How Cabinet Mission Plan could have changed the history of the world?

[ghazi52]

How Cabinet Mission Plan could have changed the history of the world?

The Cabinet Mission Plan is considered the best constitutional setup for any federation. In 1946, just before the division of British India, it was the last attempt to keep India united. Fahad Taherani explains why the idea could not realize.


News Desk
4 June 2021


Cabinet mission plan

The Cabinet Mission Plan proposed to keep British India united. It provided a federal system of governance for the country. It aimed to accommodate all the major parties of India i.e. The Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League. The Muslim League’s demand was to establish an independent state in the North West and the North East of India namely Pakistan. While Congress wanted an independent India with no partition. On the other hand, the British had their own wishes. The plan kept the balance of demands of all the parties.


The making of the Cabinet Mission

The British government amid an unprecedented international situation sent India a commission to resolve the problems of Indians with regard to the form of self-rule. This was the time of Britain coming victoriously out of the Second World War but was shacked to the core due to the effects of war. The world war had also shifted the power dynamics; Britain was no longer a superpower but the United States and the Soviet Union were.

The two parties of Britain were also divided on the future of India. Conservatives led by Sir Winston Churchill aimed to revive the empire and rule India itself. While the Labor government under Prime Minister Clement Atlee wanted to transfer power to India due to Britain’s economic plight after the war. Clement Atlee sent three members of his cabinet to India: Lord Pethick Lawrence, Secretary of India; Richard Stafford Crips, the President of Board of Trade; and Albert Alexander, the First Lord of Admiralty.

To whom should power be transferred?

The opinion was divided on the question of who would hold the power? For the Labor government, the power should be transferred to Congress. For the Conservatives, the minority and prices must be given due importance. Sir Winston Churchill said that “The word ‘minorities’ had no relevance or sense when applied to masses of human beings numbered in many scores of millions.” Undoubtedly, he was recognizing 90 million Muslims of India that it was a large community and a minority.

The Viceroy Wavell desired a united India as it would serve the interests of Britain. He was also aware that Congress did not represent the Muslims. He wanted to give safeguards to Muslims in the constitution. He also believed that Muslims can be protected in a federation with a weak center. Congress, on the other hand, believed that the safeguards were unnecessary and India must remain united. Finally, Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s demand was to secure a separate independent state for the Muslims. The question of power was to be recommended by the Cabinet Mission.

The proposal of Cabinet Mission

The Cabinet Mission started meeting the leaders of India. Mr Jinnah first denied meeting but finally agreed to cooperate because PM Atlee had warned that if no agreement is reached the power would be transferred to the Congress party. The Muslim League was offered two options:

A Pakistan with six provinces part of a common union with India and with no sovereignty.

A fully sovereign Pakistan with the partition of Bengal and Punjab.

Mr Jinnah considered both options. He knew an autonomous Pakistan would keep Muslims intact, but a sovereign Pakistan would mean a large chunk of Muslims will be left over in central India. He was also told by Chief of General Staff Arthur Smith that the division would endanger Indian security. Mr Jinnah proposed that both countries can sign a military pact. What Mr Jinnah really wanted was that the Muslim-Hindu parity within India and he saw that possibility in the plan.

The Muslim provinces, grouped together, would derive maximum autonomy. Thus he started favoring the plan. However, the leading Congress figure Mr Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi rejected the plan by saying that grouping was worse than a sovereign Pakistan.

The response of the Muslim League

The Muslim League sent a proposal of the union that may retain subjects of defence and foreign affairs at the centre but no power of legislation or taxation. It would consist of a Pakistan group of provinces and a Hindustan group. Both would contribute to the union’s expenditure.

The Cabinet Mission Plan of 16 May

The Cabinet Mission published its own plan on the 16th of May 1946. It proposed a three-tier administration. First, a union with a legislature; subjects of foreign affairs, defence; and communication for defence; and power of taxation.

Second, India would be grouped into three zones namely, Group A containing Hindu majority provinces; Group B, North-Western Muslim majority provinces; and Group C, North West Muslim majority provinces. The plan also envisaged an option of opting out of the group after the first elections. It provided that the constitution for the union would be enacted at the next stage.

This plan was followed by short-term planning that provided for the formation of an interior government; interim would be set up by a party that accepts the plan.

Who accepted the plan?

The Muslim League was divided on the plan so was Congress. Mr Jinnah favored its acceptance while Mr Liaquat Ali Khan raised objections over the Congress dominance which would swipe safeguards. However, ML accepted the plan saying that it was a stepping stop to Pakistan. On the other flank, Mr. Gandhi wrote in a Harijan Journal that “There was no take it or leave it business about the plan and the provinces were free to reject the very idea of grouping.” It transpired that Congress was allowed to modify the plan.

