India in Afghanistan

[sparklingway]

Fair is one of the most what we can call pro-Pakistan academics out there.

India in Afghanistan, part I: strategic interests, regional concerns​

By Christine Fair, October 26, 2010 Tuesday, October 26, 2010 - 10:48 AM Share

India's profile in Afghanistan has been a quiet but looming concern for New Delhi, Washington, Brussels and of course Islamabad with all wondering what is the optimal role for India in Afghanistan's reconstruction in light of the enduring security competition between India and Pakistan. On the one hand are those who want to expand India's presence in Afghanistan through increased Indian training of Afghan civilian and military personnel, development projects, and expanded economic ties. These observers are aware of India's long-standing and robust ties with Kabul and Afghans' generally positive public opinion towards Indians and India. Notably, in late August 2010, Indian National Security Adviser Rangin Spanta told an Indian journalist, "We would like to expand cooperation with India in order to strengthen Kabul's ability to secure itself."

On the other hand are those that caution against such involvement. This view was articulated forcefully by then-top NATO commander in Afghanistan Gen. Stanley McChrystal in his August 2009 "COMISAF's Initial Assessment." McChrystal opined:

Indian political and economic influence is increasing in Afghanistan, including significant development efforts and financial investment. In addition, the current Afghan government is perceived by Islamabad to be pro-Indian. While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India.

Other analysts see Indian and Pakistani competition in Afghanistan as a new "Great Game" and argue that Afghanistan can be pacified only through a regional solution that resolves once and for all the intractable Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir.

Despite the seeming importance of India's interests in Afghanistan and the regional impacts of the same, there have been few recent studies of these issues. I recently authored a report that analyzes India's current interests in Afghanistan, how it has sought to achieve its aims, and the consequences of its actions for India, Pakistan, and the international efforts to stabilize Pakistan and Afghanistan.

India rising

India's interests in Afghanistan are not only Pakistan-specific but equally, if not more importantly, tied to India's desire to be and to be seen as an extra-regional power moving toward great power status. India has long bristled at the tendency among international analysts to hitch India to Pakistan. India is keen to throw off any comparison to Pakistan -- a state it views as its diminutive and less consequential neighbor. Thus while India's presence in Afghanistan has Pakistan-specific utility it is also about India's emergent ability to influence its extended strategic neighborhood.

American officials are often unaware of how Indians conceive of their neighborhood. Indian policy analysts claim that India's strategic environment stretches to the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf in the west (some will even claim the eastern coast of Africa as the western-most border of this strategic space); to the east, it includes the Strait of Malacca and extends up to the South China Sea; to the north, it is comprised of Central Asia; and to the south, it reaches out to Antarctica.

Raja Mohan, a doyen of Indian security analysis, explains in compa*rable terms that India's grand strategy:

Divides the world into three concentric circles. In the first, which encom*passes the immediate neighborhood, India has sought primacy and a veto over the actions of outside powers. In the second, which encom*passes the so-called extended neighborhood stretching across Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral, India has sought to balance the influence of other powers and prevent them from undercutting its interests. In the third, which includes the entire global stage, India has tried to take its place as one of the great powers, a key player in international peace and security.

Thus, in many regards, India's interests in Afghanistan can be seen as merely one element within India's larger desire to be able to project its interests well beyond South Asia.

Why India cares about Afghanistan

There are at least three principle reasons why India has direct interests in Afghanistan.

First, India has had to contend with many significant security chal*lenges that stem from the Taliban's regime in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Pakistan has raised and supported several militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen/Harkat-ul-Ansar, and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami among others, which operate in India. However, all of these groups have trained in Afghanistan, with varying proximity to the Taliban and by extension al-Qaeda. Thus India is absolutely adamant that Afghanistan should not again become a terrorist safe haven.

Second, India is interested in retaining Afghanistan as a friendly state from which it has the capacity to monitor Pakistan and even, where possible, cultivate assets to influence activities in Pakistan. While India is keenly inter*ested in cultivating a significant partnership with Afghanistan, Pakistan busies itself trying to deny India these very opportunities.

