PanzerKiel
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Some thoughts regarding Indian plans to attack in the desert sector……
On a map, getting to Hyderabad (Sind) from Rajasthan is a simple problem. India may have 4 to 1 superiority in combat power on the ground, superiority in the air, and control of the sea, including a diversionary amphibious landing near Karachi. Along the southern axis of the arrow head thrust from Kokhrapar to Hyderabad is 250 kilometers as the crow flies. From Tanot to Rahim Yar Khan or Reti involves crossing 100 kilometers of Pakistan territory. Given a modest advance of 20 kilometers a day, some critics assume that something less than two weeks is perfectly adequate to cut Pakistan in two. Presumably, there will be Indian losses in the Punjab. But these will be more than compensated for by the immense gains in Sind.
In reality, for all India’s superiority of force, the situation is likely to prove quite different. To see this, we will need to examine a variety of different factors.
In one of India not very recent two-sided wargame, Blue advanced against Red at ten kilometers a day or about 70 kilometers for the attack phase. At 10 kilometers a day it might be possible to reach Rahim Yar Khan or Reti in 12 days, but Hyderabad would require a month.
Can the exercise results be replicated in combat? Particularly as Red was not played by troops specialized in this role. The pressures are all to show Blue in a favourable light and Red in an unfavorable one. If 10 kilometers a day was the exercise advance, in real life it will be less, at least until substantial attrition has occurred and Indian forces enjoy an irresistible advantage, At 1 to 5 kilometers a day, no objective on the Karachi- Lahore railroad can be cut in 12 days. India will capture large areas of sand, and nothing else.
Problems of supplying Indian Strike Forces in Desert
Can 13 divisions (1 and 21 Strike Corps, along with supporting attacks by 10 and 12 Corps, plus reserves standing by) be supported in the desert sector? This does not appear likely. Lets see a possible scenario.
· The northern end is anchored by X Corps with two large divisions, an (I) armored brigade and an (I) brigade a total of ten brigades.
· The middle is I and II Strike Corps with may be three armored, one mechanized, one RAMFOR, two RAPID and two infantry divisions plus one or two ( I ) brigades.
· The southern end is XII Corps with two divisions plus at least one (I) brigade.
· The naval component is an amphibious brigade to the west.
The amphibious brigade will be supported by the Navy by sea, so the army does not have to support it .
There should be no difficulty in supplying and supporting X Corps, as it will advance only a short distance from its bases, which are all located on rail heads.
The initial supply of XII Corps is not as simple, because there is only the rail head at Bhuj and the road network is minimal. Still, cross- country movement through the Kutch in winter should be possible along carefully reconnoitered routes, as the marshes would have dried up to a considerable extent.
It is the nine divisions with I and II Corps that are worrying. The supplies required for the war would have been laboriously assembled over the past four months through the rail heads at Barmer, Jaisalmer, and Jodhpur. But this is a huge force, and that too over the worst terrain in any of the plains sectors. Moving the supplies forward and into Pakistan to support the advancing troops will prove almost impossible only some fraction of the troops can be supported, and this reduces the odds that Pakistan faces.
While the armored spearhead has full trans desert mobility, all the wheeled supply vehicles used for support and for the infantry divisions are limited in this respect. It is unclear if the supplies required for an entire corps can be moved along one or two temporary desert roads since normally, a railhead is required to support a corps.
We can estimate that each division will require for each day’s combat consumption a thousand tons a day for an armored/mechanized division and about half that for an infantry division. The usage of the divisions themselves may well be less, but when all the supporting troops are added, and as the distance from the forward dumps to the front increases with the advance, the logistical requirements increase.
It can be argued that a rapid advance reduces the supply requirement because fixed battles, so greedily demanding of artillery ammunition, are avoided. Against this, the lack of proper roads of any sort multiplies wastages in transport. For example, we know from the World War 2 North Africa experience that three times as much fuel is required as might be thought.
In the desert, limited off road mobility creates another problem. Any blockade of the road leads to blocking of all movement behind the block because possibilities of going around the obstruction are limited. On a road where supplies are competing with the infantry moving up behind the armored spearhead, the possibilities for confusion and a breakdown of all movement are only too obvious. And it is not as if the movement is one way: empty vehicles, evacuated equipment and units, and redeploying units will all be fighting for space.
And as yet no account has been taken of enemy resistance and interdiction which will compound the difficulties by a factor of ten.
It may safely be concluded that the possibilities for supporting nine divisions, including four fully armored and mechanized, and two partially so, are dim. It will not just be the lower priority infantry that will be limited by supply constraints, it will be the spearhead itself. This will reduce Indian margin of superiority against Pakistan.
Problem of Air cover in the Desert
In 1971 Pakistan used an adhoc force from 33 Division to attack from Rahim Yar Khan to throw off 12 Division’s attack. This force appears to have consisted of an armored regiment with T-59s and an accompanying infantry brigade. Though referred to as “Pakistan’s attempt at a lightning Israeli style thrust”’ it had no intention of holding any ground or even precipitating a major battle, only of throwing Indian 12 Division off stride and thus preventing the attack on Rahim Yar Khan aimed at cutting the Karachi Lahore rail line.
It succeeded in its aim, as Indian 12 Division never really got going after that, though it captured some insignificant areas. The division was, of course, very badly handled and there were other problems, such as bad intelligence which led the division to believe it had a good (by desert standards) road on which to advance to Reti, whereas only an indifferent track existed.
