Dont go by the responses of some young posters here ...
hate is not our ideology ..it is yours ....
India can promote growth in region
- Thread starter fd24
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hate is not our ideology ..it is yours ....
Listen mate stop baiting each other. I didnt put this thread up so that people could come and troll. I agree with the thread India can contribute to the neighbourhood etc
---------- Post added at 11:26 PM ---------- Previous post was at 11:24 PM ----------
Do any of you think what kashmiris want. Most of you here remind me of my 3 year old son who who wants the toy his brother has even though he dont really want it
I just wish peace and not a single more death be it pakistani kashmiri or indian on this issue.
rollindays
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First of all, this is not the original copy of the instrument of accession. India claims it has lost the original copy. But the truth is, there was no such thing as the Instrument of Accession, & it is just a concoction by the Indian government to get a validity for capturing Kashmir. Why should Pakistan pull out its troops when India has forcefully occupied the region?
http://www.kashmir360.com/index.php/kashmir_issues/3031.html
http://www.timesofsrinagar.com/article-of-accession/
How come my posts have been totally non baiting and on topic and look at yours
ashokdeiva
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You need not pull out and we are not going to let you move forward. There will always be a stalemate.
Both spending millions of rupees at the Siachin and Sir cree saying that both India and Pakistan are the only stipid countries to tell the world that we are fighting each other at the highest battle ground.
Gautam
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First you decide what you want to do. You asked for the accession letter, and when I presented it, you wanna deny it? If you wanted to deny it then why did you ask for it in the first place? Grow up man.
What kind of source you came up with man? Read the letter again from the link that i gave you. You can even download the picture.
rollindays
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I read it, it's not an original copy, it's been concocted by the Indian government. The original copy of the article of accession has been 'lost' according to the Indian government, as it was never submitted to the UN or anywhere else during the ongoing dispute of India & Pakistan over Kashmir.
Times of Srinagar | Article of Accession
---------- Post added at 11:53 PM ---------- Previous post was at 11:51 PM ----------
I asked for the original copy. It's not an original copy. The original copy was never sent to the UN or anyone in the past from 1947 during the dispute between India & Pakistan, because there was no instrument of accession. It has been concocted by the Indian government.
Gautam
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Wow. I would love to believe you if you could come up with some good source and quote any official statement from Indian government or any other government exept yours on that.
Till then you can read the one that I gave you.
rollindays
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Logical fallacies in India's concocted instrument of accession:
THE INDIAN CLAIM TO JAMMU AND KASHMIR - A REAPPRAISAL:
by Alistair Lamb
The formal overt Indian intervention in the internal affairs of the State of Jammu and Kashmir began on about 9.00 a.m. on 27 October 1947, when Indian troops started landing at Srinagar airfield. India has officially dated the commencement of its claim that the State was part of Indian sovereign territory to a few hours earlier, at some point in the afternoon or evening of 26 October. From their arrival on 27 October 1947 to the present day, Indian troops have continued to occupy a large proportion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir despite the increasingly manifest opposition of a majority of the population to their presence. To critics of India’s position and actions in the State of Jammu and Kashmir the Government of New Delhi has consistently declared that the State of Jammu and Kashmir lies entirely within the sphere of internal Indian policy. Do the facts support the Indian contention in this respect?
The State of Jammu and Kashmir was a Princely State within the British Indian Empire. By the rules of the British transfer of power in Indian subcontinent in 1947 the Ruler of the State, Maharajah Sir Hari Singh, with the departure of the British and the lapsing of Paramountcy (as the relationship between State and British Crown was termed), could opt to join either India or Pakistan or, by doing nothing, become from 15 August 1947 the Ruler of an independent polity. The choice was the Ruler’s and his alone: there was no provision for popular consultation in the Indian Princely States during the final days of the British Raj. On 15th August 1947, by default, the State of Jammu and Kashmir became independent.
India maintains that this period of independence, the existence of which it has never challenged effectively, came to an end on 26/27 October as the result of two pairs of closely related transactions, which we must now examine. They are:
(a) an Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India which the Maharajah is alleged to have signed on 26 October 1947, and;
(b) the acceptance of this Instrument by the Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten, on 27 October 1947; plus
(c) a letter from the Maharajah to Lord Mountbatten, dated 26 October 1947, in which Indian military aid is sought in return for accession to India (on terms stated in an allegedly enclosed Instrument) and the appointment of Sheikh Abdullah to head an Interim Government of the State; and
(d) a letter from Lord Mountbatten to the Maharajah, dated 27 October 1947, acknowledging the above and noting that, once the affairs of the State have been settled and law and order is restored, “the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people.”
