Featured How American Intelligence Spy on Pakistan Army

[RedHulk]

Simplest solution is to keep your sensitive installations off grid. Chaudhary Nisar never used to carry a phone with him to avoid leakage of sensitive information.
About nuclear tech being transferred from one location to other mostly probably done during natural weather changes to avoid sat detection.
The more you depend on technology the more you are vulnerable. Afghanistan is done through old school channels.

 

[Dalit]

Simplest solution is to keep your sensitive installations off grid. Chaudhary Nisar never used to carry a phone with him to avoid leakage of sensitive information.
About nuclear tech being transferred from one location to other mostly probably done during natural weather changes to avoid sat detection.

That is exactly what Pakistan does. Use traditional and proven methods. Sometimes being offline is better than being online.

 

[LeGenD]

This makes one wonder that how Pakistan's nuclear capability has still survived. They way NSA is ahead in tech and spying, we stand naked. Nothing is protected. How does Pakistan Army do anything without them knowing about it. This is not easy to understand. How did Pakistan play chess with US in Afg theater for so long...

Friend,

Nuclear program have mechanical aspects to it as well. It has both online and offline aspects. Nuclear program is a complex development in itself.

Pakistan and USA are not at war; if US sabotage Pakistan's nuclear program, what happens next? If left unchecked for a while, Pakistan will scramble to its feet and attempt to recover from the attack.

These options will be considered only when a country would threaten USA directly. Cyberwarfare will be used to create an opening in the defenses of a country and a massive volley of decapitating strikes will follow suite (conventional and/or nuclear). This can only happen in a full-scale war. US is not pressing the trigger otherwise.

Simplest solution is to keep your sensitive installations off grid. Chaudhary Nisar never used to carry a phone with him to avoid leakage of sensitive information.
About nuclear tech being transferred from one location to other mostly probably done during natural weather changes to avoid sat detection.
The more you depend on technology the more you are vulnerable. Afghanistan is done through old school channels.

Weather patterns only disrupt optical imaging. They do not disrupt SAR imaging.

Satellite systems have evolved much since the 1990s.

 

[In arduis fidelis]

Simplest solution is to keep your sensitive installations off grid. Chaudhary Nisar never used to carry a phone with him to avoid leakage of sensitive information.
About nuclear tech being transferred from one location to other mostly probably done during natural weather changes to avoid sat detection.
The more you depend on technology the more you are vulnerable. Afghanistan is done through old school channels.

That strategy is redundant now. Everything connected to electric grid can be hacked now. Airgapping is a thing of the past now. I am sure you have heard of Stuxnet and that was years ago imagine what NSA is capable of now.

Besides you cant really protect them if insiders start taking money from Americans to smuggle in surveillance eqpt that too placed on very high ranks.
People with inside info would know who i am talking about.

 

[RedHulk]

That strategy is redundant now. Everything connected to electric grid can be hacked now. Airgapping is a thing of the past now. I am sure you have heard of Stuxnet and that was years ago imagine what NSA is capable of now.

Besides you cant really protect them if insiders start taking money from Americans to smuggle in surveillance eqpt that too placed on very high ranks.
People with inside info would know who i am talking about.

Obviously you cant do anything if infrastructure is sabotaged internally. But being off grid gives you greater protection from external threats when enemy have to go greater length to sabotage. And greater chances of being captured.

 

[Tomcats]

That strategy is redundant now. Everything connected to electric grid can be hacked now. Airgapping is a thing of the past now. I am sure you have heard of Stuxnet and that was years ago imagine what NSA is capable of now.

Besides you cant really protect them if insiders start taking money from Americans to smuggle in surveillance eqpt that too placed on very high ranks.
People with inside info would know who i am talking about.

Speaking of Stuxnet, Iran at the moment seems to very well have suffered from some sort of 'attack' similar to it and is probably still suffering if it has not fully grasped and recovered from it.

 

[ARMalik]

Anything coming out due to "Snowden Leak" should be taken with a bit of salt. He is a jewish protected agent just like the other drama queen Julian Assange. Such agents are state sponsored and releasing of info are deliberate tactics to get a response. Hence these are nothing more than "half baked" stories.