The contributory factors do not alter the situation that when lateral mobility is limited, a small force can completely throw out of gear a much larger force. Committing less than a brigade to neutralize a division, and that too in an action lasting less than three days, is not a bad investment.
Conversely, the Pakistani attack was held by a lone company of 23 Punjab with a couple of recoilless rifles till daybreak. Then six Hunters from the Armament Training Wing at Jamnager, deputed to Jaiselmer to provide air cover for 12 Division’s attacks began their action. In 30+ sorties over two days the Hunters caused the tank regiment heavy damage. The Hunters included two trainers with limited ordnance capability, and two of the combat Hunters became non- operational during the course of operations. The aircraft used only canon fire and rockets, no bombs, The Pakistani force withdrew in good order.
Doubtless there were special considerations here too: the P.A.F., for example, was largely absent during this time and the Pakistani force had no integral anti-aircraft cover. The example is nonetheless valid.
There are reasons for this. (1 ) Neither India nor Pakistan can really operate in the face of enemy air attacks and the absence of their own air cover. This is no reflection on their courage or their training: only armies with a very long history of working without air cover, such as the North Vietnam Army, can adequately acquit themselves in such circumstances, (2) Acquisition of ground targets in the desert is a most simple affair because of the dust moving vehicles kick up. The dust cloud from a brigade-sized force can be visible at upto 80 kilometers. The ground troops, in effect, solve the problem of target acquisition, a most difficult one in normal terrain, by marking themselves for all to see.
It is easy to see one of the reasons Pakistan was not overly worried about protecting Sind. It would have let India come well in, and then attacked the large, conspicuous Indian armored formations from the air. Because they would be advancing, the Indians would be especially vulnerable.
In South Western Air Command India’s bases are well back. Once Indian force advance any substantial distance into Pakistan, the armored spearheads will outrun their air cover and become helpless. Pakistan, on the other hand, has at least six, perhaps more, bases available in the area.
The I.A.F. has a simple strategy for dealing with the problem of enemy air over the Desert: suppress all relevant P.A.F. air bases in 72-hours, and keep them suppressed. The I.A.F.’s inability to provide extended air cover to the armored spearheads is then of no consequence: the P.A.F. will be in no position to fly, and the few sorties can be handled by the air defence groups.
In 1971 , the IAF quickly put out of commission the seven Pakistani fighter air fields in East Pakistan. It first put Dacca out of action. The airfield was repaired in four hours. The IAF then reattacked and this time the airfield was repaired in six hours. The third time the IAF caught the repair crews in the open killing or wounding about 80 men, and after the PAF simply gave up leaving Dacca permanently out of commission.
In 1971, the PAF failed to keep even one IAF base out of action for one day. Generally bases were repaired within 6 to 8 hours. Today the same would apply to IAF attacks on Pakistani air bases. The 1971 Eastern example is not relevant today. Against the lone fighter squadron based in the East Pakistan, India deployed ten combat squadrons and there was a huge disparity in performance between the F-86 and the IAF Su-7s and Mi G-21s. Today the PAF will fight at much lesser odds, not 10 to 1. When 16 aircraft had to protect seven fighter fields and the entire Eastern wing to boot we need not be surprised that India succeeded so easily. And even then Pakistan was still flying from Dacca as late as seven days into the war. If we reran the scenario with three F- 7 squadrons and two fights of F-16s defending against ten IAF squadrons we would get a totally different outcome. If runway attack techniques and weapons have increased lethality airfield repair techniques have also improved.
Then comes the Pakistani Defence itself….
It is worth examining the Pakistani defences against Indian Southern Command’s attack in 1971. India had two divisions, about four armored regiments, and perhaps two (I) brigade groups plus commandos and BSF troops. Pakistan had its 18 Division out of Hyderabad, plus probably at least two brigades of 33 Division in southern Punjab, perhaps two regiments of armor, Rangers and Mujahids.
India appears to have committed everything except one (I) brigade, so that Pakistan faced seven infantry brigades and four tank regiments. Yet Pakistan held India back with two partially committed brigades. Part of 51 Brigade at Naya Chor held back 11 Division. Part of one brigade from 33 Division opposed 12 Division in the Reti-Rahim Yar Khan area. So Pakistan had the equivalent of four brigades uncommitted.
The results are well known: after an initial long jump to Naya Chor, India was stalled throughout the war.
There were two reasons Pakistan could hold off the Indian attack with minimal force. (I) It was prepared to trade space for time and allow the Indian advance to over stretch itself, and (2) because of the adverse terrain Indian forces could not leave the single axis / road of advance in each sub-sector to maneuver around the defenders. So India may have had a division each at Naya Chor and Ranigarh, but actually only a brigade at a time could fight. Moreover, increasing numbers of troops were required to hold down the line of communications as India advanced, further reducing the number of troops available. In as much as Pakistan itself was limited by the desert, it could not make any effective or decisive counter attacks and so did not throw back the Indians.
The point is that a large Indian force was stuck in the desert a long way from home. Had Pakistan used its 1 Armored Division in this area instead of keeping it facing Indian Foxtrot Sector, and had air cover been available, India would have been pushed out with huge losses.
In such a situation, which could be repeated today, India’s 3-to- l superiority cannot be utilized. If Pakistan were to accept battle then we could grind it down until the 3-to-1 became 9-to-1. But it may not accept battle.
The Pakistani defence of Shakergarh in 1971 is also an example of the power of a modern defence.
