I am proud of the Kargil operation: Musharraf

[blain2]

See; even if it was covert, the cover(?) had already been blown. Even the NLI soldiers were in mufti not in uniform. Please look at the body of the Captain which was returned by the IA with a Citatation written by the CO of the IA unit opposing him (for his bravery, and he was later awarded accordingly-was it the Nishan-E-Haider); the body is in a blue track suit. The NLI was being passed off as Militants as a subterfuge and were instructed to remain in mufti. Can a Professional Army do that to its Soldiers?
The very basis of an Army's (and its soldiers) existence is "Izzat-O-Iqbal" of the "Paltan" and of its lowest "Sipahi/Jawan".
One can't mess around with that!

Yes professional armies do this all the time. Covert warfare is absolutely acceptable. Izzat-o-Iqbal comes by way of the troops showing dedication in carrying out the command and their duties which our troops performed exceptionally well. This is what their units are proud of and these shuhadaa of the units are celebrated along with those who have fallen in past wars.

 

[janon]

I guess he doesn't know of the big IAF airbase that's coming up right bang in the middle of those Kargil peaks.

Lol, true. Poor IAF did not know that Kargil is with Pakistan, when they began to build a full fledged airbase there, that can base MKIs, C-130Js and C-17s.

@A1Kaid : IAF to convert Kargil Airport into air base

Kargil to be a major Indian Air Force base

 

[blain2]

62 is big mistake from NEHRU .... but the nature of the war is too different from Kargil...

Don't dump it all on poor Nehru. IA gave him an appreciation of the situation and then went in. Not too different from Kargil in terms of how the actual dynamics of the conflict panned out.

 

[EyelessInGaza]

Yes professional armies do this all the time. Covert warfare is absolutely acceptable. ........

What are some established examples of large scale units fighting operations in civilian clothes that were accepted as justified and 'proper'?

IIRC, Army units have fought on one side or another in wars not their own- for example Germany and Britain in the Spanish civil war. But it was hardly in mufti.

I'm not speaking of small special ops teams, but army units.

 

[janon]

Don't dump it all on poor Nehru. IA gave him an appreciation of the situation and then went in. Not too different from Kargil in terms of how the actual dynamics of the conflict panned out.

The only similarity is in the result. That 1962 was a crushing defeat for India, and 1999 for Pakistan.

Anyway, my original question to you, in response to which you mentioned the 1962 India-China war, was this:

Is there any way that Pakistan could have gained anything from that military misadventure? Could pak really have taken Kashmir from India, or even large chunks of it, by that particular campaign? Was mushy expecting that India would not retaliate with full force to evict the intruders? In what scenario could the kargil intrusion have been a military success? A scenario which did not depend on underestimating India's willingness to fight to keep her territory?

What exactly did mushy hope to achieve by the kargil operation? Could it have ended any differently from what it did? Was there any other possible result?

 

[blain2]

Clarification. Siachen and Kargil are 2 different cases.

1. Kargil was not a dispute. It was on the Indian side of the LoC. Unlesss, you are now stating that you do not recognise the LoC.
1. Siachen we can keep harping on the direction of the line. There were different viewpoints. In the case of Kargil there were no difference on viewpoits on which side of the LoC Kargil fell.

LoC is not IB. Its quite simple. Your action in Siachen was not considered an open war because it took place across the LoC and not the IB. So if you are sitting anywhere around the LoC, its undecided business.

The only similarity is in the result. That 1962 was a crushing defeat for India, and 1999 for Pakistan.

Anyway, my original question to you, in response to which you mentioned the 1962 India-China war, was this:

Is there any way that Pakistan could have gained anything from that military misadventure? Could pak really have taken Kashmir from India, or even large chunks of it, by that particular campaign? Was mushy expecting that India would not retaliate with full force to evict the intruders? In what scenario could the kargil intrusion have been a military success? A scenario which did not depend on underestimating India's willingness to fight to keep her territory?

What exactly did mushy hope to achieve by the kargil operation? Could it have ended any differently from what it did? Was there any other possible result?

Crushing defeat? Hmm. Perhaps for India in 62, I know Pakistan inflicted at least as much damage as it took.

