Heritage Foundation’s Military Index exposes the myth of US military might

[Pksecurity]

The United States of America is feared as the most powerful country, both militarily and economically. It is often said that no warship can cruise anywhere in the world without the US approval. The world is treated by the American arrogance as their fiefdom where they can set foot at will. Not only the economy and the military but they also own the so-called United Nations Organization which is at the beck and call of Uncle Sam as are the Bretton Wood sisters; the World Bank and IMF.

Two American misadventures in the first decade of the current century, as those in the last century, amply demonstrated that despite its military might and overflowing kitty, the American generals are not capable to control, let alone win, any war in more than one region outside the American continent. Cases in point are US adventures in Vietnam and Cambodia and Afghanistan and Iraq. These wars bled American economy very badly with masses losing their faith in their generals. It also added to the hatred people of the world had nurtured against the arrogance of Uncle Sam.

American Think Tank, the Heritage Foundation has recently released the first of what will be an annual report on America’s military might. The report, entitled 2015 Index of U.S. Military Strength: Assessing America’s Ability to Provide for the Common Defense, is modeled on Heritage's widely successful Index of Economic Freedom.

The report is based on two critical premises namely; measuring America’s hard power in terms of “capability or modernity, capacity for operations, and readiness,” against threats to vital U.S. interests and assessment of “the ease or difficulty of operating in key regions based on existing alliances, regional political stability, the presence of U.S. military forces, and the condition of key infrastructure.”

The report concludes that America only possesses “marginal” military strength to defend its vital interests in the current threat environment. “Overall, the Index concludes that the current U.S. military force is adequate to meeting the demands of a single major regional conflict while also attending to various presence and engagement activities,” the report states. “But it would be very hard-pressed to do more and certainly would be ill-equipped to handle two, near-simultaneous major regional contingencies,” as successive administrations of both political parties have used as their benchmark for military strength.

The Index also grades each of the services, as well as the Marines and America’s nuclear forces on a five-point scale based on their capacity, capability and readiness. Only the Air Force receives an above-average grade; it is assessed as “strong,” the second-highest ranking on the scale.

The Index gives the rest of the other services and America’s nuclear arsenal the middle-of-the-pack “marginal” grade. The U.S. Army comes in at the lower end of this spectrum, owing primarily to its low state of readiness. The U.S. Navy, on the other hand, exhibits a higher state of readiness but is lacking on the capability front. Capacity is the largest weakness of the Marines, according to the Index, which also gives poor marks to the modernization and readiness of America’s nuclear arsenal.

In assessing the current threat environment, only six threats are considered: Russia, Iran, Middle East terrorism, Af-Pak terrorism, China and North Korea.

All of these actors pose at least an “elevated” threat to vital U.S. interests, with Russia and China judged as especially problematic. As the report explains, “While all six threats have been quite problematic in their behavior and in their impact on their respective regions, Russia and China are particularly worrisome given the investments they are making in the rapid modernization and expansion of their offensive military capabilities.” China and Russia are listed as “high” threats to vital U.S. interests.


Heritage Foundation’s Military Index exposes the myth of US military might | The Passive Voices

 

[Levina]

I read something similar a few days back.
Is America's Nuclear Arsenal Dying?

As Russia and other nations around the world flex their “nuclear muscles,” when it comes to the United States, maintaining a credible nuclear force is certainly a tough task. Challenges include: declining research, development and acquisition budgets; uncertain prospects for modernization, and an American public that lacks a clear understanding how nuclear weapons contribute to national security.

The U.S. nuclear force has prevented a great power war for seven decades. Yet the commitment to maintain a credible nuclear force appears shaky.

That is certainly not the case in competitor nations such as Russia, China and North Korea. While sanctions and low oil prices have crippled Russia’s economy, the Kremlin is still doggedly spending billions of dollars on modernizing its strategic rocket forces. Washington’s lack of commitment takes a toll on more than investment. It does not go unnoticed by the men and women who man the nation’s nuclear submarines, bombers, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). That only makes executing a nuclear mission more difficult, both practically and morally.