 

[blain2]

In the Pakistani calculation, with all its wherewithal, the US can know a lot about our nuclear program. The Pakistani side expects this however while the Americans can know a lot, they cannot know all and therein lies the survivability of the program.

At the end of the day, it is the people working on the inside that matter. If they sell out anywhere (Snowden's case in point), then all bets are off.

People should also realize that ISI's effectiveness (whatever it may be, I don't buy into the idiotic rankings put out by some) is more human intelligence based. We don't have the resources to make ISI technically very capable given what is available in terms of the budget. The Americans have helped ISI become better technically but as is the case in all matters intelligence, it is never a cozy relationship, rather a transactional one.

 

[Path-Finder]

sorry, what is the jist of all of it? if someone can put it an abstract!

 

[PAR 5]

US weakness arund the world) is HUMINT while their strength is SIGINT, ELINT etc

Pakistan weakness is SIGINT, ELINT etc while our strength (in Pakistan only) is HUMINT

 

[Bratva]

The title is misleading since the spying was done in lieu of helping shore up Pakistan’s sigint capacity. If it isn’t for these exchanges, our warfighting concepts would still be stuck in the 60’s.

They did both. Not only Pakistan was a partner to NSA which helped Pakistan shore up its SIGNINT significantly, but on the downside, NSA got a foothold in Pakistan to spy on the nuclear program. Take an examle of GCHQ hacking Cisco devices and re routing Pakistan internet Traffic and NSA Hacking Pakistan Green Exchange. Last but not the least, General Kayani famous words when American penetrated abbotabad, they have come for our nukes.

Isn't the green exchange communication separate from rest of the telecommunications? If its not then no wonder it can be compromised despite all firewalls.
Analyst said Pakistani analyst were ten years behind. What if they were not provided the company of cream to give them as minimum info about our capabilities. If ISI letting in NSA analyst obviously they would have not provided the whole structure by keeping them at bay

Just as Iran Nuclear Power plant was airgapped yet still got hacked, NSA hacked the Airgapped green exchange room based on the vulnerabilites that existed in the Huwaei Switches inside the green exchange room

Air Gapped Networks provide another layer of security no doubt, but when a state actor like NSA is determine to hack you, they will find ways around it. !

 

[Zulfiqar]

They did both. Not only Pakistan was a partner to NSA which helped Pakistan shore up its SIGNINT significantly, but on the downside, NSA got a foothold in Pakistan to spy on the nuclear program. Take an examle of GCHQ hacking Cisco devices and re routing Pakistan internet Traffic and NSA Hacking Pakistan Green Exchange. Last but not the least, General Kayani famous words when American penetrated abbotabad, they have come for our nukes.



Just as Iran Nuclear Power plant was airgapped yet still got hacked, NSA hacked the Airgapped green exchange room based on the vulnerabilites that existed in the Huwaei Switches inside the green exchange room

Air Gapped Networks provide another layer of security no doubt, but when a state actor like NSA is determine to hack you, they will find ways around it. !

Reminds me of a time some years ago when I used to live in a particular cantt/area. Our lines were similar to the army ones (no/partial caller ID and stuff). We were cut off from the rest of the civilian network (also affecting the colony's internet) because of an alleged cyber attack.

The network was restored after a few days.

 

[RedHulk]

They did both. Not only Pakistan was a partner to NSA which helped Pakistan shore up its SIGNINT significantly, but on the downside, NSA got a foothold in Pakistan to spy on the nuclear program. Take an examle of GCHQ hacking Cisco devices and re routing Pakistan internet Traffic and NSA Hacking Pakistan Green Exchange. Last but not the least, General Kayani famous words when American penetrated abbotabad, they have come for our nukes.



Just as Iran Nuclear Power plant was airgapped yet still got hacked, NSA hacked the Airgapped green exchange room based on the vulnerabilites that existed in the Huwaei Switches inside the green exchange room

Air Gapped Networks provide another layer of security no doubt, but when a state actor like NSA is determine to hack you, they will find ways around it. !

