Highlights of the latest IAEA report on Iran (June 1, 2020)

[QWECXZ]

The report has not been made available on the official page of the IAEA news about Iran, but here are the highlights of the latest IAEA report on Iran based on what has been published in Iranian newspapers. Particularly mashreghnews.ir because it discussed the report in more detail:

Disclaimer: Some figures might be inaccurate due to bad interpretation/translation on my part or by the Iranian media.

1- Iran operates 5060 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz.

2- Iran operates a total of 1057 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow.

3- Iran has used 96 IR-1 centrifuges in its warehouse to replace broken/damaged centrifuges.

4- Iran continues R&D and uranium enrichment on the cascades of the following centrifuges:
a) 20 IR4 centrifuges (currently enriching uranium)
b) 10 IR5 centrifuges (currently enriching uranium)
c) 30 IR6 centrifuges in two cascades (currently enriching uranium)
d) 20 IR6s centrifuges (currently enriching uranium)
e) 10 IR-s centrifuges (currently enriching uranium)

5- Iran continues R&D on the units of the following centrifuges, but it's not injecting UF6 gas into them for uranium enrichment yet:
a) One IR2m centrifuge
b) One IR3 centrifuge
c) Two IR4 centrifuges
d) One IR5 centrifuge
e) Three IR6 centrifuges
f) One IR6m centrifuge
g) One IR6s centrifuge
h) One IR6sm centrifuge
i) One IR7 centrifuge
j) One IR8 centrifuge
k) One IR8s centrifuge
l) One IR8b centrifuge
m) Two IRs centrifuges
n) And one IR9 centrifuge

6- Iran's current stockpile of uranium is as follows (numbers don't add up precisely. So, probably something has been misreported in the media):
a) A total of 1546.7 kilograms of enriched uranium in the form of UF6
b) 9.7 kilograms of uranium oxides and intermediate products
c) 7.7 kilograms of fuel rods
d) 5.7 kilograms of tails assay
*) Iran possesses 215.1 kilograms of 3.67% enriched uranium
**) Iran possesses 1356.5 kilograms of 4.5% enriched uranium, fully converted to UF6, including 483.1 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 2%.

7- The IAEA continues to investigate the origin of human-made uranium contamination that the agency reported in 2019. The IAEA claims that due to the covid-19 outbreak, the process of reporting on this matter has been delayed.

 

[Cthulhu]

Iran's stockpile yeah can't wait to see the traitor cvnts that are in charge of things in this country give it all away.

 

[QWECXZ]

Iran's stockpile yeah can't wait to see the traitor cvnts that are in charge of things in this country give it all away.

We gave up +13,000 kilograms of LEU + HALEU in 2015 and 5 years after that we have only ~1085 kilograms of LEU. :|

 

[hussainb72]

We gave up +13,000 kilograms of LEU + HALEU in 2015 and 5 years after that we have only ~1085 kilograms of LEU. :|

That's why iran should never ever negotiate with the enemy. They might show a friendly face to deceive you. But all they really want is to weaken iran and stop it from advancing.

 

[raptor22]

We gave up +13,000 kilograms of LEU + HALEU in 2015 and 5 years after that we have only ~1085 kilograms of LEU. :|

What would you do if I give you 100 ton LEU right now as possible decision maker of Iran? and how it makes any different for us?? the current stockpile is enough for 1 to 3 bombs depends on level of technology you use in your nuke? will you make a bomb now?
In return you received yellow cake and raw uranium that could be used anytime to be enriched again.

By the way,
Can anyone provide int community with such a detailed report over israel nuclear program?
Or anyone would ask what happened to the UNSCR calling upon this regime to put its program under control?
So kindly and sincerely I ask dear Mike to put a sock in it.

 

[QWECXZ]

What would you do if I give you 100 ton LEU right now as possible decision maker of Iran? and how it makes any different for us?? the current stockpile is enough for 1 to 3 bombs depends on level of technology you use in your nuke? will you make a bomb now?
In return you received yellow cake and raw uranium that could be used anytime to be enriched again.

By the way,
Can anyone provide int community with such a detailed report over israel nuclear program?
Or anyone would ask what happened to the UNSCR calling upon this regime to put its program under control?
So kindly and sincerely I ask dear Mike to put a sock in it.

If you can hypothetically give me 100 tons of LEU right now, I will find an excuse to deny the IAEA access to our nuclear facilities for a while and I will try to buy time by pretending to be interested in negotiations while I will use all of our enrichment capacity to build as many nuclear bombs as possible with it. Although I will never acknowledge that we have nukes, but I will definitely go down that path.

Our current stockpile is enough for 1 to 3 bombs? How did you come up with these numbers? Honestly speaking, I have no idea what you are talking about. You cannot build nukes with LEU. I think you have to be more precise. It is enough for building 1 to 3 nuclear bombs in what interval of time? 1 month? 3 months? 6 months? 1 year? 2 years? 5 years?

Assuming a tails assay of 0.36 based on the figures above, we can calculate the EUP as follows:
1) Iran's 215 kilograms of 3.67% UF6 requires 520 UF6 SWU/year to give 7.9 kg of 90% HEU in one year.
2) Iran's 882 kilograms of 4.5% UF6 requires 2315 UF6 SWU/year to give 40.7 kg of 90% HEU in one year.

So, assuming an estimated 7,000 UF6 SWU/year by adding the capacity of our currently installed centrifuges as reported by the IAEA, it will take Iran almost 5 months to produce 48.6 kilograms of 90% HEU. Little Man used 64 kilograms of 89% HEU with a small core that was enriched up to 99%. But that won't make a lot of difference in our calculations. It can add at most 2 weeks to our 5 months estimate. Now add to this a 3 month prior notice to leave the NPT as well.