State of Affairs

Imagine being out on the vast prairie of Montana, North Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado or Nebraska in the dead of winter, the blasts of wind making the sub-zero temperatures nearly unbearable. After driving one to three hours to reach your missile alert facility, you go down into the launch control center (LCC) where the 50-year-old equipment smells the same as it did to your father, who pulled alerts here before you were born. During winter, heavy snow may trap maintenance and missile alert crews in the missile field for days. When they finally get to go home, the smell of old equipment and chemicals lingers on their clothes.

Much the same can be said for the bomber crews who fly the exact same aircraft their fathers flew and their sons or daughters will likely fly.

Recent Analysis

The Heritage Foundation’s newly released 2015 “Index of U.S. Military Strength” evaluates the health of the U.S. nuclear complex according to nine categories. In four of those categories—“Warhead Modernization,” “Delivery Systems Modernization,” Nuclear Weapons Complex” and “Nuclear Test Readiness”—the complex was rated as “weak” (the second worst rating possible).

One of the main factors behind these low scores is sequestration. Its “automatic pilot” budget regimen threatens sustained and predictable funding—a major problem for addressing issues within the nuclear complex. Already it has forced a delay in plans to replace aging delivery systems. This includes everything from a new bomber and its nuclear certifications, to a replacement for the Ohio-class strategic submarine, to a follow-on intercontinental ballistic missile.

Another major factor contributing to lower scores are the government’s conflicting policies regarding the nuclear complex. We say we care about the nuclear force and the complex that supports it, yet manpower and resources available to execute the nuclear mission have been steadily declining until recently. We say we are in favor of a robust nuclear modernization program, yet proclaim, at the same time, we need to get to a world without nuclear weapons—all while refusing to truly modernize our weapons.

The President’s fiscal year 2016 budget dedicates over $75 million for the ground-based strategic deterrent, better known as the Minuteman replacement. While the current missiles are in fact woefully archaic—they were first deployed in the 1970s—there is no provision for replacing the even older silos and launch control centers from which a new missile would be launched.

On the bright side, the President’s budget accelerates by two years the Long-Range Stand Off missile, an essential advancement in American capabilities. This project is particularly vital considering the limited number of available stealth bombers and the angle of attack needed to counter the tunneling efforts of our adversaries, which make targets hard to reach.

The main question, however, is what Congress will do. At the end of the day, it’s the House and Senate that decide which programs get funded and at what level.

The Index’s low rankings indicate the areas of America’s nuclear force that are in greatest need of investment. And it’s a force that must be sustained. The nuclear mission is critical. Its ultimate purpose is to deter a catastrophic attack on our homeland, our forces abroad, and our allies. While it is true that we require a nuclear force we never hope to launch, it is important to recognize that our nuclear weapons serve to keep the peace every day.


As Russia and other nations around the world flex their “nuclear muscles,” when it comes to the United States, maintaining a credible nuclear force is certainly a tough task. Challenges include: declining research, development and acquisition budgets; uncertain prospects for modernization, and an American public that lacks a clear understanding how nuclear weapons contribute to national security.

The U.S. nuclear force has prevented a great power war for seven decades. Yet the commitment to maintain a credible nuclear force appears shaky.

That is certainly not the case in competitor nations such as Russia, China and North Korea. While sanctions and low oil prices have crippled Russia’s economy, the Kremlin is still doggedly spending billions of dollars on modernizing its strategic rocket forces. Washington’s lack of commitment takes a toll on more than investment. It does not go unnoticed by the men and women who man the nation’s nuclear submarines, bombers, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). That only makes executing a nuclear mission more difficult, both practically and morally.

State of Affairs

Imagine being out on the vast prairie of Montana, North Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado or Nebraska in the dead of winter, the blasts of wind making the sub-zero temperatures nearly unbearable. After driving one to three hours to reach your missile alert facility, you go down into the launch control center (LCC) where the 50-year-old equipment smells the same as it did to your father, who pulled alerts here before you were born. During winter, heavy snow may trap maintenance and missile alert crews in the missile field for days. When they finally get to go home, the smell of old equipment and chemicals lingers on their clothes.

Much the same can be said for the bomber crews who fly the exact same aircraft their fathers flew and their sons or daughters will likely fly.

