still no response, and the situation was bad for the Attoke Awan company in its exposed position and under enemy fire. Finally, he was forced to lead this company back, crossing the canal a 4th time.

On reaching the east bank, he got a shock. Lt. Brijendra Singh informed him that he had been asked to fall back, and to bring the infantry back also.

Hayde withdrew the company that had been holding its position in Batapore and fell back as ordered. It would take several hundred lives in a bloody battle two weeks later to get back to the east bank, and the only reason for this was the indecision of Brig. Rikh, and the panicky state of mind of the divisional commander, Major General Niranjan Prasad.

Good of you to mention PAF attacks against 54 Brigade ad 15 Dogra. PAF later on attacked 38 Brigade as well, 13 Punjab was routed as a result.

Reasons that IA was not able to consolidate 3 Jat success...
Repeated PAF strikes on follow-up echelons
Lack of foresight on the part of IA commanders
Absence of determined leadership at IA Brigade upwards
....in effect, it was a cheap victory which was thrown away


Just a side note....
There was a real worry on Indian side after the move of 2 IABG from Lahore front to Khem Karan on 13 Sep
XI Corps Commander, being a Sikh himself, somehow was haunted by Pak thrust towards Amritsar...therefore he constituted BHARAT FORCE, which was composed of RAJA TAL force and minor units of 2 IABG, its task being to save Amritsar while being prepared to support 15 Division...interesting point to note is that there was NO armr reserve with GOC 15 Division or Commander Bharat Force.

@Joe Shearer
50 Para Brigade attack...

 

[Joe Shearer]

@PanzerKiel @Joe Shearer , Gentlemen could you kindly include a bibliography to this thread for us to read? It would be highly appreciated .

I was waiting for @PanzerKiel to do that, since I lost all my books. However, I shall include a bibliography after finishing writing, when all the elements become clear (unless you want to start reading right away, in which case, please say so).

 

[PanzerKiel]

I was waiting for @PanzerKiel to do that, since I lost all my books. However, I shall include a bibliography after finishing writing, when all the elements become clear (unless you want to start reading right away, in which case, please say so).

...would be a bit difficult for me to write that much names......

 

[Joe Shearer]

From a military point of view, the broad front front plan of XI was a necessity as well as beneficial....
...there are three approaches from Indian side towards lahore ---Amritsar-Lahore (shortest), Harike-Khalra-Barki and via Kasur....

XI Corps faced a major battle at each of these entrances, its 15 Division at Dograi on the Amritsar-Lahore approach, its 7 Division at Barki and its 4 Mountain Division at Kasur - Khem Karan - Asal Uttar.

XI Corps attack along these approaches, with a Division each, had the advantage of a converging attack (since all these approaches converge on Lahore)....which would make it difficult for PA 10 and 11 Division to hold....converging attack also meant that the more XI Corps advanced, the problem of inter Divisions (7, 15, 4 MD) support in terms of shifting of schwerpunkt would get easier...
....However, conversely, from PA view, the more XI attack came inside Pakistan, the more compact PA defences would become...its just like you may have a 100 men against 1, but due to geo constraints you have to pass through a defile or a single door, as a result, that 1 man can hold a bigger force for a long period of time....like 300 Spartans.

One of the reasons that Harbaksh gave, and that in retrospect I should have taken on board with much greater respect, was his logic that the Ichhogil Canal was a two-edged sword: that while it was a formidable defence for the Pakistan Army against any attack on Lahore by the Indian Army, if the Indian Army could traverse the land gap between the border and the canal, the canal would become the Indian Army defensive line against the Pakistan Army itself.

This was also a reason for attacking the four bridges - Dera Baba Nanak, Bhaini Dhilwan, Dograi and the minor bridge near Jallo - to stop up any opening for counter-attack; so, too, for the bridge at Barki. The bridges further south, within the area of 4 Mountain Division near Kasur, are not included in these.

In order to cover the wide gap between 15 and 7 Division, IA deployed an adhoc force name RAJA TAL force.