In both pairs of documents it will be noted that the date of the communication from the Maharajah, be it the alleged Instrument of Accession or the letter to Lord Mountbatten, is given as 26 October 1947, that is to say before the Indian troops actually began overtly to intervene in the State’s affairs on the morning of 27 October 1947. It has been said that Lord Mountbatten insisted on the Maharajah’s signature as a precondition for his approval of Indian intervention in the affairs of what would otherwise be an independent State.
The date, 26 October 1947, has hitherto been accepted as true by virtually all observers, be they sympathetic or hostile to the Indian case. It is to be found in an official communication by Lord Mountbatten, as Governor General of Pakistan, on 1 November 1947; and it is repeated in the White paper on Jammu and Kashmir which the Government of India laid before the Indian Parliament in March 1948. Pakistani diplomats have never challenged it. Recent research, however, has demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that the date is false. This fact emerges from the archives, and it is also quite clear from such sources as the memoirs of the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir at the time, Mehr Chand Mahajan, and the recently published correspondence of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister. Circumstantial accounts of the events of 26 October 1947, notably that of V.P Menon (in his The Integration of the Indian States, London 1965), who said he was actually present when the Maharajah signed, are simply not true.
It is now absolutely clear that the two documents (a) the Instrument of Accession, and (c) the letter to Lord Mountbatten, could not possibly have been signed by the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir on 26 October 1947. The earliest possible time and date for their signature would have to be the afternoon of 27 October 1947. During 26 October 1947 the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir was travelling by road from Srinagar to Jammu. His Prime Minister, M.C. Mahajan, who was negotiating with the Government of India, and the senior Indian official concerned in State matters, V.P. Menon, were still in New Delhi where they remained overnight, and where their presence was noted by many observers. There was no communication of any sort between New Delhi and the traveling Maharajah. Menon and Mahajan set out by air from New Delhi to Jammu at about 10.00 a.m. on 27 October, and the Maharajah learned from them for the first time the result of his Prime Minister’s negotiations in New Delhi in the early afternoon of that day.
The key point, of course, a has already been noted above, is that it is now obvious that these documents could only have been signed after the overt Indian intervention in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. When the Indian troops arrived at Srinagar air field, that State was still independent. Any agreements favourable to India signed after such intervention cannot escape the charge of having been produced under duress. It was, one presumes, to escape just such a charge that the false date 26 October 1947 was assigned to these two documents. The deliberately distorted account of that very senior Indian official, V.P. Menon, to which reference has already been made, was no doubt executed for the same end. Falsification of such a fundamental element as date of signature, however, once established, can only cast grave doubt over the validity of the document as a whole .
An examination of the transactions behind these four documents in the light of the new evidence produces a number of other serious doubts. It is clear, for example, that in the case of (c) and (d), the exchange of letters between the Maharajah and Lord Mountbatten, Lord Mountbatten’s reply must antedate the letter to which it is an answer unless, as seems more than probable, both were drafted by the Government of India before being taken up to Jammu on 27 October 1947 (by V.P. Menon and Jammu and Kashmir Prime Minister M.C. Mahajan, whose movements, incidentally, are correctly reported in the London Times of 28 October 1947) after the arrival of the Indian troops at Srinagar airfield. The case is very strong, therefore, that document (c), the Maharajah’s letter to Lord Mountbatten, was dictated to the Maharajah.
Documents (c) and (d) were published by the Government of India on 28 October 1947. The far more important document (a), the alleged Instrument of Accession, was not published until many years later, if at all. It was not communicated to Pakistan at the outset of the overt Indian intervention in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, nor was it presented in facsimile to the United Nations in early 1948 as part of the initial Indian reference to the Security Council. The 1948 White Paper in which the Government of India set out its formal case in respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, does not contain the Instrument of Accession as claimed to have been signed by the Maharajah: instead, it reproduces an unsigned from of Accession such as, it is imposed, the Maharajah might have signed. To date no satisfactory original of this Instrument as signed by the Maharajah ever did sign an Instrument of Accession. There are, indeed, grounds for suspecting that he did no such thing. The Instrument of Accession referred to in document (c); a letter which as we have seen was probably drafted by Indian officials prior to being shown to the Maharajah, may never have existed, and can hardly have existed when the letter was being prepared.