 

[Armstrong]

India presented no proof of kasab's nationality. Pakistan took weeks even after knowing village name in punjab and only after it became unsustainable with international media reaching his home that pakistan admitted. You are distorting facts, unless you are suggesting internal media reached an impoverished village in south punjab before Pakistani state?

If Pakistan was willing to cover up Kasab's Nationality why would they let International Media to come to Kasab's Village ? Surely taking his family out in a matter of hours to some undisclosed location be the more prudent thing to do ?

Secondly last year pakistan fought for possession of abu jundal - one more terrorist from the same mumbai attacks, and never gave up claim on him. Surely they knew his origins before fighting with saudi for a month for his possession. Are you telling me they did not even verify his passport details during one month of diplomatic tussle between SA/ pakistan and india??? that they did not know he is an indian terrorist? They wanted him back because he belonged to pakistani state's terror machine.

No they probably wanted him back because of the way the Kasab thing was handled by India ! We probably didn't want another one-sided interrogation, media frenzy, execution & then pressurizing Pakistan to do something about it by giving them a dossier than doesn't stand in court !

There is clear evidence for not wilfully blind to see where pakistan stands on these matters - they lie lie lie until it becomes or made unsustainable.

No we just ask for 'evidence' instead of 'conjectures' & 'opinions' & we've never shied away from Impartial International Arbitration - I suggest you take us to the International Court of Justice or some other similarly relevant & impartial platform with all the evidence you've got about us 'lying & lying till it isn't sustainable anymore' !

 

[ares]

Siachen and Kargil sit across the very same LoC. Lets not create any confusion about that. Kargil was with Pakistan in 48 and in 65. It was taken over in 1971 by the IA and not returned so lets not talk about firmly this or that.

If Kargil operation violated Shimla agreement, so did Siachen. No changing of contours of the LOC through force applied in 1984 just as it did in 1999. You folks broke the rule first!

That is a wrong statement.

LOC does not run through Siachen(it ends at NJ9842)...whereas LOC is clearly demarcated in Kargil-drass sector as per Shima treaty.

You are right about the spirit of Shimla agreement, which state there will no changing of LOC by force..which is exactly, why the treaty was not violated when Indian and Pakistani forces moved into Siachen glaciers. Infact the position of Indian and Pakistans forces on Siachen glacier is denotd by Actual Ground Position Line(AGPL) and not LOC.

 

[blain2]

What are some established examples of large scale units fighting operations in civilian clothes that were accepted as justified and 'proper'?

IIRC, Army units have fought on one side or another in wars not their own- for example Germany and Britain in the Spanish civil war. But it was hardly in mufti.

I'm not speaking of small special ops teams, but army units.

The entire US foray into Afghanistan was lead by massive numbers of US SF out of uniform to blend in and disrupt the Taliban.

This whole point is comical. What rule did Pakistan break to have our troops dress in whatever made sense from an operational secrecy standpoint?

That is a wrong statement.

LOC does not run through Siachen(it ends at NJ9842)...whereas LOC is clearly demarcated in Kargil-drass sector as per Shima treaty.

You are right about the spirit of Shimla agreement, which state there will no changing of LOC by force..which is exactly, why the treaty was not violated when Indian and Pakistani forces moved into Siachen glaciers. Infact the position of Indian and Pakistans forces on Siachen glacier is denotd by Actual Ground Position Line(AGPL) and not LOC.

Talk about gross violation of a fib! AGPL is a continuation of what? Because the IB and the LoC could not be mapped due to the terrain, the reference to AGPL. The Glacier is ice, it shifts and changes, not the case with the LoC and IB down south. If looked at from south to north, its essentially the IB, then LoC and then the AGPL (an Indian term for the deployment of troops at the glacier). From the LoC onwards, its all open to debate.

 

[Armstrong]

Good and interesting point.

I had thought about it before making my first post on the subject, which is why I had said:

But yours is a valid question. To me special op teams in mufti against 'non -state elements' in territories under their civilian control is fine.

Special op teams in mufti in enemy territory in war time does happen a lot (so I read) but is pushing it in my opinion. If I recall correctly, such teams lose protection of the Geneva Convention, but that's a side argument.

Army units in mufti in enemy territory during peace time is wrong. Army units in mufti in enemy territory during war is also wrong. IMO.