XI also took away 96 Brigade under its own direct command in order to protect Amritsar against any PA attempt to take it..

THE BRIDGE AT BHAINI DHILWAN AND 96 BRIGADE

96 Brigade keeps popping in and out of the narrative; it may be recalled that 38 Brigade, operating to the north of 54 Brigade under the general command of 15 Infantry Division, had assigned 1 Jat to capture the Bhaini Dhilwan bridge. As has already been mentioned, 1 Jat got to the bridge, but retreated under heavy artillery and tank shelling. This was on the first day itself, on the 6th September.

This, among other things, including the air attacks on 54 Brigade, with heavy casualties to 13 Punjab, and the difficult passage faced by 15 Dogra, that stopped it from leapfrogging 3 Jat and attacking its objective, the bridge at Dograi, altogether, gave the 15 Div commander an impression that further progress was impossible, and he conveyed this to his Corps commander, General Dhillon. On personally inspecting the situation, along with the Army commander, Dhillon found that there had been casualties, but the situation was not out of control. 15 Div was ordered to continue, and 6 Kumaon was detached from 96 Brigade to support 1 Jat in taking the Bhaini Dhilwan bridge. This was attempted on 7th September, but did not succeed. On 8th September, the Pakistan Army counter-attacked, and put pressure on the combined forces of 6 Kumaon and 1 Jat, on the Ranian axis where they had retreated from their firm base established to attack the bridge.

To relieve pressure on 15 Div., 2 Armoured Brigade under Theograj, fresh from its exploits in the Kasur sector, was brought in on 13th September. 96 Brigade was freed up to take on the pressure, and by 14th September, had pushed back against the attacks, and captured the bridge at Bhaini Dhilwan.

Just a point of trivia....the presence of PA 11 Division was NOT KNOWN to Indian int orgs before the war.....they came to know about it once they came face to face with it

This adds to the failure of Military Intelligence to anticipate trouble for XV Corps, and to spot preparations for Grand Slam against 10 Division of XV Corps.

Coming specifically to Lahore and PA 10 Division

Main advantages enjoyed by PA 10 Division were....
BRB....already running parallel to IB, a ready made defence line.....ideally located at a distance from IB which allow PA to sufficiently attrite IA attack before the battle of BRB starts....
1/5 of 10 Division front in the north, almost 9000 yards......IA will have to face twin obstacles in the form of BRB and Ravi both...
Two approaches from Indian side towards Lahore...IA force to advance wide apart from IB, which allow 10 Division to respond to both thrusts separately without facing the joint power of 2 IA divisions....

As you mentioned in a parallel discussion on US 3 Army under Patton during the Battle of the Bulge, the numbers were approximately the same, but the cohesion among the 3 Corps that Patton handled was severely more effective than the cohesion among the 3 Corps, XV Corps, XI Corps and I Corps, that Indian Army Western Command handled.

Good of you to mention PAF attacks against 54 Brigade ad 15 Dogra. PAF later on attacked 38 Brigade as well, 13 Punjab was routed as a result.

I wonder if you have Major General Jogindar Singh's book* on the conflict. He was Chief of Staff to Harbaksh Singh, and had rather a high opinion of himself. On this point, of PAF activity, Harbaksh lays the blame squarely on him for the failure of the IAF to give the Army support, stating that without consulting him, Jogindar had consented to the withdrawal of the IAF from Ambala. Harbaksh was unable to get air cover although originally XI Corps had been assigned 24 sorties and air control teams had been attached to Army formations.

Behind The Scene: An Analysis of India's Military Operations 1947-1971 Maj Gen (Retd) JOGINDAR SINGH, VSM (Class I) ISBN: 9781897829202

Reasons that IA was not able to consolidate 3 Jat success...
Repeated PAF strikes on follow-up echelons
Lack of foresight on the part of IA commanders
Absence of determined leadership at IA Brigade upwards
....in effect, it was a cheap victory which was thrown away

At one point, Col. Hayde was less than 5 kms from Lahore International Airport.