Recent Analysis

The Heritage Foundation’s newly released 2015 “Index of U.S. Military Strength” evaluates the health of the U.S. nuclear complex according to nine categories. In four of those categories—“Warhead Modernization,” “Delivery Systems Modernization,” Nuclear Weapons Complex” and “Nuclear Test Readiness”—the complex was rated as “weak” (the second worst rating possible).

One of the main factors behind these low scores is sequestration. Its “automatic pilot” budget regimen threatens sustained and predictable funding—a major problem for addressing issues within the nuclear complex. Already it has forced a delay in plans to replace aging delivery systems. This includes everything from a new bomber and its nuclear certifications, to a replacement for the Ohio-class strategic submarine, to a follow-on intercontinental ballistic missile.

Another major factor contributing to lower scores are the government’s conflicting policies regarding the nuclear complex. We say we care about the nuclear force and the complex that supports it, yet manpower and resources available to execute the nuclear mission have been steadily declining until recently. We say we are in favor of a robust nuclear modernization program, yet proclaim, at the same time, we need to get to a world without nuclear weapons—all while refusing to truly modernize our weapons.

The President’s fiscal year 2016 budget dedicates over $75 million for the ground-based strategic deterrent, better known as the Minuteman replacement. While the current missiles are in fact woefully archaic—they were first deployed in the 1970s—there is no provision for replacing the even older silos and launch control centers from which a new missile would be launched.

On the bright side, the President’s budget accelerates by two years the Long-Range Stand Off missile, an essential advancement in American capabilities. This project is particularly vital considering the limited number of available stealth bombers and the angle of attack needed to counter the tunneling efforts of our adversaries, which make targets hard to reach.

The main question, however, is what Congress will do. At the end of the day, it’s the House and Senate that decide which programs get funded and at what level.

The Index’s low rankings indicate the areas of America’s nuclear force that are in greatest need of investment. And it’s a force that must be sustained. The nuclear mission is critical. Its ultimate purpose is to deter a catastrophic attack on our homeland, our forces abroad, and our allies. While it is true that we require a nuclear force we never hope to launch, it is important to recognize that our nuclear weapons serve to keep the peace every day.

Editor's note: This commentary was co-authored by Dr. Adam Lowther

- Michaela Dodge is a defense and strategic policy analyst in The Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy.

- Dr. Adam Lowther is a research professor at the Air Force Research Institute.

Originally appeared in Real Clear Defense

 

[jhungary]

lol, the myth is, no where in the world do any military goes to war but limit its army about what they CAN do by setting those crazy and idiot rules of engagement.

What kind of war dont allow an army take the fight to the real enemy? You want to fight to win in Vietnam, i say again, you want to win against North Vietnam, but you are not allow to set foot in North Vietnam, lol is it a joke?

All of the American war is like that after WW2, its not a war, its nust sight seeing with guns...maybe the US need to be invaded again to let the army fight their own war, I sometime actually wish we have a government like China, ruthless, authoritarian and no limit, instead of bunch of general worries about how does this battle looks like in 6 oclock news or, the news station is not gonna like it so we should not do it....lol

 

[LeGenD]

Nice way to fool the world with these type of analyses.

Fact is that USA have the best military force in the world, period. Also, US generals are not incompetent; politics actually determine "rules of engagement" for a war and politics are more about pursuit of interests then actual gains on the ground. Give US military the freedom to make its own decisions and watch the results.

I read something similar a few days back.
Is America's Nuclear Arsenal Dying?

What a load of crap.

USA currently have the most advanced and well-prepared nuclear force in the world. While USA have significantly reduced the quantity of its nuclear assets after COLD WAR along with Russia, USA continues to maintain a large nuclear force and is improving it with passage of time with relatively superior delivery systems and nuclear weapon designs.

I suggest people to read this comprehensive article: The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy | Foreign Affairs

Since the Cold War's end, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has significantly improved. The United States has replaced the ballistic missiles on its submarines with the substantially more accurate Trident II D-5 missiles, many of which carry new, larger-yield warheads. The U.S. Navy has shifted a greater proportion of its SSBNs to the Pacific so that they can patrol near the Chinese coast or in the blind spot of Russia's early warning radar network. The U.S. Air Force has finished equipping its B-52 bombers with nuclear-armed cruise missiles, which are probably invisible to Russian and Chinese air-defense radar. And the air force has also enhanced the avionics on its B-2 stealth bombers to permit them to fly at extremely low altitudes in order to avoid even the most sophisticated radar. Finally, although the air force finished dismantling its highly lethal MX missiles in 2005 to comply with arms control agreements, it is significantly improving its remaining ICBMs by installing the MX's high-yield warheads and advanced reentry vehicles on Minuteman ICBMs, and it has upgraded the Minuteman's guidance systems to match the MX's accuracy.

