India: How Credible is its Ballistic Missile Defence?

[foxhound]

Salaam....

India: How Credible is its Ballistic Missile Defence?

Debak Das
Research Intern, NSP, IPCS
e-mail: debak.d@gmail.com
India: How Credible is its Ballistic Missile Defence? by Debak Das


The strategic implications of an operational Ballistic Missile Defence System are grave and potentially dangerous. The DRDO’s successful test of the indigenously built Advanced Air Defence (AAD) interceptor on 23rd November 2012 in a ‘near deployable configuration’ is an interesting development. Its Director-General, V.K. Saraswat, recently announced that New Delhi and Mumbai could be brought under the missile defence shield system that has been successfully tested over the last few months. CNN-IBN reports that the Director of the Missile Defence Programme has stated that the AAD system is ready to be deployed over the Delhi-National Capital Region by 2014.

How credible is India’s missile defence? How is this likely to impact the regional strategic environment in South Asia?

Changing Tracks on Missile Defence: From Nay to Aye
India’s initial resistance to missile defence came from its criticism of the United States’ Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the early 80s. Even in July 2000, the then Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes opined that the US should give up the whole exercise as it would lead to far too many problems in the future. After US President, George W. Bush’s announcement of an American National Missile Defence System, it seemed that the Indian position had changed. This change has been attributed to the fact that Indian thinking about ‘nuclear weapons has always been a mix of power-oriented realism and idealistic restraint.’ (Rajesh Basrur, 2002)

The more natural and logical arguments posited were of course, that the Indian position of vehement opposition to missile defence and space based armament proliferation would not be acceptable to the successful pursuit of the Indo-US nuclear deal, the groundwork for which began in the early 2000s. The increasing pace of the Chinese and Pakistani missile programmes and the rising tensions with the latter in the period of the NDA government, also led to a giving up of the erstwhile policy of opposition to a missile defence shield.

The Missile Defence Shield

Earlier this year, The Hindu reported V.K. Saraswat claiming that incoming ballistic missiles with a range of 2000km could be destroyed with the shield and this capability would be enhanced to meet missiles with a range of 5000km by 2016. This capability was successfully tested at both the endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric levels. The DRDO has also compared this indigenously built system to the US’ Patriot 3 system. By late July, Saraswat had claimed that the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system was ready for induction and that two cities, Mumbai and New Delhi were ready to be put under its defensive shield. At the time, India Today reported that the government was baffled with the activities of the DRDO, which was acting of its own accord in announcing to the world Indian missile defence capabilities.

The 23 November test saw the supersonic interceptor AAD home in on and destroy an incoming modified Prithvi missile at an altitude of 14.7km in the endo-atmospheric stage. The success of this test has been hailed as a major boost to the development of a multi-layered BMD System. With the next test for exo-atmospheric ballistic missile interception scheduled for January, it is important to consider the strategic implications that a BMD shield entails.

Strategic Implications

Any discussion on the ballistic missile defence raises technical questions about the possible success rate of a deployed system. While the odds of an interceptor missile taking out an incoming ballistic missile with multiple warheads are low, the odds of such an interceptor system taking out multiple incoming ballistic missiles (each with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) are even lower. The ‘successful’ tests that were conducted by the DRDO were in fact against the slow moving Prithvi missiles. The DRDO has not even tested them against its own Agni missiles. How such a BMD system would fare against missiles like the Dongfeng-41 with multiple sub-warheads with separate trajectories remains an unanswered question. The Indian BMD system does not even provide an answer to Indian vulnerability to the ‘stealth’ cruise missiles like the Hatf-VII that are possessed by Pakistan.

The lack of systematic policy considerations guiding the Ballistic Missile programme has seen the DRDO act quite hawkish on the score of achieving the capability. But given that this system threatens Pakistan’s first strike capability, it is bound to lead to uncertainty and insecurity on that side of the border. The Indian BMD will thus serve to only accentuate the current missile race in South Asia.

Domestically too, statements assuring BMD capabilities to just two cities will prove to be a major headache to the central government, as selective defence of cities is bound to be contested by other parts of the country, thus possibly arousing domestic turmoil. It seems that missile testing and potentially destabilising hawkish behavior on ballistic missile defence in India has acquired a certain bureaucratic momentum of its own. It is thus important for the government to reign in these programmes. While not compromising on the technological development of Indian defences, the government needs to ensure that these capabilities do not foster insecurity in the region.

 

[IndoUS]

True, that the defense shield is limited, but if that is the case then any BMD in that matter is not 100% sure proof to protect against the a incoming missile threat. The Indian BMD's will work together with other missile defense system and will complement each other to give the best of safety. The threats of missile attack is only from Pakistan and China(though I think even China is not that much of a threat they are more interested in business and the problems we have with them are pretty small). As for Pakistan they are right next door a BMD that is capable of taking out a 2000km BM is more than enough for Pakistan and for stealthy cruise missiles there are other systems that are bought from other countries like Israel and Russia that have the capability to minimize the threat to some degree.

The Indian BMD program is in the initial phase and as picking up speed, so I will give i time there are no real immediate threats from either Pakistan or China that are so pressing that we need BMDs right now.

 

[janon]

Some parts of the article are juvenile fantasy. Here is one gem:

Domestically too, statements assuring BMD capabilities to just two cities will prove to be a major headache to the central government, as selective defence of cities is bound to be contested by other parts of the country, thus possibly arousing domestic turmoil.