India employed three divisions (36. 39, 54 Divisions) and three (I) armored brigades (2, 14, 16) against the Shakergarh salient. Pakistan had its 8 Division and 8 (I) Armored Brigade, committed to the defense itself, with substantial forces (most of 6 Armored Division, some of 17 division, and regrouped troops from the reinforce 23 Division) in reserve. But it is important to realize that essentially two brigades and an armored brigade kept the Indians down to 1 kilometer a day advance.
Indian pressure was telling on Pakistan by December 17, 1971. Had the war continued, the reserves would have had to be committed, especially if Shakergarh had fallen. But the war was not to continue, and in the two weeks of action, Pakistan most economically held back India.
On Pakistan’s side perhaps four armoured regiments and about seven or eight infantry battalions were defending. This gives a combat power of about 20. On India’s side there were about ten armored regiments, and perhaps 21+ infantry battalions, say a combat power of 50+. (36 Division was missing two brigades in the Shakergarh operations so only 21+ battalions were available.) Squaring the two sides we get 400 for Pakistan vs. 2500 for India, or a six-to one superiority for India. Yet there was no rapid advance. Good knowledge of the terrain mattered a lot. Moreover Pakistan was also greatly aided by fixed defences and an interior area of battle.
A word about 1971 Indian Campaign against East Pakistan
This campaign can provide no guide to the future for the following reasons.
· Pakistan was morally on the defensive, and its troops were exhausted after a 9-month civil war. All the excesses of the civil war and counter insurgency told on their morale, their training, and their professionalism.
· The entire world community was against Pakistan in 1971 because of the excesses of the civil war. This told heavily on the national morale.
· East Pakistan was completely cut off by the Indian armed forces. There was neither any hope of reinforcement nor of escape. But in present day, Pakistan can expect to obtain essential war material, perhaps even troops, from fraternal countries. If India would attack Pakistan, for once the United States might well have permitted shipment of some war material from third countries. Both these factors would tremendously boost Pakistani morale.
· India had no intelligence problem as the locals came forward at each and every point to inform the attackers about the exact dispositions of the enemy. India also had several tens of thousands of locals, in the Mukti Bahini, fighting alongside. By themselves the Mukti Bahini was not a particularly impressive force. But combined with the regular Indian Army, it made an invaluable contribution. But in present day, doubtless India would have found locals to aid its cause, but nothing even remotely approaching the scale of support evidenced in East Pakistan, 1971, is conceivable. And conversely. Pakistan would have found local support in Kashmir, perhaps even in the Punjab.
· India had air supremacy. But today, India would have had to fight on the traditional odds of maybe 3 to 1 against PAF. In a short war, Pakistan would be able to neutralize the IAF.
· India’s initial strategy required seizing a narrow area around East Pakistan so that the independent republic could be declared. Lt.Gen. A. A.K. Niazi, who had excellent information, accordingly had deployed his forces all along the border. He could not afford to give up any terrain, because even a thousand square kilometers was sufficient for Indies purpose. This inflexibility, this attempt to defend everything simultaneously, predictably ended up with General Niazi defending nothing. Worse, when the Indians changed their strategy and decided to go for Dacca itself, the Pakistanis had no reserves to counter the new plan. However, now, Pakistan would have had plenty of ground to give up. Indian troops would be fighting blind inside Pakistan, because there would be no Mukti Bahini and hundreds of thousands of locals to help.
· This list of differences in the situation in East Pakistan, 1971, and today, is not exhaustive. But it suffices to make the point.
A few additional points regarding 1971 war
Analysing the 1971 war presents special problems because no access is available to the actual Indian strategic plan used for the west.
Consider, nonetheless, the situation in the west as of December 16, 1971 while the cease-fire in the east was being signed.
Pakistan had 12 divisions in the west, disposed as follows: Uri—Tithwal sector : 12 Division (over strength)
Poonch—Akhnur sector : 23 Division (over strength)
Sialkot sector : 8 and 15 Divisions, 2 and 8 (I)
Armored Brigades, elements of 6 Armored Division
Lahore sector : 10 and 11 Divisions, 3 (1) Armored Brigade
Sind/Multan : 18 and 33 Divisions
Southern. Strike Force : 1 Armored and 7 Division
Northern Strike Force : 6 Armored Division(-) and one third of 17 Division.
The Northern Strike Force was held up trying to slow the Indian drive on Shakergarh town and was not free for action elsewhere. One brigade of 6 Armored Division was already engaged on the Basanter River against Indian 16 (I) Armored Brigade, a clash between several squadrons on each side, wrongly described by an over-enthusiastic Indian press as the biggest tank battle since World War 2. 17 Division had already given up brigades to 23 Division for the Chhamb assault and to IV Corps (Lahore) to strengthen the defences there. It had only one uncommitted brigade left. Since the Indians were grinding forward by sheer force, not only would all of the remaining Northern Strike Force become committed, troops would have had to be pulled down from Kashmir and up from Lahore to hold the Indian attack once Shakergarh fell.
Pakistan’s only free reserves at this time were in the Southern Strike Force. The 1 Armored and 7 Divisions were fresh and uncommitted Nominally, 33 Division was also under this force, but it had detached a brigade for Sind, to aid 18 Division, and another was reinforcing the Multan sector defences, held primarily by 105 (I) and 25 (I) Brigades from Suliemanke and Bahawalpur respectively.
Now consider India’s line up
North: 3 Division at Leh, with two brigades to spare
Uri—Tithwal : 19 Division, almost equal in size to Pakistan 12 Division
Poonch—Rajouri— Mendhar: 25 Division (over strength). Two other brigades on the line north of Akhnur.
