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How to sink an AirCraft Carrier

Why assume the carrier detects the torpedo at launch at 40km away?



The 53-65KE has a range of 18km at 40knots. The UGST torpedo (i.e. not the same torpedo as 53-65KE!) is credited with a range up to 25km/13.5nm at speed 50kts and a range up to 50km/27nm at speed 35kts (i.e. programmable speed)
See: The UGST Versatile Torpedo

See also page 303 of "Cold War submarines: the design and construction of U.S. and Soviet submarines"by Norman Polmar and Kenneth J. Moore


Unfortunately, the carrier doesn't carry any short range nuc tipped missiles. All it has are air-launched lightweight ASW torps. But a DDG might indeed launch a RUM-139 VL-ASROC which carrier a lightweight Mark 46 torpedo homing torpedo . This carrier a warhead consisting of 96.8 lb (44 kg) of PBXN-103 high explosive (bulk charge). Missile range is 22 km, torp range is 11km so max range is 33 km.

Your move ;-)



Penguin,

You still have not answered your own post---others may correct me if I misunderstood---you are launching a torpedoe from 40 km away and the range of the torpedoe is 18 km----that is according to your paste and post----.

At 45 km / hr---the torp will take roughly 25 minutes to reach the carrier if it is stationary---.

At 18 km distance the torp is dead in water and still has 22 km to go---so what did it mean---the carrier would ram into the torp with its rear end

The carrier will know about the launch the moment the launch tubes are flooded and outside doors are opened---so the moment the carrier senses that---it makes a 180 deg turn and scoots away at dash speed 30 knots---there is no way that the torp will be able to catch up---first of all with its range of 18 km the carrier doesnot have to move----but even if its range was 50---75 km---it still couldnot catch the carrier.

At time of war---a carrier is just not left by itself---it has an active escort of ships---an active escorts of helicopters hop skipping ahead, behind and on the sides---dipping their sonars for any submersibles.

Then there are counter measure that could neutralize the torps---a high speed torp fired in the direction of the incoming unit with a proximity fuse---the detonation would normally cut of the guide wire to the enemy torp---.

Frigates and destroyers would flank the the carrier, travel in its wake---noise makers will generate actual wash noise---so basically it would become impossible to hit the carrier----.

To understand sea warfare---Tom Clancy used to be somebody---but is now of basic education---his scenario won't work in this case---that was the late 70's technology radar on the ships fighting 80's wars---the 2010 ships radars etc etc etc---can tell each and every flying object apart---the AESA radar can count the number of blades on the jet engine and tell what kind of jet it is installed upon---it can distinguish between the missiles or an attack plane---.

Gen Belgrano was a bad example in comparison to current day a /c carriers---the writer should know that well.

In today's warfare, the carrier battle group has so much going on that it is not posible for a sub to take a pot shot at it from 40 km away----.

Now if the writer would have stated that the shot was taken from 4---6 km away---the sub would have been lying in wait---silent as a sea cuccumber---for many days with all its tubes loaded and flooded and ready to go---and it would have launched 4 torps at one go---re-loaded and shot 4 more within a minute or to---then I would say yes---it is a go---other than that it is just wishfull thinking---.


At that range---there will be no way out for the sub---it would have bought its one way ticket to oblivion.

Even with a disabled carrier---there will be nothing left of the enemy subs---carrier support ships and helos would take out any enemy subs in the viccinity.
 
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The concept below are purely just my own ideas, plz correct me if I made a mistake:
First, fire several long range supersonic cruise/ballistic missiles fitted with EMP warhead toward the aircraft carrier group. Some of you might think ballistic missile (even the Chinese DF-21) cannot have a guidance system accurately enough to get a direct hit on the AC, but that is not needed. Because the only thing they have to do is to strike within a certain range from the AC carrier group in order to disrupt AC group’s electronics.
Now, a series of fighter-bombers can launch their medium range Ashm toward the AC and subs can also launch Ashm toward the AC. With its weapon system and its radar/sonar system offline, the Aircraft carrier group will be defenseless against those missiles.
And, the AC is destroyed.:toast_sign::cheers:
Not good enough...So what exactly is this 'certain range' in terms of effective blast radius? An EMP wave is no different than compressed air in a conventional explosion -- blast radius. Aside from a nuclear generated EMP wave, to date, the most effective blast radius of an EMP weapon is only a few hundred meters...

High-power microwave (HPM) / E-Bomb
Currently, the radius of the weapon is not as great as nuclear EMP effects. Open literature sources indicate that effective radii of “hundreds of meters or more” are possible.
This is applicable to the most sophisticated EMP weapon design -- the virtual cathode oscillator (vircator)...

The Electromagnetic Bomb - a Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction
3. The Technology Base for Conventional Electromagnetic Bombs

The technology base which may be applied to the design of electromagnetic bombs is both diverse, and in many areas quite mature. Key technologies which are extant in the area are explosively pumped Flux Compression Generators (FCG), explosive or propellant driven Magneto-Hydrodynamic (MHD) generators and a range of HPM devices, the foremost of which is the Virtual Cathode Oscillator or Vircator. A wide range of experimental designs have been tested in these technology areas, and a considerable volume of work has been published in unclassified literature.
What is the use of having an EMP attack via ballistic missiles when the warhead needs to be within a few hundred meters anyway? Might as well spend more time and money to increase the accuracy and precision of conventional warheads.
 
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You still have not answered your own post---others may correct me if I misunderstood---you are launching a torpedoe from 40 km away and the range of the torpedoe is 18 km----that is according to your paste and post----.
Yes I did. For the third time: the UGST torpedo has a range of up to 50km/27nm at speed 35kts, or lesser range of 25km at higher speed of 50 kts. (This is not to be confused - as you are doing - with the 53-65KE torpedo which has a range of 18km at 40kts.)

At 45 km / hr---the torp will take roughly 25 minutes to reach the carrier if it is stationary---.
So? Do you think these torpedoes were designed and build with this type of range if they were not going to be used at that range?

The carrier will know about the launch the moment the launch tubes are flooded and outside doors are opened---so the moment the carrier senses that---it makes a 180 deg turn and scoots away at dash speed 30 knots---there is no way that the torp will be able to catch up---first of all with its range of 18 km the carrier doesnot have to move----but even if its range was 50---75 km---it still couldnot catch the carrier.
- How will the carrier know? US CVN are not equipped with sonar. The US Navy retired the S-3 Viking in January 2009, with its missions being assumed by other platforms. All it has are 6 SH-60F and HH-60H (which have anti-submarine weapones but no anti-torpedo weapons) and SLQ-25A Nixie torpedo countermeasures system (which doesn't do any good against a wakehoming torpedo)
- what prevents the attacker from positioning 2 or more submarines around the carrier group and attacking it (near) simultaneously? The attempt to flee the scene will bring the CVN closer to another sub.