IMBALANCE OF TERROR

Even as the United States' nuclear forces have grown stronger since the end of the Cold War, Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal has sharply deteriorated. Russia has 39 percent fewer long-range bombers, 58 percent fewer ICBMs, and 80 percent fewer SSBNs than the Soviet Union fielded during its last days. The true extent of the Russian arsenal's decay, however, is much greater than these cuts suggest. What nuclear forces Russia retains are hardly ready for use. Russia's strategic bombers, now located at only two bases and thus vulnerable to a surprise attack, rarely conduct training exercises, and their warheads are stored off-base. Over 80 percent of Russia's silo-based ICBMs have exceeded their original service lives, and plans to replace them with new missiles have been stymied by failed tests and low rates of production. Russia's mobile ICBMs rarely patrol, and although they could fire their missiles from inside their bases if given sufficient warning of an attack, it appears unlikely that they would have the time to do so.

The third leg of Russia's nuclear triad has weakened the most. Since 2000, Russia's SSBNs have conducted approximately two patrols per year, down from 60 in 1990. (By contrast, the U.S. SSBN patrol rate today is about 40 per year.) Most of the time, all nine of Russia's ballistic missile submarines are sitting in port, where they make easy targets. Moreover, submarines require well-trained crews to be effective. Operating a ballistic missile submarine -- and silently coordinating its operations with surface ships and attack submarines to evade an enemy's forces -- is not simple. Without frequent patrols, the skills of Russian submariners, like the submarines themselves, are decaying. Revealingly, a 2004 test (attended by President Vladimir Putin) of several submarine-launched ballistic missiles was a total fiasco: all either failed to launch or veered off course. The fact that there were similar failures in the summer and fall of 2005 completes this unflattering picture of Russia's nuclear forces.

Compounding these problems, Russia's early warning system is a mess. Neither Soviet nor Russian satellites have ever been capable of reliably detecting missiles launched from U.S. submarines. (In a recent public statement, a top Russian general described his country's early warning satellite constellation as "hopelessly outdated.") Russian commanders instead rely on ground-based radar systems to detect incoming warheads from submarine-launched missiles. But the radar network has a gaping hole in its coverage that lies to the east of the country, toward the Pacific Ocean. If U.S. submarines were to fire missiles from areas in the Pacific, Russian leaders probably would not know of the attack until the warheads detonated. Russia's radar coverage of some areas in the North Atlantic is also spotty, providing only a few minutes of warning before the impact of submarine-launched warheads.

Moscow could try to reduce its vulnerability by finding the money to keep its submarines and mobile missiles dispersed. But that would be only a short-term fix. Russia has already extended the service life of its aging mobile ICBMs, something that it cannot do indefinitely, and its efforts to deploy new strategic weapons continue to flounder. The Russian navy's plan to launch a new class of ballistic missile submarines has fallen far behind schedule. It is now highly likely that not a single new submarine will be operational before 2008, and it is likely that none will be deployed until later.

Even as Russia's nuclear forces deteriorate, the United States is improving its ability to track submarines and mobile missiles, further eroding Russian military leaders' confidence in Russia's nuclear deterrent. (As early as 1998, these leaders publicly expressed doubts about the ability of Russia's ballistic missile submarines to evade U.S. detection.) Moreover, Moscow has announced plans to reduce its land-based ICBM force by another 35 percent by 2010; outside experts predict that the actual cuts will slice 50 to 75 percent off the current force, possibly leaving Russia with as few as 150 ICBMs by the end of the decade, down from its 1990 level of almost 1,300 missiles. The more Russia's nuclear arsenal shrinks, the easier it will become for the United States to carry out a first strike.