Third, devel*opments in Afghanistan and Pakistan have important and usually deleterious effects upon India's domestic social fabric as well as its internal security apart from the well-known problems in and over Kashmir. Indian interlocutors have explained to me that Islamist militancy coexists with a burgeoning Hindu nationalist movement that seeks to re-craft India as a Hindu state. Hindu nation*alists and their militant counterparts live in a violent symbiosis with Islamist militant groups operating in and around India. Islamist terrorism in India and the region provides grist for the mill of Hindu nationalism and its violent offshoots.

How India can achieve these aims

India has sought to establish its presence in Afghanistan from the early days of its independence from Britain in 1947. In 1950, Afghanistan and India signed a "Friendship Treaty." India had robust ties with Afghan King Zahir Shah's regime. Prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979, New Delhi continued to formalized agreements and protocols with various pro-Soviet regimes in Kabul.

While India's role in Afghanistan was constrained during the anti-Soviet jihad, between 1979 and 1989 India reportedly expanded its development activities in Afghanistan, focusing upon industrial, irrigation, and hydroelectric projects. That India was able to sustain this presence attests to the importance that India attached to this relationship and India's willingness to persevere.

After the Taliban consolidated their hold on Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, India struggled to maintain its presence and to support anti-Taliban forces. However, Indian objectives in Afghanistan remained necessarily modest given the constrained environment. India aimed to undermine, as best it could, the ability of the Taliban to consolidate its power over Afghanistan, principally by supporting the Northern Alliance in tandem with other regional actors.

Working with Iran, Russia, and Tajikistan, India provided important (but not fully detailed) resources to the Northern Alliance, the only meaningful challenge to the Taliban in Afghanistan. According to journalist Rahul Bedi, India also ran a twenty-five-bed hospital at Farkhor (Ayni), Tajikistan, for more than a year. The Northern Alliance military commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud, died in that hospital after he was attacked by al-Qaeda suicide bombers on September 9, 2001. Through Tajikistan, India supplied the Northern Alliance with high altitude warfare equipment worth around $8 million. India also based several "defense advisers," including an officer of a brigadier rank, in Tajikistan to advise the Northern Alliance in their operations against the Taliban.

Since 2001, India has relied upon development projects and other forms of humanitarian assistance. To facilitate these projects and to collect intelligence (as all embassies and consulates do), India also now has consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif, in addition to its embassy in Kabul. There also are a number of smaller-scale activities throughout Afghanistan. According to U.S., British, and Afghan officials I interviewed over the last several years, India's activities are not isolated to the north, where it has had traditional ties, but also include efforts in the southern provinces and in the northeast, abutting the Pakistani border.

Christine Fair is an assistant professor at Georgetown University and the author of Cuisines of the Axis of Evil and Other Irritating States. In part two of this post, she will explore the future of Indian interests in Afghanistan.

What are India's Interests in Afghanistan? - by Christine Fair | The AfPak Channel

 

[sparklingway]

India in Afghanistan, part II: Indo-U.S. relations in the lengthening AfPak shadow​

By Christine Fair, October 27, 2010 Wednesday, October 27, 2010

Despite deepening security threats from both the Taliban and other Pakistan-based proxies operating against Indian personnel and institutions in Afghanistan, thus far India has remained committed to staying in Afghanistan. India has its own concerns about the ultimate settlement in Afghanistan given that such a political settlement will likely come about through some sort of a twinned process of reconciliation and reintegration of former Taliban fighters back into Afghanistan's political landscape.

Surely this will be a prominent matter of discussion when U.S. President Barack Obama undertakes a state visit to India next month. As one Indian commentator recently wrote:

The real criterion for measuring success [of the Obama visit] would lie in assessing whether or not the two leaders have reached consensus on defining the dangers that their, and other, countries face from the ****** area and how they intend to tackle it. They must agree on a mechanism for arriving at such assessment and there is only one way of doing it. What is needed is a trilateral forum of consultations consisting of the U.S., India, and Afghanistan.