Akhnur—Jammu: 10 Division (over strength) and 26 Division, 3 (I) Armored Brigade
Sialkot: 36, 39, 54 Divisions, with 2, 14 and 16 (I) Brigades
Amritsar—Ferozepur: 7, 14 and 15 Divisions plus an armored brigade
Fazilka: Foxtrot Sector: 1 Armored Division plus three brigades
Desert: 11 and 12 Divisions plus two brigades
To summarize, India had 15 divisions of which one (3 Division out of Leh) was partially oriented towards China, to Pakistan’s 12. Pakistan’s Southern Strike Force was intact, and it was slightly better off in that Indian answer to it (1 Armored and 9 Divisions of Indian Army) was not a homogeneous or a cross trained force. HQ 1 Corps, which controlled the two Indian divisions on the date of the eastern cease-fire had actually come back to the west after having spent the better part of the year in Eastern Command, preparing for, and then participating in the Bangladesh campaign. 9 Division was normally based at Ranchi as a counter to Pakistan’s 14 Division in the East.
Against that however, India’s Foxtrot Sector held more than a division’s worth of troops. A lot of India’s strength just does not show up as divisions, but it is viable combat strength anyway.
The Indian Army has always obtained fewer divisions for a given number of men than Pakistan because (1) Indian territory is larger, implying more line of communication troops and (2) India tends to have an enormous number of less than division sized units, such as independent brigades, independent battalions, and ad hoc task forces.
For example, though officially India had four armored brigades during the 1971 war, actually it had 5, because one ad hoc brigade was constituted from spare odds and ends. These were available to Indian army because it had more armored regiments than Pakistan.
Similarly Foxtrot Sector was actually a division plus, though it did not appear as such because it was not given a divisional flag. In the western armies it would have been given a divisional number so that at least the Army would not confuse itself.
The GOC Foxtrot Sector was a Major General. He had under his command or available to him 67 (I) Brigade at Fazilka, 51 Parachute Brigade at Ganganagar, and 163 Brigade out of Leh at Suratgarh. Additionally he had an ad hoc force consisting of three engineer regiments and two infantry battalions at Abohar (though General Candeth says it was one, not two infantry battalions). This is not a recommended use of engineers, a scarce and precious commodity in a shooting war, but being fully trained as infantry, in emergencies they can be so used.
If we can examine the map on the outbreak of war we would see the odd brigade or two and Indian 1 Armored Division in the Fazilka Abohar area, whereas on Pakistan’s side was its full II Corps out of Multan with 1 Armored and 33 Divisions. So the situation would have appeared much to India’s disadvantage, particularly because the front here is wide open to large-scale armored movement.
During the war, when Pakistan 7 Division failed to appear in the J and K sectors, its normal war station, there was alarm in Western Command: this division could have moved southward to join Pakistan II Corps, to make a powerful force for an attack, against Fazilka southward, thus neutralizing India’s Sialkot push.
Now consider the way events in battle wreck the best laid plans. With 7 Division joining Pakistan II Corps, India was at a definite disadvantage. But when Pakistan learned of Indian 12 Divisions proposed attack towards Islamgarh and Tanot, it faced a serious problemsince against India’s desert force of two divisions and two independent brigades it had available only one division out of Hyderabad.
Pakistan’s 16 Division was earmarked as a reserve for this vast sector, but 16 division was in East Pakistan sent there in March 1971 to help stem the revolt. 33 Division bad been hurriedly raised in a period of six months to replace this division. It had, however, to do dual duty as a reserve and as a partner to 1 Armored Division. A brigade from it was detached to throw off the attack of Indian 12 Division. Then a brigade went to reinforce Pakistan 18 Division which was slowly giving way against Indian 11 Division’s advance along the Khokrapar-Naya Chor axis.
So we may guess that Pakistan 7 Division, trained for years to operate in Kashmir, had to be sent southward to face Foxtrot Sector. The Army may not have wanted the Indian public to see a division on Foxtrot Sector, but Pakistan GHQ saw it and a vital reinforcement for Poonch was diverted. This had its repercussions in Poonch sector where the Pakistan Army failed to break through despite much effort. 7 Division’ would have made the difference between stalemate and victory.
This microcosm of deployments and counter deployments is illustrative.
By December 16, 1971 the actual situation on the ground after the induction of HQ 9 Division and three brigades from the east, was more like 16 Indian divisions to Pakistan’s 12.
Therefore, at the time of the eastern ceasefire, India had a clear superiority in the west, partially because it had started moving troops from the eastern to the western theatre. Thus, India was quite capable of continuing the war.
Further reinforcements would have come if required: chief among these were 4 Division and 6 Division. (4 Division has always been part of the general reserves available to the Indian Army and 6 Division, while nominally assigned to the western UP broder, is always available to the west because the terrain in its area is so extreme that a single independent brigade can protect the area.)
Additional to these two divisions were two more: 8 and 57 Divisions, the Northeast counter-insurgency formations, which had participated in the war as part of IV Corps on East Pakistan’s easternmost flank.
Undoubtedly time was needed to shift them to the west. India did a fairly efficient job of rapidly transferring about 20,000 troops from HQ II Corps, HQ 9 Division, three brigades, plus tank and artillery regiments. At most three weeks would have been required for shifting four additional divisions.
With the equivalent of India’s 20 divisions to Pakistan’s 12 the war in the west could have been over in the short order.