So, in almost 8 months, we can have almost enough fissile material for one gun-type bomb like Little Man.

We need at least 2 bombs because obviously the first one will be used for our first nuclear test. So, if we want to enrich natural uranium to an average of 90%, ignoring the fact that the natural uranium in Iran has a percentage of U-235 that is closer to 0.6% instead of 0.711%, this is what our estimated time for going nuclear looks like:

Assuming a feed assay of 0.7%, and assuming a tails assay of 0.36% like before, we will need 16,000 kilograms of UF6 and almost 11,000 Kg UF6 SWU/year to produce 60 kilograms of 90% HEU in one year.

So, in the most optimistic scenario, based on the numbers in the latest IAEA report, Iran is at least 18 months to 20 months away from having two uranium gun-type bombs. And I am assuming that our engineers can already build a gun-type nuclear trigger because it's not that difficult considering the level of our engineering.

We cannot have plutonium bombs because we do not have plutonium reprocessing facilities at the moment and we do not have breeder reactors. The Tehran-Research Reactor doesn't produce much plutonium (about 600 grams of plutonium). I have no idea about the Bushehr nuclear reactor but considering that the Bushehr nuclear reactor is not an underground facility and it is not safe from aerial attacks by the US, using it for plutonium production is not wise. Not to mention that it probably produces less than 10 kilograms of plutonium annually and plutonium reprocessing is extremely difficult because plutonium is extremely toxic and dangerous. Also, building a nuclear trigger for a plutonium bomb is much more challenging.

 

[GWXP]

Bushehr nuclear reactor ..... Not to mention that it probably produces less than 10 kilograms of plutonium annually and plutonium reprocessing is extremely difficult because plutonium is extremely toxic and dangerous. Also, building a nuclear trigger for a plutonium bomb is much more challenging.

According to Paul Leventhal if Bushehr light water reactor used properly it can produce 250kg of plutonium per year--enough for 30 nuclear bombs.

According to this article by Hans Rühle who is a former Head of the Planning Staff in the German Ministry of Defense.:
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkey-secretly-working-nuclear-weapons-13898

"The Iranian reactor Bushehr offers a telling example. If the reactor were powered down after eight months and the fuel rods removed, Iran would own 150 kilogrammes of plutonium with an impurity level of only 10 percent—the equivalent of twenty-five Nagasaki-category bombs"

"The common counterargument, according to which the separation of the “dirty” plutonium would require a sophisticated reprocessing plant that currently does not exist in Turkey, remains unconvincing. Studies have shown that such a plant can be built within half a year and would be the size of a regular office building."

And Iran will have 3 such reactors by 2030.

Regarding the bomb---it can not be excluded that Iran can acquire test data of 6 nuclear tests conducted by North Korea and blueprint of sophisticated North Korean nuclear device in order to build a more efficient bomb

 

[QWECXZ]

According to Paul Leventhal if Bushehr light water reactor used properly it can produce 250kg of plutonium per year--enough for 30 nuclear bombs.

According to this article by Hans Rühle who is a former Head of the Planning Staff in the German Ministry of Defense.:
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkey-secretly-working-nuclear-weapons-13898

"The Iranian reactor Bushehr offers a telling example. If the reactor were powered down after eight months and the fuel rods removed, Iran would own 150 kilogrammes of plutonium with an impurity level of only 10 percent—the equivalent of twenty-five Nagasaki-category bombs"

"The common counterargument, according to which the separation of the “dirty” plutonium would require a sophisticated reprocessing plant that currently does not exist in Turkey, remains unconvincing. Studies have shown that such a plant can be built within half a year and would be the size of a regular office building."

And Iran will have 3 such reactors by 2030.

Regarding the bomb---it can not be excluded that Iran can acquire test data of 6 nuclear tests conducted by North Korea and blueprint of sophisticated North Korean nuclear device in order to build a more efficient bomb

I am not certain about what he means by using the Bushehr nuclear reactor properly, but he probably means using the Bushehr nuclear reactor as a breeder reactor as I had already mentioned in my post. Not as a civilian reactor that Bushehr currently is. There is no argument that having a breeder reactor is a sure way of producing hundreds of kilograms of plutonium per year and the Bushehr nuclear reactor can be modified to be a breeder reactor, but as it is now, I really doubt that it produces 150 kilograms or 250 kilograms of plutonium per year.

You can produce plutonium-239 by adding one neutron to U-238 (the most common isotope of uranium that is like 99.3% of natural uranium). After a 2 day decay, your U-238 will turn into Pu-239. The problem is that adding one neutron to U-238 is not easy because to build an atomic bomb that way you will need a very strong flux of neutrons that only a nuclear reactor can provide.

As for plutonium reprocessing, it needs to be done without human intervention in a remote-controlled environment. I don't see how Turkey gets involved in this though, but it is not about the size of the building, it is about the technology that it requires to build a plutonium reprocessing plant.

As I highlighted in my post that you quoted:

I have no idea about the Bushehr nuclear reactor but considering that the Bushehr nuclear reactor is not an underground facility and it is not safe from aerial attacks by the US, using it for plutonium production is not wise.

Turning a civilian nuclear reactor into a breeder reactor that is very likely to be bombed by the enemies (leading to a catastrophe for the nearby civilian areas) is not a wise decision. We will need a breeder reactor that is safe from our enemies.