There are technologies with which you can sniff data from a cable without even connecting to it ( Read only access), thats what Russia does on american under water cables through their subs but to enter a system and to sabotage it you need to be connected to it in airgaped system(Read & Write access). This can only be done if some one from inside provide you a remote access wirelessly so you can snoope around put your undetectable malware in there to sabotage it. If every router in airgapped system is without wireless functionality its not possible to wirelessly connect to it. Yes you can read the data from a range if there is any device for that but you won't be able to change the transmitted data. I don't think there is any that powerful device which can read data from a drone or satellite from a non wireless system. But if you manually attach a powerful wireless device it can be picked by drone or satellite. A normal TIN CAN wireless receiver can pick wireless signals from 2km. So a person who want to sabotage something can sit 2km away and do the job on wireless system.

 

[Asian.Century]

SNOWDEN ARCHIVE
——THE SIDTODAY
FILES
SIDtoday is the internal newsletter for the NSA’s most important division, the Signals Intelligence Directorate. The Intercept released four years’ worth of newsletters in batches, starting with 2003, after editorial review. From the documents and the accompanying articles available in this archive, you can learn a surprising amount about what the agency's spies were doing, how they were doing it, and why.

https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/?orderBy=publishedTime&orderDirection=desc#archive

SNOWDEN ARCHIVE
——THE SIDTODAY
The NAC's Advanced Network Development & Analysis (ANDA) Division

SUMMARY
Profile of the Network Analysis Center's ANDA division, which helped capture suspected al Qaeda operative Husam al-Yemeni, improved understanding of the Pakistani Army Defense Network, and spied on a network associated with the leader of Venezuela

DOCUMENT’S DATE
Mar. 29 2004
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
Dec. 7 2016



Where do SIGINT collectors and analysts go for information needed to access and exploit targets of interest? -- The Network Analysis Center (NAC). Today we'd like to profile one of the NAC's three divisions, namely the Advanced Network Development and Analysis (ANDA) Division. (TS//SI) The ANDA Division brings together people with a range of skills -- Collection Managers, Computer Scientists, Engineers, Intelligence Analysts, Network Engineers and Mathematicians -- all performing Network Analysis in order to isolate and access targets within the worldwide digital network. In doing so, we use a variety of data sources, including open source data and SIGINT information such as routing protocol data.

As worldwide network use has exploded, becoming the communications of choice for many targets, ANDA is called upon from various elements within both the Analysis and Production and Data Acquisition Directorates to assist with both tactical and strategic Network Analysis needs. (TS//SI) Our work has shown concrete results. For example, ANDA played an instrumental part during the January 2004 apprehension of a key Al Qaida operative within Iraq - namely Husam al-Yemeni, aka Firas.

We've assisted the Office of Regional Targets with developing a more complete understanding of the Pakistani Army Defense Network (ADN) infrastructure. We've also assisted this same office with the development of an important digital network associated with Venezuelan's leader, Victor Chavez. Regularly we assist the Office of Counterterrorism with the daily tracking of several key targets as they move throughout the worldwide digital network.

https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/3233071-the-nac-s-advanced-network-development-amp/

A Success Story, In Which the MSOC Takes On a Pakistani Satellite and GSM Network

SUMMARY
In March 2006, analysts working at the Misawa Security Operations Center discovered two Pakistani GSM cell phone infrastructure links and began sustained collection. In the following months they discovered and began spying on a total of 14 links. These GSM links "enable development and reporting on al-Qaeda senior leadership, which primarily uses GSM and C2C (computer-to-computer) modes of communication."
DOCUMENT’S DATE
Dec. 11 2006
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
May. 29 2019

NMDC Tech Lead, Misawa Security Operations Center (F79) Run Date: 12/11/2006 SERIES:

Misawa's NMDC has four branches: a Signals Keeping Secrets Development Center (SDC); a Network Analysis Center (NAC); a 4. A Success Story, In Target Analysis Center (TAC) and a System Development Branch. Which the MSOC Takes On a Pakistani GSM Network (U//FOUO) Misawa Security Operations Center

(TS//SI//REL) In March 2006, SDC analysts identified two GSM 1 infrastructure links carried over the Chinastar-1 satellite. Processing these signals briefly through a recently acquired developmental JUGGERNAUT system revealed the links were in use by a Pakistani operator. A longer look produced Priority 2 and 3 telephone calls, which prompted the NMDC to keep the links on developmental collection and perform more analytical work to determine the relative value.

