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India is perfectly capable of Winning a Two-Front WAR

Wrong info bro.
XVII Corps is currently being raised and first units have already been formed.
First units already inducted.

A new training base for the corps was recently commissioned:
http://indianexpress.com/article/in...military-station-in-berhampore-today-3071340/

that's good.

and you will have to ignore my arrogance for this question "as i am not that good in corp regiment things".
what exact is the strength and equipment's in an Indian corp ? or what have you guyz Planned for this "specific" corp ?
 
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Interesting, I see Indian friends complaining about Pakistanis going on about nukes all the time but when China comes in to play they start singing the same tune :D
:D .

No doubt of that.

India has a significant advantage in a defensive war with China, unless the Chinese have 8:1 numerical superiority like in 1962(a ratio which now they won't be able to replicate) Chinese offensive will stall in few days.

PLA’s war wherewithal on the Indo-Tibet frontline must be carted over 1500 kilometers from their logistic hubs at Lhasa and Kashgarh, which in turn must be stocked from central China, a further 2000 kilometers away. The entire logistic connectivity by road, rail, pipeline and air depends upon tenuous lines of communication and static staging yards, all situated over a terrain that is completely open, devoid of local resources and subject to such extreme conditions as it must obtain at 4300 meters of average altitude and sub-zero cold almost throughout the year. Even if China has engineered her transportation capacity to 24000 tons a day and therefore stated to be able to build up 30 divisions, including formations already in place, in 30 days, and sustain this force in war indefinitely, such theoretical calculations may be valid under ‘test conditions’, in practice this will invariably not be so. No doubt, the whole system of induction and sustenance for PLA’s field forces in war would be ripe for interdiction by air power and special operations.

On the Indian side, the terrain south of the 4300 to 5400 meter high Himalayan passes, constricted and snow-bound most of the year, is characterised by razor-sharp ridgelines, steep slopes and narrow, gorge-like valleys generally running North to South. The Indian logistic installations are between 350 to 400 kilometers in depth, and therefore, in terms of turn around time, comparable to that of the PLA in Tibet. Road axes connecting Indian foothills to the Indo-Tibet Border, being aligned more or less along the narrow valley floors, are extremely difficult to interdict by air or ground fire; these are targetable only in some stretches and even then require super-skills, high-technology and load of chance to score effective hits. Notably, scope exists to make such hits even more ineffective by means of modern methods of camouflage, deception and repair.

To undertake offensive operations in such terrain, PLA formations have to confine to constricted valleys that are hemmed-in by successive ridge lines, thus limiting the scope for tactical level lateral manoeuvre. At the operational level, axes of offensive have to remain isolated from each other, while envelopment and turning movement, besides inviting risks of entrapment, would entail such heavy logistic back up as to be prohibitive in terms of resources and time. Further, some distance down the Southern slopes into Indian territory, the terrain closes down to subsume the advantages that heavy weaponry and high-technology might bring to PLA’s offensive. Indeed, the ground is heavily biased in favour of defensive operations - if conducted with aggressive intent.

We have reasons to believe that mother earth has not been overly supportive of aggression from Tibetan Plateau across the Himalayan Passes into India. Indeed, any PLA offensive across the Indo-Tibet Border has to contend with an adverse terrain anomaly: its build-up and spring-board areas straddle a ground that exposes its war machine to disruption by inhospitable elements as well as air and ground attack, while its offensive across the watershed passes would be beleaguered by a ground that favours classically conducted defensive operations. Indeed, PLA’s offensive across the passes would have to fight ‘friction of terrain’ and ‘tension of logistics’ before engaging Indian forces - with “General Snow” ever ready to cut off its lifeline.

Therefore, even if the PLA commits overwhelming number of formations to its offensives, as to how many of these could actually be employable - along limited, narrow axes, and against successive lines of defences, remains a moot point to consider.

In addition an offensive by India's XVII mountain strike corps would further divert PLA forces.
I think you forget to mention PLA Rocket Force & Rocket Artillery . :)
 
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No doubt of that.

India has a significant advantage in a defensive war with China, unless the Chinese have 8:1 numerical superiority like in 1962(a ratio which now they won't be able to replicate) Chinese offensive will stall in few days.

