India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

[Joe Shearer]

I'll not be posting now......just to make sure to give enough time to everyone to let all, whatever has been already reflected, to sink in and get absorbed.

But ofcourse, am always available to answer any queries...

LOL.

You have given enough food for thought, more so for Indian readers than for Pakistani.

A knowledgeable friend of mine consoled me the other day when I was expressing great discomfort over the level of young officers in the Pakistan Army. "Look at your batch, Sir," he said. I was wondering what my IIM batch had to do with all this. "I mean your NDA batch," he clarified. I pointed out that most of them had retired between 2005 and 2010. "No, no, look at their quality!" It was a sobering reflection.

"For every one officer of the sort you are stressing about, there are nine others, at least five of whom are at one or two levels higher, who are duds."

The world looked brighter. He dimmed the lights with his next remark.

"It is exactly the same in the Indian Army, only we are bigger, so we have more duds."

My friend's NDA batch are at Lt. Col and Col., Group Captain and naval Captain levels, so he should know.

 

[PanzerKiel]

LOL.

You have given enough food for thought, more so for Indian readers than for Pakistani.

A knowledgeable friend of mine consoled me the other day when I was expressing great discomfort over the level of young officers in the Pakistan Army. "Look at your batch, Sir," he said. I was wondering what my IIM batch had to do with all this. "I mean your NDA batch," he clarified. I pointed out that most of them had retired between 2005 and 2010. "No, no, look at their quality!" It was a sobering reflection.

"For every one officer of the sort you are stressing about, there are nine others, at least five of whom are at senior levels, who are duds."

The world looked brighter. He dimmed the lights with his next remark.

"It is exactly the same in the Indian Army, only we are bigger, so we have more duds."

My friend's NDA batch are at Lt. Col and Col., Group Captain and naval Captain levels, so he should know.

Interesting....

another hidden aim, for whatever i have presented in the past few days, is to give something to the Pakistani readers as well.

Due to obvious reasons, we also hear recriminations about Pakistan Army, its leadership, that isnt good, that it wasnt able to perform or win any wars in the past...

i just want to say one thing...in real life, numbers do matter, and Pakistan having denied India victory in conventional wars, or deterring Indian to go to war in Brass Tacks, Trident, Parakaram etc....if seen from a critical, military eye....are no small feats......purely going by the numbers game, we were gone in 1948 maybe....but look today, an atomic power and a credible army.....

so....food for thought for people living on both sides of the border....

 

[Joe Shearer]

Interesting....

another hidden aim, for whatever i have presented in the past few days, is to give something to the Pakistani readers as well.

Due to obvious reasons, we also hear recriminations about Pakistan Army, its leadership, that isnt good, that it wasnt able to perform or win any wars in the past...

i just want to say one thing...in real life, numbers do matter, and Pakistan having denied India victory in conventional wars, or deterring Indian to go to war in Brass Tacks, Trident, Parakaram etc....if seen from a critical, military eye....are no small feats......purely going by the numbers game, we were gone in 1948 maybe....but look today, an atomic power and a credible army.....

so....food for thought for people living on both sides of the border....

The Pakistan Army has shown resilience and the ability to learn from its mistakes, and also to innovate with available resources to build up strong defences - a useful reference is its use of HAT and LAT formations. To be honest, our real enemy is not the Army.

Interesting....

another hidden aim, for whatever i have presented in the past few days, is to give something to the Pakistani readers as well.

Due to obvious reasons, we also hear recriminations about Pakistan Army, its leadership, that isnt good, that it wasnt able to perform or win any wars in the past...

i just want to say one thing...in real life, numbers do matter, and Pakistan having denied India victory in conventional wars, or deterring Indian to go to war in Brass Tacks, Trident, Parakaram etc....if seen from a critical, military eye....are no small feats......purely going by the numbers game, we were gone in 1948 maybe....but look today, an atomic power and a credible army.....

so....food for thought for people living on both sides of the border....

Also, showing that the opponent has not been able to suffocate the PA with overwhelming bulk is victory by itself. The key, I think, is the amazing quick reactions that the smaller force has displayed.

