Holbrooke concerned over anti US sentiments despite aid

[DaRk WaVe]

Learn to read between the lines.

seems you always go for between the lines

Pakistan's nuclear weapons are safe​

LONDON: Pakistan's nuclear installations are so well guarded that militants behind a wave of violence in the country's heartland would find it very hard to storm them and steal material for a nuclear bomb, analysts say.

But the sophistication of recent attacks and their proximity to Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure suggest this risk, while low, remains a cause for worry.

'I don't think it is realistic any more to say there is no threat to these weapons, that they are totally safe,' said Professor Shaun Gregory at Britain's University of Bradford.

Heavy conventional guarding, a blanket of secrecy, deliberate deception, the separation of warheads from missiles, and security practices adopted from the United States are all used to protect weapons and nuclear installations.

The nightmare scenario would be of militants using a suicide bombing as a diversionary tactic in order to send in a team of commandos - similar to those who attacked the Pakistan Army's own headquarters last month in the city of Rawalpindi.

Then, and given the secrecy surrounding Pakistan's nuclear programme this would need collusion and information from inside, they would try to grab fissile material for a nuclear bomb.

'If commandos managed to penetrate a nuclear installation, that would be a very serious breach,' said Sharon Squassoni, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

'It's likely they would fail, it's very likely they would fail, but that would be a bit too close for comfort.'

It is a scenario the army, which guards its nuclear assets as its best defence against Pakistan's bigger neighbour India, will do everything in its power to avoid.

'If the Pakistan Army does one thing, it will be to ensure the nuclear assets stay with them,' said Rahul Roy-Chaudhury at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

'These are the key strategic assets of the Pakistan Army. This is what prevents India from attacking them, in their view.'

Indeed so well guarded are the nuclear weapons that in the event of war, no outside power could take them out.

'The Americans, the Indians, the Israelis do not have any chance of spiriting these weapons away except with the help of the Pakistan Army,' said Gregory.

The military has also long been aware of the need to keep militant sympathisers away from the nuclear weapons programme - a concern frequently cited given close links in the past between the army and various militant groups.

General Khalid Kidwai, head of the army's Strategic Plans Division which runs the nuclear programme, conducts intensive personnel vetting modelled on US personality profiling.

'He is very much in control of things,' said Roy-Chaudhury. 'I believe he runs a strong counter-intelligence programme. Anyone employed is closely vetted; senior officers are selected personally by him.'

According to analysts and research reports, the warheads are not mated with aircraft and missile delivery systems.

Nor are they moved except in times of crisis - as happened in 1999 and 2001/2002 during confrontations with India.

Other security measures cited by analysts, but hard to confirm, include the separation of warheads from detonators.

They also say the army is believed to have developed a rudimentary system to electronically lock its nuclear weapons, modelled on the US Permissive Action Link (PAL).

Nonetheless, the ability of militants, some linked to al Qaeda, to strike apparently at will in Pakistan's heartland Punjab province, give pause for thought.

Both Rawalpindi and Islamabad, respectively the military and political capitals, have come under attack in recent weeks.

Last month's attack at army headquarters in Rawalpindi demonstrated a sophistication in tactics which could be developed further for an assault on a nuclear installation.

The gunmen, wearing army uniform, were able to break through a security gate, and take hostages.

The raid, and the drive-by fatal shooting in Islamabad of a brigadier on leave from peacekeeping duties in Sudan, also suggested militants had good intelligence on the military. Two other brigadiers were shot at in Islamabad, but survived.

According to Gregory, over the last few years militants had launched attacks outside bases believed to be involved in part of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure - including the manufacture and assembly of components.

They had also evolved forms of attack which could combine suicide bombers with ground assault teams. 'This tactic could be used to penetrate even highly defended sites,' he said.

And while Pakistan's nuclear arsenals are thought to be stored deep within the country, possibly in Sind and Baluchistan provinces, nuclear weapons production sites in Punjab, scene of much of the latest violence, could prove more vulnerable.

This would not mean the attackers would obtain a functioning nuclear bomb. And even if they were able to penetrate a nuclear production site, they would still have to manage the logistics under fire of removing the 25 kg (55 lb) of fissile material needed to make a nuclear bomb.

But they could seize material for a dirty bomb - which causes relatively few casualties but major environmental damage - and valuable technology while scoring a propaganda coup. – Reuters

 

[jeypore]

'The Americans, the Indians, the Israelis do not have any chance of spiriting these weapons away except with the help of the Pakistan Army,' said Gregory.