At time of war---a carrier is just not left by itself---it has an active escort of ships---an active escorts of helicopters hop skipping ahead, behind and on the sides---dipping their sonars for any submersibles.
ASW focus is on subs, not torps. So all you need is a chance for a first shot.

Then there are counter measure that could neutralize the torps---a high speed torp fired in the direction of the incoming unit with a proximity fuse---the detonation would normally cut of the guide wire to the enemy torp---.
You should have read one of my earlier links which discusses anti-torpedo defenses of the USN: the only ships with the ability to detect/track incoming torps are the Arleigh Burk DDGs and no ships or aircraft have any active anti-torp measures. There is the Nixie, but this is a decoy against accoustic homing torps, not wire-guided or wake-homing torps. So, once the wakehoming torps are in the water, there is no defense but manouvre and shielding ('sacrificing') by escorts (i.e. no technical/weapon fixes to the problem).

Frigates and destroyers would flank the the carrier, travel in its wake---noise makers will generate actual wash noise---so basically it would become impossible to hit the carrier----.
In fact, DDGs and FFGs would be miles away from the carrier. No carrier group will sail together as the tight group typically depicted in photographs (for PR purposes). Noise makers (Nixie) don't disturb wakehomers, crossing wakes doesn't disturb accoustic homing torps, and neither disturbs modern wireguided torps and old fashioned straight running torps with impact or influence fusing.

To understand sea warfare---Tom Clancy used to be somebody---but is now of basic education---his scenario won't work in this case---that was the late 70's technology radar on the ships fighting 80's wars---the 2010 ships radars etc etc etc---can tell each and every flying object apart---the AESA radar can count the number of blades on the jet engine and tell what kind of jet it is installed upon---it can distinguish between the missiles or an attack plane---.
Nowhere did I suggest Tom Clancy is the source on sub warfare. I just mentioned it as an interesting scenario of how to disable a sub using accoustic homing lightweight ASW torpedoes. And radar doesn't work underwater.

Gen Belgrano was a bad example in comparison to current day a /c carriers---the writer should know that well.
It is the only post WW2 wartime engagement. Thus the only example with use of modern torps in anger.

In today's warfare, the carrier battle group has so much going on that it is not posible for a sub to take a pot shot at it from 40 km away----.
Funny then, how in most naval exercises SS(K)s do rather well against carrier groups. From rather more close distances even. Hence the proliferation of modern SS(K)s and ASW remain major ongoing concerns of the USN.

Now if the writer would have stated that the shot was taken from 4---6 km away---the sub would have been lying in wait---silent as a sea cuccumber---for many days with all its tubes loaded and flooded and ready to go---and it would have launched 4 torps at one go---re-loaded and shot 4 more within a minute or to---then I would say yes---it is a go---other than that it is just wishfull thinking---.
Speak of an example from fiction ... The odds of stumbling on a carrier group this way are virtually nil. The sub would essentially serve as an intelligent seamine: there are other solutions available for that role (torpedomines).

At that range---there will be no way out for the sub---it would have bought its one way ticket to oblivion.
It didn't state the scenario required that the sub lived to tell. Lets apply this to the nuke warhead scenario as well: launch platform(s) has/have to survive the attack.

Even with a disabled carrier---there will be nothing left of the enemy subs---carrier support ships and helos would take out any enemy subs in the viccinity.
But air attack and surface attack become much more possible with the carrier out of the equation.
 
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To sink US ACC one must learn what USSR was planning. The clue is long range land based strategic bombers!
 
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I really would like to see the same degree of scrutiny being applied to the 'nuke the carrier group' scenario.
 
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Yes I did. For the third time: the UGST torpedo has a range of up to 50km/27nm at speed 35kts, or lesser range of 25km at higher speed of 50 kts. (This is not to be confused - as you are doing - with the 53-65KE torpedo which has a range of 18km at 40kts.)


So? Do you think these torpedoes were designed and build with this type of range if they were not going to be used at that range?



Penguin,

How are you today? How was the new year party? Had a good time---I thought so?

You see problem with paste and post kind of scenarios is that the poster gets lost in the specs----.

What you are not realizing is that the carrier is not stationary---it is a moving object and it can run the opposite direction from the oncoming threat.

In naval jargon, it is expected that a successful torpedoe must have 2 to 2 1/2 the speed of the target to be successful----otherwise the target would evade the launch of 40 km distance just by turning around and going dash speed of 30 knots.

So---arithmatically, it becomes impossible for the torp to catch it first of all----secondly, the torp would run out of fuel----.

Now, not so articulate part of your argument is that why was the torp designed that way if it could not do the job----my good man if all the things and weapons designed should and must do the job they were destined to do, we would settle all discussions---it is designed to do this job so be it.

In this scenario, we are inadvertantly discussing the u s carrier---which will never be by itself.
 
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You see problem with paste and post kind of scenarios is that the poster gets lost in the specs----.
I'm not lost at all.

What you are not realizing is that the carrier is not stationary---it is a moving object and it can run the opposite direction from the oncoming threat.
I've at no point assumed the carrier to be stationary. Besides, I think I addressed that issue: having several subs in the area leaves the carrier nowhere to run: turning away from one threat means turning into another.

In naval jargon, it is expected that a successful torpedoe must have 2 to 2 1/2 the speed of the target to be successful----otherwise the target would evade the launch of 40 km distance just by turning around and going dash speed of 30 knots.

So---arithmatically, it becomes impossible for the torp to catch it first of all----secondly, the torp would run out of fuel----.
Nobody said torpedoes (not even wake homing torpedoes) are perfect. Meanwhile, you are assuming the carrier has nothing else to do but run (after it has detected launch instantly - which I don't see it do in reality, for reasons indicated), disregarding any ongoing (required) flight ops for example. Running may not be an option, therefore, or may incur a cost such as the loss of an airgroup or component thereof. Besides, you've assume a wake homer needs to be fired from the rear, in which case the carrier only has to speed up. There is no reason to assume the torp cannot be fired head on. If this is the case, then with it running 35kts and the carrier initially doing 20-25 kts, while landing aircraft, how long do you think it takes for the carrier to turn and reach full steed in 180 degrees the opposite direction? How much will the torp have closed in that amount of time?

Now the worst part of your argument is that why was the torp designed that way if it could not do the job----my good man if all the things and weapons designed should and must do the job they were destined to do, we would settle all discussions---it is designed to do this job so be it.
IIRC I chose launchpoint at effective max range, but mentioned that sneaking in close was another possibility. Both scenario's have been effective during exercises. Meanwhile, please explain why the russians - who are no slouches at submarine warfare - would develop a torpedo with programmable speed, so it has the option of a short-but-fast run and a slower-but-longrange run (UGST is one of their latest torps), if it is a useless feature.