Even if there had been an Instrument of Accession, then if it followed the form indicated in the unsigned example of such an Instrument published in the Indian 1948 White Paper it would have been extremely restrictive in the rights conferred upon the Government of India. All that were in fact transferred from the State to the Government of India by such an Instrument were the powers over Defence, Foreign Relations and certain aspects of Communications. Virtually all else was left with the State Government. Thanks to Article 370 of the Indian Constitution of January 1950 (which, unlike much else relating to the former Princely States, has survived to some significant degree in current Indian constitution theory, if not in practice), the State of Jammu and Kashmir was accorded a degree of autonomy which does not sit at all comfortably with the current authoritarian Indian administration of those parts of the State which it holds.
Not only would such an Instrument have been restrictive, but also by virtue of the provisions, of (d), Lord Mountbatten’s letter to the Maharajah dated 27 October 1947, it would have been conditional. Lord Mountbatten, as Governor-General of India, made it clear that the State of Jammu and Kashmir would only be incorporated permanently within the Indian fold after approval as a result of some form of reference to the people, a procedure which soon (with United Nations participation) became defined as a fair and free plebiscite . India has never permitted such a reference to the people to be made.
Why would the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir not have signed an Instrument of Accession? The answer lies in the complex course of events of August, September and October 1947 emerged. The Maharajah, confronted with growing internal disorder (including a full scale rebellion in the Poonch region of the State), sought Indian military help without, it at all possible, surrendering his own independence. The Government of India delayed assisting him in the hope that in despair he would accede to India before any Indian actions had to be taken. In the event, India had to move first. Having secured what he wanted, Indian military assistance, the Maharajah would naturally have wished to avoid paying the price of the surrender of his independence by signing any instrument which he could possibly avoid signing. From the Afternoon of 27 October 1947 onwards a smoke screen conceals both the details and the immediate outcome of this struggle of wills between the Government of India and the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir. To judge from the 1948 White Paper an Instrument of accession may not have been signed by March 1948, by which time the Indian case for sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir was already being argued before the United Nations.
The patently false dates of documents (a) and (c) alter fundamentally the nature of the overt Indian intervention in Jammu and Kashmir on 27 October 1947. India was not defending its own but intervening in a foreign State. There can be no reasonable doubt that had Pakistan been aware of this falsification of the record it would have argued very differently in international for from the outset of the dispute; and had the United Nations understood the true chronology it would have listened with for less sympathy to arguments presented to it by successive Indian representatives. Given the facts as they are now known, it may well be that an impartial international tribunal would decided that India had no right at all to be in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
THE INDIAN CLAIM TO JAMMU AND KASHMIR - A REAPPRAISAL:
by Alistair Lamb
The formal overt Indian intervention in the internal affairs of the State of Jammu and Kashmir began on about 9.00 a.m. on 27 October 1947, when Indian troops started landing at Srinagar airfield. India has officially dated the commencement of its claim that the State was part of Indian sovereign territory to a few hours earlier, at some point in the afternoon or evening of 26 October. From their arrival on 27 October 1947 to the present day, Indian troops have continued to occupy a large proportion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir despite the increasingly manifest opposition of a majority of the population to their presence. To critics of India’s position and actions in the State of Jammu and Kashmir the Government of New Delhi has consistently declared that the State of Jammu and Kashmir lies entirely within the sphere of internal Indian policy. Do the facts support the Indian contention in this respect?
The State of Jammu and Kashmir was a Princely State within the British Indian Empire. By the rules of the British transfer of power in Indian subcontinent in 1947 the Ruler of the State, Maharajah Sir Hari Singh, with the departure of the British and the lapsing of Paramountcy (as the relationship between State and British Crown was termed), could opt to join either India or Pakistan or, by doing nothing, become from 15 August 1947 the Ruler of an independent polity. The choice was the Ruler’s and his alone: there was no provision for popular consultation in the Indian Princely States during the final days of the British Raj. On 15th August 1947, by default, the State of Jammu and Kashmir became independent.
India maintains that this period of independence, the existence of which it has never challenged effectively, came to an end on 26/27 October as the result of two pairs of closely related transactions, which we must now examine. They are:
(a) an Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India which the Maharajah is alleged to have signed on 26 October 1947, and;
(b) the acceptance of this Instrument by the Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten, on 27 October 1947; plus
(c) a letter from the Maharajah to Lord Mountbatten, dated 26 October 1947, in which Indian military aid is sought in return for accession to India (on terms stated in an allegedly enclosed Instrument) and the appointment of Sheikh Abdullah to head an Interim Government of the State; and
(d) a letter from Lord Mountbatten to the Maharajah, dated 27 October 1947, acknowledging the above and noting that, once the affairs of the State have been settled and law and order is restored, “the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people.”