To determine how much the nuclear balance has changed since the Cold War, we ran a computer model of a hypothetical U.S. attack on Russia's nuclear arsenal using the standard unclassified formulas that defense analysts have used for decades. We assigned U.S. nuclear warheads to Russian targets on the basis of two criteria: the most accurate weapons were aimed at the hardest targets, and the fastest-arriving weapons at the Russian forces that can react most quickly. Because Russia is essentially blind to a submarine attack from the Pacific and would have great difficulty detecting the approach of low-flying stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles, we targeted each Russian weapon system with at least one submarine-based warhead or cruise missile. An attack organized in this manner would give Russian leaders virtually no warning.

This simple plan is presumably less effective than Washington's actual strategy, which the U.S. government has spent decades perfecting. The real U.S. war plan may call for first targeting Russia's command and control, sabotaging Russia's radar stations, or taking other preemptive measures -- all of which would make the actual U.S. force far more lethal than our model assumes.

According to our model, such a simplified surprise attack would have a good chance of destroying every Russian bomber base, submarine, and ICBM. [See Footnote #1] This finding is not based on best-case assumptions or an unrealistic scenario in which U.S. missiles perform perfectly and the warheads hit their targets without fail. Rather, we used standard assumptions to estimate the likely inaccuracy and unreliability of U.S. weapons systems. Moreover, our model indicates that all of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal would still be destroyed even if U.S. weapons were 20 percent less accurate than we assumed, or if U.S. weapons were only 70 percent reliable, or if Russian ICBM silos were 50 percent "harder" (more reinforced, and hence more resistant to attack) than we expected. (Of course, the unclassified estimates we used may understate the capabilities of U.S. forces, making an attack even more likely to succeed.)

To be clear, this does not mean that a first strike by the United States would be guaranteed to work in reality; such an attack would entail many uncertainties. Nor, of course, does it mean that such a first strike is likely. But what our analysis suggests is profound: Russia's leaders can no longer count on a survivable nuclear deterrent. And unless they reverse course rapidly, Russia's vulnerability will only increase over time.

China's nuclear arsenal is even more vulnerable to a U.S. attack. A U.S. first strike could succeed whether it was launched as a surprise or in the midst of a crisis during a Chinese alert. China has a limited strategic nuclear arsenal. The People's Liberation Army currently possesses no modern SSBNs or long-range bombers. Its naval arm used to have two ballistic missile submarines, but one sank, and the other, which had such poor capabilities that it never left Chinese waters, is no longer operational. China's medium-range bomber force is similarly unimpressive: the bombers are obsolete and vulnerable to attack. According to unclassified U.S. government assessments, China's entire intercontinental nuclear arsenal consists of 18 stationary single-warhead ICBMs. These are not ready to launch on warning: their warheads are kept in storage and the missiles themselves are unfueled. (China's ICBMs use liquid fuel, which corrodes the missiles after 24 hours. Fueling them is estimated to take two hours.) The lack of an advanced early warning system adds to the vulnerability of the ICBMs. It appears that China would have no warning at all of a U.S. submarine-launched missile attack or a strike using hundreds of stealthy nuclear-armed cruise missiles.

Many sources claim that China is attempting to reduce the vulnerability of its ICBMs by building decoy silos. But decoys cannot provide a firm basis for deterrence. It would take close to a thousand fake silos to make a U.S. first strike on China as difficult as an attack on Russia, and no available information on China's nuclear forces suggests the existence of massive fields of decoys. And even if China built them, its commanders would always wonder whether U.S. sensors could distinguish real silos from fake ones.

Despite much talk about China's military modernization, the odds that Beijing will acquire a survivable nuclear deterrent in the next decade are slim. China's modernization efforts have focused on conventional forces, and the country's progress on nuclear modernization has accordingly been slow. Since the mid-1980s, China has been trying to develop a new missile for its future ballistic missile submarine as well as mobile ICBMs (the DF-31 and longer-range DF-31A) to replace its current ICBM force. The U.S. Defense Department predicts that China may deploy DF-31s in a few years, although the forecast should be treated skeptically: U.S. intelligence has been announcing the missile's imminent deployment for decades.