Just a side note....
There was a real worry on Indian side after the move of 2 IABG from Lahore front to Khem Karan on 13 Sep
XI Corps Commander, being a Sikh himself, somehow was haunted by Pak thrust towards Amritsar...therefore he constituted BHARAT FORCE, which was composed of RAJA TAL force and minor units of 2 IABG, its task being to save Amritsar while being prepared to support 15 Division...interesting point to note is that there was NO armr reserve with GOC 15 Division or Commander Bharat Force.

This, as you know, was due to the sudden recent formation of I Corps and posting of Major General Dunn as Corps Commander; originally 1 Armoured Div was the armoured reserve of XI Corps.

@Joe Shearer
50 Para Brigade attack...

Coming to that, as a prelude to the Battle of Dograi.

 

[meghdut]

I was waiting for @PanzerKiel to do that, since I lost all my books. However, I shall include a bibliography after finishing writing, when all the elements become clear (unless you want to start reading right away, in which case, please say so).

Its okay Joe do it later if you so desire. I read a few already and want to expand my understanding of the matter. I asked for yours and panzerkiels suggestions because I don’t want to waste my time and money on jingoistic accounts which many books are. Please take your time Sir

...would be a bit difficult for me to write that much names......

Still Sir if you could later on put up a list here it would be really appreciated. You don’t have to list everything, just those you think are mostly unbiased and accurate , and also a good read

 

[Joe Shearer]

Its okay Joe do it later if you so desire. I read a few already and want to expand my understanding of the matter. I asked for yours and panzerkiels suggestions because I don’t want to waste my time and money on jingoistic accounts which many books are. Please take your time Sir

Very briefly, as I nurse a stomach ache and take a brief break from the narrative, may I check if you have read this core list?

1. Indian Army After Independence - Major K. C. Praval
2. War Despatches - Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh
3. Behind the Scene - Maj. Gen. Jogindar Singh

There was also frequent and laudatory mention made by Shuja Nawaz of another book besides his own Crossed Swords.

There is a plethora of excellent books - judging by extracts and by reviews - written by Pakistani authors, and that is the long list that @PanzerKiel is referring to. There may be as many as a dozen in that list, and it is not one to be reproduced in a jiffy.

Still Sir if you could later on put up a list here it would be really appreciated. You don’t have to list everything, just those you think are mostly unbiased and accurate , and also a good read

 

[meghdut]

Very briefly, as I nurse a stomach ache and take a brief break from the narrative, may I check if you have read this core list?

1. Indian Army After Independence - Major K. C. Praval
2. War Despatches - Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh
3. Behind the Scene - Maj. Gen. Jogindar Singh

There was also frequent and laudatory mention made by Shuja Nawaz of another book besides his own Crossed Swords.

There is a plethora of excellent books - judging by extracts and by reviews - written by Pakistani authors, and that is the long list that @PanzerKiel is referring to. There may be as many as a dozen in that list, and it is not one to be reproduced in a jiffy.

I read no 1 and 3 no2 is on my kindle and I’ll start as soon as I get to time. On top I read the following, Slender was the thread, History of Pakistan Army (Clloughley) 1965 air war by Pvs jagan, Witness to surrender , India’s wars since Independence by Sukhwant Singh Also From Kutch to Tashkent by Bajwa
So I have some background now want to sharpen it , something on Siachen and Kargil maybe? I read VP Mallicks book in Kargil long back

 

[PanzerKiel]

I read no 1 and 3 no2 is on my kindle and I’ll start as soon as I get to time. On top I read the following, Slender was the thread, History of Pakistan Army (Clloughley) 1965 air war by Pvs jagan, Witness to surrender , India’s wars since Independence by Sukhwant Singh Also From Kutch to Tashkent by Bajwa
So I have some background now want to sharpen it , something on Siachen and Kargil maybe? I read VP Mallicks book in Kargil long back

Kargil Conflict by Shireen Mazari