In some measure, India should be assured that the Obama administration's assessment of the "Pakistan challenge" more closely mirrors that of India than that of the Bush administration, which remained doggedly committed to its Panglossian assessments of Pakistani President Parvez Musharraf's various promises to contend with the terrorism menaces based in and from Pakistan. However, as Bob Woodward lays bare in Obama's Wars, while the Obama White House has a better appreciation of the challenges with Pakistan it lacks any significant strategy to contend with them.

Moreover, Obama has much to prove to the Indians following a shaky start. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went to China first -- not India. Both Obama and Clinton made various statements attesting to the primacy of China in the U.S.'s Asia strategy. India was piqued by the Obama administration's lack of attention, having become habituated to the incessant wooing of the Bush administration, which urged the United States to alter its entire nonproliferation regime to accommodate the controversial Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal. The deal was important to Washington ostensibly to constrain China. Ashley Tellis, the architect of the deal, explained the importance of such a move in 2005:

If the United States is serious about advancing its geopolitical objectives in Asia, it would almost by definition help New Delhi develop its strategic capabilities such that India's nuclear weaponry and associated delivery systems could deter against the growing and utterly more capable nuclear forces Beijing is likely to possess by 2025.

Any U.S. retrenchment from this position on China would leave India exposed.

India continues to watch with concern as Washington continues to ply military assistance to Pakistan while remaining unable or unwilling to compel Pakistan to abandon militancy as a tool of foreign policy and to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure that has inflicted such harm upon India and other countries the region. Worse, India fears that Washington will provide funds and access to weapon systems that are more appropriate to target India than Pakistani insurgents. In the wake of the recently concluded U.S.-Pakistan strategic dialogue, more defense wares will be on their way to Pakistan. India's Defense Minister A.K. Antony summarized India's concerns during a September 2010 trip to Washington: "We feel that even though the U.S. is giving arms to Pakistan to fight terrorism, our practical experience is (that) it is always being misused. They are diverting a portion against India," Antony had said during his visit here.

Will India stay the course in Afghanistan? Planning for the "day after"

Obama's (largely misconstrued) announcement that U.S. troops will begin drawing down military forces from Afghanistan in a conditions-based fashion in July 2011 has been widely read as "sever and saunter," or perhaps even "cut and run" among Afghanistan's neighbors. The Obama administration's assurances that the United States will remain committed to Afghanistan's development and transition have had little palliative impacts upon these calculations. India is no exception. Obama's commitment to ending the military commitment to Afghanistan has triggered a vigorous domestic debate within India about its future role in Afghanistan.

Indians are right to worry about how they will continue their programs and initiatives in Afghanistan as the United States and other international military forces reconfigure their posture away from active military operations in the future. Indian personnel have been under steady attack in Afghanistan.

After the 2008 attack on India's Embassy in Kabul, the Indian Express ran a poignant editorial that captured this dilemma. The author wrote:

After the Kabul bombing, India must come to terms with an important question that it has avoided debating so far. New Delhi cannot continue to expand its economic and diplomatic activity in Afghanistan, while avoiding a commensurate increase in its military presence there. For too long, New Delhi has deferred to Pakistani and American sensitivities about raising India's strategic profile in Afghanistan.

Some Indian analysts have articulated an explicitly military option for India in Afghanistan. Dr. Subhash Kapila, writing in December 2009, explains, "India has wrongly shied away from a military commitment in Afghanistan for two major reasons. The first was the American reluctance to permit Indian military involvement in Afghanistan out of deference to Pakistan Army sensitivities. The second reason was the political and strategic timidity of India's political leadership who have yet to recognize that being a big power would involve shouldering military responsibilities to reorder in India's favor the security environment in South Asia." He argues that since the U.S. exit is a question of when not if, India must begin preparing extensive contingency planning for the "day after" of the U.S. exit from Afghanistan.

In August of 2008, Pragati (an online, independent Indian defense publication) dedicated an entire issue to debating whether or not India should send troops to Afghanistan. One author argued that India should expand its civilian effort as well as forge a military option. Shushant T. Singh, one of the contributors to that issue, explains, "A significant Indian military presence in Afghanistan will alter the geo-strategic landscape in the extended neighborhood, by expanding India's power projection in Central Asia."

Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, in the same issue of Pragati, urges India to stay the course and push to train Afghan National Security Forces over the objections of the United States, NATO, and Pakistan. At the other extreme are those who worry that the benefits of any Indian presence in Afghanistan are outweighed by the cost. (India has already been forced to expand its security forces' presence in Afghanistan to secure the civilian efforts underway.) Proponents of scaling back argue that India should do so when the United States and other coalition partners reduce their kinetic operations and retract their military footprints beginning in July 2011.

The stakes for India are higher than some may appreciate. India's efforts to shape the outcome in Afghanistan with its own security interests will be important evidence that India has what it takes to be a power of any consequence outside of South Asia -- much less globally. If India cannot effectively shape the course of events in its own "immediate neighborhood," how can it credibly lay claim to its great power aspirations at home or abroad?

Christine Fair is an assistant professor at Georgetown University and the author of Cuisines of the Axis of Evil and Other Irritating States. In part one of this post, she considered India's historical interests in Afghanistan.

http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/post..._us_relations_in_the_lengthening_afpak_shadow

 

[Tshering22]

India in Afghanistan, part II: Indo-U.S. relations in the lengthening AfPak shadow​

By Christine Fair, October 27, 2010 Wednesday, October 27, 2010

Despite deepening security threats from both the Taliban and other Pakistan-based proxies operating against Indian personnel and institutions in Afghanistan, thus far India has remained committed to staying in Afghanistan. India has its own concerns about the ultimate settlement in Afghanistan given that such a political settlement will likely come about through some sort of a twinned process of reconciliation and reintegration of former Taliban fighters back into Afghanistan's political landscape.

Surely this will be a prominent matter of discussion when U.S. President Barack Obama undertakes a state visit to India next month. As one Indian commentator recently wrote:



In some measure, India should be assured that the Obama administration's assessment of the "Pakistan challenge" more closely mirrors that of India than that of the Bush administration, which remained doggedly committed to its Panglossian assessments of Pakistani President Parvez Musharraf's various promises to contend with the terrorism menaces based in and from Pakistan. However, as Bob Woodward lays bare in Obama's Wars, while the Obama White House has a better appreciation of the challenges with Pakistan it lacks any significant strategy to contend with them.

Moreover, Obama has much to prove to the Indians following a shaky start. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went to China first -- not India. Both Obama and Clinton made various statements attesting to the primacy of China in the U.S.'s Asia strategy. India was piqued by the Obama administration's lack of attention, having become habituated to the incessant wooing of the Bush administration, which urged the United States to alter its entire nonproliferation regime to accommodate the controversial Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal. The deal was important to Washington ostensibly to constrain China. Ashley Tellis, the architect of the deal, explained the importance of such a move in 2005:



Any U.S. retrenchment from this position on China would leave India exposed.

India continues to watch with concern as Washington continues to ply military assistance to Pakistan while remaining unable or unwilling to compel Pakistan to abandon militancy as a tool of foreign policy and to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure that has inflicted such harm upon India and other countries the region. Worse, India fears that Washington will provide funds and access to weapon systems that are more appropriate to target India than Pakistani insurgents. In the wake of the recently concluded U.S.-Pakistan strategic dialogue, more defense wares will be on their way to Pakistan. India's Defense Minister A.K. Antony summarized India's concerns during a September 2010 trip to Washington: "We feel that even though the U.S. is giving arms to Pakistan to fight terrorism, our practical experience is (that) it is always being misused. They are diverting a portion against India," Antony had said during his visit here.

Will India stay the course in Afghanistan? Planning for the "day after"

Obama's (largely misconstrued) announcement that U.S. troops will begin drawing down military forces from Afghanistan in a conditions-based fashion in July 2011 has been widely read as "sever and saunter," or perhaps even "cut and run" among Afghanistan's neighbors. The Obama administration's assurances that the United States will remain committed to Afghanistan's development and transition have had little palliative impacts upon these calculations. India is no exception. Obama's commitment to ending the military commitment to Afghanistan has triggered a vigorous domestic debate within India about its future role in Afghanistan.