Even when they are eventually fielded, the DF-31s are unlikely to significantly reduce China's vulnerability. The missiles' limited range, estimated to be only 8,000 kilometers (4,970 miles), greatly restricts the area in which they can be hidden, reducing the difficulty of searching for them. The DF-31s could hit the contiguous United States only if they were deployed in China's far northeastern corner, principally in Heilongjiang Province, near the Russian-North Korean border. But Heilongjiang is mountainous, and so the missiles might be deployable only along a few hundred kilometers of good road or in a small plain in the center of the province. Such restrictions increase the missiles' vulnerability and raise questions about whether they are even intended to target the U.S. homeland or whether they will be aimed at targets in Russia and Asia.

Given the history of China's slow-motion nuclear modernization, it is doubtful that a Chinese second-strike force will materialize anytime soon. The United States has a first-strike capability against China today and should be able to maintain it for a decade or more.

Similar revelation from another article: The Real Danger in Nuclear Modernization | The Diplomat

Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear arsenals and the U.S. is not. The line is so dramatic and so alarming that commentators have found it useful in justifying all sorts of expansions of U.S. nuclear policy, including more extensive modernization plans, new nuclear weapons, and assertive revisions of nuclear strategy. If these steps are not taken, the most powerful country in the world could find itself subject to coercion, its allies bullied, falling behind its adversaries.

This thinking is mistaken on three counts. First, the United States is modernizing its nuclear forces. Second, the U.S. nuclear triad is markedly superior to the Chinese and Russian arsenals. Most importantly, the real danger to strategic stability may not be the U.S. falling behind the modernization of other countries but in racing aggressively ahead.

The United States has not taken an “acquisition holiday” in its nuclear arsenal, as Maj. Gen. Garret Harencak recently asserted. This thought relies on a misreading of the natural nuclear modernization cycles of the major nuclear powers: While many of Russia’s ageing systems are reaching the ends of their service lives in this decade, many of the systems that make up the U.S. arsenal are not due to retire until the 2020s.

Rather than “sit back and simply maintain our existing aging nuclear forces,” as Congressman Michael Turnercharged, the United States is gearing up a comprehensive modernization program that in many ways exceeds the requirements of time and deterrence. In some areas (including the nation’s strategic bombers and its tactical bombs) the plans would replace existing systems before the older ones need to be retired. In others (like intercontinental ballistic missiles) the services are considering significant upgrades to existing systems. Moreover, the U.S. arsenal has been undergoing continual modernization as necessary, including major upgrades to strategic bombers and recent life extensions of the warheads atop ballistic missiles launched from both land and sea.

The U.S. nuclear arsenal is a robust, redundant triad. It consists of highly capable platforms at each leg of the triad and relatively few nonstrategic systems. The upcoming modernization plans will build on extensive experience in designing, constructing, and operating sophisticated stealth platforms.

In contrast to the United States, Russian strategic forces are now in the middle of their modernization cycle. Though the Kremlin is modernizing aging systems in each leg of their triad, the Russian arsenal will remain markedly less capable than its American counterpart for the foreseeable future.

Even given extensive modernization, a number of question marks remain. One is the trend toward placing more warheads on each launcher. Intended to counteract the U.S. national missile defense system, the result is a level of vulnerability the United States would never accept in its arsenal because each launcher now presents a more inviting target. Furthermore, Russia is retaining many tactical systems that are strategically useless, including torpedoes, depth charges, and short-range ground-launched missiles that could never reach the United States. Lastly, Russia’s ability to fund its modernization program is dubious, given that oil now stands at half the price required to balance the Russian budget. In this environment, and with other military priorities pressing, it will be a major sacrifice for Putin to push ahead with building the nation’s first stealth bomber.

At sea, Russia is building eight new Borei submarines to make up for weaknesses in the current fleet. For example, Hans Kristensen has found that in 2012 the U.S. submarine fleet conducted 28 lengthy deterrent patrols to points near to its adversaries’ coasts, while Russia sailed on only five patrols in areas near its own coastal regions, barely enough to keep one submarine at sea at any given time. Yet by the time Russia has rolled out its fleet of eight Boreis, the United States expects to be launching the first of its 12 next-generation submarines. While Russia has flirted with abandoning continuous-at-sea deterrence, the United States plans to replicate a very strict requirement for its own larger fleet of submarines.

