ADT
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- Mar 3, 2010
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Recommendations
Under the July 18, 2005 joint statement, the U.S. and India committed themselves to “build closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena”. This does not require, nor should it encourage, U.S. cooperation on India’s ICBM program directly or indirectly. In fact, the U.S. has already taken a step in the right direction by offering to launch Indian astronauts in upcoming space shuttle missions and to involve them to the fullest extent in the International Space Station.
The U.S. should do more to encourage India to launch its satellites and science packages on U.S. and foreign launchers by making these launches more affordable. The U.S. also should be forthcoming in offering India access, as appropriate, to the benefits of U.S.
satellite programs -- including communications, earth resource observation, and exploration of the cosmos.
India, in fact, has some of the world’s best astrophysicists and cosmologists. It is in our interest, as well as the world’s, that we welcome these Indian experts into the search for basic answers about the universe. We should make the data from the Hubble telescope and similar systems available to Indian scientists and encourage them to become full partners in its analysis.
On the other hand, there are some critical cautions to be observed.
1) Do not be naive about the nature of India’s program.
After more than two decades of reports about India’s interest in an ICBM -- including reports from Russia, statements on India’s ICBM capability by the U.S. intelligence community, and the firing of an Indian official after he publicly described the Surya program -- there should be no illusions. The reports consistently state that India’s ICBM
will be derived from its space launch vehicle technology.
o The U.S. should not believe that it is possible to separate India’s “civilian” space launch program -- the incubator of its long-range missiles -- from India’s military program.
o There should be no illusions about the target of the ICBM. It is the United States -- to protect India from the theoretical possibility of “high-tech aggression”.
o The U.S. intelligence community’s semi-annual unclassified reporting toCongress on India’s nuclear and missile programs was discontinued after April 2003. This reporting should be resumed.
# 2) Do not assist India’s space launch programs.
The U.S. should not cooperate either with India’s space launches or with satellites that India will launch. India hopes that satellite launches will earn revenues that will accelerate its space program -- including rocket development. U.S. payloads for Indian launches -- such as the envisioned cooperative lunar project -- risk technology transfer
(see recommendation #3) and invite other nations to be less restrained in their use of Indian launches.
o The U.S. should resume discouraging other nations from using Indian launches, while encouraging India to resume the practice of launching satellites on other nations’ space launch vehicles.
o Given the frequent reports of Russian cryogenic rockets being used in the Surya, the U.S. should work with Russia to ensure that Russian space cooperation with India does not undercut U.S. restraint.
o Because there is no meaningful distinction between India’s civilian and military rocket programs, the U.S. should explicitly or de facto place ISRO back on the “entities” list of destinations that require export licenses.
o Congress should insist that the U.S. explain its “red lines” regarding space cooperation with India. If these lines are not drawn tightly enough, Congress should intervene.
3) Review carefully any cooperation with India’s satellite programs.
India is reportedly developing multiple nuclear warheads for its long-range missiles. If India develops an ICBM, the next step will be to develop countermeasures to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. Certain satellite technologies can help India with both of these developments.
o The U.S. should review its satellite cooperation to ensure that it does not aid India inappropriately in the technologies of dispensing or orienting spacecraft, of automated deployment of structures in space, or of other operations that would materially contribute to multiple warheads or countermeasures against missile defenses.
4) Stop using cooperation in dangerous technologies as diplomatic baubles.
India is the current example of a broader, disfunctional tendency in bilateral relations to display trust and friendship by opening up the most dangerous forms of cooperation. The U.S. should not fall further into this trap with India -- or with any other nation.
o India needs many other forms of economic and military cooperation more than it needs nuclear and space technology. If India insists on focusing technology cooperation in these areas, the U.S. should take it as a red flag.
o The U.S. removal of technology sanctions imposed after India’s 1998 nuclear tests was an adequate -- and perhaps excessive -- display of friendship. Further technology cooperation should be limited to areas that do not contribute to nuclear weapons or their means of delivery.
Conclusion
The target of an Indian ICBM would be the United States. The technology of an Indian ICBM would be that of a space launch vehicle -- either directly via the PSLV or indirectly via the Agni, which is based on India’s SLV-3. The U.S. should not facilitate the acquisition or improvement of that technology directly or indirectly In this matter, U.S. clarity and restraint are what the world -- and India -- need.