In this scenario, we are inadvertantly discussing the u s carrier---not a lone ship by itself.
Carriers - irrespective of nation - don't travel alone. Nonetheless, to assume carrier escorts are within a few miles to the carrier they are escorting is a fallacy. So, that leaves a window of opportunity for the attacking sub(s).
Then again, engaging a USN CBG will be different from engaging a UK CBG, which will be different from engaging a French or Russian CBG, which will be different from engaging a Brazilian or Indian CBG, due to the differing qualities and quantities of ships and aircraft and other resources of these respective navies.
 
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2 stealthy missile boats and a submarine will do the damn trick.
My 2 CENTS
 
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We do remember this incident:
Originally published 12:15 a.m., November 13, 2006, updated 12:00 a.m., November 13, 2006
China sub stalked U.S. fleet

A Chinese submarine stalked a U.S. aircraft carrier battle group in the Pacific last month and surfaced within firing range of its torpedoes and missiles before being detected, The Washington Times has learned.

According to the defense officials, the Chinese Song-class diesel-powered attack submarine shadowed the Kitty Hawk undetected and surfaced within five miles of the carrier Oct. 26.

The surfaced submarine was spotted by a routine surveillance flight by one of the carrier group's planes.

The Kitty Hawk battle group includes an attack submarine and anti-submarine helicopters that are charged with protecting the warships from submarine attack.

According to the officials, the submarine is equipped with Russian-made wake-homing torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles.
China sub stalked U.S. fleet - Washington Times

Rear Admiral Hank McKinney, the former commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s submarine force, tells us not to be to hard on the sub-hunters:

"I have no inside information on this event, but it is very difficult to detect a quiet diesel submarine and the Song–class submarines are quality submarines. Operating in international waters in the vicinity of a US battle group is perfectly normal — good operational training.
The Chinese very well could have staged this event to make a point about the vulnerability of the Battle Group to submarine attack. The US Navy is fully aware of [those] vulnerabilities…
The Chinese are building a credible submarine force which will make it very difficult for the US Navy to maintain sea control dominance in or near coastal waters off of China."
Behind the Kitty Hawk Incident (Updated) | Defense Tech
 
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Have you guys read about the Sunburn Missile.

Iran: A Bridge too Far?

Iran: A Bridge too Far?

The weapon that could defeat the US in the Gulf

A word to the reader: The following paper is so shocking that, after preparing the initial draft, I didn’t want to believe it myself, and resolved to disprove it with more research. However, I only succeeded in turning up more evidence in support of my thesis. And I repeated this cycle of discovery and denial several more times before finally deciding to go with the article. I believe that a serious writer must follow the trail of evidence, no matter where it leads, and report back. So here is my story. Don’t be surprised if it causes you to squirm. Its purpose is not to make predictions –– history makes fools of those who claim to know the future –– but simply to describe the peril that awaits us in the Persian Gulf. By awakening to the extent of that danger, perhaps we can still find a way to save our nation and the world from disaster. If we are very lucky, we might even create an alternative future that holds some promise of resolving the monumental conflicts of our time. MG

Iran: A Bridge too Far?

by Mark Gaffney

10/26/04 "ICH" -- Last July, they dubbed it operation Summer Pulse: a simultaneous mustering of US Naval forces, world wide, that was unprecedented. According to the Navy, it was the first exercise of its new Fleet Response Plan (FRP), the purpose of which was to enable the Navy to respond quickly to an international crisis. The Navy wanted to show its increased force readiness, that is, its capacity to rapidly move combat power to any global hot spot. Never in the history of the US Navy had so many carrier battle groups been involved in a single operation. Even the US fleet massed in the Gulf and eastern Mediterranean during operation Desert Storm in 1991, and in the recent invasion of Iraq, never exceeded six battle groups. But last July and August there were seven of them on the move, each battle group consisting of a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier with its full complement of 7-8 supporting ships, and 70 or more assorted aircraft. Most of the activity, according to various reports, was in the Pacific, where the fleet participated in joint exercises with the Taiwanese navy.

But why so much naval power underway at the same time? What potential world crisis could possibly require more battle groups than were deployed during the recent invasion of Iraq? In past years, when the US has seen fit to “show the flag” or flex its naval muscle, one or two carrier groups have sufficed. Why this global show of power?

The news headlines about the joint-maneuvers in the South China Sea read: “Saber Rattling Unnerves China”, and: “Huge Show of Force Worries Chinese.” But the reality was quite different, and, as we shall see, has grave ramifications for the continuing US military presence in the Persian Gulf; because operation Summer Pulse reflected a high-level Pentagon decision that an unprecedented show of strength was needed to counter what is viewed as a growing threat –– in the particular case of China, because of Peking’s newest Sovremenny-class destroyers recently acquired from Russia.

“Nonsense!” you are probably thinking. That’s impossible. How could a few picayune destroyers threaten the US Pacific fleet?”

Here is where the story thickens: Summer Pulse amounted to a tacit acknowledgement, obvious to anyone paying attention, that the United States has been eclipsed in an important area of military technology, and that this qualitative edge is now being wielded by others, including the Chinese; because those otherwise very ordinary destroyers were, in fact, launching platforms for Russian-made 3M-82 Moskit anti-ship cruise missiles (NATO designation: SS-N-22 Sunburn), a weapon for which the US Navy currently has no defense. Here I am not suggesting that the US status of lone world Superpower has been surpassed. I am simply saying that a new global balance of power is emerging, in which other individual states may, on occasion, achieve “an asymmetric advantage” over the US. And this, in my view, explains the immense scale of Summer Pulse. The US show last summer of overwhelming strength was calculated to send a message.

The Sunburn Missile

I was shocked when I learned the facts about these Russian-made cruise missiles. The problem is that so many of us suffer from two common misperceptions. The first follows from our assumption that Russia is militarily weak, as a result of the breakup of the old Soviet system. Actually, this is accurate, but it does not reflect the complexities. Although the Russian navy continues to rust in port, and the Russian army is in disarray, in certain key areas Russian technology is actually superior to our own. And nowhere is this truer than in the vital area of anti-ship cruise missile technology, where the Russians hold at least a ten-year lead over the US. The second misperception has to do with our complacency in general about missiles-as-weapons –– probably attributable to the pathetic performance of Saddam Hussein’s Scuds during the first Gulf war: a dangerous illusion that I will now attempt to rectify.

Many years ago, Soviet planners gave up trying to match the US Navy ship for ship, gun for gun, and dollar for dollar. The Soviets simply could not compete with the high levels of US spending required to build up and maintain a huge naval armada. They shrewdly adopted an alternative approach based on strategic defense. They searched for weaknesses, and sought relatively inexpensive ways to exploit those weaknesses. The Soviets succeeded: by developing several supersonic anti-ship missiles, one of which, the SS-N-22 Sunburn, has been called “the most lethal missile in the world today.”

