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History of Vietnam or What do you want to know about Vietnam?

If you recall, that was the argument between you and dichoi.

I only offered to help you analyze the Wang Anshi's reforms, which I did already, however, you only wanted to provoke an argument with me.

I spent several hours searching through it already. All you need to do is read it.

The burden of proof is on you,you made the claims and somehow I have to do your research for you.

The 24 histories are quite accessible,you're just being lazy.
 
If you recall, that was the argument between you and dichoi.

I only offered to help you analyze the Wang Anshi's reforms, which I did already, however, you only wanted to provoke an argument with me.

I spent several hours searching through it already. All you need to do is read it.
dichoi never quotes anything substantial a trait that you seem to have as well.

You made the claims,its that simple you either have the proof to back up your assertions or you if you can't just say so.

You gave me a tourist website and a paper by some random person named Paul Rittman none of which quotes any sources.
 
That article isn't from a Chinese guy? No wonder you continued to argue.

I am not going sit here and write your essay for you. If you would have copied that article for your work, your professor will know where you got it from. Also, I wanted you to see from another person that share the same view regarding The fall of Song. It is as good as any article out there.

If you don't have the History of the Song, just say so. I won't blame you. We (@dichoi and I) know and that good enough for us. We don't have to proof anything. If you want to know, research it for yourself.

Do you need me to send you a copy?
dichoi never quotes anything substantial a trait that you seem to have as well.

You made the claims,its that simple you either have the proof to back up your assertions or you if you can't just say so.

You gave me a tourist website and a paper by some random person named Paul Rittman none of which quotes any sources.
 
That article isn't from a Chinese guy? No wonder you continued to argue.

I am not going sit here and write your essay for you. If you would have copied that article for your work, your professor will know where you got it from. Also, I wanted you to see from another person that share the same view regarding The fall of Song. It is as good as any article out there.

If you don't have the History of the Song, just say so. I won't blame you. We (@dichoi and I) know and that good enough for us. We don't have to proof anything. If you want to know, research it for yourself.

Do you need me to send you a copy?
Yawn,another Vietnamese who cries I'm racist against non Chinese works when I use Western sources to supplement Chinese ones,really if you weren't so academically incompetent we wouldn't be having this discussion.

Why are you even trying to defend you sources,The Fall of the Song doesn't even have an author and is written for tourists.

What are the credentials of Paul Rittman?

If I don't have have access to the Song Shi then why did I bother using it as a source for the siege of Yongzhou?

Do you or do you not understand what burden of proof is?
 
I already gave you the volume number and the Historian's name. If you've read the history, then you would have known what we claim is true. If you possess a copy of it, then it would be easy for you to find it. That is my burden of proof.

I suggest that you read the whole history rather than cherry pick from internet sources.

Although I don't know who Paul is, I can vouch for the content of his work.
Yawn,another Vietnamese who cries I'm racist against non Chinese works when I use Western sources to supplement Chinese ones,really if you weren't so academically incompetent we wouldn't be having this discussion.

Why are you even trying to defend you sources,The Fall of the Song doesn't even have an author and is written for tourists.

What are the credentials of Paul Rittman?

If I don't have have access to the Song Shi then why did I bother using it as a source for the siege of Yongzhou?

Do you or do you not understand what burden of proof is?
 
I already gave you the volume number and the Historian's name. If you've read the history, then you would have known what we claim is true. If you possess a copy of it, then it would be easy for you to find it. That is my burden of proof.

I suggest that you read the whole history rather than cherry pick from internet sources.

Although I don't know who Paul is, I can vouch for the content of his work.

I think he's purposely going around the subject, @Rent - San.

He's arguing for sake of argument , without even reading the content.

A shame.
 
I already gave you the volume number and the Historian's name. If you've read the history, then you would have known what we claim is true. If you possess a copy of it, then it would be easy for you to find it. That is my burden of proof.

I suggest that you read the whole history rather than cherry pick from internet sources.