On a map, getting to Hyderabad (Sind) from Rajasthan is a simple problem. India may have 4 to 1 superiority in combat power on the ground, superiority in the air, and control of the sea, including a diversionary amphibious landing near Karachi. Along the southern axis of the arrow head thrust from Kokhrapar to Hyderabad is 250 kilometers as the crow flies. From Tanot to Rahim Yar Khan or Reti involves crossing 100 kilometers of Pakistan territory. Given a modest advance of 20 kilometers a day, some critics assume that something less than two weeks is perfectly adequate to cut Pakistan in two. Presumably, there will be Indian losses in the Punjab. But these will be more than compensated for by the immense gains in Sind.
In reality, for all India’s superiority of force, the situation is likely to prove quite different. To see this, we will need to examine a variety of different factors.
In one of India not very recent two-sided wargame, Blue advanced against Red at ten kilometers a day or about 70 kilometers for the attack phase. At 10 kilometers a day it might be possible to reach Rahim Yar Khan or Reti in 12 days, but Hyderabad would require a month.
Can the exercise results be replicated in combat? Particularly as Red was not played by troops specialized in this role. The pressures are all to show Blue in a favourable light and Red in an unfavorable one. If 10 kilometers a day was the exercise advance, in real life it will be less, at least until substantial attrition has occurred and Indian forces enjoy an irresistible advantage, At 1 to 5 kilometers a day, no objective on the Karachi- Lahore railroad can be cut in 12 days. India will capture large areas of sand, and nothing else.
Problems of supplying Indian Strike Forces in Desert
Can 13 divisions (1 and 21 Strike Corps, along with supporting attacks by 10 and 12 Corps, plus reserves standing by) be supported in the desert sector? This does not appear likely. Lets see a possible scenario.
· The northern end is anchored by X Corps with two large divisions, an (I) armored brigade and an (I) brigade a total of ten brigades.
· The middle is I and II Strike Corps with may be three armored, one mechanized, one RAMFOR, two RAPID and two infantry divisions plus one or two ( I ) brigades.
· The southern end is XII Corps with two divisions plus at least one (I) brigade.
· The naval component is an amphibious brigade to the west.
The amphibious brigade will be supported by the Navy by sea, so the army does not have to support it .
There should be no difficulty in supplying and supporting X Corps, as it will advance only a short distance from its bases, which are all located on rail heads.
The initial supply of XII Corps is not as simple, because there is only the rail head at Bhuj and the road network is minimal. Still, cross- country movement through the Kutch in winter should be possible along carefully reconnoitered routes, as the marshes would have dried up to a considerable extent.
It is the nine divisions with I and II Corps that are worrying. The supplies required for the war would have been laboriously assembled over the past four months through the rail heads at Barmer, Jaisalmer, and Jodhpur. But this is a huge force, and that too over the worst terrain in any of the plains sectors. Moving the supplies forward and into Pakistan to support the advancing troops will prove almost impossible only some fraction of the troops can be supported, and this reduces the odds that Pakistan faces.
While the armored spearhead has full trans desert mobility, all the wheeled supply vehicles used for support and for the infantry divisions are limited in this respect. It is unclear if the supplies required for an entire corps can be moved along one or two temporary desert roads since normally, a railhead is required to support a corps.
We can estimate that each division will require for each day’s combat consumption a thousand tons a day for an armored/mechanized division and about half that for an infantry division. The usage of the divisions themselves may well be less, but when all the supporting troops are added, and as the distance from the forward dumps to the front increases with the advance, the logistical requirements increase.
It can be argued that a rapid advance reduces the supply requirement because fixed battles, so greedily demanding of artillery ammunition, are avoided. Against this, the lack of proper roads of any sort multiplies wastages in transport. For example, we know from the World War 2 North Africa experience that three times as much fuel is required as might be thought.
In the desert, limited off road mobility creates another problem. Any blockade of the road leads to blocking of all movement behind the block because possibilities of going around the obstruction are limited. On a road where supplies are competing with the infantry moving up behind the armored spearhead, the possibilities for confusion and a breakdown of all movement are only too obvious. And it is not as if the movement is one way: empty vehicles, evacuated equipment and units, and redeploying units will all be fighting for space.
And as yet no account has been taken of enemy resistance and interdiction which will compound the difficulties by a factor of ten.
It may safely be concluded that the possibilities for supporting nine divisions, including four fully armored and mechanized, and two partially so, are dim. It will not just be the lower priority infantry that will be limited by supply constraints, it will be the spearhead itself. This will reduce Indian margin of superiority against Pakistan.
Problem of Air cover in the Desert
In 1971 Pakistan used an adhoc force from 33 Division to attack from Rahim Yar Khan to throw off 12 Division’s attack. This force appears to have consisted of an armored regiment with T-59s and an accompanying infantry brigade. Though referred to as “Pakistan’s attempt at a lightning Israeli style thrust”’ it had no intention of holding any ground or even precipitating a major battle, only of throwing Indian 12 Division off stride and thus preventing the attack on Rahim Yar Khan aimed at cutting the Karachi Lahore rail line.
It succeeded in its aim, as Indian 12 Division never really got going after that, though it captured some insignificant areas. The division was, of course, very badly handled and there were other problems, such as bad intelligence which led the division to believe it had a good (by desert standards) road on which to advance to Reti, whereas only an indifferent track existed.
The contributory factors do not alter the situation that when lateral mobility is limited, a small force can completely throw out of gear a much larger force. Committing less than a brigade to neutralize a division, and that too in an action lasting less than three days, is not a bad investment.