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the old military establishment fell upon hard times. But in the late1990s Moscow awakened to the under-utilized potential of its missile technology to generate desperately needed foreign exchange. A decision was made to resuscitate selected programs, and, very soon, Russian missile technology became a hot export commodity. Today, Russian missiles are a growth industry generating much-needed cash for Russia, with many billions in combined sales to India, China, Viet Nam, Cuba, and also Iran. In the near future this dissemination of advanced technology is likely to present serious challenges to the US. Some have even warned that the US Navy’s largest ships, the massive carriers, have now become floating death traps, and should for this reason be mothballed.

The Sunburn missile has never seen use in combat, to my knowledge, which probably explains why its fearsome capabilities are not more widely recognized. Other cruise missiles have been used, of course, on several occasions, and with devastating results. During the Falklands War, French-made Exocet missiles, fired from Argentine fighters, sunk the HMS Sheffield and another ship. And, in 1987, during the Iran-Iraq war, the USS Stark was nearly cut in half by a pair of Exocets while on patrol in the Persian Gulf. On that occasion US Aegis radar picked up the incoming Iraqi fighter (a French-made Mirage), and tracked its approach to within 50 miles. The radar also “saw” the Iraqi plane turn about and return to its base. But radar never detected the pilot launch his weapons. The sea-skimming Exocets came smoking in under radar and were only sighted by human eyes moments before they ripped into the Stark, crippling the ship and killing 37 US sailors.

The 1987 surprise attack on the Stark exemplifies the dangers posed by anti-ship cruise missiles. And the dangers are much more serious in the case of the Sunburn, whose specs leave the sub-sonic Exocet in the dust. Not only is the Sunburn much larger and faster, it has far greater range and a superior guidance system. Those who have witnessed its performance trials invariably come away stunned. According to one report, when the Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani visited Moscow in October 2001 he requested a test firing of the Sunburn, which the Russians were only too happy to arrange. So impressed was Ali Shamkhani that he placed an order for an undisclosed number of the missiles.

The Sunburn can deliver a 200-kiloton nuclear payload, or: a 750-pound conventional warhead, within a range of 100 miles, more than twice the range of the Exocet. The Sunburn combines a Mach 2.1 speed (two times the speed of sound) with a flight pattern that hugs the deck and includes “violent end maneuvers” to elude enemy defenses. The missile was specifically designed to defeat the US Aegis radar defense system. Should a US Navy Phalanx point defense somehow manage to detect an incoming Sunburn missile, the system has only seconds to calculate a fire solution –– not enough time to take out the intruding missile. The US Phalanx defense employs a six-barreled gun that fires 3,000 depleted-uranium rounds a minute, but the gun must have precise coordinates to destroy an intruder “just in time.”

The Sunburn’s combined supersonic speed and payload size produce tremendous kinetic energy on impact, with devastating consequences for ship and crew. A single one of these missiles can sink a large warship, yet costs considerably less than a fighter jet. Although the Navy has been phasing out the older Phalanx defense system, its replacement, known as the Rolling Action Missile (RAM) has never been tested against the weapon it seems destined to one day face in combat.

Implications For US Forces in the Gulf

The US Navy’s only plausible defense against a robust weapon like the Sunburn missile is to detect the enemy’s approach well ahead of time, whether destroyers, subs, or fighter-bombers, and defeat them before they can get in range and launch their deadly cargo. For this purpose US AWACs radar planes assigned to each naval battle group are kept aloft on a rotating schedule. The planes “see” everything within two hundred miles of the fleet, and are complemented with intelligence from orbiting satellites.

But US naval commanders operating in the Persian Gulf face serious challenges that are unique to the littoral, i.e., coastal, environment. A glance at a map shows why: The Gulf is nothing but a large lake, with one narrow outlet, and most of its northern shore, i.e., Iran, consists of mountainous terrain that affords a commanding tactical advantage over ships operating in Gulf waters. The rugged northern shore makes for easy concealment of coastal defenses, such as mobile missile launchers, and also makes their detection problematic. Although it was not widely reported, the US actually lost the battle of the Scuds in the first Gulf War –– termed “the great Scud hunt” –– and for similar reasons. Saddam Hussein’s mobile Scud launchers proved so difficult to detect and destroy –– over and over again the Iraqis fooled allied reconnaissance with decoys –– that during the course of Desert Storm the US was unable to confirm even a single kill. This proved such an embarrassment to the Pentagon, afterwards, that the unpleasant stats were buried in official reports. But the blunt fact is that the US failed to stop the Scud attacks. The launches continued until the last few days of the conflict. Luckily, the Scud’s inaccuracy made it an almost useless weapon. At one point General Norman Schwarzkopf quipped dismissively to the press that his soldiers had a greater chance of being struck by lightning in Georgia than by a Scud in Kuwait.

But that was then, and it would be a grave error to allow the Scud’s ineffectiveness to blur the facts concerning this other missile. The Sunburn’s amazing accuracy was demonstrated not long ago in a live test staged at sea by the Chinese –– and observed by US spy planes. Not only did the Sunburn missile destroy the dummy target ship, it scored a perfect bull’s eye, hitting the crosshairs of a large “X” mounted on the ship’s bridge. The only word that does it justice, awesome, has become a cliché, hackneyed from hyperbolic excess.

The US Navy has never faced anything in combat as formidable as the Sunburn missile. But this will surely change if the US and Israel decide to wage a so-called preventive war against Iran to destroy its nuclear infrastructure. Storm clouds have been darkening over the Gulf for many months. In recent years Israel upgraded its air force with a new fleet of long-range F-15 fighter-bombers, and even more recently took delivery of 5,000 bunker-buster bombs from the US –– weapons that many observers think are intended for use against Iran.