Well, that clearly answers your question about Zandari!!! Now Politicitians of the world should know clearly, who to deal with in Pakistan!!!

But my Dear you forget to highlight this:

The nightmare scenario would be of militants using a suicide bombing as a diversionary tactic in order to send in a team of commandos - similar to those who attacked the Pakistan Army's own headquarters last month in the city of Rawalpindi.

Then, and given the secrecy surrounding Pakistan's nuclear programme this would need collusion and information from inside, they would try to grab fissile material for a nuclear bomb.

'If commandos managed to penetrate a nuclear installation, that would be a very serious breach,' said Sharon Squassoni, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

Thanks for the complement about reading between the lines...

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Well, that clearly answers your question about Zandari!!! Now Politicitians of the world should know clearly, who to deal with in Pakistan!!!

Zardari is not controlling army
Zardari is a problem no doubt but he's almost 'helpless' against Army e.g. 'Giving ISI under control of ministry of Interior' you remember that scandal

But my Dear you forget to highlight this:

you also forgot to read words "nightmare scenario"
& yeah TTP & Al Qeda has got an SAS division aka Commandos

post Number 30 is there for you, take your time & read it, its a neutral source after all

 

[jeypore]

you also forgot to read words "nightmare scenario"
& yeah TTP & Al Qeda has got an SAS division aka Commandos
post Number 30 is there for you, take your time & read it, its a neutral source after all

And that's Why your army has a hard time destroying those throwback commandos as well asking for more equipments from US to do so!!!!

Thanks!!!

 

[DaRk WaVe]

And that's Why your army has a hard time destroying those throwback commandos as well asking for more equipments from US to do so!!!!

Thanks!!!

nah US army is cutting those Talib SAS divisions like carrots

do u think the 'Talib SAS Divisions' are skilled to carry out operation to STEAL Pakistani nukes, Ohh please

 

[jeypore]

nah US army is cutting those Talib SAS divisions like carrots

do think the Talib SAS Divisions are skilled to carry out operation to STEAL Pakistani nukes, Ohh please

Well, Miss Emo, I thought we where talking about Americans controlling the nuclear facilities then these talibs!!!


See this comes up in any conversation because your country is plagued by a cancer called Taliban, which has become a big monkey in your back.

Thanks.....

 

[DaRk WaVe]

Well, Miss Emo,

I thought we where talking about Americans controlling the nuclear facilities then these talibs!!!​

See this comes up in any conversation because your country is plagued by a cancer called Taliban, which has become a big monkey in your back.

Thanks.....

the part you quoted says...

The nightmare scenario would be of militants using a suicide bombing as a diversionary tactic in order to send in a team of commandos - similar to those who attacked the Pakistan Army's own headquarters last month in the city of Rawalpindi.

Then, and given the secrecy surrounding Pakistan's nuclear programme this would need collusion and information from inside, they would try to grab fissile material for a nuclear bomb.

'If commandos managed to penetrate a nuclear installation, that would be a very serious breach,' said Sharon Squassoni, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

so i was replying
don't read too much between the lines, do read on the lines as well

Talib SAS

 

[Kompromat]

Well, Miss Emo, I thought we where talking about Americans controlling the nuclear facilities then these talibs!!!


See this comes up in any conversation because your country is plagued by a cancer called Taliban, which has become a big monkey in your back.

Thanks.....

Do you run an intelligence firm ? Give us your source or stop it!!

 

[karan.1970]

post Number 30 is there for you, take your time & read it, its a neutral source after all

True.. however the security scenario in pakistan has changed significantly since Dec 2007. Back then who would have imagined the kind of maheym these folks are unleashing in pakistan. Despite knowing the whole history of pakistan sponsored terrorism in India, today it seems almost(stress on the word almost) petty for india to talk about terrorism against it considering the explosive situation pakistan's common people are having to live through due to past policies of their country.

So while there is no debate about the strength of pakistan's command and control systems around their nukes, this so called rag and tag army of militants has surprised everyone so many times in the past. and hence the preparation by the US as even though Pakistan considers India as its prime enemy, if heaven forbid, these terrorists lay their hands on nclear material, the odds are that the target would be US

 

[DaRk WaVe]

True.. however the security scenario in pakistan has changed significantly since Dec 2007. Back then who would have imagined the kind of maheym these folks are unleashing in pakistan. Despite knowing the whole history of pakistan sponsored terrorism in India, today it seems almost(stress on the word almost) petty for india to talk about terrorism against it considering the explosive situation pakistan's common people are having to live through due to past policies of their country.