China

Since becoming a nuclear power, China has consistently demonstrated restraint in its nuclear force structure and American intelligence estimates have consistently overestimated Chinese capabilities. It is only in the last ten years that China has gained a plausible second-strike capability against the continental United States and only in the last two years that it has developed a triad of nuclear delivery systems by commissioning its first functional missile submarines. Far from a threat to U.S. nuclear supremacy, China’s gradual modernization is only now approaching a modern nuclear arsenal.

Overall, the capabilities of Chinese nuclear forces are hardly alarming: the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence says the new Jin-class ballistic missile submarines are easier to detect than 1970s-era Soviet submarines; the newest DF-31A ICBMs may not have the range to strike Washington; and China’s new air-launched cruise missile is to be carried by Xian H-6 bombers, which were derived from 1950s-era Soviet Badgers that Russia retired from service in 1993.

There is little evidence that Russia and China are looking to exceed the American advantage in these areas, or that they could if they wanted to. Instead, many of the modernization programs in these countries are the predictable result of previous American decisions. The new Russian Sarmat heavy ICBM, the shift toward multiple warheads, and the Chinese submarine programs are expected reactions to U.S. deployment of ballistic missile defense systems. Meanwhile, the trend in both countries toward mobile missiles is a response to American conventional superiority and military doctrines that seek to defeat sophisticated defenses and gain access to defended targets. U.S. strategists put these policies in place with full knowledge that they would provoke reactions of this sort. It would be foolish to now attribute sinister motives to expected responses.

Given the stability and sophistication of the U.S. arsenal and the vulnerabilities in Russian and Chinese systems, current plans for aggressive nuclear modernization may cause more problems than they solve.

It is vitally in the American interest that nuclear weapons are never again used in war. The likeliest path to nuclear use in the coming decades is not that an enemy suddenly launches a surprise attack on the continental United States with superior delivery systems. The greater concern is that a crisis could lead Russia or China to feel that they had been backed into a corner by U.S. conventional superiority and that utilizing a nuclear weapon could, in Moscow’s words, “de-escalate” the crisis. Nuclear forces that could provoke this scenario are destabilizing and could inadvertently lead to nuclear use. The most important steps the United States can take to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again are those that support a condition of mutual nuclear deterrence and not those that seek to overcome it.

The United States is in the enviable position of moving second in this round of modernization. The U.S. should use its position of technological and diplomatic strength to ensure strategic stability at the nuclear level, rather than destabilizing the world in a vain search for a useless supremacy.

There has always been an element in American strategic circles that is unwilling to accept the mutual vulnerability that underwrites nuclear deterrence. There will be calls to refuse mutual deterrence with China and to attempt to transcend the condition with Russia as punishment for bad behavior. The United States should resist this urge and instead build nuclear forces that are modest, affordable, and stabilizing. The real danger in U.S. nuclear modernization may not be too little, but too much.

---

As for Russia and China, both of the aforementioned articles are consistent in their revelations that USA have relatively much superior and effective nuclear force in comparison in current times and this disparity will continue to exist for years to come. Indeed this is true, people just pay attention to quantity of nuclear weapons and get spooked, however, quality factor is much more important and decisive.

 

[jhungary]

Let me tell you this.

In Iraq, we have a rules of engagement saying We can only fire at Iraqi, as long as he is facing you and firing their weapon at you.

That equal to

If he turn his back against you, you can't fire
If he drop his weapon, you can't fire
If he left your line of sight, you can't fire
If he don't fire at you but fire at somebody else, you can't fire
If he point the weapon at you but no muzzle flash, you can't fire.

lol, this is how the war was fought. so you tell me

 

[The SC]

Let me tell you this.

In Iraq, we have a rules of engagement saying We can only fire at Iraqi, as long as he is facing you and firing their weapon at you.

That equal to

If he turn his back against you, you can't fire
If he drop his weapon, you can't fire
If he left your line of sight, you can't fire
If he don't fire at you but fire at somebody else, you can't fire
If he point the weapon at you but no muzzle flash, you can't fire.

lol, this is how the war was fought. so you tell me

What about the half million Iraqi civilians killed by US troops, was that by rules of engagement. They weren't armed at all, let alone a muzzle flash. The Iraqi war was one of the most savage ones fought in history. There you had the most powerfull army in the world plus 50 other armies against merely civilians...
It just reminds one of the old crusades and their "rules of engagement", i.e; none and extreme...