The arming for war has been matched by threats. Israeli officials have declared repeatedly that they will not allow the Mullahs to develop nuclear power, not even reactors to generate electricity for peaceful use. Their threats are particularly worrisome, because Israel has a long history of pre-emptive war. (See my 1989 book Dimona: the Third Temple? and also my 2003 article Will Iran Be Next? posted at < WILL IRAN BE NEXT? >)

Never mind that such a determination is not Israel&#8217;s to make, and belongs instead to the international community, as codified in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). With regard to Iran, the International Atomic Energy Agency&#8217;s (IAEA&#8217;s) recent report (September 2004) is well worth a look, as it repudiates facile claims by the US and Israel that Iran is building bombs. While the report is highly critical of Tehran for its ambiguities and its grudging release of documents, it affirms that IAEA inspectors have been admitted to every nuclear site in the country to which they have sought access, without exception. Last year Iran signed the strengthened IAEA inspection protocol, which until then had been voluntary. And the IAEA has found no hard evidence, to date, either that bombs exist or that Iran has made a decision to build them. (The latest IAEA report can be downloaded at: GlobalSecurity.org - Reliable Security Information)

In a talk on October 3, 2004, IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei made the clearest statement yet: "Iran has no nuclear weapons program", he said, and then repeated himself for emphasis: &#8220;Iran has no nuclear weapons program, but I personally don&#8217;t rush to conclusions before all the realities are clarified. So far I see nothing that could be called an imminent danger. I have seen no nuclear weapons program in Iran. What I have seen is that Iran is trying to gain access to nuclear enrichment technology, and so far there is no danger from Iran. Therefore, we should make use of political and diplomatic means before thinking of resorting to other alternatives.&#8221;

( http://www.aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/news_service/middle_east_full_story.asp?service_id=5051 )

No one disputes that Tehran is pursuing a dangerous path, but with 200 or more Israeli nukes targeted upon them the Iranians&#8217; insistence on keeping their options open is understandable. Clearly, the nuclear nonproliferation regime today hangs by the slenderest of threads. The world has arrived at a fateful crossroads.

A Fearful Symmetry?

If a showdown over Iran develops in the coming months, the man who could hold the outcome in his hands will be thrust upon the world stage. That man, like him or hate him, is Russian President Vladimir Putin. He has been castigated severely in recent months for gathering too much political power to himself. But according to former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who was interviewed on US television recently by David Brokaw, Putin has not imposed a tyranny upon Russia &#8211;&#8211; yet. Gorbachev thinks the jury is still out on Putin.

Perhaps, with this in mind, we should be asking whether Vladimir Putin is a serious student of history. If he is, then he surely recognizes that the deepening crisis in the Persian Gulf presents not only manifold dangers, but also opportunities. Be assured that the Russian leader has not forgotten the humiliating defeat Ronald Reagan inflicted upon the old Soviet state. (Have we Americans forgotten?) By the mid-1980s the Soviets were in Kabul, and had all but defeated the Mujahedeen. The Soviet Union appeared secure in its military occupation of Afghanistan. But then, in 1986, the first US Stinger missiles reached the hands of the Afghani resistance; and, quite suddenly, Soviet helicopter gunships and MiGs began dropping out of the skies like flaming stones. The tide swiftly turned, and by 1989 it was all over but the hand wringing and gnashing of teeth in the Kremlin. Defeated, the Soviets slunk back across the frontier. The whole world cheered the American Stingers, which had carried the day.

This very night, as he sips his cognac, what is Vladimir Putin thinking? Is he perhaps thinking about the perverse symmetries of history? If so, he may also be wondering (and discussing with his closest aides) how a truly great nation like the United States could be so blind and so stupid as to allow another state, i.e., Israel, to control its foreign policy, especially in a region as vital (and volatile) as the Mid-East. One can almost hear the Russians&#8217; animated conversation:

&#8220;The Americans! What is the matter with them?&#8221;
&#8220;They simply cannot help themselves.&#8221;
&#8220;What idiots!&#8221;
&#8220;A nation as foolish as this deserves to be taught a lesson&#8230;&#8221;
&#8220;Yes! For their own good.&#8221;
&#8220;It must be a painful lesson, one they will never forget&#8230;&#8221;
&#8220;Are we agreed, then, comrades?&#8221;
&#8220;Let us teach our American friends a lesson about the limits of military power!&#8221;

Does anyone really believe that Vladimir Putin will hesitate to seize a most rare opportunity to change the course of history and, in the bargain, take his sweet revenge? Surely Putin understands the terrible dimensions of the trap into which the US has blundered, thanks to the Israelis and their neo-con supporters in Washington who lobbied so vociferously for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, against all friendly and expert advice, and who even now beat the drums of war against Iran. Would Putin be wrong to conclude that the US will never leave the region unless it is first defeated militarily? Should we blame him for deciding that Iran is &#8220;one bridge too far&#8221;?

If the US and Israel overreach, and the Iranians close the net with Russian anti-ship missiles, it will be a fearful symmetry, indeed&#8230;

Springing the Trap

At the battle of Cannae in 216 BC the great Carthaginian general, Hannibal, tempted a much larger Roman army into a fateful advance, and then enveloped and annihilated it with a smaller force. Out of a Roman army of 70,000 men, no more than a few thousand escaped. It was said that after many hours of dispatching the Romans Hannibal&#8217;s soldiers grew so tired that the fight went out of them. In their weariness they granted the last broken and bedraggled Romans their lives&#8230;

Let us pray that the US sailors who are unlucky enough to be on duty in the Persian Gulf when the shooting starts can escape the fate of the Roman army at Cannae. The odds will be heavily against them, however, because they will face the same type of danger, tantamount to envelopment. The US ships in the Gulf will already have come within range of the Sunburn missiles and the even more-advanced SS-NX-26 Yakhonts missiles, also Russian-made (speed: Mach 2.9; range: 180 miles) deployed by the Iranians along the Gulf&#8217;s northern shore. Every US ship will be exposed and vulnerable. When the Iranians spring the trap, the entire lake will become a killing field.

Anti-ship cruise missiles are not new, as I&#8217;ve mentioned. Nor have they yet determined the outcome in a conflict. But this is probably only because these horrible weapons have never been deployed in sufficient numbers. At the time of the Falklands war the Argentine air force possessed only five Exocets, yet managed to sink two ships. With enough of them, the Argentineans might have sunk the entire British fleet, and won the war. Although we&#8217;ve never seen a massed attack of cruise missiles, this is exactly what the US Navy could face in the next war in the Gulf. Try and imagine it if you can: barrage after barrage of Exocet-class missiles, which the Iranians are known to possess in the hundreds, as well as the unstoppable Sunburn and Yakhonts missiles. The questions that our purblind government leaders should be asking themselves, today, if they value what historians will one day write about them, are two: how many of the Russian anti-ship missiles has Putin already supplied to Iran? And: How many more are currently in the pipeline? In 2001 Jane&#8217;s Defense Weekly reported that Iran was attempting to acquire anti-ship missiles from Russia. Ominously, the same report also mentioned that the more advanced Yakhonts missile was &#8220;optimized for attacks against carrier task forces.&#8221; Apparently its guidance system is &#8220;able to distinguish an aircraft carrier from its escorts.&#8221; The numbers were not disclosed&#8230;