Congress accepted the plan with its own interpretation saying that grouping was not necessary. It said, “While adhering to our views we accept your proposals and are prepared to work with them with a view to achieving our objective.” The Muslims smelled a conspiracy; Lord Wavell said it was not a genuine acceptance.

On the 29th of July, Jawaharlal Nehru held a presser and declared that they do not accept the grouping. The London Statement of December 6 contraindicated with Congress’s interpretation and said that the grouping was the key point of the plan. Abdul Kalam Azad of Congress believed that the plan would have solved the communal problem but Mr. Nehru destroyed all the hopes.

Direct Action Day

The Muslim League reacted to these developments and immediately backed off from the plan. Mr Jinnah called for ‘direct action’ on August the 16th. The day passed peacefully across India except in Calcutta where riots erupted between Hindus and Muslims. Mr. Kazmi writes “Riots were started by Hindu and the Muslims retaliated fiercely.


The collapse of the Cabinet Mission Plan

On the 2nd of September, Congress formed the interim government. Muslim League led by Mr. Khan joined the government and presented a ‘people-friendly budget.’ The tussle between the two parties swelled in the government after the introduction of this budget which aimed to win the hearts of the poor. Congress continued to oppose the grouping and finally, the 16 May Plan collapsed when it accepted the creation of Pakistan. Perhaps they thought partition would be temporary as the new Muslim country had no industries to sustain economically. The rest is history.

How Cabinet Mission Plan could have changed the history of the world?

The Cabinet Mission Plan proposed to keep British India united. It provided a federal system of governance for the country.

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[Syed1.]

Interesting... I recall studying about this approximately decade and half ago in Pak Studies.

I wonder what the subcontinent would have been like in terms of development had this plan been accepted. Two groups of Pakistan provinces and Hindustan provinces under a common flag. No spending on wars or excessive military equipment would have surely helped the people of the subcontinent to attain prosperity by now.

However, that being said as being witnessed in todays India, Muslims and Hindus will always have friction whenever either is in absolute majority and a sizeable minority of the other exists. For that I'll be forever thankful to Mr. Jinnah for a free and independent Muslim country in Pakistan.

 

[ghazi52]

Revisiting the Resolution​

Dr Muhammad Reza Kazimi

Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman addresses the historic Muslim League session at Lahore, 1940. Liaquat Ali Khan and the Quaid-i-Azam can be seen conferring in the background.


Was the Lahore Resolution a mistake? We need only to look at the ongoing genocide in Gaza for an answer. The borders of Israel expanded in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973, even though the Jews were a tiny minority in that region. It is statehood that made all the difference. Israel was created as a small state, but it was a state, and a state could receive external support. Critics of the Two-Nation Theory need to see how elusive the two-state solution is now in Palestine.

The Lahore Resolution was no sudden decision. Its story began in Karachi. On October 10, 1938, Shaikh Abdul Majid moved Resolution No.5 at the Sindh Muslim League Conference. The resolution was seconded by Khan Bahadur Gurmani and supported by Sir Abdullah Haroon, Sayed Abdul Rauf Shah and Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni. It was on this occasion that G.M. Sayed articulated that the Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations.

“This Conference considers it absolutely essential, in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment and political self-determination of the two nations, known as Hindus and Muslims, to recommend to the All-India Muslim League to review and revise the entire conception of what should be the suitable constitution for India which will secure honourable and legitimate status to them.”

There were two other steps before the Lahore Session. On March 25, 1939, speaking at Meerut, Liaquat Ali Khan said: “If Hindus and Muslims cannot live together, then they should divide the country on the basis of religion and culture.” The next development was at Muhammad Ali Park, Calcutta. On April 17, 1939, presiding over a meeting to observe the first death anniversary of Allama Iqbal, the Raja of Mahmudabad, referring to the Allama’s Allahabad address in 1930, said:

The Lahore Resolution was not a sudden decision; nor was it some British ploy to divide the subcontinent.

“The main purpose of this proposal was a single autonomous, independent Muslim Government, or, if you want to phrase it in constitutional terms, then understand that a separate federation of autonomous Muslim provinces is brought into being.” (Shaiq Ahmad Usmani (ed.), Asr-i-Jadeed, Calcutta, April 18, 1939)

Thus, the road to Lahore was opened, but before we come to its text, let us deal with the accusation that the Lahore Resolution was inspired by the British and drafted by Sir Zafarullah Khan. We have two writers who cite the actual views of Sir Zafarullah Khan on the matter. Hasan Ja’far Zaidi cites the actual opinion of Sir Zafarullah Khan:

“There is, for instance, the Pakistan scheme which broadly speaking seeks to divide India into Muslim and non-Muslim parts, the Muslim part being described as Pakistan … one has only to contemplate the expense, misery, suffering and horror involved in any such attempt … the scheme is utterly impractical.” (Dawn, July 16, 2017)

Khan Abdul Wali Khan cites the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow’s letter dated March 12, 1940, to Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State, as below:

“Under my instruction, Zafarullah wrote a memorandum on the subject: Two Dominion States: I have already sent it to your attention. I have also asked him for further clarification, which he says is forthcoming. He is anxious, however, that no one should find out that he had prepared the plan. He has, however, given me the right to do with it what I like, including sending a copy to you. Copies have been passed on to Jinnah and, I think, to Sir Akbar Hydari. While he, Zafarullah, cannot admit its authorship, his document has been prepared for adoption by the Muslim League with a view to giving it the fullest publicity.” (Facts are Facts, New Delhi, Vikas, 1987, p29)

Note that the last part is open to two interpretations. The first is that the idea of demanding two dominions should be formulated and popularized. This interpretation would have been valid had All-India Muslim League leaders like Shaikh Abdul Majid, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and the Raja of Mahmudabad had not, as detailed above, already been demanding two federations since 1938.

The second interpretation is that it was a document drawn up to dissuade the Muslim League from demanding Partition; otherwise, why would Sir Zafarullah Khan be anxious that he should not be known as the author of a solution repeatedly and publicly demanded by the leaders of the Muslim League? Sir Zafarullah’s anxiety, that he should not be known as the author, could be that he was going counter to the Muslim League. This ties in with Zafarullah Khan’s note, as cited by Hasan Ja’far Zaidi.

Ashique Husain Batalvi, who was present when the Lahore Resolution was being drafted, cited the correspondence between the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, and the Secretary of State, Lord Zetland. The Viceroy wrote on March 25, 1940:

“I do not attach too much importance to Jinnah’s demand for the carving out of India into an indefinite number of so-called ‘Dominions’, and I would judge myself his attitude at the present moment is that, as Congress are putting forward a preposterous claim which they know is incapable of acceptance, he equally will put forward just as extreme a claim the impracticality of which he is just as well aware.”

Wali Khan cites the above letter on pages 30 and 31 of his book; he, however, omits the reply that the secretary of state gave on April 5, 1940, which was:

“I think that in the course of the forthcoming debate, I shall be bound to express my dissent from the proposals which have recently been put forward by the All-India Muslim League in the course of their recent Conference at Lahore. I would very much doubt whether they have been properly thought out.” (Jang, August 25, 1987)

Since the secretary of state for India thought that the Lahore Resolution had not been “properly thought out,” this disposes of the notion that the British had thought it out. The operative portion of the Resolution reads:

“No constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute ‘Independent states’ in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.”

Ashique Husain Batalvi made the criticism that the Resolution was imprecisely expressed. The areas which were demanded should have been named. This criticism was valid, as it allowed the partition of Punjab and Bengal. The more intriguing ambiguity was the use of two discordant terms, “autonomous” and “sovereign”. What is autonomous cannot be sovereign; what is sovereign does not need to be autonomous. B.R. Ambedkar lost no time in pointing out this discrepancy. The question of why these phrases were used was to provide a cover for the separation of Bengal from Pakistan.

Awami League leaders, from 1948 to 1966, demanded autonomy for the eastern wing on the basis of the Lahore Resolution. In 1947, Mr. Jinnah and the All-India Muslim League were quite willing to let a united and independent Bengal emerge on August 15, 1947, but then, Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel blocked the move, censuring Mahatma Gandhi and insulting Sarat Chandra Bose in the process. All this has been attested to by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in his Unfinished Memoirs. Could the Congress have been acting under the guidance of Sir Zafarullah Khan?

Even the British could not have been behind the denial of independence to Bengal, as PM Clement Atlee’s letter to President Harry Truman shows. Atlee alerted Truman of the possibility that three independent nations would emerge on the map of South Asia. Dawn carried this correspondence on December 28, 2018. This denial of independence, that is, the ‘third option’, had its repercussions in the referendum in the North-West Frontier Province, when the two options given were joining either India or Pakistan, but the third option of independence was omitted because it had been denied to Bengal. On this point, Wali Khan, in his book, unjustly chastises the British:

“The British were clever manipulators! They were able to utilize different and opposing forces to their advantage. The Viceroy approached Hindu Mahasabha for the unity of India. They approached the Muslim League and Jinnah for partitioning the country. This was an excellent method to set these two forces on a collision course.” (p45)

The fact was that when the Independent Bengal proposal was put to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, he invoked the Two-Nation Theory to turn it down: “There was no chance of Hindus there agreeing to live under permanent Muslim domination” (Transfer of Power Papers, Vol X, 1013). Why Nehru blocked the independence of Bengal, he did not hide. “East Bengal is going to be a source of embarrassment for Pakistan.” (Transfer of Power Papers, Vol XI, 03). Thus, to blame the British is not fair. Khan Abdul Wali Khan seems to have realized this. He was to admit that the, “Withdrawal of the British from South Asia was a mistake.” (The News, April 15, 1995).

This was a mere 18 years after the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan.
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