In both pairs of documents it will be noted that the date of the communication from the Maharajah, be it the alleged Instrument of Accession or the letter to Lord Mountbatten, is given as 26 October 1947, that is to say before the Indian troops actually began overtly to intervene in the State’s affairs on the morning of 27 October 1947. It has been said that Lord Mountbatten insisted on the Maharajah’s signature as a precondition for his approval of Indian intervention in the affairs of what would otherwise be an independent State.
The date, 26 October 1947, has hitherto been accepted as true by virtually all observers, be they sympathetic or hostile to the Indian case. It is to be found in an official communication by Lord Mountbatten, as Governor General of Pakistan, on 1 November 1947; and it is repeated in the White paper on Jammu and Kashmir which the Government of India laid before the Indian Parliament in March 1948. Pakistani diplomats have never challenged it. Recent research, however, has demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt that the date is false. This fact emerges from the archives, and it is also quite clear from such sources as the memoirs of the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir at the time, Mehr Chand Mahajan, and the recently published correspondence of Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister. Circumstantial accounts of the events of 26 October 1947, notably that of V.P Menon (in his The Integration of the Indian States, London 1965), who said he was actually present when the Maharajah signed, are simply not true.
It is now absolutely clear that the two documents (a) the Instrument of Accession, and (c) the letter to Lord Mountbatten, could not possibly have been signed by the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir on 26 October 1947. The earliest possible time and date for their signature would have to be the afternoon of 27 October 1947. During 26 October 1947 the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir was travelling by road from Srinagar to Jammu. His Prime Minister, M.C. Mahajan, who was negotiating with the Government of India, and the senior Indian official concerned in State matters, V.P. Menon, were still in New Delhi where they remained overnight, and where their presence was noted by many observers. There was no communication of any sort between New Delhi and the traveling Maharajah. Menon and Mahajan set out by air from New Delhi to Jammu at about 10.00 a.m. on 27 October, and the Maharajah learned from them for the first time the result of his Prime Minister’s negotiations in New Delhi in the early afternoon of that day.
The key point, of course, a has already been noted above, is that it is now obvious that these documents could only have been signed after the overt Indian intervention in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. When the Indian troops arrived at Srinagar air field, that State was still independent. Any agreements favourable to India signed after such intervention cannot escape the charge of having been produced under duress. It was, one presumes, to escape just such a charge that the false date 26 October 1947 was assigned to these two documents. The deliberately distorted account of that very senior Indian official, V.P. Menon, to which reference has already been made, was no doubt executed for the same end. Falsification of such a fundamental element as date of signature, however, once established, can only cast grave doubt over the validity of the document as a whole .
An examination of the transactions behind these four documents in the light of the new evidence produces a number of other serious doubts. It is clear, for example, that in the case of (c) and (d), the exchange of letters between the Maharajah and Lord Mountbatten, Lord Mountbatten’s reply must antedate the letter to which it is an answer unless, as seems more than probable, both were drafted by the Government of India before being taken up to Jammu on 27 October 1947 (by V.P. Menon and Jammu and Kashmir Prime Minister M.C. Mahajan, whose movements, incidentally, are correctly reported in the London Times of 28 October 1947) after the arrival of the Indian troops at Srinagar airfield. The case is very strong, therefore, that document (c), the Maharajah’s letter to Lord Mountbatten, was dictated to the Maharajah.
Documents (c) and (d) were published by the Government of India on 28 October 1947. The far more important document (a), the alleged Instrument of Accession, was not published until many years later, if at all. It was not communicated to Pakistan at the outset of the overt Indian intervention in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, nor was it presented in facsimile to the United Nations in early 1948 as part of the initial Indian reference to the Security Council. The 1948 White Paper in which the Government of India set out its formal case in respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, does not contain the Instrument of Accession as claimed to have been signed by the Maharajah: instead, it reproduces an unsigned from of Accession such as, it is imposed, the Maharajah might have signed. To date no satisfactory original of this Instrument as signed by the Maharajah ever did sign an Instrument of Accession. There are, indeed, grounds for suspecting that he did no such thing. The Instrument of Accession referred to in document (c); a letter which as we have seen was probably drafted by Indian officials prior to being shown to the Maharajah, may never have existed, and can hardly have existed when the letter was being prepared.