The US Navy will come under fire even if the US does not participate in the first so-called surgical raids on Iran&#8217;s nuclear sites, that is, even if Israel goes it alone. Israel&#8217;s brand-new fleet of 25 F-15s (paid for by American taxpayers) has sufficient range to target Iran, but the Israelis cannot mount an attack without crossing US-occupied Iraqi air space. It will hardly matter if Washington gives the green light, or is dragged into the conflict by a recalcitrant Israel. Either way, the result will be the same. The Iranians will interpret US acquiescence as complicity, and, in any event, they will understand that the real fight is with the Americans. The Iranians will be entirely within their rights to counter-attack in self-defense. Most of the world will see it this way, and will support them, not America. The US and Israel will be viewed as the aggressors, even as the unfortunate US sailors in harm&#8217;s way become cannon fodder. In the Gulf&#8217;s shallow and confined waters evasive maneuvers will be difficult, at best, and escape impossible. Even if US planes control of the skies over the battlefield, the sailors caught in the net below will be hard-pressed to survive. The Gulf will run red with American blood&#8230;

From here, it only gets worse. Armed with their Russian-supplied cruise missiles, the Iranians will close the lake&#8217;s only outlet, the strategic Strait of Hormuz, cutting off the trapped and dying Americans from help and rescue. The US fleet massing in the Indian Ocean will stand by helplessly, unable to enter the Gulf to assist the survivors or bring logistical support to the other US forces on duty in Iraq. Couple this with a major new ground offensive by the Iraqi insurgents, and, quite suddenly, the tables could turn against the Americans in Baghdad. As supplies and ammunition begin to run out, the status of US forces in the region will become precarious. The occupiers will become the besieged&#8230;

With enough anti-ship missiles, the Iranians can halt tanker traffic through Hormuz for weeks, even months. With the flow of oil from the Gulf curtailed, the price of a barrel of crude will skyrocket on the world market. Within days the global economy will begin to grind to a halt. Tempers at an emergency round-the-clock session of the UN Security Council will flare and likely explode into shouting and recriminations as French, German, Chinese and even British ambassadors angrily accuse the US of allowing Israel to threaten world order. But, as always, because of the US veto the world body will be powerless to act...

America will stand alone, completely isolated. Yet, despite the increasingly hostile international mood, elements of the US media will spin the crisis very differently here at home, in a way that is sympathetic to Israel. Members of Congress will rise to speak in the House and Senate, and rally to Israel&#8217;s defense, while blaming the victim of the attack, Iran. Fundamentalist Christian talk show hosts will proclaim the historic fulfillment of biblical prophecy in our time, and will call upon the Jews of Israel to accept Jesus into their hearts; meanwhile, urging the president to nuke the evil empire of Islam. From across America will be heard histrionic cries for fresh reinforcements, even a military draft. Patriots will demand victory at any cost. Pundits will scream for an escalation of the conflict.

A war that ostensibly began as an attempt to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons will teeter on the brink of their use&#8230;

Conclusion

Friends, we must work together to prevent such a catastrophe. We must stop the next Middle East war before it starts. The US government must turn over to the United Nations the primary responsibility for resolving the deepening crisis in Iraq, and, immediately thereafter, withdraw US forces from the country. We must also prevail upon the Israelis to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and open all of their nuclear sites to IAEA inspectors. Only then can serious talks begin with Iran and other states to establish a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the Mid East &#8211;&#8211; so essential to the region&#8217;s long-term peace and security.

* * *
Mark Gaffney&#8217;s first book, Dimona the Third Temple? (1989), was a pioneering study of Israel&#8217;s nuclear weapons program. Mark&#8217;s articles about the Mid-East and proliferation issues have appeared in the Middle East Policy Journal, Washington Report On Middle East Affairs, the Earth Island Journal, The Oregonian, the Daily Californian, and have been posted on numerous web sites, especially Counterpunch.org. Mark&#8217;s 2003 paper Will Iran Be Next? can be viewed at < www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran.htm> Mark&#8217;s newest book, Gnostic Secrets of the Naassenes, was released by Inner Traditions Press in May 2003. Email <Mhgaffney@aol.com> For more information go to Gnostic Secrets of the Naassenes

(In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. Information Clearing House has no affiliation whatsoever with the originator of this article nor is Information Clearing House endorsed or sponsored by the originator.)
 
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Facinating article , but it got carried away in end

a) When US/Israel would need to launch and attack they can wip up
a reason , as they did vs Iraq, and their media ranted for weeks
to convince the local population , how dangerous the situation was

b) They also defied the UN mandate , UN officially lost its meaning
the day US decided to invade IRAQ, and then we also saw Russia
reply back on US anti sheild initiatives, in Georgia , to say if you can
invade a country so can we but russian moved back - US are still stuck in
Afghanistan


The main conclusion from the article you posted is

1) Effectively is effectiveness of Cruise Missile based attacks on ships
2) Sunburn Missile that russia produces which was quite interesting to
read about , a mysterious weapon with pin point accuracy


The question remains is how will the cruise missiles be delivered to the target

a) Iran's airforce is pretty useless , in effective unless they acquired
Sukhoi-30 crafts from russia unless they got 30 of these they do
not have a valid launch platform
b) S300 is a game changer when it comes to air defence



As far as what the world would side or not , in our world most of the world will just condemm any attack even a nuclear attack on Iran , there will be few protests , and then the story will become old.

After all was it not the Israelis that bombed the Iraqi WMD research program and nothing happened - like wise the world will watch


Modern day warfare , is just like a school yard fight , an agressor will attck , and someone will have to either do something about it or get their faces smashed... the other school kids will just stand and watch
...and may be condemn or tell stories about the incident


From Iran'a prespective - they are lucky that China/Russia is watching over them - else US would be moving in from Iraq/Afghanistan simultaneously into Iran to over throw the gov


Again facinating indeed , I wonder exactly what has Russia provided to Iran , they must have given Iran (S300 system) just as a mean to get even with US for their role in Afghanistan vs Russia


Russia already stated , any missile shield in poland would be declaration of war - so knowing that US's aim to put missiles so close to Russia is a very very very .... concerning act
 
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I have been contributing to this forum for almost two months now. During this i time i have fought with the sheer arrogance of the moderators and admins of this forum.

The final straw was when they closed my welcome thread, as some of my friends were posting there.

I asked them for a reason and the reply was and i quote " i shall consider myself lucky that it was allowed for that long..."

No I don't consider myself lucky at all, they shall consider themselves lucky that people, like myself, waste their time by posting on this web page.

As far as i am concern if my welcome thread is not good enough to be here then they don't deserve to have my other contributions to this forum either.

Hence i am withdrawing all my posts from this forum.
 
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Have you guys read about the Sunburn Missile.
Yes, I have...

Mark Gaffney said:
Iran: A Bridge too Far?

Iran: A Bridge too Far?

The weapon that could defeat the US in the Gulf
That is 'could', not will.