Indians are right to worry about how they will continue their programs and initiatives in Afghanistan as the United States and other international military forces reconfigure their posture away from active military operations in the future. Indian personnel have been under steady attack in Afghanistan.

After the 2008 attack on India's Embassy in Kabul, the Indian Express ran a poignant editorial that captured this dilemma. The author wrote:



Some Indian analysts have articulated an explicitly military option for India in Afghanistan. Dr. Subhash Kapila, writing in December 2009, explains, "India has wrongly shied away from a military commitment in Afghanistan for two major reasons. The first was the American reluctance to permit Indian military involvement in Afghanistan out of deference to Pakistan Army sensitivities. The second reason was the political and strategic timidity of India's political leadership who have yet to recognize that being a big power would involve shouldering military responsibilities to reorder in India's favor the security environment in South Asia." He argues that since the U.S. exit is a question of when not if, India must begin preparing extensive contingency planning for the "day after" of the U.S. exit from Afghanistan.

In August of 2008, Pragati (an online, independent Indian defense publication) dedicated an entire issue to debating whether or not India should send troops to Afghanistan. One author argued that India should expand its civilian effort as well as forge a military option. Shushant T. Singh, one of the contributors to that issue, explains, "A significant Indian military presence in Afghanistan will alter the geo-strategic landscape in the extended neighborhood, by expanding India's power projection in Central Asia."

Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, in the same issue of Pragati, urges India to stay the course and push to train Afghan National Security Forces over the objections of the United States, NATO, and Pakistan. At the other extreme are those who worry that the benefits of any Indian presence in Afghanistan are outweighed by the cost. (India has already been forced to expand its security forces' presence in Afghanistan to secure the civilian efforts underway.) Proponents of scaling back argue that India should do so when the United States and other coalition partners reduce their kinetic operations and retract their military footprints beginning in July 2011.

The stakes for India are higher than some may appreciate. India's efforts to shape the outcome in Afghanistan with its own security interests will be important evidence that India has what it takes to be a power of any consequence outside of South Asia -- much less globally. If India cannot effectively shape the course of events in its own "immediate neighborhood," how can it credibly lay claim to its great power aspirations at home or abroad?

Christine Fair is an assistant professor at Georgetown University and the author of Cuisines of the Axis of Evil and Other Irritating States. In part one of this post, she considered India's historical interests in Afghanistan.

Indo-U.S. relations in the lengthening AfPak shadow | The AfPak Channel

If the reports have it, no one is planning to leave anytime soon and on the contrary, more players are planning to arrive in the hot zone--2 of them being possibly Iran and Russia. Iranians have a strong influence in the bordering regions of Afghanistan and therefore can help create anti-Taliban sentiments in people due to their own personal grudge against Taliban fighters (before Bush and party gatecrashed into Afghanistan, Iran was said to about to go on a war against Taliban for massacring shias).

Russians have other non-religion related grudges that are historical and concerns that are futuristic. They might not bring in soldiers but they would definitely bring in intelligence.

Those who're thinking that Afghanistan is a "graveyard of empires", need to know the changed scenario of the world.

 

[GOD OF WAR]

What a waste of time... nothing new...
Sometimes I seriously doubt the intellect of foreign researchers to come up with the same kiddish stuff and even getting accolade for it.. When u start reading such articles, for some reason, you expect alot more other than the same old stale and beat down point of view.

We all know 3 things

1. US is leaving with a bloody nose and shattered teeth
2. India & Pakistan are both toiling to secure their place in the vacuum created.
3. The Pashtun Afghan will butcher NA and Indian presence.

Question is how does India plan on playing 'Inspector general' of Kabul alone with uncle sam gone?

the fact that Indians have invested billions in Afghanistan in infrastructure and training won't mean worth a dime to the pashtuns who regards them as 'infidals'. And after seeing Nato and Us forces getting ruptured, the Indians may not want to send in their own troops in the region. Regional stakes or no regional stakes, Indian media and public will start creating a real mess repeating the same mantra that echos in pakistani media 'We are fighting someone else's war'!