Is the author saying that deploying a BMD shield for Delhi and Mumbai is going to create civil war in the country, because the rest of the country will rise up in revolt because they didn't get one? Does he think that India is like a big kindergarten and BMD shields are like bags of chocolate, that kids in one city will protest and make a scene if they don't get it? I can imagine people in many parts of the country rising up against lack of electricity or roads or flowing water, but for lack of ballistic missile defence shields? The author is both underestimating and overestimating the average Indian with this assertion. A unique feat, I must say.

 

[peep]

Some parts of the article are juvenile fantasy. Here is one gem:



Is the author saying that deploying a BMD shield for Delhi and Mumbai is going to create civil war in the country, because the rest of the country will rise up in revolt because they didn't get one? Does he think that India is like a big kindergarten and BMD shields are like bags of chocolate, that kids in one city will protest and make a scene if they don't get it? I can imagine people in many parts of the country rising up against lack of electricity or roads or flowing water, but for lack of ballistic missile defence shields? The author is both underestimating and overestimating the average Indian with this assertion. A unique feat, I must say.

 

[DMLA]

It is from a "peace promoting" organization and that too from an intern! The whole purpose of IPCS is to promote "nuclear disarmament". I stopped reading as soon as I saw the guy is from IPCS.

 

[ILLUMINATO]

In it's current form even Patriot missile defence system won't be able to defend against MIRV carrying Dongfeng-41 .
We move step by step in R&D from one generation of systems to next one and then again next one and so on and so forth .
This article says Indian PAD systems will make Pakistan insecure regarding her first strike capability.Don't he think developing defensive weapons are better for the region and human kind when compared to offensive weapon systems.

 

[ironman1]

In it's current form even Patriot missile defence system won't be able to defend against MIRV carrying Dongfeng-41 .
We move step by step in R&D from one generation of systems to next one and then again next one and so on and so forth .
This article says Indian PAD systems will make Pakistan insecure regarding her first strike capability.Don't he think developing defensive weapons are better for the region and human kind when compared to offensive weapon systems.

ya ! that's why US is working on space based interceptors !

 

[arbit]

Its a half baked analysis. Too many obvious loopholes in the theory.

Firstly context of such a deployment needs to be assessed. Has he done so. No.
Pakistan has gone adventerous when ever it feels overly confident. In simple terms an insecure Pakistan will complaint, threaten and whine. While a confident Pakistan will cross the threshold. Case in point. Kargil.
Hence better this way.
Secondly by what twisted logic one wouldnt want to protect oneself from a stated first strike? We dont have a first use policy, this defence system compensates for it and balances out any rash decision across the border.

Lastly though ingenious, the statement that providing selective cover and leaving out the rest will forment unrest is silly to say the least. He should do some more research on the demography of this country before writing piece such as this, else the chances of moving up from intern are not very bright.

 

[for truth]

Salaam....

India: How Credible is its Ballistic Missile Defence?

Strategic Implications

Any discussion on the ballistic missile defence raises technical questions about the possible success rate of a deployed system. While the odds of an interceptor missile taking out an incoming ballistic missile with multiple warheads are low, the odds of such an interceptor system taking out multiple incoming ballistic missiles (each with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) are even lower. The ‘successful’ tests that were conducted by the DRDO were in fact against the slow moving Prithvi missiles. The DRDO has not even tested them against its own Agni missiles. How such a BMD system would fare against missiles like the Dongfeng-41 with multiple sub-warheads with separate trajectories remains an unanswered question.

this part,the author has completely copy pasted from the another article written by prasun sengupta, the questions about intercepting prithvi and agni were the same questions raised by sengupta. nothing new here.

The Indian BMD system does not even provide an answer to Indian vulnerability to the ‘stealth’ cruise missiles like the Hatf-VII that are possessed by Pakistan.

actually, i haven't heard any system that promises 100% security cover, not even the american patriot nor the Russian s-300 or s-400.

The lack of systematic policy considerations guiding the Ballistic Missile programme has seen the DRDO act quite hawkish on the score of achieving the capability. But given that this system threatens Pakistan’s first strike capability, it is bound to lead to uncertainty and insecurity on that side of the border. The Indian BMD will thus serve to only accentuate the current missile race in South Asia.

in other words, the onus will be on Pakistan, we can push Pakistan in giving a nuclear response, and than launch our own multiple nuclear weapons, which can be justified as a retaliation.

Domestically too, statements assuring BMD capabilities to just two cities will prove to be a major headache to the central government, as selective defence of cities is bound to be contested by other parts of the country, thus possibly arousing domestic turmoil. It seems that missile testing and potentially destabilising hawkish behavior on ballistic missile defence in India has acquired a certain bureaucratic momentum of its own. It is thus important for the government to reign in these programmes. While not compromising on the technological development of Indian defences, the government needs to ensure that these capabilities do not foster insecurity in the region.

utter BS.

to sum up all, there are only two operational BMD's capable against defending the ICBM'S, the Russian A-35 anti-ballistic missile system and the U.S. Ground-Based Mid course Defense, and there are many serious questions even regarding these systems.
none of the BMD's in operation are 100% reliable.

 

[hari sud]

In this discussion above, do not get into too many technicalities.

If the enemy fired six nuclear missiles at Delhi and four of them were shot down by missile defence and two hit Delhi inaccurately then missile defence job is done.

Imagine if there is no missile defence.

Ask this question from the enemy who has no missile defence. Each and every Indian missile will hit the target.

Guess who come out ahead, although in a nuclear war there would be no winner but only one comes out ahead and survives.