Mark Gaffney said:
“Nonsense!” you are probably thinking. That’s impossible. How could a few picayune destroyers threaten the US Pacific fleet?”
Correct...Nonsense and grossly hyperbolic are exactly what I am thinking.

Mark Gaffney said:
The Sunburn Missile

I was shocked when I learned the facts about these Russian-made cruise missiles.
Am not 'shocked' at all. Too bad you are, professor Gaffney.

Mark Gaffney said:
The problem is that so many of us suffer from two common misperceptions. The first follows from our assumption that Russia is militarily weak, as a result of the breakup of the old Soviet system. Actually, this is accurate, but it does not reflect the complexities. Although the Russian navy continues to rust in port, and the Russian army is in disarray, in certain key areas Russian technology is actually superior to our own. And nowhere is this truer than in the vital area of anti-ship cruise missile technology, where the Russians hold at least a ten-year lead over the US. The second misperception has to do with our complacency in general about missiles-as-weapons –– probably attributable to the pathetic performance of Saddam Hussein’s Scuds during the first Gulf war: a dangerous illusion that I will now attempt to rectify.
Utter BS. From a technical perspective, a weapon's label as 'anti-whatever' is meaningless. A cruise missile, be it against a target on land or sea, differs only in the environment. If anything, land is more difficult than sea since land has uneven features while the sea is relatively uniform on the surface. A cruise missile that can navigate on land via terrain following and avoidance can certainly deal with the sea. The only major issue is 'multipath propagation effects' and they are:

1) Direct-direct
2) Direct-indirect
3) Indirect-direct
4) Indirect-indirect

Water produces different radar multipath propagation effects than land where the target can appear to be below the surface, confusing the missile's radar. Explanation for the four above items is for another point for discussion, but essentially they not unknown and the US is fully capable of compensating for this effect. Others may not be so capable. The easiest solution is to fly at a higher altitude but that would make the weapon vulnerable to radar detection. Fly lower and the missile's own radar is limited by line-of-sight, visually and electronically, and must deal with water's unique multipath propagation effects. So where are the evidences, professor Gaffney, that the Russians are a decade ahead of US in radar technology?

Mark Gaffney said:
Many years ago, Soviet planners gave up trying to match the US Navy ship for ship, gun for gun, and dollar for dollar. The Soviets simply could not compete with the high levels of US spending required to build up and maintain a huge naval armada.
Utter BS. Russia and other Soviet republics were not resource poor. This is sheer distortion. The Soviets built entire secret cities dedicated for military weapons development and these cities were never officially acknowledged.

Closed city - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
There are currently 42 publicly-acknowledged closed cities in Russia with a total population of about 1.5 million people. 75% are administered by the Russian Ministry of Defence, with the rest being administered by the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency, formerly the Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom).[2] Another 15 or so closed cities are believed to exist, but their names and locations have not been publicly disclosed by the Russian government.
Nearly two millions dedicated for weapons development. They ranged from janitors to Nobel caliber scientists. The projects ranged from electronics to metallurgy to NBC weapons. How many armies in the world would love to have 1.5 million troops? The scientists, engineers and technicians enjoyed the best the Soviets had to offer, from pay to housing to assorted minor privileges. So this argument is patently false to be kind and blatantly a lie to be blunt about it. There was no shortage of money the Soviets can spend on these cities but the problem was the inherent inefficiencies of a joke of an economic system and the corruption of the Soviet government that no amount of money could overcome.

Mark Gaffney said:
They shrewdly adopted an alternative approach based on strategic defense. They searched for weaknesses, and sought relatively inexpensive ways to exploit those weaknesses. The Soviets succeeded: by developing several supersonic anti-ship missiles, one of which, the SS-N-22 Sunburn, has been called “the most lethal missile in the world today.”
Sounds scary enough for a B-rated movie.

Mark Gaffney said:
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the old military establishment fell upon hard times. But in the late1990s Moscow awakened to the under-utilized potential of its missile technology to generate desperately needed foreign exchange. A decision was made to resuscitate selected programs, and, very soon, Russian missile technology became a hot export commodity. Today, Russian missiles are a growth industry generating much-needed cash for Russia, with many billions in combined sales to India, China, Viet Nam, Cuba, and also Iran. In the near future this dissemination of advanced technology is likely to present serious challenges to the US. Some have even warned that the US Navy’s largest ships, the massive carriers, have now become floating death traps, and should for this reason be mothballed.
How this claim is more BS is coming...

Mark Gaffney said:
The Sunburn missile has never seen use in combat, to my knowledge, which probably explains why its fearsome capabilities are not more widely recognized.
If it has never been used in combat, then how is it 'fearsome'? Slick sales brochures writers?

Mark Gaffney said:
Other cruise missiles have been used, of course, on several occasions, and with devastating results. During the Falklands War, French-made Exocet missiles, fired from Argentine fighters, sunk the HMS Sheffield and another ship. And, in 1987, during the Iran-Iraq war, the USS Stark was nearly cut in half by a pair of Exocets while on patrol in the Persian Gulf. On that occasion US Aegis radar picked up the incoming Iraqi fighter (a French-made Mirage), and tracked its approach to within 50 miles. The radar also “saw” the Iraqi plane turn about and return to its base. But radar never detected the pilot launch his weapons. The sea-skimming Exocets came smoking in under radar and were only sighted by human eyes moments before they ripped into the Stark, crippling the ship and killing 37 US sailors.
The USS Stark did not have the AEGIS system.

Mark Gaffney said:
The 1987 surprise attack on the Stark exemplifies the dangers posed by anti-ship cruise missiles. And the dangers are much more serious in the case of the Sunburn, whose specs leave the sub-sonic Exocet in the dust. Not only is the Sunburn much larger and faster, it has far greater range and a superior guidance system. Those who have witnessed its performance trials invariably come away stunned. According to one report, when the Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani visited Moscow in October 2001 he requested a test firing of the Sunburn, which the Russians were only too happy to arrange. So impressed was Ali Shamkhani that he placed an order for an undisclosed number of the missiles.
So what? Since when did Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani became a technical expert? Is it because Iran is so good at Photochopping missile launches?

Mark Gaffney said:
The Sunburn can deliver a 200-kiloton nuclear payload, or: a 750-pound conventional warhead, within a range of 100 miles, more than twice the range of the Exocet. The Sunburn combines a Mach 2.1 speed (two times the speed of sound) with a flight pattern that hugs the deck and includes “violent end maneuvers” to elude enemy defenses.
This imply the missile is intelligent enough to RESPOND to threats to itself while in flight. Or is it more likely that the missile's maneuvers are PROGRAMMED? But either way, missiles have finite fuel load and the more a missile maneuvers, the less its effective range. One hundred miles maximum range is not the launch point, air or ground. More like 50-60 if the missile must maneuver in its PROGRAMMED flight, which make the Sunburn somewhat more effective than the Exocet. This lead back to the assertion that aircraft carriers are now 'floating death traps'. Even if launch at maximum range, the carrier must either be inside that radius against a land platform, or that the attacking aircraft must close within 100 miles of the aircraft. In a combat situation, any hostile aircraft will be detected by AWACS and intercepted long before he can close to inside 100 miles. The combat radius of the carrier's air wing is far greater than 100 miles, making the land Sunburns vulnerable.