(TS//SI//REL) The NMDC System Development Branch continued surveying Chinastar-1, identified ten additional signals carrying Pakistani GSM links and placed six of these on developmental collection. (S//SI//REL) The TAC further analyzed the links and engaged S2I (Counterterrorism) to assess their value. S2I determined the links served the Karachi area. (TS//SI//REL) Because the NMDC identified the signals of interest and informed the appropriate target offices, the MSOC received sustained tasking for these signals in April from S2I11 (al-Qa'ida Senior Leadership Branch). FORNSAT Planning (S33121) had proactively installed two JUGGERNAUT systems in LADYLOVE, Misawa's sustained mission area, but they lacked the modems necessary to take over collection from the NMDC. Both the NMDC and LADYLOVE engaged FORNSAT Planning and Collection Management (S33123) branches to rectify the capability gap.

In June, FORNSAT Planning provided additional modems to enable the collection of the GSM carriers. After the installation of the new equipment in July, the collection of the Pakistani links moved from the NMDC to LADYLOVE. (TS//SI//REL) Since then, the NMDC has identified and added to sustained collection six more Pakistani GSM infrastructure links--a total of fourteen. These provide sole-source collection of the infrastructure links for various GSM providers and enable development and reporting on al-Qaeda senior leadership, which primarily uses GSM and C2C 2 modes of communication. (U//FOUO) So it was that Misawa's NMDC discovered an important new target and drove the creation of a new mission capability.

https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/5987479-a-success-story-in-which-the-msoc-takes-on-a/

The Geographic Resource Center Has Info You Need: Maps, Data and Research
SUMMARY
The Geographic Resource Center is NSA's map library, which provides hard-copy and digital maps and geographic data to analysts at NSA headquarters and around the world.

DOCUMENT’S DATE
Oct. 29 2004
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
Apr. 24 2017

(S) Many analysts visit the GRC in person so they can talk with staff about the kind of map they want and what they want it for. GRC analysts know what questions to ask and where to draw from the vast resources, whether for a planning map for the wall, a tourist map of Kabul, data for an ArcView project, or the pinpointing of a target. Most often, a single quick visit solves a simple problem. Sometimes the problems are harder.

(S//SI) Earlier this year, Pakistan military analysts following Pakistani troop movements were frustrated by the Pakistanis' use of a coordinate system that didn't match up with any current maps. GRC researchers found old copies of Pakistan topographic maps produced by the British in the 1940s -- which turned out to have nearly the same grid system used by the Pakistanis. After scanning and printing the maps, the NGA (National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, formerly NIMA) liaison then transferred the images to a CD for use by the analysts at their desktops.

(S//SI) "The maps dug out by the GRC researchers were used to locate many small villages not in the gazetteer, which in turn helped us track the reported locations of various terrorist high value targets," said , an analyst involved in the project. "We also were able to update and formulate the Pakistani military's order of battle and force disposition for the area."


https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/3676099-the-geographic-resource-center-has-info-you-need/


SECONDDATE is a tool designed to intercept web requests and redirect browsers on target computers to an NSA web server. That server, in turn, is designed to infect them with malware.

(TS//SI//RELTOUSA, FVEY) SIGINT Development Challenge:Establish a proven foundation of targets in Pakistan's National Telecommunications Corporation's (NTC)VIP Division. Mission Example and Result:Successfully enabled positive identification of users in NTC's VIPdivision who focus on maintaining the Green Exchange.

The Green Exchange branch houses ZXJ-10 switches , which are the backbone of Pakistan's GreenLine communications network.This network is used by senior Pakistani civilian and military leadership.Four machines in the VIP division who have Green Exchange related documents on their machines were successfully implanted.

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3031638-Select-Slides-FINAL-PMR-4-24-13-Redacted.html

Very interesting Read. Has Pakistan built any successful defences yet?

 

[Falcon26]

A Firsthand View of Pakistan and Its SIGINTers

SUMMARY
An intelligence analysis intern goes to Pakistan, where the partner agency is “at least 10 years -- if not many more -- behind ours,” and deep cultural differences characterize the relationship.