There is also the gray area of unit strength. Is one soldier in mufti in enemy territory 'as wrong' as a platoon or a company or a battalion or a regiment in mufti in enemy territory? I don't know where that line gets crossed, but I do believe that when you're speaking of regiments, that line has been crossed a long time ago.

Dude, you're opinion sounds more like an impulsive urge to assert something than an objective assertion per se ! What does the numerical strength (large or small) has to do with it ? Its the nature that counts.

And why is it wrong or unbecoming for an Army Unit to do that ? Is it wrong because 'soldiers' shouldn't be doing this sort of thing ? Why ? Are Intelligence Operatives scum of the earth that they're expected to do such work & its ever so unbecoming for a soldier to do it ? What is this logic ?

And it goes without saying that we didn't really have a peace-time pre '03 (I think when the ceasefire was signed); we just didn't have significant operations....just the usual cross firing & bombardments !

 

[Capt.Popeye]

When exactly was the lid blown ? For all intents & purposes it was the Mujahideen vs the Indian Army & only after we recognized that that narrative was unsustainable did we stop perpetuating it & finally recognized the men as our own !

The notion of disowning them exists only in your mind's eye - Not the NLI ! Do you think they weren't briefed for the role they were playing...that they weren't conditioned into their roles ?

No the NLI was not briefed on the nature and scope of the Ops that they were pushed into. Hear Lt Gen Shahid Aziz and Lt Gen Talat Masood's TV interview on this point. Actually the bearded PA Colonel who was then Deputy DG ISPR and who has also written a book based on interviews with serving (and surviving) personnel in Kargil is much more precise on this point. Btw, his observations as recorded in his book is at odds with what you are saying in some posts @Armstrong; especially about morale in both the NLI ranks and among the dependants of the casualties.
About this Plan(?) of the gang of 4; it was so "ad hoc" that the PA patrols were asked to push forward and occupy what they could. Which they did, since they found vacated posts. That was the easy part. After that there was no plan. So they stayed put. Till the IA and IAF response began, That is when heel broke loose for the penn-packet deployments. When the resupply dump in Muntho Dhalo went up in smoke, then their survivabilty was gone, no food, no ammo, no hopes of even casevac. Not to forget that the winter push started in abt Nov 1998 had already taken its toll of medical casualties and all the PA units were well depleted.

Finally; it was not only the NLI that was involved in Kargil, though they were the bulk of the force.
There were others also:

Pakistani Forces used at Kargil

The forces earmarked for OPERATION BADR were: 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 12th battalions of the Pakistan Army’s Northern Light Infantry (NLI). Also included were some Mujaheddin (employed as porters for resupply) and members of Pakistan's Special Services Group (SSG) since Officers from 1 and 3 Special Services Group were also killed. Along with elements from the Chitral and Bajaur Scouts. It is estimated that about 5,000 troops were involved, while the troops actually occupying the vacant Indian posts were approx. 1800.. Since officers from several other regiments were also identified – 24 Sind, 13 Azad Kashmir, 1 and 63 Frontier Force, 60 Baluch – it might be tempting to assume other battalions were involved. More likely that these officers probably were on deputation to the NLI.
These forces were provided with fire-support by at least 18 batteries of PA Artillery.


As that list above shows; it was not just the NLI or irregulars involved.

 

[BATMAN]

@blain2 .. worth reading.... super answers to the baseless propaganda of Indians and their Pakistani versions.

 

[ares]

AGPL is a continuation of what? Because the IB and the LoC could not be mapped due to the terrain, the reference to AGPL. The Glacier is ice, it shifts and changes, not the case with the LoC and IB down south.

AGPL or Actual Ground Position Line as the name suggests is a line demarcating Indian and Pakistani troop position.The troops, who moved into the areas after 1984.Hence their no question AGPL being demarcated in previous treaties.

The Siachen region was not demarcated in 1972 agreement, as it was then considered insignificant, an areas incapable human habitation,back then it served very little strategic purpose to either army.

When exactly was the lid blown ? For all intents & purposes it was the Mujahideen vs the Indian Army & only after we recognized that that narrative was unsustainable did we stop perpetuating it & finally recognized the men as our own !

The notion of disowning them exists only in your mind's eye - Not the NLI ! Do you think they weren't briefed for the role they were playing...that they weren't conditioned into their roles ?

Who is this 'we'..does this include Pakistani armed forces?
If so, then 'we ' knew all along that those fighting in Kargil, are Pakistan's own soldiers and not any Mujaheddin.