 

[PanzerKiel]

The Pakistan Army has shown resilience and the ability to learn from its mistakes, and also to innovate with available resources to build up strong defences - a useful reference is its use of HAT and LAT formations. To be honest, our real enemy is not the Army.



Also, showing that the opponent has not been able to suffocate the PA with overwhelming bulk is victory by itself. The key, I think, is the amazing quick reactions that the smaller force has displayed.

Take the example of Ex Brass Tacks....1987.....just to show how PA leadership had been transformed by then due to a number of factors between 1971 and 1980s...hardly a decade and a half.....

In a curious way, the positions of the Indian and the Pakistani leaders were reversed in 1987. In 1971 , Mrs. Gandhi backed by a galaxy of brilliant advisors, kept a politically naive Field Marshal Yahya Khan dancing to her tune. In 1986/87, it was an astute General Zia backed by some of the best advisors Pakistan has ever had who kept Indian leadership dancing to his tune.

General Zia was a man of iron self-control. He had the measure of his stronger adversary and played him like a master fisherman playing a powerful shark -- one wrong move and the shark will destroy the fisherman. But with cunning, guile, and an enormous moral strength, the fisherman can defeat the shark. And this is exactly what General Zia had been doing.

and let me tell you....its been 50 years since 1971.....its a long time....

The Pakistan Army has shown resilience and the ability to learn from its mistakes, and also to innovate with available resources to build up strong defences - a useful reference is its use of HAT and LAT formations. To be honest, our real enemy is not the Army.



Also, showing that the opponent has not been able to suffocate the PA with overwhelming bulk is victory by itself. The key, I think, is the amazing quick reactions that the smaller force has displayed.

or take the example of PAF

The PAF has always been far smaller than the IAF. The ratio has never been as bad as 1953, when India had about ten jet fighter squadrons to one of Pakistan’s but it has never been better than three-to-one. With resources being so tight, the P.A.F. has always striven to get the best return from a small force.

The PAF reached its peak about 1960. It had ten combat squadrons, seven on the F-86 Sabre, two on B- 57 (the American version of the Canberra) and one on the F- 104 Starfighter, and about 160 combat aircraft. The IAF had about 500 aircraft in 25 large squadrons. The small Pakistani force operated....and still operates with high efficiency, learning quickly from its American mentors that a small number of highly professional pilots flying standardized aircraft, and backed up with first class maintenance and a well-organized air base system costs less, and is more powerful, than a larger, more disorganized force.
Performance of PAF is in front of us.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Take the example of Ex Brass Tacks....1987.....just to show how PA leadership had been transformed by then due to a number of factors between 1971 and 1980s...hardly a decade and a half.....

In a curious way, the positions of the Indian and the Pakistani leaders were reversed in 1987. In 1971 , Mrs. Gandhi backed by a galaxy of brilliant advisors, kept a politically naive Field Marshal Yahya Khan dancing to her tune. In 1986/87, it was an astute General Zia backed by some of the best advisors Pakistan has ever had who kept Indian leadership dancing to his tune.

General Zia was a man of iron self-control. He had the measure of his stronger adversary and played him like a master fisherman playing a powerful shark -- one wrong move and the shark will destroy the fisherman. But with cunning, guile, and an enormous moral strength, the fisherman can defeat the shark. And this is exactly what General Zia had been doing.

and let me tell you....its been 50 years since 1971.....its a long time....

I intend to go into a crouching foetal position on this one, and to say that the leadership we had in 86-87 was among the most inept and accident-prone. Playing Rajiv Gandhi was more playing a gigantic earth-worm than a shark. For us to face Zia when we were being led by this dunderhead was really unfair.

Take the example of Ex Brass Tacks....1987.....just to show how PA leadership had been transformed by then due to a number of factors between 1971 and 1980s...hardly a decade and a half.....

In a curious way, the positions of the Indian and the Pakistani leaders were reversed in 1987. In 1971 , Mrs. Gandhi backed by a galaxy of brilliant advisors, kept a politically naive Field Marshal Yahya Khan dancing to her tune. In 1986/87, it was an astute General Zia backed by some of the best advisors Pakistan has ever had who kept Indian leadership dancing to his tune.