Although I don't know who Paul is, I can vouch for the content of his work.
That isn't proving anything,quote the passage in the Song Shi.

Quiet rich coming from you,you use 2 random internet sources to back up your assertions while I have used the Cambridge History of China.

How can you vouch for Paul when you don't even know his credentials?

I think he's purposely going around the subject, @Rent - San.
Seems like you don't understand what burden of proof is,if you make the claim then you need a solid foundation to back it up otherwise its just hearsay.

Considering how you make unfounded claims all the time I'm not surprised by your attitude.
 
Too much accusations. Empty talk. Some people's posts are bereft of any content worthy of note.
 
So you only have the Cambridge version. You know that the translation is not to its exact meaning. No wonder you don't have a clue as to what you were arguing about. And there I thought you were having difficulty reading formal script as I try to help you understand.
In that case, you need to get the Li Tao's History of the Song before provoking an argument with others in this forum.
That isn't proving anything,quote the passage in the Song Shi.

Quiet rich coming from you,you use 2 random internet sources to back up your assertions while I have used the Cambridge History of China.


Seems like you don't understand what burden of proof is,if you make the claim then you need a solid foundation to back it up otherwise its just hearsay.
 
Hi @Rent,


One area of interest I had in my undergraduate years was the the discourse on Fengjian system of Chinese antiquity. Its interesting that after the rebellion of An Lushan , there were political theorists during the Northern Song period that touted that the concept of Fengjian was rather anachronistic. These said political theorists influenced the statesmen and literati of the Northern Song Epoch and this led to the support of the Imperial Vision of centralization and interventionist policies that would define succeeding Imperial Dynasties. The Yuan implemented the same concept in their foreign policies as seen during their punitive expedition to the Kingdom of Singhasari in present day Java. The 2 failed invasions in Japan was also an example of the political lit that the Yuan Ruling Elite borrowed from the Song literati.





Your view?
 
So you only have the Cambridge version. You know that the translation is not to its exact meaning. No wonder you don't have a clue as to what you were arguing about. And there I thought you were having difficulty reading formal script as I try to help you understand.
In that case, you need to get the Li Tao's History of the Song before provoking an argument with others in this forum.
Your views on the Cambridge History of China clearly show you have never even read it,its far from being a translation.

I have already shown the ability to comprehend and translate Classical Chinese numerous times on this forum you on the other hand have shown nothing.

I suppose you have the credentials to best Paul Jakov Smith and Ari Daniel Levine?

I already showed you the biography of Su Jian in the Song Shi if I didn't have access to it why would I bother referencing it?

My arguments are based off the Cambridge History of China as well as the Song Shi while you rely on random internet articles and your refusal to source your claims.
 
I have read a few chapters but did not buy a copy for myself because it is not the same as Li Tao's work, which was compiled during this Dynasty in 1114

Now, I shall ask you for your burden of proof to prove our claim otherwise.

Did the Cambridge version forget to translate this part?
Your views on the Cambridge History of China clearly show you have never even read it,its far from being a translation.

I have already shown the ability to comprehend and translate Classical Chinese numerous times on this forum you on the other hand have shown nothing.

I suppose you have the credentials to best Paul Jakov Smith and Ari Daniel Levine?

I already showed you the biography of Su Jian in the Song Shi if I didn't have access to it why would I bother referencing it?

My arguments are based off the Cambridge History of China as well as the Song Shi while you rely on random internet articles and your refusal to source your claims.
 
I have read a few chapters but did not buy a copy for myself because it is not the same as Li Tao's work, which was compiled during this Dynasty in 1114

Now, I shall ask you for your burden of proof to prove our claim otherwise.

Did the Cambridge version forget to translate this part?
So I'm supposed to provide burden of proof for you inability to source quality sources what kind of logic is this?

On the wealth the reforms generated.