DOCUMENT’S DATE
May. 31 2006

PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
Aug. 15 2018

(S//REL) A Firsthand View of Pakistan and Its SIGINTers FROM: Intelligence Analysis Intern Run Date: 05/31/2006

(S//SI) NSA's relationship with Pakistani intelligence is of high importance. An IA intern had the opportunity to see the relationship close-up...

(S//REL) I recently had the opportunity to travel to Pakistan with a group of coworkers from various Product Lines and organizations throughout NSA for the Annual Planning Conference (APC) with our Pakistani Partner, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, Technical (DGT). I cannot think of a better way to end my 3-year internship in the Intelligence Analysis Development Program (IADP), and the experiences that I've had in the Foreign Affairs Directorate (FAD), topped off by my trip to Pakistan, will stay with me throughout my career.

(U) Author poses with rifle (S//SI) I landed in FAD (NSA's Foreign Affairs Directorate) for my sixth and final IA Intern tour as the Assistant Country Desk Officer for Pakistan, hoping to learn a little bit about how NSA works with its Third Party Partners on the Counterterrorism mission. Experiencing Pakistan firsthand at the APC was a fascinating experience for me because I was able to witness negotiations with our Partner up-close and personal. Having spent most of my time in SID working with our technologically savvy Second Party Partners, this was quite an eye-opening experience for me.

(S//SI) Actually being in-country allowed me to get a sense of the cultural and economic factors that influence Pakistan to make the decisions it makes as a state. In large part, Pakistan lacks the competitive and entrepreneurial edge that drives innovation in capitalist states, and this is apparent in its SIGINT apparatus. As one observer on the trip noted, Pakistan is in a natural state of rest.

(S//SI) DGT's technology is at least 10 years -- if not many more -- behind ours. And not surprisingly, even their technical academic knowledge is on a different level -- not because they are any less intelligent, but more as a result of the level and quality of training available in Pakistan. Of course this lag is caused by many factors, not the least of which is economic. Pakistan is, after all, a developing nation. That being said, NSA has a vested interest in making Pakistan into a first-class SIGINT organization because of its geopolitical standing in the world -it is home to a large number of Al-Qa'ida Senior Leadership (most likely to include UBL and Zawahiri), not to mention other terrorist organizations, and provides a pipeline for narcotics trafficking. (U//FOUO) On a lighter note, the Partner escorted us on some very interesting cultural excursions, including a shopping trip to Rawalpindi... ...a visit to the King Faisel Mosque (built by the King of Saudi Arabia as a gift to the newly independent Pakistan), and a trip up a dangerously narrow and steep road to the beautiful Margalla Hills Park, which overlooks Islamabad: ...We were escorted at all times by a cadre of four security guards armed with AK-47s, so we felt pretty safe for the most part. I enjoyed the food immensely and have to agree with the Pakistanis that they have the best rice in the world!

(S//REL) The negotiations at the APC were difficult at times and trust has always been an issue on both sides of the partnership. Pakistan struggles with the anti-American sentiment that runs ripe throughout the country, but the government claims to be committed to standing by the US as its friend and partner. My sojourn to Pakistan opened my eyes to the relationships that NSA has beyond our English-speaking allies and I gained an understanding of Pakistan's contribution to many NSA missions. (U) So, what did I learn? Here are a few nuggets: (S) What NSA wants isn't necessarily what the partner wants. (S) What the partner wants isn't always something NSA is willing to give. (U) We both may be speaking English, but that doesn't mean we understand each other. (U) If you're a woman, don't be overly offended if a Pakistani man refuses to shake your hand.

"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)." DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108

https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/4755718-a-firsthand-view-of-pakistan-and-its-siginters/

The Only Game in Town (part 1)

SUMMARY
An intelligence analysis intern describes her tour as NSA counterterrorism representative at the CIA station in Islamabad, where she witnessed the arrests of several dozen terrorists.

DOCUMENT’S DATE
Dec. 15 2004
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
Apr. 24 2017

(U) The Only Game in Town (part 1) FROM: Intelligence Analysis (IA) Intern Run Date: 12/15/2004 IA intern describes her experience at the first SIGINT Fusion Cell in Islamabad, March-August 2004...