Conversely, the Pakistani attack was held by a lone company of 23 Punjab with a couple of recoilless rifles till daybreak. Then six Hunters from the Armament Training Wing at Jamnager, deputed to Jaiselmer to provide air cover for 12 Division’s attacks began their action. In 30+ sorties over two days the Hunters caused the tank regiment heavy damage. The Hunters included two trainers with limited ordnance capability, and two of the combat Hunters became non- operational during the course of operations. The aircraft used only canon fire and rockets, no bombs, The Pakistani force withdrew in good order.
Doubtless there were special considerations here too: the P.A.F., for example, was largely absent during this time and the Pakistani force had no integral anti-aircraft cover. The example is nonetheless valid.
There are reasons for this. (1 ) Neither India nor Pakistan can really operate in the face of enemy air attacks and the absence of their own air cover. This is no reflection on their courage or their training: only armies with a very long history of working without air cover, such as the North Vietnam Army, can adequately acquit themselves in such circumstances, (2) Acquisition of ground targets in the desert is a most simple affair because of the dust moving vehicles kick up. The dust cloud from a brigade-sized force can be visible at upto 80 kilometers. The ground troops, in effect, solve the problem of target acquisition, a most difficult one in normal terrain, by marking themselves for all to see.
It is easy to see one of the reasons Pakistan was not overly worried about protecting Sind. It would have let India come well in, and then attacked the large, conspicuous Indian armored formations from the air. Because they would be advancing, the Indians would be especially vulnerable.
In South Western Air Command India’s bases are well back. Once Indian force advance any substantial distance into Pakistan, the armored spearheads will outrun their air cover and become helpless. Pakistan, on the other hand, has at least six, perhaps more, bases available in the area.
The I.A.F. has a simple strategy for dealing with the problem of enemy air over the Desert: suppress all relevant P.A.F. air bases in 72-hours, and keep them suppressed. The I.A.F.’s inability to provide extended air cover to the armored spearheads is then of no consequence: the P.A.F. will be in no position to fly, and the few sorties can be handled by the air defence groups.
In 1971 , the IAF quickly put out of commission the seven Pakistani fighter air fields in East Pakistan. It first put Dacca out of action. The airfield was repaired in four hours. The IAF then reattacked and this time the airfield was repaired in six hours. The third time the IAF caught the repair crews in the open killing or wounding about 80 men, and after the PAF simply gave up leaving Dacca permanently out of commission.
In 1971, the PAF failed to keep even one IAF base out of action for one day. Generally bases were repaired within 6 to 8 hours. Today the same would apply to IAF attacks on Pakistani air bases. The 1971 Eastern example is not relevant today. Against the lone fighter squadron based in the East Pakistan, India deployed ten combat squadrons and there was a huge disparity in performance between the F-86 and the IAF Su-7s and Mi G-21s. Today the PAF will fight at much lesser odds, not 10 to 1. When 16 aircraft had to protect seven fighter fields and the entire Eastern wing to boot we need not be surprised that India succeeded so easily. And even then Pakistan was still flying from Dacca as late as seven days into the war. If we reran the scenario with three F- 7 squadrons and two fights of F-16s defending against ten IAF squadrons we would get a totally different outcome. If runway attack techniques and weapons have increased lethality airfield repair techniques have also improved.
Then comes the Pakistani Defence itself….
It is worth examining the Pakistani defences against Indian Southern Command’s attack in 1971. India had two divisions, about four armored regiments, and perhaps two (I) brigade groups plus commandos and BSF troops. Pakistan had its 18 Division out of Hyderabad, plus probably at least two brigades of 33 Division in southern Punjab, perhaps two regiments of armor, Rangers and Mujahids.
India appears to have committed everything except one (I) brigade, so that Pakistan faced seven infantry brigades and four tank regiments. Yet Pakistan held India back with two partially committed brigades. Part of 51 Brigade at Naya Chor held back 11 Division. Part of one brigade from 33 Division opposed 12 Division in the Reti-Rahim Yar Khan area. So Pakistan had the equivalent of four brigades uncommitted.
The results are well known: after an initial long jump to Naya Chor, India was stalled throughout the war.
There were two reasons Pakistan could hold off the Indian attack with minimal force. (I) It was prepared to trade space for time and allow the Indian advance to over stretch itself, and (2) because of the adverse terrain Indian forces could not leave the single axis / road of advance in each sub-sector to maneuver around the defenders. So India may have had a division each at Naya Chor and Ranigarh, but actually only a brigade at a time could fight. Moreover, increasing numbers of troops were required to hold down the line of communications as India advanced, further reducing the number of troops available. In as much as Pakistan itself was limited by the desert, it could not make any effective or decisive counter attacks and so did not throw back the Indians.
The point is that a large Indian force was stuck in the desert a long way from home. Had Pakistan used its 1 Armored Division in this area instead of keeping it facing Indian Foxtrot Sector, and had air cover been available, India would have been pushed out with huge losses.
In such a situation, which could be repeated today, India’s 3-to- l superiority cannot be utilized. If Pakistan were to accept battle then we could grind it down until the 3-to-1 became 9-to-1. But it may not accept battle.
The Pakistani defence of Shakergarh in 1971 is also an example of the power of a modern defence.
India employed three divisions (36. 39, 54 Divisions) and three (I) armored brigades (2, 14, 16) against the Shakergarh salient. Pakistan had its 8 Division and 8 (I) Armored Brigade, committed to the defense itself, with substantial forces (most of 6 Armored Division, some of 17 division, and regrouped troops from the reinforce 23 Division) in reserve. But it is important to realize that essentially two brigades and an armored brigade kept the Indians down to 1 kilometer a day advance.
