Originally posted by A.Rahman@Mar 29 2006, 08:15 AM
thank u, now add it to my rep :?:
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Lets bargain, I give you one you give me two?
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Originally posted by A.Rahman@Mar 29 2006, 08:15 AM
thank u, now add it to my rep :?:
[post=8048]Quoted post[/post]
Originally posted by A.Rahman@Mar 29 2006, 09:39 AM
There is nothing as Islamic bomb, its a term invented by Islamophobic people.
muslim scholars invented theories and Algebra, why isnt its called "Islamic theorm" or "Muslim maths" ?
Its pretty obvious that media creates fear about Islam in hearts of people by using terms like "Islamic bomb"
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Obstacles to Indo-US N-deal
By Najmuddin A. Shaikh
ACTING with remarkable speed, the Bush administration has submitted to Congress its proposals for changes in American law that would be required to give effect to the agreement that President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reached in New Delhi on March 1. It has also brought the proposal to a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliersââ¬â¢ Group so that this group of countries with the potential to export nuclear technology can make similar amendments in the guidelines they currently use to govern the export of nuclear and dual-use equipment and technology.
A propaganda offensive has also been launched to highlight the benefits of the agreement and to rebut the charge that the agreement would cause the unravelling of the non-proliferation regime created under the leadership of the US over the past decades, and triggered, ironically, by the Indian testing of a nuclear device in 1974. As an opening gambit in the long negotiations with Congress, the administration has laid down the marker, to its great disadvantage ââ¬â though it would be pleasing to the Indians ââ¬â that the agreement must be accepted as it stands since a renegotiation would lead to its unravelling.
Currently, American law provides that the president can exempt any country from the prohibition on exports of nuclear technology and equipment and, if the country is a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) the exemption will take effect if Congress does not pass a joint resolution denying the exemption within 90 days. For countries that are not signatories of the NPT however, Congress has to approve the exemption and can take as long as it wishes to do so.
The changes that the administration has now proposed would exempt India and treat it as though it was a NPT signatory so that the deal can only be blocked if Congress is able to muster the will to pass a joint resolution within 90 days.
In effect, this would mean that Congress would have virtually no oversight and no ability to influence the terms and conditions of the proposed transfer. Apart from the non-proliferation lobby in Congress ââ¬â there are many influential lawmakers in this group ââ¬â other legislators are going to be concerned about the infringement on congressional oversight rights and obligations that the vesting of such power in the president would represent.
The more serious issue will be the concerns of the non-proliferators. While the deal was being negotiated many in Congress believed that the bottom line of the American administration would be that the deal would minimize Indiaââ¬â¢s ability to accumulate the material required for manufacturing nuclear weapons. In other words, that most of Indiaââ¬â¢s nuclear reactors, particularly the fast breeder reactors, would be placed under perpetual safeguards, and those that were allowed to remain outside safeguards would not provide material for more than five or six nuclear weapons a year.
It was also assumed that as Indiaââ¬â¢s nuclear programme expanded, with foreign assistance or through indigenous efforts, all the new facilities would be placed under safeguards and would not be allowed to contribute to Indiaââ¬â¢s nuclear weapon building capability. The current agreement does no such thing.
A close perusal of the agreement shows that of the reactors India has under operation or under construction, currently four are already under safeguards ââ¬â Rajasthan I and II (Canadian origin) and Tarapur I and II (American origin) as will be the two Russian ââ¬â assisted reactors at Koodakulam.
India has agreed that the research reactor CIRUS (Canadian origin but fuelled in part by heavy water provided by the US and now internationally known as the source of the plutonium clandestinely diverted by India for constructing the nuclear device it exploded in 1974) will be shut down by 2010 while the other research reactor at the Bhaba Atomic Research Centre (BARC) will be moved out and placed under international safeguards at its new location thus ensuring that BARC itself is not open to international inspection. None of the other currently operating reactors are to be placed under safeguards.
Another facet of the agreement that is cause for concern is that even those reactors that are being placed under safeguards will remain only for as long as the Americans or other members of the NSG continue to supply fuel. In the event of an interruption in the fuel supply the Indians will be free to remove the inspectors and to use the material from the reactors in any fashion that they choose.
It has been calculated by American scientists that with eight nuclear reactors outside safeguards India will be able to accumulate enough spent fuel to produce the plutonium needed for 50 nuclear weapons annually. Other calculations place the figure even higher. Of course, everyone is aware that Indiaââ¬â¢s own limited natural uranium resources will now be available for Indiaââ¬â¢s strategic programme since it will receive fuel from abroad for its civilian safeguarded reactors.
Opponents of the deal have presented the following arguments:
ââ¬â It will open the door to other nuclear weapon countries cutting similar deals with their proteges ââ¬â Russia with Iran and China with Pakistan.
ââ¬â Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Japan, South Korea, etc, all forsook nuclear ambitions because they were told that there were penalties attached and that civilian nuclear cooperation would go forward only with such countries as had signed the NPT. For them there would be no legal or moral justification for not demonstrating nuclear weapon capability even if this meant opting out of the NPT. Similar considerations would apply even more forcefully in the Middle East where the presence of a nuclearised Israel provides an added incentive. In other words, once the breach has been created there will be many who will wish to drive through it, and there would be little the international community (the West) could do to stop it.
ââ¬â If India wished to be treated like a nuclear weapon country then it must accept the restrictions the nuclear weapon states have imposed on themselves. All of them, including China, have stopped the production of fissionable material for military purposes. Implicit in this is that even if India has a small stock of fissionable material at this time this stock should be enough to create the minimum nuclear deterrent that India says it wants. At the most, India should keep out of safeguards only a limited number of reactors that would give it the fissionable material for five to six nuclear weapons annually.
ââ¬â Whatever Pakistan may say now it is inevitable that there will be a nuclear arms race in South Asia. The Pentagon thinking on this was perhaps best reflected in the policy paper issued in January 2001 under the title ââ¬ÅProliferation: Threat and Responseââ¬Â. It said, ââ¬ÅIndian and Pakistani strategic programmes continue to be driven by the perception of the otherââ¬â¢s effort ..... India and Pakistan are expected to continue improving their nuclear and missile forces. In effect, a slow-speed Indo-Pak nuclear and missile arms race is underway, with consequences that are difficult to predict and potential for spillover beyond the subcontinent.ââ¬Â
It is perhaps instructive from our perspective even if American analysts have not raised it forcefully that during the long negotiations that the Americans conducted with India and Pakistan after the ââ¬Ë98 nuclear tests to persuade both countries to define and adhere to a minimum nuclear deterrent the American deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, frequently said that during the Cold War the Americans and Russians had spent 5.5 trillion dollars to develop and maintain their nuclear arsenals.
He did not actually say so but it was clear that the ââ¬Åoverkillââ¬Â capacity that both countries developed flowed not from the security needs perceived by strategists but from the pressure that the highly articulate scientists and the industrial ââ¬â military complex exerted on policymakers. There is every reason to believe that something similar could happen in South Asia.
It is clear that even while touting the virtues of this agreement such as promoting non-proliferation or easing Indiaââ¬â¢s energy shortage ââ¬â arguments that no one in Congress will buy ââ¬â the Bush administration will be highlighting the role that this agreement will play in giving India the nuclear clout it needs to be Americaââ¬â¢s strategic partner in containing China. Will Congress buy this? A recent article in the prestigious Foreign Affairs argues that, ââ¬Åthe United States stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacyââ¬Â and that soon the US will be able to ââ¬Ådestroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with a first strike.ââ¬Â
In detailing Chinaââ¬â¢s nuclear capabilities the article says that ââ¬ÅChinaââ¬â¢s entire intercontinental nuclear arsenal consists of 18 stationary single-warhead ICBMs. These are not ready to launch on warning: their warheads are kept in storage and the missiles themselves are unfuelled (Chinaââ¬â¢s ICBMs use liquid fuel, which corrodes the missiles after 24 hours. Fuelling them is estimated to take two hours.)ââ¬Â, and that ââ¬Ågiven the history of Chinaââ¬â¢s slow-motion nuclear modernization, it is doubtful that a Chinese second-strike force will materialize anytime soon. The United States has a first-strike capability against China today and should be able to maintain it for a decade or moreââ¬Â.
Congressmen and advisers such as former Senator Nunn will be aware that this is not just empty talk but a reflection of the reality that prevails. The United States has or will soon have ââ¬Ånuclear primacyââ¬Â In these circumstances would it be wise to put at risk this US supremacy by assisting another country ââ¬â no matter how friendly it is now ââ¬â that could in future become a counter-weight not to China but in combination with China to American supremacy?
For the moment, the tempo that the administration has sought to build for an early consideration of its proposal by Congress appears to have stalled. Partly this is due to Bushââ¬â¢s diminished political standing, partly to the perception that the Americans have been out-negotiated. What seems clear, however, is that there will be no early consideration and that the possibilities are that it will be on the congressional agenda only next year. It is also likely that as and when it comes up the Congress will subject it to conditions limiting Indian access to fissile material for weapon production.
It appears that the Americans are faced with a similar problem in the 45-nation NSG also. There is no doubt that many of the NSG members cannot afford to ignore American wishes but they will want nevertheless to try and minimise the damage to the non-proliferation regime.
The latest reports suggest that in the Vienna meeting of the NSG held a few days ago the Americans were not able to win support for putting the Indian deal on the agenda. A long battle lies ahead and no one should expect an early resolution. What should South Asia do in the meanwhile? Perhaps we need to ponder whether we want to step on the slippery slope which led the Soviet Union to ruin or to take a page out of the book of our northern neighbour which seems to be doing little to increase its nuclear might, and work out among ourselves a nuclear restraint regime that meets security needs without requiring an ever spiralling arms race.
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
Link
A Dangerous Deal With India
By Jimmy Carter
Wednesday, March 29, 2006; Page A19
During the past five years the United States has abandoned many of the nuclear arms control agreements negotiated since the administration of Dwight Eisenhower. This change in policies has sent uncertain signals to other countries, including North Korea and Iran, and may encourage technologically capable nations to choose the nuclear option. The proposed nuclear deal with India is just one more step in opening a Pandora's box of nuclear proliferation.
The only substantive commitment among nuclear-weapon states and others is the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), accepted by the five original nuclear powers and 182 other nations. Its key objective is "to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology . . . and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament." At the five-year U.N. review conference in 2005, only Israel, North Korea, India and Pakistan were not participating -- three with proven arsenals.
Our government has abandoned the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and spent more than $80 billion on a doubtful effort to intercept and destroy incoming intercontinental missiles, with annual costs of about $9 billion. We have also forgone compliance with the previously binding limitation on testing nuclear weapons and developing new ones, with announced plans for earth-penetrating "bunker busters," some secret new "small" bombs, and a move toward deployment of destructive weapons in space. Another long-standing policy has been publicly reversed by our threatening first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. These decisions have aroused negative responses from NPT signatories, including China, Russia and even our nuclear allies, whose competitive alternative is to upgrade their own capabilities without regard to arms control agreements.
Last year former defense secretary Robert McNamara summed up his concerns in Foreign Policy magazine: "I would characterize current U.S. nuclear weapons policy as immoral, illegal, militarily unnecessary, and dreadfully dangerous."
It must be remembered that there are no detectable efforts being made to seek confirmed reductions of almost 30,000 nuclear weapons worldwide, of which the United States possesses about 12,000, Russia 16,000, China 400, France 350, Israel 200, Britain 185, India and Pakistan 40 each -- and North Korea has sufficient enriched nuclear fuel for a half-dozen. A global holocaust is just as possible now, through mistakes or misjudgments, as it was during the depths of the Cold War.
Knowing for more than three decades of Indian leaders' nuclear ambitions, I and all other presidents included them in a consistent policy: no sales of civilian nuclear technology or uncontrolled fuel to any country that refused to sign the NPT.
There was some fanfare in announcing that India plans to import eight nuclear reactors by 2012, and that U.S. companies might win two of those reactor contracts, but this is a minuscule benefit compared with the potential costs. India may be a special case, but reasonable restraints are necessary. The five original nuclear powers have all stopped producing fissile material for weapons, and India should make the same pledge to cap its stockpile of nuclear bomb ingredients. Instead, the proposal for India would allow enough fissile material for as many as 50 weapons a year, far exceeding what is believed to be its current capacity.
So far India has only rudimentary technology for uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, and Congress should preclude the sale of such technology to India. Former senator Sam Nunn said that the current agreement "certainly does not curb in any way the proliferation of weapons-grade nuclear material." India should also join other nuclear powers in signing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
There is no doubt that condoning avoidance of the NPT encourages the spread of nuclear weaponry. Japan, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Argentina and many other technologically advanced nations have chosen to abide by the NPT to gain access to foreign nuclear technology. Why should they adhere to self-restraint if India rejects the same terms? At the same time, Israel's uncontrolled and unmonitored weapons status entices neighboring leaders in Iran, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other states to seek such armaments, for status or potential use. The world has observed that among the "axis of evil," nonnuclear Iraq was invaded and a perhaps more threatening North Korea has not been attacked.
The global threat of proliferation is real, and the destructive capability of irresponsible nations -- and perhaps even some terrorist groups -- will be enhanced by a lack of leadership among nuclear powers that are not willing to restrain themselves or certain chosen partners. Like it or not, the United States is at the forefront in making these crucial strategic decisions. A world armed with nuclear weapons could be a terrible legacy of the wrong choices.
Former president Carter, a Democrat, is founder of the Carter Center.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6032801210.html
I am sure you are a honest man. Tell me should I/we believe you when you claim that Pakistan was responsible for the Union Carbide gas leak?Originally posted by SATAN@Mar 29 2006, 04:20 PM
As a warning...poison gas got "accidently" released at the union carbide plant in Bhopal killing off thousands.
N-deal: Rice gives Saran preview of testimony
Washington,DC | March 30, 2006 10:27 IST
Giving a clear indication that the Bush administration intended to put its best foot forward to push through the US-India civilian nuclear agreement, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in an extended meeting with Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran on Wednesday, gave a preview of the testimony she will present before the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 5 and the House International Relations Committee the following day.
Administration sources told rediff.com, that Rice, clearly sensitive to the remarks by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh earlier in the day, informed Saran about what she intended to do during her public testimony next week to alleviate some of the concerns expressed by lawmakers - a good many of whom still needed to be convinced that the deal is in the best interests of Washington's national security interests.
Some of these concerns were further exacerbated by an article in The Washington Post by former President Jimmy Carter who pilloried the deal describing it as dangerous and one that would only lead to the unravelling of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Carter's op-ed followed close on the heels of the concern expressed last week by former US Senator Sam Nunn, who is the co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, to send across a warning in an interview with The Washington Post that the deal will harm United States' vital interest in preventing nuclear proliferation and urged Congress not to approve the deal unless India acquiesced to some tough conditions.
However, administration sources acknowledged that as pointed out by Dr Singh, the ball was now clearly in the administration's court because under the terms of the agreement and the July 18 Indo-US Joint Statement, the US was obliged to convince Congress and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to approve the deal once India provided a credible separation plan.
Administration sources said Rice who left for Germany, France and the United Kingdom to consult with Washington's key European allies largely on the common strategy to isolate Iran, will also bring up the nuclear deal issue with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who has expressed qualms about the agreement.
Meanwhile, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns expressed confidence earlier this week that several lawmakers will sponsor both the Senate and the House bills - introduced by Senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and Congressman Henry Hyde, the head of the House International Relations Committee - once Rice testifies before both committees April 5 and 6 and answers lawmakers' queries.
Burns was up on Capitol Hill on Wednesday morning along with Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph, providing a classified briefing to members and staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on India's separation plan and the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement - a draft of which he has already provided to the Congress - that he and Saran hope to nail down before the foreign secretary returns to New Delhi on Friday.
Even as Burns and Joseph were briefing lawmakers, Saran hit the ground running with a meeting with Rice's chief counselor and confidante, Phil Zelikow, who along with Burns, were Rice's key aides who set the US-India civilian nuclear deal in motion as part of the strategic partnership between the two countries.
Burns, on his return from the Hill, hosted a working lunch for Saran and his delegation in the Henry Clay Room on the 8th Floor of the State Department, where he informed Saran of his meetings with members and staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and some of the concerns and ideas they had put forth.
According to sources, the ideas include a commitment from India to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapon testing and that India cease any further production of fissile material production.
The Bush administration has warned that some of the conditions Congress has been calling for are 'deal breakers' and Indian Ambassador Ronen Sen also reiterated in an interview with rediff.com last week that there was absolutely no chance of India accepting any amendment or condition to the negotiated deal and that any such amendment would 'make the agreement a non-starter.'
Also present during the working luncheon was Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher, who was in Vienna last week to push for the deal at the Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting and include it in the NSG's formal agenda in late May when its board of governors convenes. The NSG, however, was lukewarm to the US suggestion.
Administration sources said that Boucher and Saran had "compared notes" on the NSG meeting, since New Delhi has also been talking to some members trying to garner support for the deal, and sort of tallied up the yeas and the nays as it exists currently in order to guesstimate the chances of consensus.
Incidentally, Boucher leaves for Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and a couple of Central Asian states late Thursday.
On Wednesday evening, Saran was hosted for dinner at the 'I Ricci' Restaurant on 19th Street, Northwest, by former US Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill, whose firm Barbour.Griffith and Rogers International, is one of two lobbying firms working on Capitol Hill to push through the deal.
Earlier, in the week, Burns tried to explain away some of the conditions that some lawmakers have been calling for not as conditions but ideas and noted that "I would just say there is a difference between ideas or conditions that are meant to strengthen the agreement and ideas and conditions that are meant to essentially have us go back and renegotiate it."
Burns, however said he was not overly concerned over the NSG's cold reception to the US proposal, saying, "The reason why the India issue is not on the agenda of the board meeting for late May is because we are not quite sure when the Congress is going to act."
"But you can call the members of the NSG at any time. So if we miss the late May board meeting, you can call a meeting in July or August. So that is not an insurmountable area for us."
When asked about Hyde's statement about Congress looking at attaching 'possible conditions' if it is to amend current US law to facilitate the approval of the legislation, even as he introduced the bill on the request of the President, Burns said, "I have not seen chairman Hyde's statement, so I don't want to respond to it."
But he noted that "Secretary Rice is testifying before his Committee, so we will get a sense of what he is talking about, but he is a very important person in this debate and Secretary Rice has met him already to talk about the agreement and the testimony. We have already answered lot of questions for the HIRC (House International Relations Committee) staff and we will continue to do so."
"So we are looking forward to working with Chairman Hyde," Burns added.
http://ia.rediff.com/news/2006/mar/30ndeal...?q=tp&file=.htm
Agreed wholeheartedly!Originally posted by Samudra@Mar 30 2006, 04:35 AM
You can call it whatever you want to.And can we all stop blaming the unIslamic world for everything please? It would be a refreshing change. :cool2:
Originally posted by Neo@Mar 30 2006, 03:04 PM
Agreed wholeheartedly!
But the whole islamophobia erruption started after 9/11 and you'll find muslim posters on the defending side, regardless which forum you visit.
You're a senior member at WAB forum, you know what I mean.
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Originally posted by Neo@Mar 30 2006, 04:34 PM
Agreed wholeheartedly!
But the whole islamophobia erruption started after 9/11 and you'll find muslim posters on the defending side, regardless which forum you visit.
You're a senior member at WAB forum, you know what I mean.
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Originally posted by Samudra@Mar 29 2006, 10:35 PM
The whole frigging world has heard it all so many times.And I dont have to mention about people growing increasingly tired of the pious platitude showered everyday along with the nails and sharpnels.
Originally posted by A.Rahman@Apr 3 2006, 12:50 PM
Someone said "There is nothing more frightful than ignorance in action".
And it is frightening to see how you perceive Islam, I will suggest you first learn the basic principles of Islam before posting your opinions.
If you really want to get some knowledge about Islam then please visit: www.islamicity.com/forum
thank you.
I hope you find the truth about Islam.
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Originally posted by Samudra@Mar 29 2006, 01:12 PM
Edited
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