PLA’s war wherewithal on the Indo-Tibet frontline must be carted over 1500 kilometers from their logistic hubs at Lhasa and Kashgarh, which in turn must be stocked from central China, a further 2000 kilometers away. The entire logistic connectivity by road, rail, pipeline and air depends upon tenuous lines of communication and static staging yards, all situated over a terrain that is completely open, devoid of local resources and subject to such extreme conditions as it must obtain at 4300 meters of average altitude and sub-zero cold almost throughout the year. Even if China has engineered her transportation capacity to 24000 tons a day and therefore stated to be able to build up 30 divisions, including formations already in place, in 30 days, and sustain this force in war indefinitely, such theoretical calculations may be valid under ‘test conditions’, in practice this will invariably not be so. No doubt, the whole system of induction and sustenance for PLA’s field forces in war would be ripe for interdiction by air power and special operations.

On the Indian side, the terrain south of the 4300 to 5400 meter high Himalayan passes, constricted and snow-bound most of the year, is characterised by razor-sharp ridgelines, steep slopes and narrow, gorge-like valleys generally running North to South. The Indian logistic installations are between 350 to 400 kilometers in depth, and therefore, in terms of turn around time, comparable to that of the PLA in Tibet. Road axes connecting Indian foothills to the Indo-Tibet Border, being aligned more or less along the narrow valley floors, are extremely difficult to interdict by air or ground fire; these are targetable only in some stretches and even then require super-skills, high-technology and load of chance to score effective hits. Notably, scope exists to make such hits even more ineffective by means of modern methods of camouflage, deception and repair.

To undertake offensive operations in such terrain, PLA formations have to confine to constricted valleys that are hemmed-in by successive ridge lines, thus limiting the scope for tactical level lateral manoeuvre. At the operational level, axes of offensive have to remain isolated from each other, while envelopment and turning movement, besides inviting risks of entrapment, would entail such heavy logistic back up as to be prohibitive in terms of resources and time. Further, some distance down the Southern slopes into Indian territory, the terrain closes down to subsume the advantages that heavy weaponry and high-technology might bring to PLA’s offensive. Indeed, the ground is heavily biased in favour of defensive operations - if conducted with aggressive intent.

We have reasons to believe that mother earth has not been overly supportive of aggression from Tibetan Plateau across the Himalayan Passes into India. Indeed, any PLA offensive across the Indo-Tibet Border has to contend with an adverse terrain anomaly: its build-up and spring-board areas straddle a ground that exposes its war machine to disruption by inhospitable elements as well as air and ground attack, while its offensive across the watershed passes would be beleaguered by a ground that favours classically conducted defensive operations. Indeed, PLA’s offensive across the passes would have to fight ‘friction of terrain’ and ‘tension of logistics’ before engaging Indian forces - with “General Snow” ever ready to cut off its lifeline.

Therefore, even if the PLA commits overwhelming number of formations to its offensives, as to how many of these could actually be employable - along limited, narrow axes, and against successive lines of defences, remains a moot point to consider.

In addition an offensive by India's XVII mountain strike corps would further divert PLA forces.
brilliant analysis
 
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Even with one front with Chinese aid on Pakistan side, India will never win: when China give assistance to NK in 1950, we pushed UN army back to 38 parallel line, when we assisted North Vietnam in 1960, US can only bombed with B-52 but never dare to advance deep into North Vietnam territory, when China and Pakistan help Sri Lanka, India stay mute and mumbling...and now they fantasized with the theory of winning two front war against Pakistan and China?
 
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India is perfectly capable of Winning a Two-Front WAR
Sunday, March 05, 2017
By: TNN-Blog

Source Link: Click Here

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Army chief declares that India is perfectly capable of winning a two-front war against China and Pakistan. But consider this: the Chinese military has two million active personnel, Pakistan has 600,000, while India has 1.3 million. The math does does not seem to favor India.

After 26/11, India was sorely tempted to retaliate against Pakistan. As it was after the attack on Parliament in 2001. But after every major provocation, it dithers. For sure there is heavy American pressure. But Indian defence planners also seem unsure.