Indian pressure was telling on Pakistan by December 17, 1971. Had the war continued, the reserves would have had to be committed, especially if Shakergarh had fallen. But the war was not to continue, and in the two weeks of action, Pakistan most economically held back India.
On Pakistan’s side perhaps four armoured regiments and about seven or eight infantry battalions were defending. This gives a combat power of about 20. On India’s side there were about ten armored regiments, and perhaps 21+ infantry battalions, say a combat power of 50+. (36 Division was missing two brigades in the Shakergarh operations so only 21+ battalions were available.) Squaring the two sides we get 400 for Pakistan vs. 2500 for India, or a six-to one superiority for India. Yet there was no rapid advance. Good knowledge of the terrain mattered a lot. Moreover Pakistan was also greatly aided by fixed defences and an interior area of battle.
A word about 1971 Indian Campaign against East Pakistan
This campaign can provide no guide to the future for the following reasons.
· Pakistan was morally on the defensive, and its troops were exhausted after a 9-month civil war. All the excesses of the civil war and counter insurgency told on their morale, their training, and their professionalism.
· The entire world community was against Pakistan in 1971 because of the excesses of the civil war. This told heavily on the national morale.
· East Pakistan was completely cut off by the Indian armed forces. There was neither any hope of reinforcement nor of escape. But in present day, Pakistan can expect to obtain essential war material, perhaps even troops, from fraternal countries. If India would attack Pakistan, for once the United States might well have permitted shipment of some war material from third countries. Both these factors would tremendously boost Pakistani morale.
· India had no intelligence problem as the locals came forward at each and every point to inform the attackers about the exact dispositions of the enemy. India also had several tens of thousands of locals, in the Mukti Bahini, fighting alongside. By themselves the Mukti Bahini was not a particularly impressive force. But combined with the regular Indian Army, it made an invaluable contribution. But in present day, doubtless India would have found locals to aid its cause, but nothing even remotely approaching the scale of support evidenced in East Pakistan, 1971, is conceivable. And conversely. Pakistan would have found local support in Kashmir, perhaps even in the Punjab.
· India had air supremacy. But today, India would have had to fight on the traditional odds of maybe 3 to 1 against PAF. In a short war, Pakistan would be able to neutralize the IAF.
· India’s initial strategy required seizing a narrow area around East Pakistan so that the independent republic could be declared. Lt.Gen. A. A.K. Niazi, who had excellent information, accordingly had deployed his forces all along the border. He could not afford to give up any terrain, because even a thousand square kilometers was sufficient for Indies purpose. This inflexibility, this attempt to defend everything simultaneously, predictably ended up with General Niazi defending nothing. Worse, when the Indians changed their strategy and decided to go for Dacca itself, the Pakistanis had no reserves to counter the new plan. However, now, Pakistan would have had plenty of ground to give up. Indian troops would be fighting blind inside Pakistan, because there would be no Mukti Bahini and hundreds of thousands of locals to help.
· This list of differences in the situation in East Pakistan, 1971, and today, is not exhaustive. But it suffices to make the point.
A few additional points regarding 1971 war
Analysing the 1971 war presents special problems because no access is available to the actual Indian strategic plan used for the west.
Consider, nonetheless, the situation in the west as of December 16, 1971 while the cease-fire in the east was being signed.
Pakistan had 12 divisions in the west, disposed as follows: Uri—Tithwal sector : 12 Division (over strength)
Poonch—Akhnur sector : 23 Division (over strength)
Sialkot sector : 8 and 15 Divisions, 2 and 8 (I)
Armored Brigades, elements of 6 Armored Division
Lahore sector : 10 and 11 Divisions, 3 (1) Armored Brigade
Sind/Multan : 18 and 33 Divisions
Southern. Strike Force : 1 Armored and 7 Division
Northern Strike Force : 6 Armored Division(-) and one third of 17 Division.
The Northern Strike Force was held up trying to slow the Indian drive on Shakergarh town and was not free for action elsewhere. One brigade of 6 Armored Division was already engaged on the Basanter River against Indian 16 (I) Armored Brigade, a clash between several squadrons on each side, wrongly described by an over-enthusiastic Indian press as the biggest tank battle since World War 2. 17 Division had already given up brigades to 23 Division for the Chhamb assault and to IV Corps (Lahore) to strengthen the defences there. It had only one uncommitted brigade left. Since the Indians were grinding forward by sheer force, not only would all of the remaining Northern Strike Force become committed, troops would have had to be pulled down from Kashmir and up from Lahore to hold the Indian attack once Shakergarh fell.
Pakistan’s only free reserves at this time were in the Southern Strike Force. The 1 Armored and 7 Divisions were fresh and uncommitted Nominally, 33 Division was also under this force, but it had detached a brigade for Sind, to aid 18 Division, and another was reinforcing the Multan sector defences, held primarily by 105 (I) and 25 (I) Brigades from Suliemanke and Bahawalpur respectively.
Now consider India’s line up
North: 3 Division at Leh, with two brigades to spare
Uri—Tithwal : 19 Division, almost equal in size to Pakistan 12 Division
Poonch—Rajouri— Mendhar: 25 Division (over strength). Two other brigades on the line north of Akhnur.