So while there is no debate about the strength of pakistan's command and control systems around their nukes, this so called rag and tag army of militants has surprised everyone so many times in the past. and hence the preparation by the US as even though Pakistan considers India as its prime enemy, if heaven forbid, these terrorists lay their hands on nclear material, the odds are that the target would be US

no doubt they have surprised us but there is NO way they can penetrate Pakistani Nuke facilities, I mean you think some morons control them or what?
the security apparatus & setup for Pakistani nukes has no doubt improved(they are not sitting idle), Don't talk in the air..

 

[DaRk WaVe]

here's another one....

No threat to Pakistan’s N-arsenal: US​

​

WASHINGTON: The United States took the lead on Sunday in assuring the world that the militant attack on the GHQ in Rawalpindi posed no threat to the Pakistani state which was not only capable of defending its nuclear weapons but also of defeating the terrorists.

The assurance, given first by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at a joint news briefing with her British counterpart in London, was echoed by other prominent US politicians, lawmakers and military commanders.

Secretary Clinton said the extremists were ‘increasingly threatening the authority of the state, but we see no evidence that they are going to take over the state.’

She added: ‘We have confidence in the Pakistani government and military’s control over nuclear weapons.’

British Foreign Secretary David Miliband endorsed her, saying that Pakistan faced a ‘mortal threat,’ but there was no danger of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons being seized by terrorists.

‘I think it’s very important that alarmist talk is not allowed to gather pace,’ he said.

Yet, as the news of the attack on the GHQ reached Washington, it did cause an alarm, with experts urging the US government to look closely at Pakistan’s capability to protect its nuclear weapons.

But soon a retired US general, Tom McInerney, appeared on Fox News to assure the Americans that ‘the Pakistani army … is a very capable army.’ He, however, urged the Obama administration to encourage Pakistan to launch an attack on North and South Waziristan where, he said, Al Qaeda was hiding and using those areas for attacking other places in Pakistan.

Another retired US general, Jack Keane, emphasised the need to work with Pakistan to defeat the extremists. ‘We have to convince them that we’re there, that Pakistan’s stability is in our national interest. And we have to prove that, as well, by stabilising Afghanistan,’ he told ABC News.

The general conceded that ‘given our track record in Afghanistan and also in Pakistan, there’s reason for that scepticism’ and that’s why the previous and current Pakistani governments had ‘a hedging strategy with the Taliban.’

In CBS ‘Face the Nation,’ Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell said Saturday’s attack underscored the danger of the Taliban, not only in Afghanistan but in Pakistan as well.

‘We also know that Pakistan has nuclear weapons. The Taliban taking over a country like Pakistan would be completely and totally unacceptable, destabilising not only in that area of the world but all around,’ he warned.

Senator Diane Feinstein, another prominent Democrat, said the US could not allow the Taliban to take over Afghanistan because their next step would be in Pakistan ‘and that’s very serious.’

The Pakistanis, she noted, were beginning to ‘show their mettle … they seemed to have much more get-up-and-go, to really be able to work with us in securing Fata and other areas.’

Senator Saxby Chambliss, a Republican, warned that ‘if Afghanistan falls … the neighbouring country has the opportunity to be really invaded or encroached upon by bad guys.’

The programme’s coordinator, George Stephanopoulos, questioned the wisdom of putting Afghanistan before Pakistan, noting that ‘for every dollar we’re spending in Pakistan, we’re spending $30 in Afghanistan.’

In CNN’s ‘State of the Union’ show, Senator John McCain, a former Republican presidential candidate, noted the progress that the Pakistani military was making against the militants.

‘We, the Pakistani military, go in, we clear and we hold and we secure, and you Americans are using the wrong strategy,’ Mr McCain quoted Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi as telling a think-tank in Washington last week.

‘I’ll tell you, I didn’t think I’d hear that some time ago,’ said Senator McCain.

Senator Bob Casey, a Democrat, noted that Al Qaeda and related groups in Fata could threaten Islamabad and ‘we’ve got to make sure that that threat is dealt with.’

Senator Jack Reed, a senior Democratic lawmaker, warned that the situation in Pakistan was extremely complicated.

And because of the Bush administration’s preoccupation with Iraq, ‘Al Qaeda has significantly reconstituted itself in Pakistan over the last several years,’ he said.

The United States, he said, not only needed to continue drone attacks but should also deploy counter-terrorism forces on the ground in Afghanistan.