Further...

USS Enterprise (CVN-65) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In the morning of 14 January 1969, a MK-32 Zuni rocket loaded on a parked F-4 Phantom exploded due to ordinance 'cook off' after being overheated by an aircraft start unit mounted to a tow tractor.[13] The explosion set off fires and additional explosions across the flight deck. The fires were brought under control relatively quickly (when compared with previous carrier flight deck fires), but 27 lives were lost and an additional 314 personnel were injured. The fire destroyed 15 aircraft, and the resulting damage forced Enterprise to put in for repairs, primarily to repair the flight deck's armored plating.[14] In early March 1969, repairs to the ship were completed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and the ship proceeded on her deployment to Vietnam and the Tonkin Gulf.
According to US Navy report, several 500lb MK-82s detonated on the Enterprise's deck.

Enterprise
The primary damage to the ship was caused by explosions of weapons penetrating the flight deck, “sending large, high velocity fragments into compartments below.” Five large holes in the flight deck were made by Mk 82 bombs that “cooked off in the fire.” A series of four explosions occurred between 0822–0826, and four more from 0830–0835. Making desperate efforts to clear the area of potential hazards, the crew had jettisoned all unexploded ordnance into the sea seven minutes later.
From WW II experience, if this was in a war, the Enterprise would still be able to conduct flight operations even alongside firefighting efforts. This shows the toughness of post WW II designs and engineerings for these ships. Hardly 'floating death traps'.

Mark Gaffney said:
The missile was specifically designed to defeat the US Aegis radar defense system.
Baseless claim. For an educated man, you are awfully gullible, professor.

Mark Gaffney said:
Should a US Navy Phalanx point defense somehow manage to detect an incoming Sunburn missile, the system has only seconds to calculate a fire solution –– not enough time to take out the intruding missile.
Air-air engagements with Mach closing speed and those missiles can calculate firing solutions in a few seconds just fine.

Mark Gaffney said:
The US Phalanx defense employs a six-barreled gun that fires 3,000 depleted-uranium rounds a minute, but the gun must have precise coordinates to destroy an intruder “just in time.”
Wrong...Just point the gun in the general direction and its own radar can do the rest.

Mark Gaffney said:
The Sunburn’s combined supersonic speed and payload size produce tremendous kinetic energy on impact, with devastating consequences for ship and crew. A single one of these missiles can sink a large warship, yet costs considerably less than a fighter jet. Although the Navy has been phasing out the older Phalanx defense system, its replacement, known as the Rolling Action Missile (RAM) has never been tested against the weapon it seems destined to one day face in combat.
So for the Russian weapon that has never been used in combat but it is absolutely 'fearsome'. The American defense weapon that is also never been in combat should have its capabilities doubted.

Mark Gaffney said:
Implications For US Forces in the Gulf

The US Navy’s only plausible defense against a robust weapon like the Sunburn missile is to detect the enemy’s approach well ahead of time, whether destroyers, subs, or fighter-bombers, and defeat them before they can get in range and launch their deadly cargo. For this purpose US AWACs radar planes assigned to each naval battle group are kept aloft on a rotating schedule. The planes “see” everything within two hundred miles of the fleet, and are complemented with intelligence from orbiting satellites.

But US naval commanders operating in the Persian Gulf face serious challenges that are unique to the littoral, i.e., coastal, environment. A glance at a map shows why: The Gulf is nothing but a large lake, with one narrow outlet, and most of its northern shore, i.e., Iran, consists of mountainous terrain that affords a commanding tactical advantage over ships operating in Gulf waters. The rugged northern shore makes for easy concealment of coastal defenses, such as mobile missile launchers, and also makes their detection problematic. Although it was not widely reported, the US actually lost the battle of the Scuds in the first Gulf War –– termed “the great Scud hunt” –– and for similar reasons. Saddam Hussein’s mobile Scud launchers proved so difficult to detect and destroy –– over and over again the Iraqis fooled allied reconnaissance with decoys –– that during the course of Desert Storm the US was unable to confirm even a single kill. This proved such an embarrassment to the Pentagon, afterwards, that the unpleasant stats were buried in official reports. But the blunt fact is that the US failed to stop the Scud attacks. The launches continued until the last few days of the conflict. Luckily, the Scud’s inaccuracy made it an almost useless weapon. At one point General Norman Schwarzkopf quipped dismissively to the press that his soldiers had a greater chance of being struck by lightning in Georgia than by a Scud in Kuwait.
Who said the American aircraft carriers must be inside the Gulf?

Mark Gaffney said:
But that was then, and it would be a grave error to allow the Scud’s ineffectiveness to blur the facts concerning this other missile. The Sunburn’s amazing accuracy was demonstrated not long ago in a live test staged at sea by the Chinese –– and observed by US spy planes. Not only did the Sunburn missile destroy the dummy target ship, it scored a perfect bull’s eye, hitting the crosshairs of a large “X” mounted on the ship’s bridge. The only word that does it justice, awesome, has become a cliché, hackneyed from hyperbolic excess.
Give US all a break, professor. The way weapons testing works is that you try to control variables as much as possible and release them incrementally. If any point the missile fail in any test, you have a point where you can regress to find out how did the missile fail to acquire the target or fly into the ground, for example. For this test, if true and it would be spectacular if it is true, there would have been a radar reflector hidden somewhere on the ship that is not visible to spectators but is an electronic beacon for the missile's radar. There is nothing inherently wrong or 'cheating' with this test as it would be to see if the missile's own radar can acquire a return. The missile would not be armed with explosive. The reflector would incrementally decrease in size until it is deemed no longer needed. If this demonstration is true, then the X is a dead giveaway to the presense of a hidden radar reflector, which would indicate this is still a testing regime. Radar do not see paint, professor.

No need to go further.
 
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I have been contributing to this forum for almost two months now. During this i time i have fought with the sheer arrogance of the moderators and admins of this forum.

The final straw was when they closed my welcome thread, as some of my friends were posting there.

I asked them for a reason and the reply was and i quote " i shall consider myself lucky that it was allowed for that long..."

No I don't consider myself lucky at all, they shall consider themselves lucky that people, like myself, waste their time by posting on this web page.

As far as i am concern if my welcome thread is not good enough to be here then they don't deserve to have my other contributions to this forum either.

Hence i am withdrawing all my posts from this forum.
 
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