The U.S. needs to divert from the present “glide path” and reorient itself and India onto a more productive course of cooperation. It would be a cruel irony if, in the hope of becoming strategic partners, we became each other’s strategic targets.
http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/060207SpeierICBM.pdf
Under the July 18, 2005 joint statement, the U.S. and India committed themselves to “build closer ties in space exploration, satellite navigation and launch, and in the commercial space arena”. This does not require, nor should it encourage, U.S. cooperation on India’s ICBM program directly or indirectly. In fact, the U.S. has already taken a step in the right direction by offering to launch Indian astronauts in upcoming space shuttle missions and to involve them to the fullest extent in the International Space Station.
The U.S. should do more to encourage India to launch its satellites and science packages on U.S. and foreign launchers by making these launches more affordable. The U.S. also should be forthcoming in offering India access, as appropriate, to the benefits of U.S.
satellite programs -- including communications, earth resource observation, and exploration of the cosmos.
India, in fact, has some of the world’s best astrophysicists and cosmologists. It is in our interest, as well as the world’s, that we welcome these Indian experts into the search for basic answers about the universe. We should make the data from the Hubble telescope and similar systems available to Indian scientists and encourage them to become full partners in its analysis.
On the other hand, there are some critical cautions to be observed.
1) Do not be naive about the nature of India’s program.
After more than two decades of reports about India’s interest in an ICBM -- including reports from Russia, statements on India’s ICBM capability by the U.S. intelligence community, and the firing of an Indian official after he publicly described the Surya program -- there should be no illusions. The reports consistently state that India’s ICBM
will be derived from its space launch vehicle technology.
o The U.S. should not believe that it is possible to separate India’s “civilian” space launch program -- the incubator of its long-range missiles -- from India’s military program.
o There should be no illusions about the target of the ICBM. It is the United States -- to protect India from the theoretical possibility of “high-tech aggression”.
o The U.S. intelligence community’s semi-annual unclassified reporting toCongress on India’s nuclear and missile programs was discontinued after April 2003. This reporting should be resumed.
# 2) Do not assist India’s space launch programs.
The U.S. should not cooperate either with India’s space launches or with satellites that India will launch. India hopes that satellite launches will earn revenues that will accelerate its space program -- including rocket development. U.S. payloads for Indian launches -- such as the envisioned cooperative lunar project -- risk technology transfer
(see recommendation #3) and invite other nations to be less restrained in their use of Indian launches.
o The U.S. should resume discouraging other nations from using Indian launches, while encouraging India to resume the practice of launching satellites on other nations’ space launch vehicles.
o Given the frequent reports of Russian cryogenic rockets being used in the Surya, the U.S. should work with Russia to ensure that Russian space cooperation with India does not undercut U.S. restraint.
o Because there is no meaningful distinction between India’s civilian and military rocket programs, the U.S. should explicitly or de facto place ISRO back on the “entities” list of destinations that require export licenses.
o Congress should insist that the U.S. explain its “red lines” regarding space cooperation with India. If these lines are not drawn tightly enough, Congress should intervene.
3) Review carefully any cooperation with India’s satellite programs.
India is reportedly developing multiple nuclear warheads for its long-range missiles. If India develops an ICBM, the next step will be to develop countermeasures to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. Certain satellite technologies can help India with both of these developments.
o The U.S. should review its satellite cooperation to ensure that it does not aid India inappropriately in the technologies of dispensing or orienting spacecraft, of automated deployment of structures in space, or of other operations that would materially contribute to multiple warheads or countermeasures against missile defenses.
4) Stop using cooperation in dangerous technologies as diplomatic baubles.
India is the current example of a broader, disfunctional tendency in bilateral relations to display trust and friendship by opening up the most dangerous forms of cooperation. The U.S. should not fall further into this trap with India -- or with any other nation.
o India needs many other forms of economic and military cooperation more than it needs nuclear and space technology. If India insists on focusing technology cooperation in these areas, the U.S. should take it as a red flag.
o The U.S. removal of technology sanctions imposed after India’s 1998 nuclear tests was an adequate -- and perhaps excessive -- display of friendship. Further technology cooperation should be limited to areas that do not contribute to nuclear weapons or their means of delivery.
Conclusion
The target of an Indian ICBM would be the United States. The technology of an Indian ICBM would be that of a space launch vehicle -- either directly via the PSLV or indirectly via the Agni, which is based on India’s SLV-3. The U.S. should not facilitate the acquisition or improvement of that technology directly or indirectly In this matter, U.S. clarity and restraint are what the world -- and India -- need.
The U.S. needs to divert from the present “glide path” and reorient itself and India onto a more productive course of cooperation. It would be a cruel irony if, in the hope of becoming strategic partners, we became each other’s strategic targets.
http://www.npec-web.org/Essays/060207SpeierICBM.pdf