Even if there had been an Instrument of Accession, then if it followed the form indicated in the unsigned example of such an Instrument published in the Indian 1948 White Paper it would have been extremely restrictive in the rights conferred upon the Government of India. All that were in fact transferred from the State to the Government of India by such an Instrument were the powers over Defence, Foreign Relations and certain aspects of Communications. Virtually all else was left with the State Government. Thanks to Article 370 of the Indian Constitution of January 1950 (which, unlike much else relating to the former Princely States, has survived to some significant degree in current Indian constitution theory, if not in practice), the State of Jammu and Kashmir was accorded a degree of autonomy which does not sit at all comfortably with the current authoritarian Indian administration of those parts of the State which it holds.
Not only would such an Instrument have been restrictive, but also by virtue of the provisions, of (d), Lord Mountbatten’s letter to the Maharajah dated 27 October 1947, it would have been conditional. Lord Mountbatten, as Governor-General of India, made it clear that the State of Jammu and Kashmir would only be incorporated permanently within the Indian fold after approval as a result of some form of reference to the people, a procedure which soon (with United Nations participation) became defined as a fair and free plebiscite . India has never permitted such a reference to the people to be made.
Why would the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir not have signed an Instrument of Accession? The answer lies in the complex course of events of August, September and October 1947 emerged. The Maharajah, confronted with growing internal disorder (including a full scale rebellion in the Poonch region of the State), sought Indian military help without, it at all possible, surrendering his own independence. The Government of India delayed assisting him in the hope that in despair he would accede to India before any Indian actions had to be taken. In the event, India had to move first. Having secured what he wanted, Indian military assistance, the Maharajah would naturally have wished to avoid paying the price of the surrender of his independence by signing any instrument which he could possibly avoid signing. From the Afternoon of 27 October 1947 onwards a smoke screen conceals both the details and the immediate outcome of this struggle of wills between the Government of India and the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir. To judge from the 1948 White Paper an Instrument of accession may not have been signed by March 1948, by which time the Indian case for sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir was already being argued before the United Nations.
The patently false dates of documents (a) and (c) alter fundamentally the nature of the overt Indian intervention in Jammu and Kashmir on 27 October 1947. India was not defending its own but intervening in a foreign State. There can be no reasonable doubt that had Pakistan been aware of this falsification of the record it would have argued very differently in international for from the outset of the dispute; and had the United Nations understood the true chronology it would have listened with for less sympathy to arguments presented to it by successive Indian representatives. Given the facts as they are now known, it may well be that an impartial international tribunal would decided that India had no right at all to be in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Gautam
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I asked you to give me an official statement from any government except Pakistan, which says this. But you came up with mere speculations and theories.
I showed you a picture of the instrument which you wanna deny but you expect people to believe some theories. Good going.
I showed you a picture of the instrument which you wanna deny but you expect people to believe some theories. Good going.
Subramanian
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forget about kashmir,thats already a stalemate.
On topic,india can obviously aid growth.India has a lot of capital and there many industries in Pakistan and Bangladesh which can gain from capital mobility and cheaper capital and lower cost and more competitiveness and profitability but it is not easy at all.
On topic,india can obviously aid growth.India has a lot of capital and there many industries in Pakistan and Bangladesh which can gain from capital mobility and cheaper capital and lower cost and more competitiveness and profitability but it is not easy at all.
Gautam
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rollindays,
I know you're performing your best Google search ability to support your claim and to find a statement from Indian government, but let me save you some time here.. there isn't anything that you're looking for.
I would request all of you guys to stop believing in all the theories that you come across. Come to the real world man. You're looking at the picture and deny it, and you want me to believe your theories?
All I wanted to say was that we never started any war because someone accused India which is a lie....
Good night rollindays.. see you around..
I know you're performing your best Google search ability to support your claim and to find a statement from Indian government, but let me save you some time here.. there isn't anything that you're looking for.
I would request all of you guys to stop believing in all the theories that you come across. Come to the real world man. You're looking at the picture and deny it, and you want me to believe your theories?
All I wanted to say was that we never started any war because someone accused India which is a lie....
Good night rollindays.. see you around..
rollindays
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The UN or no international agency accepts this as the original document, because the document was never submitted to the UN or any other international agency after 1947, & only appeared about 10-15 years ago, a concoction by the Indian government. The dates on this forged document are wrong too.
Jade
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Would it mean that India can go into Pakistan side of Kashmir and attack the militant camps?
Why dont you guys try and and see.
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