Im no analyst, just my 2 cents worth

 

[A.Muqeet khan]

What a waste of time... nothing new...
Sometimes I seriously doubt the intellect of foreign researchers to come up with the same kiddish stuff and even getting accolade for it.. When u start reading such articles, for some reason, you expect alot more other than the same old stale and beat down point of view.

We all know 3 things

1. US is leaving with a bloody nose and shattered teeth
2. India & Pakistan are both toiling to secure their place in the vacuum created.
3. The Pashtun Afghan will butcher NA and Indian presence.

Question is how does India plan on playing 'Inspector general' of Kabul alone with uncle sam gone?

the fact that Indians have invested billions in Afghanistan in infrastructure and training won't mean worth a dime to the pashtuns who regards them as 'infidals'. And after seeing Nato and Us forces getting ruptured, the Indians may not want to send in their own troops in the region. Regional stakes or no regional stakes, Indian media and public will start creating a real mess repeating the same mantra that echos in pakistani media 'We are fighting someone else's war'!

Im no analyst, just my 2 cents worth

well true but as far as northern alliance is concerned and india is considered u are wrong u should know that AFGHANI hate us Pakistani more then these "infidels"(with apologies ) and rightly as we are the responsible for the way these Afghani ppl lived and this hate wont go that easily so for that we need to do some thing very concrete a person should be patriotic but not stupid

 

[Md Akmal]

Kissinger’s controversial prescription for Indian interest
"Viewpoints"

Sunday September 19 2010 15:53:59 PM BDT

By Mohammad Zainal Abedin, USA

It is very strange and even difficult to believe that the former US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger in order to safeguard the so-called interest of India in Afghanistan advocated to involve a consortium of countries to define, protect and guarantee a definition of statehood for Afghanistan. Such advocacy utterly denies and defies the very fundamental sovereign rights of self-rule and self-determination of the Afghan people. Kissinger made his controversial theory while presenting a keynote paper at a seminar on ‘Global security, governance and the emerging distribution of power held in Geneva on September 10. It was sponsored by International Institute of Strategic Studies.

PTI that covered the event quoted Kissinger as saying, “In many respects India will be the most affected country if a jihadist Islamism gains impetus in Afghanistan.” He said, a uni-lateral American role cannot be a long-term solution. A long-term solution must involve a combination, a consortium of countries in defining, protecting and guaranteeing a definition of statehood for Afghanistan. He suggested, neighbours of Afghanistan should join hands to chart out the future of war-torn country, rather than depend on unilateral US efforts.

India does not have common border with Afghanistan. It is difficult to calculate how the alleged Islamists will harm India. Will the so-called jihadis of Afghanistan swoop on India? Such apprehension is totally ridiculous. Why Kissinger, a hero of diplomacy, didn’t elaborate how India will seriously be affected. India, if really faces so, should it mean that Afghanistan will not be given its sovereign status to determine its affairs. Should the sovereignty of Afghanistan be divided among it neighbouring countries only to save Indian interest? Is Indian interest is more precious or valuable than that of Afghanistan’s sovereign entity? Why he defies the role of the Afghan people? Shouldn’t the Afghan people have the right to decide their own fate to protect their own interest?

Should Afghanistan sacrifice its sovereignty at the cost of Indian interest? How he could think that the neighours of Afghanistan should work out a definition determining the statehood of Afghanistan? What a wonderful theory it is! This theory is contrary to the universal concept of sovereign status of Afghanistan and international norms of non-interference on its internal and external affairs. It is the Afghan people who are the sole authority to decide how they will protect their motherland, what type of system they will adopt and follow. History says, no outside inference under any form will be tolerated by the Afghan people. External interference will only aggravate the situation further. Such move will not only prolong the misery and bloodshed in Afghanistan, but also inflame sanguinary war in the whole region. Kissinger should be smarter in dealing with the technicalities of Afghanistan.