In 1076 the government spent only 6.4 million strings of the 10.4 million strings it collected in service exemption fees, for a surplus of 4 million strings. At the same time, the fund contained 8.5 million strings of unused “current funds” (hsientsai)
– in some circuits equal to an entire year’s income – built up through underspending and the accumulation of surplus emergency fees (k’uan-sheng chien) up to 1076. The winery and ferry account was equally well capitalized, with an income of 2.1 million units (primarily cash) over expenditures(1.7 million units). pg 426

In 1084 the government collected or held 18,729,300 million strings in service exemption fees, and 5,050,090 strings in wine and ferry fees. The transformation of the hired service policy into a mechanism of revenue extraction was complete. pg 426

Like all monopolies, however, the state trade agency was extremely profitable. For the single year of the tenth month of 1076 to the tenth month of 1077, the state trade agency reported net returns (hsi-ch’ien) of 1.41 million strings of cash, a return of 28 percent on its basic capitalization of 5 million strings at that time.By 1085 the basic capitalization had more than doubled,
to 12.26 million strings, which at the same rate of return should have yielded 3.45 million strings in interest. pg 433

We can be more precise about the profitability of the New Policies as a whole, which very significantly enriched government coffers. One historian estimates that in 1077 the major revenue measures – state trade, green sprouts,
and hired service – added an extra 18 million strings, or 33 percent, to the 54 million strings of cash obtained through traditional currency sources. Other than state trade, this new currency stream was collected almost entirely from the agricultural sector of the economy. pg 433

By the end of 1076,the Court of Agricultural Supervision (Ssu-nung ssu) had built up a surplus of
unspent reserves (hsien-tsai ch’ien) from the rural credit, service exemption, and winery and ferry franchise funds totaling 49.9 million mixed units, including 27.7 million strings of cash. pg 434


Debunking your accusation that the Song-XiXia wars made the Song go bankrupt:

For Shen-tsung these hoards were to be the life’s blood of his campaign against the Tanguts. And though the Tangut war of 1081–3 exacted an enormous toll in money and men, New Policies revenues were so robust that imperial treasuries remained full into the next reign period. pg 434


Debunking your claims that Wang Anshi was to blame for Tangut wars when Shenzong was at the helm:

As a young man Shen-tsung was fixated on recovering the northern territories occupied by the Tanguts and the Khitan, and he ascended the throne in 1067 eager to wage offensive wars. In Shen-tsung’s mind, recovering the northlands
was the raison d’ˆetre of the New Policies, and so it is ironic that only Wang An-shih, the architect of the New Policies, was able to restrain the emperor’s irredentist ambitions. pg 464-465

Wang put this prudent view to effect in a series of border issues that embroiled the two empires between
1072 and 1076, when he consistently sought to preserve peace, even where peace meant adopting a compliant attitude toward the Liao. pg 465

But in practice Wang preached a cautious approach to the Tanguts as well. Wang’s real views were revealed in 1070, after Sung incursions into Tangut territory had provoked retaliatory attacks in Ching-y¨uan circuit:
"What if we show a strong front to the [Tanguts] and they decline to obey; how will the court then deal with them? We are not now strong enough to match troops (chiao-ping) with them; and if we do not match troops, then what else can we do? It would be most inappropriate if we first put up a show of strength and are then forced to humble ourselves. Under the current circumstances, we should make a point of being accommodating (jou) toward [the Hsia]; by being accommodating we are least likely to miscalculate." pg 466


Wang Anshi wanted to annex Tibetan territories instead and some northwestern territories:

What then did Wang offer an emperor whose motivating ambition was to recover the lost territories of the north? In brief, he offered Shen-tsung a policy of expansion, colonization, and economic exploitation in the frontier regions of Hunan and Szechwan, and in the Tibetan tribal lands of the Tsinghai and Kansu region. pg 466


Wang Anshi advocated war when the Ly dynasty overstepped its boundaries:

In late 1075, Annamese troops attacked walled towns across the border in Kuang-nan West, searching for rebels harbored
by the Chinese. In addition, the Annamese claimed they were on a mission of mercy, “to save the people from the green sprouts and service exemption policies of the Middle Kingdom.” Taking this as a personal affront, Wang An-shih persuaded the emperor to launch a punitive expedition, for which he personally wrote the proclamation.pg 468


The blame on the fall of the Song dynasty in traditional works is mainly Cai Jing and his cronies as well as Huizong's emphasis on Taoism:

Judgments of the Hui-tsung era have tended toward high levels of generalization,for the documentary record of his reign poses a minefield of historiographic problems. Foremost of these issues is the moralistic praise-and-blame
bias of traditional Chinese historiography. In the standard dynastic histories of the Sung, and in privately compiled works of historiography, Hui-tsung and his long-serving chief councilor Ts’ai Ching (1046–1127) have been held responsible for a litany of crimes against the moral and territorial integrity of the state. Ts’ai and his fellow state councilors, pejoratively referred to as the “Six Felons” (liu tsei), were blamed for prosecuting the most sweeping factional
purge in Sung history, allowing governmental corruption to run rampant, and pushing the subjects of the empire toward impoverishment and rebellion. In the judgment of posterity, the greatest crime of these so-called felonious ministers
was their bungling of border diplomacy and military strategy, which precipitated the Jurchen Chin invasion, the sack of K’ai-feng, and the fall of the north. pg 557

In traditional historiography, the extravagance of Hui-tsung’s court and his promotion of religious Taoism are interpreted as harbingers of dynastic collapse. Hui-tsung is portrayed as a Neronic figure who frolicked in his sumptuous
pleasure gardens while the empire was impoverished, eventually succumbing to rebellion from within and conquest from without. And by declaring the Divine Empyrean sect of Taoism to be the state religion, the emperor invited
the moralistic scorn of later historians. pg 602
 
I must say the Cambridge version seems to be very decent. I will get myself a copy of this as well. Thank you.

Stay in school and don't do drugs.
So I'm supposed to provide burden of proof for you inability to source quality sources what kind of logic is this?

On the wealth the reforms generated.

In 1076 the government spent only 6.4 million strings of the 10.4 million strings it collected in service exemption fees, for a surplus of 4 million strings. At the same time, the fund contained 8.5 million strings of unused “current funds” (hsientsai)
– in some circuits equal to an entire year’s income – built up through underspending and the accumulation of surplus emergency fees (k’uan-sheng chien) up to 1076. The winery and ferry account was equally well capitalized, with an income of 2.1 million units (primarily cash) over expenditures(1.7 million units). pg 426

In 1084 the government collected or held 18,729,300 million strings in service exemption fees, and 5,050,090 strings in wine and ferry fees. The transformation of the hired service policy into a mechanism of revenue extraction was complete. pg 426

Like all monopolies, however, the state trade agency was extremely profitable. For the single year of the tenth month of 1076 to the tenth month of 1077, the state trade agency reported net returns (hsi-ch’ien) of 1.41 million strings of cash, a return of 28 percent on its basic capitalization of 5 million strings at that time.By 1085 the basic capitalization had more than doubled,
to 12.26 million strings, which at the same rate of return should have yielded 3.45 million strings in interest. pg 433

We can be more precise about the profitability of the New Policies as a whole, which very significantly enriched government coffers. One historian estimates that in 1077 the major revenue measures – state trade, green sprouts,
and hired service – added an extra 18 million strings, or 33 percent, to the 54 million strings of cash obtained through traditional currency sources. Other than state trade, this new currency stream was collected almost entirely from the agricultural sector of the economy. pg 433

By the end of 1076,the Court of Agricultural Supervision (Ssu-nung ssu) had built up a surplus of
unspent reserves (hsien-tsai ch’ien) from the rural credit, service exemption, and winery and ferry franchise funds totaling 49.9 million mixed units, including 27.7 million strings of cash. pg 434


Debunking your accusation that the Song-XiXia wars made the Song go bankrupt:

For Shen-tsung these hoards were to be the life’s blood of his campaign against the Tanguts. And though the Tangut war of 1081–3 exacted an enormous toll in money and men, New Policies revenues were so robust that imperial treasuries remained full into the next reign period. pg 434


Debunking your claims that Wang Anshi was to blame for Tangut wars when Shenzong was at the helm:

As a young man Shen-tsung was fixated on recovering the northern territories occupied by the Tanguts and the Khitan, and he ascended the throne in 1067 eager to wage offensive wars. In Shen-tsung’s mind, recovering the northlands
was the raison d’ˆetre of the New Policies, and so it is ironic that only Wang An-shih, the architect of the New Policies, was able to restrain the emperor’s irredentist ambitions. pg 464-465

Wang put this prudent view to effect in a series of border issues that embroiled the two empires between
1072 and 1076, when he consistently sought to preserve peace, even where peace meant adopting a compliant attitude toward the Liao. pg 465

But in practice Wang preached a cautious approach to the Tanguts as well. Wang’s real views were revealed in 1070, after Sung incursions into Tangut territory had provoked retaliatory attacks in Ching-y¨uan circuit:
"What if we show a strong front to the [Tanguts] and they decline to obey; how will the court then deal with them? We are not now strong enough to match troops (chiao-ping) with them; and if we do not match troops, then what else can we do? It would be most inappropriate if we first put up a show of strength and are then forced to humble ourselves. Under the current circumstances, we should make a point of being accommodating (jou) toward [the Hsia]; by being accommodating we are least likely to miscalculate." pg 466


Wang Anshi wanted to annex Tibetan territories instead and some northwestern territories:

What then did Wang offer an emperor whose motivating ambition was to recover the lost territories of the north? In brief, he offered Shen-tsung a policy of expansion, colonization, and economic exploitation in the frontier regions of Hunan and Szechwan, and in the Tibetan tribal lands of the Tsinghai and Kansu region. pg 466


Wang Anshi advocated war when the Ly dynasty overstepped its boundaries:

In late 1075, Annamese troops attacked walled towns across the border in Kuang-nan West, searching for rebels harbored
by the Chinese. In addition, the Annamese claimed they were on a mission of mercy, “to save the people from the green sprouts and service exemption policies of the Middle Kingdom.” Taking this as a personal affront, Wang An-shih persuaded the emperor to launch a punitive expedition, for which he personally wrote the proclamation.pg 468


The blame on the fall of the Song dynasty in traditional works is mainly Cai Jing and his cronies as well as Huizong's emphasis on Taoism:

Judgments of the Hui-tsung era have tended toward high levels of generalization,for the documentary record of his reign poses a minefield of historiographic problems. Foremost of these issues is the moralistic praise-and-blame
bias of traditional Chinese historiography. In the standard dynastic histories of the Sung, and in privately compiled works of historiography, Hui-tsung and his long-serving chief councilor Ts’ai Ching (1046–1127) have been held responsible for a litany of crimes against the moral and territorial integrity of the state. Ts’ai and his fellow state councilors, pejoratively referred to as the “Six Felons” (liu tsei), were blamed for prosecuting the most sweeping factional
purge in Sung history, allowing governmental corruption to run rampant, and pushing the subjects of the empire toward impoverishment and rebellion. In the judgment of posterity, the greatest crime of these so-called felonious ministers
was their bungling of border diplomacy and military strategy, which precipitated the Jurchen Chin invasion, the sack of K’ai-feng, and the fall of the north. pg 557

In traditional historiography, the extravagance of Hui-tsung’s court and his promotion of religious Taoism are interpreted as harbingers of dynastic collapse. Hui-tsung is portrayed as a Neronic figure who frolicked in his sumptuous
pleasure gardens while the empire was impoverished, eventually succumbing to rebellion from within and conquest from without. And by declaring the Divine Empyrean sect of Taoism to be the state religion, the emperor invited
the moralistic scorn of later historians. pg 602
 
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