who told you that Thorium reactors do not produce plutonium ?
For your benefit I am posting it again ....
Implications of Fast Breeder Reactor Programme to Indian capability to produce Weapon Grade Plutonium
Do you even have any idea what great strategic significance the FBR programme holds for our plutonium stockpile ???
Following post will help you understand why Atomic Energy Commission is steaming ahead with FBR programme .
it has dual impact on India's military nuclear programme ....by using Thorium as primary fuel ...it leaves our Uranium deposits exclusively for weapon production ....besides it generates Plutonium as "by-product " which is by far most favored "fissile material " for weapons ....
This is the reason why our fast breeder Reactors are not subjected to IAEA safeguards purview ...given its strategic importance
For detail analysis please see following amazing Presentation
http://www.princeton.edu/~aglaser/talk2006_princeton.pdf
As you see as per the figures quoted in this particular presentation, India's capacity to generate weapon grade Plutonium will surge to 150 kg /year as compared to Pakistans's capacity to generate 10-15 kg /year after completion of Khushab-2 !!!
That translates to 10-15 times enhanced capacity vis a vis Pakistan !!!
And as you shall see this is based on Single FBR that is about to go critical early next year ....India plans to build 6 FBRs in near future ....that will increase the weapon grade plutonium by another 6 fold ....!!!
Weapon-Grade Plutonium Production Potential in the Indian Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor
Abstract :
India is building a 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, which is scheduled to be operational by 2010. India has refused to accept international safeguards on this facility, raising concerns that the plutonium produced in its uranium blankets might be used to make nuclear weapons. Based on neutronics calculations for a detailed three-dimensional model of the reactor, we estimate that up to 140 kg of weapon-grade plutonium could be produced with this facility each year. This article shows how India's large stockpile of separated reactor-grade plutonium from its unsafeguarded spent heavy-water reactor fuel could serve as makeup fuel to allow such diversion of the weapon-grade plutonium from the blankets of the fast breeder reactor. We describe and assess the most plausible refueling strategies for producing weapon-grade plutonium in this way.
DOI:10.1080/08929880701609154 Alexander Glasera & M. V. Ramana
Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives
Volume 15, Issue 2, 2007 pages 85-105