Akhnur—Jammu: 10 Division (over strength) and 26 Division, 3 (I) Armored Brigade
Sialkot: 36, 39, 54 Divisions, with 2, 14 and 16 (I) Brigades
Amritsar—Ferozepur: 7, 14 and 15 Divisions plus an armored brigade
Fazilka: Foxtrot Sector: 1 Armored Division plus three brigades
Desert: 11 and 12 Divisions plus two brigades
To summarize, India had 15 divisions of which one (3 Division out of Leh) was partially oriented towards China, to Pakistan’s 12. Pakistan’s Southern Strike Force was intact, and it was slightly better off in that Indian answer to it (1 Armored and 9 Divisions of Indian Army) was not a homogeneous or a cross trained force. HQ 1 Corps, which controlled the two Indian divisions on the date of the eastern cease-fire had actually come back to the west after having spent the better part of the year in Eastern Command, preparing for, and then participating in the Bangladesh campaign. 9 Division was normally based at Ranchi as a counter to Pakistan’s 14 Division in the East.
Against that however, India’s Foxtrot Sector held more than a division’s worth of troops. A lot of India’s strength just does not show up as divisions, but it is viable combat strength anyway.
The Indian Army has always obtained fewer divisions for a given number of men than Pakistan because (1) Indian territory is larger, implying more line of communication troops and (2) India tends to have an enormous number of less than division sized units, such as independent brigades, independent battalions, and ad hoc task forces.
For example, though officially India had four armored brigades during the 1971 war, actually it had 5, because one ad hoc brigade was constituted from spare odds and ends. These were available to Indian army because it had more armored regiments than Pakistan.
Similarly Foxtrot Sector was actually a division plus, though it did not appear as such because it was not given a divisional flag. In the western armies it would have been given a divisional number so that at least the Army would not confuse itself.
The GOC Foxtrot Sector was a Major General. He had under his command or available to him 67 (I) Brigade at Fazilka, 51 Parachute Brigade at Ganganagar, and 163 Brigade out of Leh at Suratgarh. Additionally he had an ad hoc force consisting of three engineer regiments and two infantry battalions at Abohar (though General Candeth says it was one, not two infantry battalions). This is not a recommended use of engineers, a scarce and precious commodity in a shooting war, but being fully trained as infantry, in emergencies they can be so used.
If we can examine the map on the outbreak of war we would see the odd brigade or two and Indian 1 Armored Division in the Fazilka Abohar area, whereas on Pakistan’s side was its full II Corps out of Multan with 1 Armored and 33 Divisions. So the situation would have appeared much to India’s disadvantage, particularly because the front here is wide open to large-scale armored movement.
During the war, when Pakistan 7 Division failed to appear in the J and K sectors, its normal war station, there was alarm in Western Command: this division could have moved southward to join Pakistan II Corps, to make a powerful force for an attack, against Fazilka southward, thus neutralizing India’s Sialkot push.
Now consider the way events in battle wreck the best laid plans. With 7 Division joining Pakistan II Corps, India was at a definite disadvantage. But when Pakistan learned of Indian 12 Divisions proposed attack towards Islamgarh and Tanot, it faced a serious problemsince against India’s desert force of two divisions and two independent brigades it had available only one division out of Hyderabad.
Pakistan’s 16 Division was earmarked as a reserve for this vast sector, but 16 division was in East Pakistan sent there in March 1971 to help stem the revolt. 33 Division bad been hurriedly raised in a period of six months to replace this division. It had, however, to do dual duty as a reserve and as a partner to 1 Armored Division. A brigade from it was detached to throw off the attack of Indian 12 Division. Then a brigade went to reinforce Pakistan 18 Division which was slowly giving way against Indian 11 Division’s advance along the Khokrapar-Naya Chor axis.
So we may guess that Pakistan 7 Division, trained for years to operate in Kashmir, had to be sent southward to face Foxtrot Sector. The Army may not have wanted the Indian public to see a division on Foxtrot Sector, but Pakistan GHQ saw it and a vital reinforcement for Poonch was diverted. This had its repercussions in Poonch sector where the Pakistan Army failed to break through despite much effort. 7 Division’ would have made the difference between stalemate and victory.
This microcosm of deployments and counter deployments is illustrative.
By December 16, 1971 the actual situation on the ground after the induction of HQ 9 Division and three brigades from the east, was more like 16 Indian divisions to Pakistan’s 12.
Therefore, at the time of the eastern ceasefire, India had a clear superiority in the west, partially because it had started moving troops from the eastern to the western theatre. Thus, India was quite capable of continuing the war.
Further reinforcements would have come if required: chief among these were 4 Division and 6 Division. (4 Division has always been part of the general reserves available to the Indian Army and 6 Division, while nominally assigned to the western UP broder, is always available to the west because the terrain in its area is so extreme that a single independent brigade can protect the area.)
Additional to these two divisions were two more: 8 and 57 Divisions, the Northeast counter-insurgency formations, which had participated in the war as part of IV Corps on East Pakistan’s easternmost flank.
Undoubtedly time was needed to shift them to the west. India did a fairly efficient job of rapidly transferring about 20,000 troops from HQ II Corps, HQ 9 Division, three brigades, plus tank and artillery regiments. At most three weeks would have been required for shifting four additional divisions.
With the equivalent of India’s 20 divisions to Pakistan’s 12 the war in the west could have been over in the short order.
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of the Army and CAPF would be the vastly increased efficiency of road protection and the ability for Corps Commander XV Corps to shuffle his cards as he pleases, without worrying about the truly yogic manoeuvres that he presently has to undergo to send a brigade from A to B.