(S//SI) (S//SI) As I was sitting in the Heathrow terminal on an eight-hour layover, awaiting my flight to Islamabad, I thought about all the advice I had been given the week before my departure. Several experienced travelers had suggested I buy baggy clothes and a headscarf to cover myself, while others claimed that Islamabad was a fairly progressive city compared to the rest of Pakistan. I was anxious to find out for myself and excited about the opportunity to be part of the first NSA SIGINT Fusion Cell at Station* Islamabad. Over the next four and a half months, I would learn the importance of this team and why Station once described SIGINT as "the only game in town" during a critical time in the Pakistani Spring Offensive when there were no other intelligence sources available. (S) Just a few weeks before, I had been making preparations to deploy to Baghdad as part of a NIST team , which was a logical follow-on to the Iraq reporting I had been doing in the Counterterrorism (CT) Sunni Extremism Branch. When the NIST office asked if I would be interested in a brand-new position in Pakistan instead, I eagerly jumped at the chance to experience a country I had studied in graduate school, as well as spent a year targeting in the Pakistan Branch. I quickly went through the deployment processing checklist, put my belongings into storage, and boarded the plane less than three weeks later.

(U//FOUO) When I touched down in Pakistan, it was obvious that I would need to get accustomed to the constant stream of stares and curious looks I would receive, since women with blonde hair are a rarity. As I sat alone in the terminal waiting for my driver, with literally hundreds of Pakistanis in traditional dress watching me inquisitively, it truly hit me that I was embarking on one of the most exciting times in my personal and professional career. I was taken where I would be living out of my two suitcases for the next four and a half months. I instantly thought of how different my living arrangements would have been in Baghdad, as I was now in a mini-bar stocked room and able to enjoy all the amenities that a Western hotel has to offer. (U) A colorful jinga bus filled with passengers in Taxila.

(TS//SI) The Embassy compound itself is one of the largest in the world and sports a new gym, pool, restaurant/club, track, and softball field. My desk would be in a very small room on the third floor, which could have as many as 10 people working shoulder-toshoulder at any given time. Even though I had originally deployed SERIES:

as part of a NIST, it was quickly determined that interests would be best served if I worked in another capacity. I became the NSA CT representative to the Settled Areas Office (SAO) Liaison Branch, which focuses exclusively on non-tribal areas such as Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta. My role would be to provide NSA CT analytic support and keep SAO informed of any relevant NSA reporting or SIGINT leads. SAO, in conjunction with the Pakistani partner, has been responsible for over 600 arrests since September 11. I would be able to witness first-hand the arrest of several dozen terrorists during my tenure at Station.

(TS//SI) My typical workday began around 0830 when I started preparations for my daily SIGINT briefing to the Tribal Areas Office and also COS (Chief of Station) Islamabad, which involved prioritizing various SIGINT reporting, gists, or tips that we had received. Following the briefings, I dedicated the rest of the day to supporting the SAO targeters and acting as the middleman between Station and NSAW to facilitate a variety of issues. I coordinated with the appropriate offices at NSA to ensure that Station had the most up-to-date intelligence possible, as well as keep NSA apprised of activity in the field. In addition to the steady stream of support I received from HQs, I was able to utilize the various NSA databases and analytic tools to provide services ranging from a quick number look-up to comprehensive targeting packages.

(TS//SI) As mentioned above, SAO works closely with its liaison counterpart to track and arrest high-value targets throughout Pakistan, which means that Station must supply daily releasable tearlines with the relevant intelligence. I was able to author several of these tearlines, as well as coordinate approvals with the necessary offices at NSAW. There were several occasions when I was literally on the phone with NSOC while a SAO targeter waited in the doorway for approval to pass the time-sensitive message to liaison.

(TS//SI) Perhaps the best aspect about the position was that it afforded me the opportunity to witness the start of one of the most collaborative ventures NSA has undertaken. With the stand-up of the Fusion Cell, NSA became truly integrated with Station personnel for the first time and was able to contribute in ways that were once impossible. As the SAO representative, I was able to coordinate with NSAW, Bagram, GRSOC, and the Tribal Areas Office at Station to ensure that actionable SIGINT was in the operators' hands as close to real-time as possible.