General Zia was a man of iron self-control. He had the measure of his stronger adversary and played him like a master fisherman playing a powerful shark -- one wrong move and the shark will destroy the fisherman. But with cunning, guile, and an enormous moral strength, the fisherman can defeat the shark. And this is exactly what General Zia had been doing.

and let me tell you....its been 50 years since 1971.....its a long time....



or take the example of PAF

The PAF has always been far smaller than the IAF. The ratio has never been as bad as 1953, when India had about ten jet fighter squadrons to one of Pakistan’s but it has never been better than three-to-one. With resources being so tight, the P.A.F. has always striven to get the best return from a small force.

The PAF reached its peak about 1960. It had ten combat squadrons, seven on the F-86 Sabre, two on B- 57 (the American version of the Canberra) and one on the F- 104 Starfighter, and about 160 combat aircraft. The IAF had about 500 aircraft in 25 large squadrons. The small Pakistani force operated....and still operates with high efficiency, learning quickly from its American mentors that a small number of highly professional pilots flying standardized aircraft, and backed up with first class maintenance and a well-organized air base system costs less, and is more powerful, than a larger, more disorganized force.
Performance of PAF is in front of us.

Very helpful. Thank you very much.

 

[PanzerKiel]

I intend to go into a crouching foetal position on this one, and to say that the leadership we had in 86-87 was among the most inept and accident-prone. Playing Rajiv Gandhi was more playing a gigantic earth-worm than a shark. For us to face Zia when we were being led by this dunderhead was really unfair.

Very helpful. Thank you very much.

I always believe that Gen Sundarji and Arun Singh were on one side....the side which wanted war.....rest everyone was on the other side.....

 

[Joe Shearer]

I always believe that Gen Sundarji and Arun Singh were on one side....the side which wanted war.....rest everyone was on the other side.....

I also think so, but @jbgt90 should be answering this one. His array of documentation on that period is unique.

Take the example of Ex Brass Tacks....1987.....just to show how PA leadership had been transformed by then due to a number of factors between 1971 and 1980s...hardly a decade and a half.....

In a curious way, the positions of the Indian and the Pakistani leaders were reversed in 1987. In 1971 , Mrs. Gandhi backed by a galaxy of brilliant advisors, kept a politically naive Field Marshal Yahya Khan dancing to her tune. In 1986/87, it was an astute General Zia backed by some of the best advisors Pakistan has ever had who kept Indian leadership dancing to his tune.

General Zia was a man of iron self-control. He had the measure of his stronger adversary and played him like a master fisherman playing a powerful shark -- one wrong move and the shark will destroy the fisherman. But with cunning, guile, and an enormous moral strength, the fisherman can defeat the shark. And this is exactly what General Zia had been doing.

and let me tell you....its been 50 years since 1971.....its a long time....



or take the example of PAF

The PAF has always been far smaller than the IAF. The ratio has never been as bad as 1953, when India had about ten jet fighter squadrons to one of Pakistan’s but it has never been better than three-to-one. With resources being so tight, the P.A.F. has always striven to get the best return from a small force.

The PAF reached its peak about 1960. It had ten combat squadrons, seven on the F-86 Sabre, two on B- 57 (the American version of the Canberra) and one on the F- 104 Starfighter, and about 160 combat aircraft. The IAF had about 500 aircraft in 25 large squadrons. The small Pakistani force operated....and still operates with high efficiency, learning quickly from its American mentors that a small number of highly professional pilots flying standardized aircraft, and backed up with first class maintenance and a well-organized air base system costs less, and is more powerful, than a larger, more disorganized force.
Performance of PAF is in front of us.

At the broadest level, and without any wish to offend, it is quite clear that the PAF is Pakistan's top service, followed by the PA, and both trailed by the PN. The Indian sequence is different, with the Navy perhaps the best. The point is that the PAF displayed something special in recent aerial clashes - mission-planning and execution capability. I don't think the IAF top leadership went wrong; it was the operational commanders who messed up, in multiple ways.

I will respond to your invitation to talk about all three services once the appropriate moment comes, while discussing 1965. Right now, a little bit more is needed to be done about presenting the facts about 1947-48, and that should be finished by tomorrow noon.