‘And we also have to begin to work together with the Pakistani forces. And that’s a very delicate issue because they’re very sensitive of their sovereignty. They’re very sensitive of our presence in Pakistan,’ he added.

‘But lately they’ve shown because they’re, I think, generally fearful of their own situation, a willingness to cooperate more, to conduct operations in South Waziristan, to attack or allow drone operations in their airspace,’ he said.

‘That has to be continued. And so when the president (Obama) is making a judgment on Afghanistan, he literally has to understand its complications and its effects in Pakistan.’

DAWN.COM | World | No threat to Pakistan?s N-arsenal: US

 

[Creder]

Am i in the wrong thread ?

 

[naved_kam]

Boss Mr. Holbrooke will feel bad. On one hand you take money from him, on the other hand "aap unhe is baat ka ehsaan jata rahe hain" and then when he feels bad about it, you say "ukhaad le". It is fair for him to feel bad and at the moment he does not have any choice about the scenario expect for putting up with it. But I think there is a threshold for everything. Excess of everything is bad. I for sure know that excess of this clear liquid with a bat on the bottle is really bad. Head is still aching.....

 

[karan.1970]

no doubt they have surprised us but there is NO way they can penetrate Pakistani Nuke facilities, I mean you think some morons control them or what?
the security apparatus & setup for Pakistani nukes has no doubt improved(they are not sitting idle), Don't talk in the air..

A little uncalled for ma'am. Any thing that disagrees with your assessment does not automatically become talking in air. I have simply offered a suggestion on what could be the thinking behind the american article.

 

[karan.1970]

[B]Concerns over India's nuclear safety[/B]

NUCLEAR PLANTS
Nuclear safety: A poor record
Although as yet in India, there has not been a severe accident leading to core meltdown or large radiation exposures to the public, on measures of occupational exposure to workers, and compliance with standards for accident prevention, Indian nuclear plants perform poorly, writes Ashwin Kumar.

30 March 2007 - Nuclear reactors contain large amounts of radioactive material; this health hazard makes safety in nuclear facilities especially important. An examination of the safety record in India's nuclear facilities reveals poor practices and routine accidents, ranging from leaks of oil to complete loss of power in a reactor causing all safety systems to be disabled. Although as yet in India, there has not been a severe accident leading to core meltdown or large radiation exposures to the public, on measures of occupational exposure to workers, India's nuclear facilities perform poorly. For example in the 1980s, for which data is available, radiation exposures to power plant workers were ten times the world average for each unit of electricity and twice the world average for each monitored worker. As recently as 2003, there have been accidents involving high radiation exposures to workers.

Despite this record, claims about safe operation are sometimes made by the nuclear establishment in India. Sometimes, claims for safety are based on the technical features of the facilities, which suggest a bright future. The following excerpt from the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPC), administered by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), is illustrative: "NPC engineers have shared their expertise internationally by participating in safety reviews and inspection of reactors in other countries conducted by the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We are continuously updating our safety systems and procedures even at the cost of short-term economic benefit. Besides, all our plants are designed, constructed, commissioned, operated and maintained under the strict supervision of the AERB."

Notions of safety differ, but what they all have in common are usually claims about the future. In making the connection between the past record of anomalies and future prospects for safety, one must go beyond the mere presence or absence of accidents to study the factors present.

The 'engineering' approach to safety

To engineers, a safe reactor is usually one which is reliable, meaning that things can be expected to perform correctly most of the time. Safety is improved by incorporating backup systems to make overall operation more reliable, and protection systems to prevent the escalation of accidents. Ultimately, physical barriers protect the public from leakage of radioactive material. Backup devices and physical barriers together constitute "redundancy", so called because they are, in the engineers' judgement, not likely to be needed when the reactor is functioning properly but could become important as independent safety measures when something goes wrong.


In such an approach, it is indeed possible to make reactors operate safely but this depends on everything operating reliably. When the DAE claims that its reactors are designed to operate safely because of the different safety devices, one could immediately ask to what extent these devices are present and operating as they should be. Here, the record is not good. Safety systems have been inadequate in many facilities. For example, the two reactors at Tarapur shared emergency core cooling systems for a long time in violation of standards that required each reactor to have its own system. The reactors at Madras and Rajasthan had been operating for many years without high pressure core cooling systems, which would be needed if coolant is lost during an accident. The need for such systems has been known since the 1970s but the Madras reactors, built in the mid-1980s, were operating without them until 2004.

