Al Bhatti
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August 28, 2013
Hezbollah’s chickens are coming home to roost
The strongest among the Lebanese political morass has been doing its level best to ensure that the current terrible situation gets even worse
Hassan Nasrallah is an orator of incredible ability. The man, when he speaks, has his audience in a veritable trance. Nothing short of an enrapturing command of language could help him sell his policies today to the legions of supporters who are increasingly paying the price. It is of course generous to ascribe to Nasrallah and not the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) the authorship of these policies, but I digress. The fact is, Lebanon has been paying the price for Hezbollah’s oversized ego for some time now, which is fine, if like Nasrallah, one believes that a Lebanon populated by anything less than fawning sycophants to the “Resistance” is worthless.
However, now, and to what should be an alarmingly increasing extent, Nasrallah’s policies are impacting his own constituency, comprising a significant majority of Lebanon’s Shiites. The traditionally impenetrable fortress Dahieh has witnessed two attacks in which at least 25 people were killed and more than 350 injured. Of course, the suburb of southern Beirut was carpet-bombed by Israeli jets during the 2006 war, but that was different. Nasrallah had a solid majority of Lebanon — and the region — behind him during the July War. This time, Hezbollah must contend with a deeply polarised Lebanese society and a region that does not distinguish between its fighters and Bashar Al Assad’s Shabiha. Nasrallah’s chickens are coming home to roost.
Several media reports have now documented how Lebanese Shiites in the Gulf are finding it difficult to separate themselves from Hezbollah in the eyes of authorities. A decision by the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in June to impose sanctions on the group will surely add to the woes suffered by these expatriates. Deportations due to suspected Hezbollah ties are nothing new and have been occurring for years according to various reports. In meetings with Emirati officials last year, Lebanese President Michel Sulaiman is said to have raised the issue of deportations. Furthermore, Lebanese Shiites living in the Gulf states have long reported difficulty in obtaining and renewing work permits. The scrutiny placed on expatriates and the pace of deportations and disruptions to daily life are surely to increase now as Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria is expected to intensify. As a result so will the backlash and not just from the Gulf. It is, however, difficult to assess whether Hezbollah really cares. The group thrives on this victim mentality and it has never really been the darling of the circles of international diplomacy.
The Gulf’s reaction to Hezbollah’s regional policies is not reduced to Lebanese living in the six states. Lebanon itself, long a fabled tourism destination for petrodollars, has been suffering heavily due to the security and political calculations of the GCC. In June last year, the bloc issued a travel advisory to their citizens against vacationing in Lebanon. The warning translated to practically a ban that has starved the country’s economy from much-needed seasonal spending. According to an industry lobbyist, Lebanon’s hotels are set to see their worst year since the outbreak of the civil war in 1975. The hotel occupancy rate for 2012 is estimated to have been below 40 per cent, a steep decline for what was the region’s premier tourism destination. The disappearance last year of 45 per cent of the summer’s spending due to a cancelled tourism season raised the alarm this year as Lebanon is threatened by the possibility of a slip into recession. By any stretch, Lebanon’s economy is in crisis, much of which has to do with Hezbollah’s regional policies.
Yet, the “Party of God”, the strongest among the Lebanese political morass has been doing its level best to ensure that the current terrible situation becomes even worse. If we are to entertain for a moment that Nasrallah’s protestations in a previous speech, that Lebanese factions should fight their battles in Syria and not Lebanon, were genuine, recent events must compel him to rethink. Nasrallah is responsible for the collapse of Lebanon’s ‘disassociation’ policy with regard to the Syrian conflict.
If Hezbollah is a Lebanese political party and not an extension of the regional ambitions of the Islamic Republic then it must prioritise its own domestic state of affairs. The bombing in Dahieh is a dangerous development. No longer is the spillover from Syria reduced to Tripoli or Arsal, it has manifested itself in all its bloody gore in Nasrallah’s heartland. The collapse of the March 8 Alliance — which is technically not due to Hezbollah’s regional policies — denies it critical political cover to play its part in protecting the Syrian regime. Nasrallah’s ability to play regional politics is obstructed by the fact that Hezbollah still exists within the Lebanese state, and not above it, with all of the attendant limitations.
In spite of its remarkable disregard for Lebanon’s stability, security and prosperity — evidenced by its reckless policies — there may still be time for Hezbollah to decide if it is part of the Lebanese political fabric and if its primary commitment is to that fabric.
Hezbollah’s indefatigable loyalty to the project of the Islamic Republic has cost Lebanon immeasurably and the cost it has had on Hezbollah itself is growing. It once was a party with legendary cross-sectarian and cross-regional appeal and had forged a strong alliance that extended beyond sectarian tribalism and was able to face down the well-oiled machine of March 14, with the deep reservoir of support from among Lebanese Shiite.
Lebanon’s woes due to Hezbollah’s activities are clear to see and today the party itself, while may be feared, is certainly regionally isolated. It is also domestically resented for the way its weapons have paralysed Lebanon’s political progress. Yet, Hezbollah continues to cynically exploit the legacy of Imam Musa Al Sadr, claiming that it carries on the torch of his activism on behalf of his people. Al Sadr sought to improve the living conditions of the Shiite and to have them recognised and welcomed as equal members of the Lebanese nation. Is it not then worth asking, in the light of the bombings in Dahieh and all that has transpired before, where Hezbollah is taking Lebanon’s Shiites?