India is not a party to Afghan conflict. India is the parasitic beneficiary of foreign invasion in Afghanistan. It was always with the invaders. For this reason when Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, India took the side of its Moscow mentors. During the whole cold war era India played such an ugly role, as if, it was a Soviet tentacle. India had to pack from Afghanistan when the Soviet soldiers were beaten out of Afghan soil. America, however, for mysterious reason, did not punish India for taking the side in favour of its arch rival Soviet Union.

After the extinction of Soviet Union, astonishing the whole world, India took shelter under American wing. Though India is not a party to US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), it sent its security personnel and RAW operatives and agents in Afghanistan under the cover of reconstructing and rehabilitating its infrastructures. Availing American invasion India made huge business in Afghanistan under the cover of reconstruction of infrastructure, providing medical and humanitarian services and a bit of English language training. India opened more diplomatic missions in Afghanistan than its real requirements, basically to recruit and infiltrate its agents in Afghan society and its surrounding countries. Afghan freedom fighters comprehending the vicious and dubious role of India repeatedly killed the Indians. After these operations and renewal of its relations with the Federation of Russia — the heir of Soviet Union, India has already closed down some of its services in Afghanistan.

It is alleged that India secretly spies for Russian intelligence agencies and plays duel roles in Afghanistan. Outwardly it works for America to squeeze Pakistan and reap maximum benefits from the war; inwardly it fuels the Talibans financially and militarily. India not only supplies arms and explosives to the Talibans, but also infiltrated its former or working soldiers and common nationals in Taliban groups in order to prolong the war. The more the war prolongs the more benefits India will derive and above all, the more Pakistan will remain at bay. It is alleged at the instigation of its mentors in Moscow, India might be involved in Moscow-orchestrated design to ruin America militarily and financially in order to retaliate the defeat of Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Knowledgeable sources allege, Kissinger sided with Indian interest, as India maintains close hobnob with Israel. They also opine Kissinger-like people instigated Bush administration to invade to Muslim countries — Iraq and Afghanistan that virtually ruined America’s economy and degraded its image and creditability and acceptability. The latest theory of Kissinger to involve the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan is to ignite the fire of war in the whole region that will boom the arm business, which is a monopoly of the Jews — the community to which Kissinger belongs to. Other groups believe, as delivering lectures, has emerged as an income generating art, Kissinger might have got huge amount of cash, in exchange of presenting such a keynote paper at the Geneva seminar that entirely severs Indian interest. * (Mohammad Zainal Abedin is a Bangladeshi researcher & journalist). Email: noa@agni.com

Thirty-seven nations are currently represented in the ranks of the ISAF:

NATO Members

Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

Non-NATO Contributors

Albania, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Finland, Macedonia, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland

Who empowered decide, define, the status in fact, instigates India that its interest will seriously theorized toignore the person of

ISAF Troop Contributions

As of February 1, 2010, ISAF included 85,795 from 43 countries, including NATO Allies and non-NATO partners.44

NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen, following a meeting of foreign ministers in December

2009, said he expected additional pledges of at least 5,000 troops to be forthcoming. Since then, a number of new NATO pledges not reflected in the above table have been announced: Albania,

125; Croatia, 40; Czech Republic, 100; Germany, 500; Italy, 1,040; Lithuania, 20; Poland, 680;

Portugal, 120; Romania, 700; Slovakia, 240; Spain, 500; Turkey (N/A); United Kingdom, 1,200.

Non-NATO nations that have made additional commitments are Armenia, 40; Australia, 120;

Finland, 25; Georgia, 923; Macedonia, 80; Sweden, 125; Ukraine, 22. Other nations that have indicated possible contributions are Colombia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Montenegro, and South

Korea. At the same time, however, Canada and the Netherlands will be withdrawing their contingents in 2011 and 2010, respectively. 45

From the outset, NATO has struggled to secure sufficient troop contributions for ISAF. One consideration for potential troop contributors is cost—NATO’s long-standing practice, “costs lie where they fall,” typically means that countries pay their own costs when they contribute troops

to a mission such as Afghanistan. Another consideration is the need for domestic political support.