 

[PanzerKiel]

I will respond to your invitation to talk about all three services once the appropriate moment comes, while discussing 1965. Right now, a little bit more is needed to be done about presenting the facts about 1947-48, and that should be finished by tomorrow noon.

I always love to discuss about airforce and navies, as much as about Armies.....lets wait for that opportunity then....

 

[Joe Shearer]

I'll not be posting now......just to make sure to give enough time to everyone to let all, whatever has been already reflected, to sink in and get absorbed.

But ofcourse, am always available to answer any queries...

It is interesting to speculate if any of your readers has read between your lines, and realised that you have put things in such a way that the future course of action for the Indian military defines itself. It is easier said, and thought, than done, but the logic is inescapable.

 

[PanzerKiel]

I always love to discuss about airforce and navies, as much as about Armies.....lets wait for that opportunity then....

...since being brought-up in the best of tri-services traditions, am a great believer of tri-services synergy.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I always love to discuss about airforce and navies, as much as about Armies.....lets wait for that opportunity then....

Having been born a Virgo, you must forgive me while I cross every 't' and dot every 'i'. I will hurry as much as I can.

...since being brought-up in the best of tri-services traditions, am a great believer of tri-services synergy.

My case is different, and my loyalty is bound to one service. The original of the device of a unit named 310 Squadron was painted by my mother. Its original aircraft were inducted by her brother.

So let us give it one more day.

 

[notorious_eagle]

The point is that the PAF displayed something special in recent aerial clashes - mission-planning and execution capability. I don't think the IAF top leadership went wrong; it was the operational commanders who messed up, in multiple ways.

Sir, thank you for bringing up this topic. I would love to get your feedback on this topic in regards to IAF's performance on Feb 27.

IAF has top coverage in the form of Swordfish and Phalcons. Both these assets are data-linked providing the Indian C4I the ability to look deep inside Pakistan and share that information live with all the Sector Commanders. My question is, why didn't IAF pick up PAF's incoming strike package when it was expected that PAF would retaliate and the border was hot. From the limited information we have about IAF, it does not appear that the Phalcons were Airborne during the time of the confrontation. That would explain why the IAF interceptors were having an incredible tough time getting a comprehensive picture of the battlefield. The Swordfish and Phalcons are incredibly potent assets which clearly were not utilized to their full capacity.

Where do you think the gaps were? Also, please expand on the part i highlighted bold?

Please and Thank You

 

[Gryphon]

The final point is about the role of the Mountain Divisions. These are different from ordinary divisions insofar as they are stripped of certain additional resources to allow a light footprint in mountain warfare. That does not help, indeed, it becomes a burden when the Division is re-deployed to the Pakistani front from the Chinese front. This is a discussion by itself, but I hope the hint will allow readers to fill in the blanks.

(Plains) Infantry Div = 3/4× Infantry Brigades + Arty Brigade + Armd Regiment

(Mountain) Infantry Div = at least 3× Infantry Brigades + Arty Brigade + (I) Armd Squadron [optional]*

*Applies to PA 12th Div + 19th Div + FCNA and to all IA Mountain Div's.

So, I don't see exactly what resources the MD's are lacking given their potential to absorb an (I) Mech or Armd Bde [into their ORBAT] while operating in the plains.

 

[Joe Shearer]

(Plains) Infantry Div = 3/4× Infantry Brigades + Arty Brigade + Armd Regiment

(Mountain) Infantry Div = at least 3× Infantry Brigades + Arty Brigade + (I) Armd Squadron [optional]*

*Applies to PA 12th Div + 19th Div + FCNA and to all IA Mountain Div's.

So, I don't see exactly what resources the MD's are lacking given their potential to absorb an (I) Mech or Armd Bde [into their ORBAT] while operating in the plains.

That is IF there is armour or mechanised infantry attached to a Mountain Div on re-deployment in the plains. That soaks up an otherwise independent armoured brigade straightaway.

 

[TsAr]

@PanzerKiel and @Joe Shearer please also enlighten us as to what measures were taken and discussed by both the armies after apparent failure to achieve their targets.