Muath Al Wari is a UAE-based researcher. You can follow him at www.twitter.com/MuathAlWari
Hezbollah
Hezbollah’s chickens are coming home to roost
The strongest among the Lebanese political morass has been doing its level best to ensure that the current terrible situation gets even worse
Hassan Nasrallah is an orator of incredible ability. The man, when he speaks, has his audience in a veritable trance. Nothing short of an enrapturing command of language could help him sell his policies today to the legions of supporters who are increasingly paying the price. It is of course generous to ascribe to Nasrallah and not the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) the authorship of these policies, but I digress. The fact is, Lebanon has been paying the price for Hezbollah’s oversized ego for some time now, which is fine, if like Nasrallah, one believes that a Lebanon populated by anything less than fawning sycophants to the “Resistance” is worthless.
However, now, and to what should be an alarmingly increasing extent, Nasrallah’s policies are impacting his own constituency, comprising a significant majority of Lebanon’s Shiites. The traditionally impenetrable fortress Dahieh has witnessed two attacks in which at least 25 people were killed and more than 350 injured. Of course, the suburb of southern Beirut was carpet-bombed by Israeli jets during the 2006 war, but that was different. Nasrallah had a solid majority of Lebanon — and the region — behind him during the July War. This time, Hezbollah must contend with a deeply polarised Lebanese society and a region that does not distinguish between its fighters and Bashar Al Assad’s Shabiha. Nasrallah’s chickens are coming home to roost.
Several media reports have now documented how Lebanese Shiites in the Gulf are finding it difficult to separate themselves from Hezbollah in the eyes of authorities. A decision by the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in June to impose sanctions on the group will surely add to the woes suffered by these expatriates. Deportations due to suspected Hezbollah ties are nothing new and have been occurring for years according to various reports. In meetings with Emirati officials last year, Lebanese President Michel Sulaiman is said to have raised the issue of deportations. Furthermore, Lebanese Shiites living in the Gulf states have long reported difficulty in obtaining and renewing work permits. The scrutiny placed on expatriates and the pace of deportations and disruptions to daily life are surely to increase now as Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria is expected to intensify. As a result so will the backlash and not just from the Gulf. It is, however, difficult to assess whether Hezbollah really cares. The group thrives on this victim mentality and it has never really been the darling of the circles of international diplomacy.
The Gulf’s reaction to Hezbollah’s regional policies is not reduced to Lebanese living in the six states. Lebanon itself, long a fabled tourism destination for petrodollars, has been suffering heavily due to the security and political calculations of the GCC. In June last year, the bloc issued a travel advisory to their citizens against vacationing in Lebanon. The warning translated to practically a ban that has starved the country’s economy from much-needed seasonal spending. According to an industry lobbyist, Lebanon’s hotels are set to see their worst year since the outbreak of the civil war in 1975. The hotel occupancy rate for 2012 is estimated to have been below 40 per cent, a steep decline for what was the region’s premier tourism destination. The disappearance last year of 45 per cent of the summer’s spending due to a cancelled tourism season raised the alarm this year as Lebanon is threatened by the possibility of a slip into recession. By any stretch, Lebanon’s economy is in crisis, much of which has to do with Hezbollah’s regional policies.
Yet, the “Party of God”, the strongest among the Lebanese political morass has been doing its level best to ensure that the current terrible situation becomes even worse. If we are to entertain for a moment that Nasrallah’s protestations in a previous speech, that Lebanese factions should fight their battles in Syria and not Lebanon, were genuine, recent events must compel him to rethink. Nasrallah is responsible for the collapse of Lebanon’s ‘disassociation’ policy with regard to the Syrian conflict.
If Hezbollah is a Lebanese political party and not an extension of the regional ambitions of the Islamic Republic then it must prioritise its own domestic state of affairs. The bombing in Dahieh is a dangerous development. No longer is the spillover from Syria reduced to Tripoli or Arsal, it has manifested itself in all its bloody gore in Nasrallah’s heartland. The collapse of the March 8 Alliance — which is technically not due to Hezbollah’s regional policies — denies it critical political cover to play its part in protecting the Syrian regime. Nasrallah’s ability to play regional politics is obstructed by the fact that Hezbollah still exists within the Lebanese state, and not above it, with all of the attendant limitations.
In spite of its remarkable disregard for Lebanon’s stability, security and prosperity — evidenced by its reckless policies — there may still be time for Hezbollah to decide if it is part of the Lebanese political fabric and if its primary commitment is to that fabric.
Hezbollah’s indefatigable loyalty to the project of the Islamic Republic has cost Lebanon immeasurably and the cost it has had on Hezbollah itself is growing. It once was a party with legendary cross-sectarian and cross-regional appeal and had forged a strong alliance that extended beyond sectarian tribalism and was able to face down the well-oiled machine of March 14, with the deep reservoir of support from among Lebanese Shiite.
Lebanon’s woes due to Hezbollah’s activities are clear to see and today the party itself, while may be feared, is certainly regionally isolated. It is also domestically resented for the way its weapons have paralysed Lebanon’s political progress. Yet, Hezbollah continues to cynically exploit the legacy of Imam Musa Al Sadr, claiming that it carries on the torch of his activism on behalf of his people. Al Sadr sought to improve the living conditions of the Shiite and to have them recognised and welcomed as equal members of the Lebanese nation. Is it not then worth asking, in the light of the bombings in Dahieh and all that has transpired before, where Hezbollah is taking Lebanon’s Shiites?
Muath Al Wari is a UAE-based researcher. You can follow him at www.twitter.com/MuathAlWari
Hezbollah