(TS//SI) One success story was when a high-value target was captured due to timely intelligence and a good working relationship between NSA and CIA. Analysts at NSAW worked extra hours to ensure that Station had the latest DNI and telephony intelligence, which were often the first tippers or reporting that we received in the field. A combination of NSAW tippers, CIA cable traffic, and front-end analysis in the SAO all contributed to a successful capture operation.

(S//SI) The original NSA SIGINT Fusion Cell at Station Islamabad. The author is third from the right. *Notes: (S) The term "Station" refers to a CIA operations center located within a US Embassy abroad. (U) Watch for the conclusion of this article, coming soon... "(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)." DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108


https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/3676159-the-only-game-in-town-part-1/

The Only Game in Town (part 2)

SUMMARY
An intelligence analysis intern describes the lighter side of deployment to Islamabad, including shopping, dining, and camel rides.

DOCUMENT’S DATE
Dec. 16 2004

PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
Apr. 24 2017

(U) The Only Game in Town (part 2) FROM: Intelligence Analysis (IA) Intern Run Date: 12/16/2004 Here's part 2 (and final) of Islamabad. (S) story of her tdy to

(U//FOUO) Despite the long hours we all put in at the Embassy, there was time for some shopping, dining out, and a little bit of sightseeing. While Pakistan remains a high-threat environment, as evidenced by the recent explosion at the Marriott Hotel, I still maintained a semi-normal lifestyle that wasn't confined to the Embassy grounds. I frequented many shops in Islamabad where you could buy everything from Persian carpets, glass bracelets, spice boxes, and hand-carved woodwork to the very latest American DVDs, which were all at considerably lower prices. The shop owners, and the MANY street vendors, were always anxious to sell to Americans, so there was no shortage of goods being offered at every corner.

(U) Women selling glass bracelets at an outdoor market in Islamabad. (U) Carpet shopping in Islamabad with fellow TDYer (U//FOUO)

If work at the Embassy was finished early enough, there were many dinner options in the city. The Marriott Hotel alone had five restaurants that included Chinese, Japanese, and Thai cuisine. There was even a Pizza Hut and ice cream parlor that served food comparable to that found in the US. It's definitely one of the few places I've been to where you can get a steak dinner with two side dishes for about $4.00, although its inevitable that you will eventually get sick no matter where you choose to eat.

(U//FOUO) Additionally, I wanted to share a few of the more memorable experiences I had during my TDY: Visiting the neighboring town of Taxila and getting a flat tire that we had to change in a crowded parking lot. Touring Murree and riding on a probably-not-so-safe chairlift down the side of a mountain. Riding on a camel in a very decrepit, run-down zoo, which charged an admission price of around $.10.

Going running almost every day at 13:00, in 100-120 degree heat, with everyone I pass yelling that I'm absolutely crazy to be doing anything outside. Eating dinner at the "Chicken Shack," which requires considerable faith in both the drive up the winding road and the cooking.

Haggling over the price of something already cheap, someone who can't speak English, just because it's expected and fun. Driving on the left hand side of the road, with the steering wheel on the right hand side of the car, in a place where there are practically "no rules," and trying to avoid the countless number of people and even donkeys loitering in the street.

(S//SI) Station Islamabad is one of the most exciting, challenging, and fast-paced locations to work in the world, with everyone putting in lots of overtime and weekend hours to accommodate for the dynamic environment. It is one of the few places where you can truly experience your surroundings while seeing the fruits of your counterterrorism efforts on a daily basis. I would recommend that anyone looking for an exhilarating tour where they can see SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMINT in action give serious consideration to an assignment here.

(U) The Faisal Mosque in Islamabad is the second-largest mosque in the world. "(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may

not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)." DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108

https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/3676160-the-only-game-in-town-part-2/

“In large part, Pakistan lacks the competitive and entrepreneurial edge that drives innovation in capitalist states, and this is apparent in its SIGINT apparatus. As one observer on the trip noted, Pakistan is in a natural state of rest.”

How true is this statement? This is what you and many others have repeatedly pointed out @Bilal Khan (Quwa)