Pakistan will fight to the hilt any Indian attack, but after a few weeks it will wilt. It hopes that the Chinese open a second front against India, but that could be a forlorn hope. The Chinese, inscrutable as ever, may decide to do nothing. Or they may show solidarity with Pakistan and hit India.

India would then be forced to take on China, much to Pakistan’s delight. All along, there would be intense American pressure to bring a subcontinental war to a halt. But it may not succeed. In the absence of China, a sinking Pakistan would be tempted to resort to nukes.

The situation would be as complicated in case Pakistan initiates a war against India. In a couple of years, the Taliban should have taken Kabul. Thousands of foreign jihadis—Chechens, Uighurs, Arabs—would suddenly become unemployed then.

Pakistan will almost without fail redirect them, as well as its own jihadis, against Kashmir. It tried the same in 1989, had the Indian army on the ropes but the army recovered and the Pakistani putsch failed. But now presents another golden opportunity that Pakistan is sure not to miss.

The only difference is that the Indian army is battle-hardened now and well-versed in counter-insurgency. So Pakistan will find it hard to detach Kashmir from India. Frustrated, it may launch an attack elsewhere, once again hoping the Chinese would join in the party.

But with India not the aggressor, China might be more reluctant to do so. Or they just might. With the Chinese one never knows. Indian defence planners must then necessarily plan for a two-front war. How prepared are they?

The vast majority of India’s men and munitions face Pakistan. Things look rather bleak on its eastern front. Each time a few Chinese soldiers show up on the border, an edgy army alerts the media, which raises a national alarm. The ghost of 1962 is still alive and kicking.

The Chinese have unveiled two types of stealth fighters. The stealth fighter is an amazing conventional weapon. Evading radar, and hence detection, it can hone in with exact precision on an enemy target, destroy it, and return home unscathed.

India is light years away from developing any reliable fighter jet, leave alone a stealth. India’s primary deterrent against China seems to be missiles, but long-range missiles can go awry. Aim for Shanghai but plonk yourself in the water. An Indian proposal to raise a mountain strike corps aimed against China was scrapped, apparently for lack of money.

Indian defence planners have been following a twin-track weaponization policy. They fund indigenous arms development, but even 70 years after Independence, Indian defence labs cannot produce a decent pistol.

The labs moan that the powers that be are really only interested in acquiring arms from abroad, perhaps because of all the cuts involved. That may well be the case, but the point is that India must arm itself effectively, whether indigenously or through foreign means.

The previous government was so haunted by the ghost of Bofors that it literally put a stop to any major weapons acquisition. The current government seems keen to undo past mistakes, but it has convolved foreign arms procurement with its Make in India campaign.

The Rafale was the winner in a tortuous tender process, but when the government arm-twisted the French to make the jet in India, they balked. The price would have to go up considerably, because the French would have to set up foreign supply chains in India, Indian manufacturers not seen as being up to the mark.

The air force needs about 200 fighter jets. The Americans seem inclined to make the F-16 in India, but they do not not appear terribly convincing. Saab of Sweden has been an aggressive promisor, but then again. Conflating buying foreign jets with making them in India could take years before they take to the skies.

And then, what about the stealth? India needs at least a few stealth fighters of its own to counter China. Any company we get conventional jets from must have stealth capability as well as the willingness to supply it to us.

Finally, the military has to be made a more attractive career choice. The army suffers from a shortage of 10,000 officers. A senior army officer recounted that in a country like India, there is no shortage of people. But the army needs quality people.

After Independence, the army was a career of choice, which led to the stunning 1971.

In both Pakistan and China, military personnel are looked after from cradle to grave. We treat our veterans shabbily. Any army necessarily has to have brawn, but to prevail, it must have brains like Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Rommel. Do we?
utter nonsense.

India can never win a two front war. Take Germany for example.
 
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China alone is enough to beat India two times within a week and then again a third time just to score a hat-trick.

These articles are meant to satisfy frustrated and warmongering nation of India.
India can never win a war against China.
 
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These so called bloggers, seems to be desperate to initiate a war... Though, none of the bloggers will be around but millions suffering the aftermath of war. Times of India blog and the credibility, speaks volume that how to treat it.

Nobody is attacking India but if India wants to initiate War, what to say then however, we read usually that India is not attacking anyone, so should handle such war mongers.
 
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