ANALYSIS: Terrorism in Pak-India relations Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
India has adopted a two-pronged strategy for coping with terrorism from Pakistan. There is a return to coercive diplomacy by moving its troops from peacetime locations to positions closer to the India-Pak border and tough statements from Indias top civilian and military leadership
Terrorism and jihad overshadow India-Pakistan relations. The meeting of their foreign secretaries in New Delhi on February 25, 2010, failed to agree on a shared agenda for resuming the talks suspended after the terrorist attack in Mumbai on November 26, 2008. The outcome of the talks could not have been different because the two sides had divergent official briefs to pursue. Pakistan wanted to revive the suspended talks on eight issue areas, including terrorism. The Indian side was there only to restate what its top leaders had already said: that Pakistan must satisfy India on terrorism before any other issue can be discussed.
Since the Mumbai attacks, India has reduced India-Pakistan relations to a single issue terrorism which is one dimensional, i.e. Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT). India wants Pakistan to decimate the LeT leadership and infrastructure or hand over its leaders to India as Pakistan handed over some alleged terrorists to the US. Other dimensions of terrorism and militancy that threaten Pakistans internal stability and security do not interest India.
India has adopted a two-pronged strategy for coping with terrorism from Pakistan. There is a return to coercive diplomacy by moving its troops from peacetime locations to positions closer to the India-Pak border. This is coupled with tough statements from Indias top civilian and military leadership, including the repeated threat of any action if there is another major terrorist attack in India. There have also been suggestions of surgical airstrikes on terrorist camps in Pakistan or Pakistan-administered Kashmir, limited war, and the resort to the Cold Start strategy. India also launched a global diplomatic campaign to mobilise support for its position on Pakistan as an epicentre of terrorism.
Most Indian statements and diplomatic activities are meant to deflect domestic pressure not only from the opposition parties, especially the BJP, but also from some circles in the Congress Party that think a powerful state like India should play tough with Pakistan.
Pakistans policies towards Islamic militant groups and their terrorist activities have changed over the last year. Its military is genuinely engaged in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency activities in the tribal areas and the security authorities are taking limited action against the militant groups based in mainland Pakistan, especially in Punjab.
However, the LeT and other Punjab-based militant groups are at a lower rank in Pakistani priorities for fighting terrorism. The order of priority is: al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban and their allies in the tribal area, the Afghan Taliban and Punjab-based groups, including the LeT. The immediate and direct threat to Pakistan comes from the first three types of groups. The US and others interested in stabilising the situation in Afghanistan also focus on al Qaeda and the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.
Pakistan does not have the capacity to take equally firm action simultaneously against all these groups when it has to keep a reasonable number of troops close to the Indian border in view of the ongoing troubled relations.
Instead of cooperating with each other to counter terrorism, India and Pakistan have returned to their traditional rivalry. They are now engaged in a proxy war in Afghanistan. Their intelligence agencies are working to undermine each others interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan has also made repeated complaints of Indias financial support to the Baloch dissidents based in Afghanistan.
Another sign of increased trouble between Pakistan and India is the river water issue. Pakistan complains that India is manipulating the river water in Kashmir and working on new water storage and power-generation projects that violate the Indus Water Treaty. The Indian response is that water shortages are due to changing weather patterns and Pakistans poor water management. Indias Indus Water Commissioner visited Pakistan in February and March but the water issue could not be resolved. Pakistan is now planning to take the Kishanganga Dam issue to international arbitration. Pakistans Indus Water Commissioner is waiting for Indian permission to visit the present and planned dam sites in Indian-administered Kashmir.
India has approached the US and Saudi Arabia for diplomatic support of its terrorism-related demands from Pakistan. The US sympathises with Indias position and it has designated the LeT as a terrorist organisation. It has also taken up the issue of the LeT (now operating as Jamaat-ud-Dawa) with Pakistan. However, the US is not going to do anything beyond expressing concern on this issue because it views al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban as greater threats. The same can be said about Saudi Arabia. To them, the LeT is a lesser threat than al Qaeda and their allied groups, which include the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. The current security priorities of the US and Saudi Arabia are more in line with Pakistan than with India.
The coordination between Pakistan and the US appears to have increased as the Obama administration launched a new Afghanistan strategy earlier this year, one that focuses on tough military action in Afghanistan, reconciliation with and reintegration of selected Taliban, and Pakistans sustained military action in the tribal areas. These new strategies aim at creating conducive conditions for a gradual US withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Greater attention on the future of Afghanistan will make the US and other Western states less receptive to Indias single item terrorism agenda against Pakistan. India will face increased diplomatic persuasion to improve relations with Pakistan so that the latter can devote full attention to the tribal areas and the Afghan border.
India and Pakistan need to adopt the following steps to neutralise militants from imposing their agenda on Indo-Pakistan relations:
1. India should agree to a comprehensive dialogue on all contentious issues and work towards resolving the less contentious ones. Improved relations create more space for Pakistan to take firmer action against the groups known for their activities in Kashmir and India.
2. There is no military option available to India and Pakistan for solving their bilateral problems. Indias prime minister should not pay attention to those talking about a limited war, surgical airstrikes or Cold Start.
3. Pakistans military and intelligence establishment need to give up altogether the use of jihadis for pursuing their agenda in Kashmir. The blowback of the jihad strategy has undermined Pakistans internal harmony and stability. Pakistan can no longer afford such a self-destructive strategy.
4. As immediate confidence-building measures, the two sides should address the water issue, encourage more trade and movement of people across the LoC in Kashmir and liberalise the visa and travel regime.
Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst
