Justin Joseph
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India and NATO
India is simply too big to be just another partner country to NATO.
A Commentary by Michael Rühle, Deputy Head of Policy Planning, NATO
06:29 GMT, April 7, 2010 Last February, in a speech at the annual Munich Security Conference, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen argued that the Alliance should turn into a consultation forum for global security issues. Such a role, he argued, would require the transatlantic security alliance to develop closer relations with all major global players, including India and China.
Only a few years ago, any mentioning of India and China as potential NATO partners would have led to raised eyebrows not only in Delhi and Beijing, but also in many NATO member countries. Not this time. In the days just after the Munich conference, there were a few, predictably cautious reactions in India and China. All in all, however, the Secretary Generals suggestion did not spark a lot of debate, let alone controversy.
And why should it? This is not a veiled attempt to draw India and other rising powers into the Alliances political and military orbit. And neither is it an attempt to outflank the United Nations as the ultimate arbiter of global security. The suggestion to use NATO as a consultation forum is much less grandiose, and much more pragmatic: in an age that is increasingly shaped by the forces of globalisation, managing common security challenges requires a much tighter network among the key players.
Afghanistan is a compelling case in point. NATOs leadership of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has not only brought the Alliance to Chinas borders, it has also created much greater interdependence between NATO and India. As a major international donor, and given her considerable civilian presence in Afghanistan, India has a strategic interest not only in the security that ISAF forces provide, but also in the stabilising influence which NATOs engagement brings to the region around Afghanistan. NATOs long-term success in Afghanistan, in turn, hinges on the success of the civilian reconstruction efforts that India and others provide. Afghanistan has thus become a prime example of how new challenges create new dependencies and relationships.
NATO has made a sustained effort to adapt its policies and structures to these new realities. Today, the 28 member Alliance entertains diplomatic and military relations with over 30 non-members throughout the world. The scope and intensity of these relationships vary according to the specific interests of each partner country. Some countries prefer to keep things low-key, with ad-hoc staff-level talks or by attending seminars or courses.
Others limit their interaction with NATO to political dialogue. Still others opt for a much closer military partnership, to be able to take part in demanding operations alongside NATO Allies. But all these relationships with NATO are voluntary and à-la-carte. They do not include the mutual defence commitment that binds the Allies, but neither do they compromise a partner countrys particular foreign policy, for instance its non-aligned security tradition.
Still, many Indian analysts harbour doubts about the possible implications for their countrys international position if it should develop closer ties with NATO. As one eminent Indian analyst put it a recent conference in Delhi, India is simply too big to be just another partner country to the Atlantic Alliance. And while most members of the Indian strategic community readily admit that NATOs Afghanistan mission coincides with Indias own strategic interest in stabilising that country, they do not necessarily conclude from this that India and NATO should develop closer cooperation. On the contrary, many seem to believe that NATOs eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan will mean the end of its interest in Asia. Finally, since India enjoys close bilateral relations with all major NATO allies, some see little added value of building closer ties to the Alliance.
Are these valid arguments? First, any concern that India could be relegated to the status of a junior NATO partner is misplaced. China's staff level contacts with NATO have certainly not hindered that nations rapid ascent. And neither has the stature of countries like Japan, Egypt or Australia suffered from their cooperation with NATO. Hence, India will not need to compromise the fundamental tenets of its foreign and security policy. Second, even after the end of its engagement in Afghanistan, the Alliance will remain interested in the stability of the wider region, and in developing the political and military ties which it already has there at the moment.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the case for closer cooperation between India and NATO does not rest solely on Afghanistan. Because there is a growing need for nations and organisations to cooperate more closely in many other areas, too. Much of the consultation will take place in the United Nations. But challenges such as energy security, nuclear proliferation, failing states and piracy all compel nations to look for additional frameworks which allow them not only to talk together, but also to work together, including militarily.
NATO is one such framework and the only one with six decades of experience in multinational military planning and cooperation. For the Alliance, sharing this unique experience more widely is both natural and inevitable. And in this respect, NATOs recent cooperation with the Indian navy in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia will likely be followed by closer cooperation in other areas as well.
In sum, the issue is not whether India and NATO should consult and cooperate, but how this can best be done. Should we continue on an ad hoc basis, with the limited effectiveness that is inherent to improvisation? Or should India and NATO opt for a more regular dialogue, in which they learn about each others perceptions, policies, and procedures, and are able to quickly operationalise that knowledge in tackling common challenges? To this author, the choice is clear: exploiting NATOs potential as a forum for consultation and cooperation is a win-win situation, both for India and for the Alliance.
(Michael Rühle is the Deputy Head of Policy Planning, NATO. The views expressed are personal and do not reflect any institutional position)
----
The article was first published on the website of the National Maritime Foundation (NMF) and is reproduced by defpro.com with NMFs kind permission.
defence.professionals | defpro.com
India is simply too big to be just another partner country to NATO.
A Commentary by Michael Rühle, Deputy Head of Policy Planning, NATO
06:29 GMT, April 7, 2010 Last February, in a speech at the annual Munich Security Conference, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen argued that the Alliance should turn into a consultation forum for global security issues. Such a role, he argued, would require the transatlantic security alliance to develop closer relations with all major global players, including India and China.
Only a few years ago, any mentioning of India and China as potential NATO partners would have led to raised eyebrows not only in Delhi and Beijing, but also in many NATO member countries. Not this time. In the days just after the Munich conference, there were a few, predictably cautious reactions in India and China. All in all, however, the Secretary Generals suggestion did not spark a lot of debate, let alone controversy.
And why should it? This is not a veiled attempt to draw India and other rising powers into the Alliances political and military orbit. And neither is it an attempt to outflank the United Nations as the ultimate arbiter of global security. The suggestion to use NATO as a consultation forum is much less grandiose, and much more pragmatic: in an age that is increasingly shaped by the forces of globalisation, managing common security challenges requires a much tighter network among the key players.
Afghanistan is a compelling case in point. NATOs leadership of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has not only brought the Alliance to Chinas borders, it has also created much greater interdependence between NATO and India. As a major international donor, and given her considerable civilian presence in Afghanistan, India has a strategic interest not only in the security that ISAF forces provide, but also in the stabilising influence which NATOs engagement brings to the region around Afghanistan. NATOs long-term success in Afghanistan, in turn, hinges on the success of the civilian reconstruction efforts that India and others provide. Afghanistan has thus become a prime example of how new challenges create new dependencies and relationships.
NATO has made a sustained effort to adapt its policies and structures to these new realities. Today, the 28 member Alliance entertains diplomatic and military relations with over 30 non-members throughout the world. The scope and intensity of these relationships vary according to the specific interests of each partner country. Some countries prefer to keep things low-key, with ad-hoc staff-level talks or by attending seminars or courses.
Others limit their interaction with NATO to political dialogue. Still others opt for a much closer military partnership, to be able to take part in demanding operations alongside NATO Allies. But all these relationships with NATO are voluntary and à-la-carte. They do not include the mutual defence commitment that binds the Allies, but neither do they compromise a partner countrys particular foreign policy, for instance its non-aligned security tradition.
Still, many Indian analysts harbour doubts about the possible implications for their countrys international position if it should develop closer ties with NATO. As one eminent Indian analyst put it a recent conference in Delhi, India is simply too big to be just another partner country to the Atlantic Alliance. And while most members of the Indian strategic community readily admit that NATOs Afghanistan mission coincides with Indias own strategic interest in stabilising that country, they do not necessarily conclude from this that India and NATO should develop closer cooperation. On the contrary, many seem to believe that NATOs eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan will mean the end of its interest in Asia. Finally, since India enjoys close bilateral relations with all major NATO allies, some see little added value of building closer ties to the Alliance.
Are these valid arguments? First, any concern that India could be relegated to the status of a junior NATO partner is misplaced. China's staff level contacts with NATO have certainly not hindered that nations rapid ascent. And neither has the stature of countries like Japan, Egypt or Australia suffered from their cooperation with NATO. Hence, India will not need to compromise the fundamental tenets of its foreign and security policy. Second, even after the end of its engagement in Afghanistan, the Alliance will remain interested in the stability of the wider region, and in developing the political and military ties which it already has there at the moment.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the case for closer cooperation between India and NATO does not rest solely on Afghanistan. Because there is a growing need for nations and organisations to cooperate more closely in many other areas, too. Much of the consultation will take place in the United Nations. But challenges such as energy security, nuclear proliferation, failing states and piracy all compel nations to look for additional frameworks which allow them not only to talk together, but also to work together, including militarily.
NATO is one such framework and the only one with six decades of experience in multinational military planning and cooperation. For the Alliance, sharing this unique experience more widely is both natural and inevitable. And in this respect, NATOs recent cooperation with the Indian navy in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia will likely be followed by closer cooperation in other areas as well.
In sum, the issue is not whether India and NATO should consult and cooperate, but how this can best be done. Should we continue on an ad hoc basis, with the limited effectiveness that is inherent to improvisation? Or should India and NATO opt for a more regular dialogue, in which they learn about each others perceptions, policies, and procedures, and are able to quickly operationalise that knowledge in tackling common challenges? To this author, the choice is clear: exploiting NATOs potential as a forum for consultation and cooperation is a win-win situation, both for India and for the Alliance.
(Michael Rühle is the Deputy Head of Policy Planning, NATO. The views expressed are personal and do not reflect any institutional position)
----
The article was first published on the website of the National Maritime Foundation (NMF) and is reproduced by defpro.com with NMFs kind permission.
defence.professionals | defpro.com
...It is only possible on paper. What role would such a nation play when both groups are against each other. I do not want to name any country but I know one which could be applied to some extent.