Often, backup equipment has been part of the design but unavailable during operation. For example, backup pumps for coolant circulation have on many occasions been unavailable when the operating pumps have been disabled by external factors such as fluctuations in the grid. Sometimes, even the minimum requirement of pumps has been unavailable, causing the reactors to be operated at reduced power. In an engineering approach, this record illustrates poor reliability of backup systems, suggesting that safety is also not as good as it could be. The above information about inoperative backup equipment is obtained from International Atomic Energy Agency reports of operating experience; the DAE is required to internationally report events which involve shutdown of the reactor. Secrecy in the nuclear programme means that problems surface only when an accident has occurred or the reactor has to be shut down. Therefore, the public record is only a weak test for reliability.

Are physical barriers good enough?

Ultimately, reactor designers rely on physical barriers to prevent harm to the public. In most reactors, there is a primary vessel that contains the fuel, radioactivity, and heat produced in the reaction. Outside there is a secondary containment building, meant as a physical barrier to prevent leakage of radioactive gases and material to the environment. Integrity of these barriers is often demonstrated through mathematical models up to a certain limit of pressure and temperature; during normal operation and under most accidents, these limits must be met.

in some reactor types, there might be accidents for which it is difficult if not impossible to design barriers. For example fast reactors, one of which is being built in Kalpakkam, are vulnerable to a reactivity increase that could lead to explosive breakup of the fuel, leading to high energies that are difficult to physically contain. In fact, once the fuel becomes hot enough to melt, it is difficult to know what will happen next and the effectiveness of protective barriers cannot be guaranteed. Severe accidents apart, the effectiveness of these barriers also depends on their quality of design and construction. While the containment building was being constructed for the Kaiga reactor in Karnataka, its inner shell collapsed due to deficiencies in design. If this problem is widespread, it weakens the case for safety on the basis of 'defense-in-depth'. Unfortunately, until an accident happens and the barriers are tested, one might never know. And subsequently, attribution might be difficult.

Reliability in design and operations is necessary for safety, but it might not be enough. One problem with nuclear reactors is that components and subsystems often interact in unanticipated ways to cause accidents ('interactive complexity'). A classic example is the Three Mile Island accident, in which operators did not know the state of the reactor at the time and performed actions that actually worsened it. Redundancy could sometimes be part of the problem. For example in the Fermi fast breeder reactor in the United States, a safety device meant to catch the core in case it melted actually initiated a near meltdown when a part of it broke away and blocked the flow of coolant.

While such problems can often be fixed once they are identified, all such interactions might not be identified before they actually occur. There is plenty of evidence elsewhere of nuclear plant operators being surprised by unexpected interactions during accidents. While in some cases, accidents could have still been prevented if warning signs had been heeded, that is no consolation to the operators who are trying to fix the reactor as the accident is happening or the designers who are trying to build safe systems but cannot understand how things might go wrong.

What makes an accident?

Multiple failures must occur at the same time for a severe accident to happen. This has happened in the past, for example in the Narora reactor in Uttar Pradesh in 1993. The accident happened when a fire spread through the cables and shut down all the safety systems and operators had to intervene manually to shut down the reactor. This might appear quite unusual, but the operating records reveal how the conditions leading up to the accident were always present.

The fire started when a poorly designed turbine experienced large vibrations and its blades broke away. Large vibrations in Indian turbines have happened before, but this was the first time that the blades broke and ruptured a pipe containing hydrogen, which then leaked and caught fire. Around the same time, oil was leaking in the turbine building. Oil leaks too are common in DAE's reactors, but this time the oil also caught fire. Fire spread through the power carrying cables and disabled them. Backup cables were present but had been placed in close proximity without being encased in fire retardant sheaths, in violation of international design guidelines. Therefore, they did not function effectively as backups. The accident was preventable, and the DAE had not learnt from best practices in cabling design, nor did it heed warnings from the turbine manufacturer about blade fatigue problems, especially significant in Indian reactors where excessive shaking of the turbines has occurred many times.

Nuclear reactors are tightly coupled, which means that there are few alternate pathways to diffuse accidents, which can often progress very quickly. To ensure safety, the appropriate interventions - whether by humans or automatic safety equipment - must occur quickly and be adequately planned for. This also requires a culture of reliability throughout the organisation.

Dude.. American state starts doubting the security of pakistani nuclear weapons from a perspective of them falling in the hands of terrorist and put up a 3 year old article talking about poor accident prevention methods in Indian civil reactors.. Duhh??