44 International Security Assistance Force “Placemat” dated October 22, 2009, available at ISAF - International Security Assistance Force - Official Homepage

docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf.

45 Erlanger, Steven. “Europe’s Revolving Door in Afghanistan,” New York Times, December 21, 2009.

----------------------------------
Mohammad Zainal Abedin, USA
E Mail: noa@agni.com

 

[MYSTIC]

Thank you. very nice article.

 

[IND151]

presence of India in Afghanistan will keep pressure on pak.

 

[GOD OF WAR]

well true but as far as northern alliance is concerned and india is considered u are wrong u should know that AFGHANI hate us Pakistani more then these "infidels"(with apologies ) and rightly as we are the responsible for the way these Afghani ppl lived and this hate wont go that easily so for that we need to do some thing very concrete a person should be patriotic but not stupid

sir, u r rite, a person should not be stupid... but I donot think what u r saying has credence. afghans may hate pakistanis for one thing, but historically speaking, Pakistan has stronger links in Afghan territory. keeping the Soviat war and the present conflict in picture. Mullah omer has also stated many times that He has no enmity towards Pakistan (in diplomatic terms means, it means we are close) secondly, The Afghan pashtun will take revenge from anybody who sided up with NA, they will not discriminate as to who helped them build infrastructure in their country. thirdly, Afghan pushtuns hate Tajiks, and they will see to it that they have their vengence for cooperating with US and India.
Once again not being jingonistic, just realistic
Could you substantiate ur statement that "Afghans hate Pakistan and rightly so"?

 

[MYSTIC]

presence of India in Afghanistan will keep pressure on pak.

what pressure? they will always be suspicious of our activities. Their counter would be intensifying their efforts in Bangladesh and Azad Kashmir

 

[MYSTIC]

India should have nothing to do with Afganistan. We should get out the country along with the NATO forces. Why should we clean the mess created by them? Let Pakistan their ally in the war do the cleaning. Let see whether they would make the same mistake as last time and put the Taleban in power again...

 

[The Clarifier]

India should have nothing to do with Afganistan. We should get out the country along with the NATO forces. Why should we clean the mess created by them? Let Pakistan their ally in the war do the cleaning. Let see whether they would make the same mistake as last time and put the Taleban in power again...

Letting us 'clean our own mess' would be the biggest strategic mistake India could ever do...

 

[MYSTIC]

sir, u r rite, a person should not be stupid... but I donot think what u r saying has credence. afghans may hate pakistanis for one thing, but historically speaking, Pakistan has stronger links in Afghan territory. keeping the Soviat war and the present conflict in picture. Mullah omer has also stated many times that He has no enmity towards Pakistan (in diplomatic terms means, it means we are close) secondly, The Afghan pashtun will take revenge from anybody who sided up with NA, they will not discriminate as to who helped them build infrastructure in their country. thirdly, Afghan pushtuns hate Tajiks, and they will see to it that they have their vengence for cooperating with US and India.
Once again not being jingonistic, just realistic
Could you substantiate ur statement that "Afghans hate Pakistan and rightly so"?

Very true. 'Enemy's Enemy is your friend' logic does not apply to Afghanistan. Better let them be.

 

[MYSTIC]

Letting us 'clean our own mess' would be the biggest strategic mistake India could ever do...

Not really. Pakistan supporting the Taliban again would be the biggest mistake Pakistan would ever make. Last time round the world didn't care, this time they will be watching.

 

[MYSTIC]

Did you forget the IC 814 Hijacking?

Pakistani terrorists - ISI - Taliban

Hello Mr. India, are you going to fight the war in Afghanistan? You will be sitting comfortably in your AC room acting as a keyboard warrior while our troops will be fighting and dyeing for no cause. Do you realize how many years it would take to get rid of the Taliban (if at all it is possible). Do you want the Taliban to wage a war against India. Pakistan would be more than happy to help them.

Let the PA breed them or kill them. Its their headache. Let our troops guard our borders. Do not forget that this is not our war.