Infact 'we' also knew since the planning stages of the operation itself, that once declared as Mujaheddin.. Pakistan will not able to overtly support them or come to their rescue
Which proved to be very true ..as IAF started bombing Pakistani positions, all PAF could do is wiggle its thumbs.

'We' also knew that Pakistan army could never launch a diversionary attack to relive pressure of 'Mujaheddin' positions...Such was the state of logistics that many Pakistani army soldiers were surviving by eating grass.

Even after being met with such treatment, you do not see a sense of abandonment in the Soldiers then you are not looking deep enough.

 

[Armstrong]

No the NLI was not briefed on the nature and scope of the Ops that they were pushed into. Hear Lt Gen Shahid Aziz and Lt Gen Talat Masood's TV interview on this point. Actually the bearded PA Colonel who was then Deputy DG ISPR and who has also written a book based on interviews with serving (and surviving) personnel in Kargil is much more precise on this point. Btw, his observations as recorded in his book is at odds with what you are saying in some posts @Armstrong; especially about morale in both the NLI ranks and among the dependants of the casualties.
About this Plan(?) of the gang of 4; it was so "ad hoc" that the PA patrols were asked to push forward and occupy what they could. Which they did, since they found vacated posts. That was the easy part. After that there was no plan. So they stayed put. Till the IA and IAF response began, That is when heel broke loose for the penn-packet deployments. When the resupply dump in Muntho Dhalo went up in smoke, then their survivabilty was gone, no food, no ammo, no hopes of even casevac. Not to forget that the winter push started in abt Nov 1998 had already taken its toll of medical casualties and all the PA units were well depleted.

Finally; it was not only the NLI that was involved in Kargil, though they were the bulk of the force.
There were others also:

Pakistani Forces used at Kargil

The forces earmarked for OPERATION BADR were: 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 12th battalions of the Pakistan Army’s Northern Light Infantry (NLI). Also included were some Mujaheddin (employed as porters for resupply) and members of Pakistan's Special Services Group (SSG) since Officers from 1 and 3 Special Services Group were also killed. Along with elements from the Chitral and Bajaur Scouts. It is estimated that about 5,000 troops were involved, while the troops actually occupying the vacant Indian posts were approx. 1800.. Since officers from several other regiments were also identified – 24 Sind, 13 Azad Kashmir, 1 and 63 Frontier Force, 60 Baluch – it might be tempting to assume other battalions were involved. More likely that these officers probably were on deputation to the NLI.
These forces were provided with fire-support by at least 18 batteries of PA Artillery.


As that list above shows; it was not just the NLI or irregulars involved.

Aziz has some huge question marks on his credibility, after enjoying the spoils of a Military Government through & through, he suddenly grows a conscience & writes a book on it ! And Talat Sahib, is long retired & belonged to the Engineering Corp, therefore he serves as a Defense Analyst not someone who brings know-how of contemporary military happenings to light !

I'd love to know about the Colonel Sahib, I hope he isn't that Lawyer guy !

I suggest you listen to General Gulraiz Keeyani's scathing interview on Kargil for a better case ! An outstanding soldier who highlighted the Kargil Fiasco in the most critical of words for Musharraf !

And I never said that it was only the NLI !

Fortunately, I don't have to rely on the interviews of a select few, being in Pakistan & knowing a couple of soldiers from the Pakistan Army (past & present), has its perks - So the morale bit; either there was some massive coverup within the Army or they're all lying to me with a very straight face !

 

[janon]

Crushing defeat? Hmm. Perhaps for India in 62, I know Pakistan inflicted at least as much damage as it took.

Since you only replied to that first sentence, and ignored the questions I asked (which I asked you for the second time), shall I assume that those questions have no answers?

Here they are, for everyone to ponder upon:

Is there any way that Pakistan could have gained anything from that military misadventure? Could pak really have taken Kashmir from India, or even large chunks of it, by that particular campaign? Was mushy expecting that India would not retaliate with full force to evict the intruders? In what scenario could the kargil intrusion have been a military success? A scenario which did not depend on underestimating India's willingness to fight to keep her territory?

What exactly did mushy hope to achieve by the kargil operation? Could it have ended any differently from what it did? Was there any other possible result?