 

[jhungary]

What about the half million Iraqi civilians killed by US troops, was that by rules of engagement. They weren't armed at all, let alone a muzzle flash. The Iraqi war was one of the most savage ones fought in history. There you had the most powerfull army in the world plus 50 other armies against merely civilians...
It just reminds one of the old crusades and their "rules of engagement", i.e; none and extreme...

Lol half millions civilian killed? you can listen to th BS spread around by either party of choice, at the end of a day, ask yourselves this question.

Were you there? I can tell you this I was in Iraq for a whole year, 9 months to be exact, the rate we have been killing people over there, it would have take us at least 50 years to kill half a million people over there, our whole BCT have 465 confirm kill with the tour of 2003, and that's higher than average. You do the maths.

 

[The SC]

Lol half millions civilian killed? you can listen to th BS spread around by either party of choice, at the end of a day, ask yourselves this question.

Were you there? I can tell you this I was in Iraq for a whole year, 9 months to be exact, the rate we have been killing people over there, it would have take us at least 50 years to kill half a million people over there, our whole BCT have 465 confirm kill with the tour of 2003, and that's higher than average. You do the maths.

You can try to hide what you want but the whole World won't believe you, just too many world organizations did the statistics, and I was conservative in the 500 000 figure, a million should be more accurate.

Iraq Death Toll Reaches 500,000 Since Start Of U.S.-Led Invasion, New Study Says

Nearly half a million people have died from war-related causes in Iraq since the US-led invasion in 2003, according to an academic study published in the United States on Tuesday...

Iraq Death Toll Reaches 500,000 Since Start Of U.S.-Led Invasion, New Study Says





ORB survey of Iraq War casualties

On 28 January 2008, ORB published an update based on additional work carried out in rural areas of Iraq. Some 600 additional interviews were undertaken September 20 to 24, 2007. As a result of this the death estimate was revised to 1,033,000 with a given range of 946,000 to 1,120,000

ORB survey of Iraq War casualties - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[gambit]

What about the half million Iraqi civilians killed by US troops...

Nearly half a million people have died from war-related causes...

Those are contradictory. Killed by troops is direct and unequivocal. Dead because of war related causes can mean many things that have nothing to do with the military, unless one strains logical relationships to make round pegs fit into square holes so that the military is to blame for everything.

 

[DrawingDead]

You can try to hide what you want but the whole World won't believe you, just too many world organizations did the statistics, and I was conservative in the 500 000 figure, a million should be more accurate.

Iraq Death Toll Reaches 500,000 Since Start Of U.S.-Led Invasion, New Study Says

Nearly half a million people have died from war-related causes in Iraq since the US-led invasion in 2003, according to an academic study published in the United States on Tuesday...

Iraq Death Toll Reaches 500,000 Since Start Of U.S.-Led Invasion, New Study Says





ORB survey of Iraq War casualties

On 28 January 2008, ORB published an update based on additional work carried out in rural areas of Iraq. Some 600 additional interviews were undertaken September 20 to 24, 2007. As a result of this the death estimate was revised to 1,033,000 with a given range of 946,000 to 1,120,000

ORB survey of Iraq War casualties - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

That's the total of everyone killed during that period. That's includes sectarian violence, suicide bombings and other acts of violence by the Iraqis towards each other. You're not trying to pass that off as our doing, are you?

 

[gambit]

That's the total of everyone killed during that period. That's includes sectarian violence, suicide bombings and other acts of violence by the Iraqis towards each other. You're not trying to pass that off as our doing, are you?

The belief today is that it is better off that Iraq was under Saddam Hussein than Iraq is today. The sad implication is that the ME cannot live unless the region is ruled by cruel dictatorships.

 

[jhungary]

You can try to hide what you want but the whole World won't believe you, just too many world organizations did the statistics, and I was conservative in the 500 000 figure, a million should be more accurate.

Iraq Death Toll Reaches 500,000 Since Start Of U.S.-Led Invasion, New Study Says

Nearly half a million people have died from war-related causes in Iraq since the US-led invasion in 2003, according to an academic study published in the United States on Tuesday...

Iraq Death Toll Reaches 500,000 Since Start Of U.S.-Led Invasion, New Study Says





ORB survey of Iraq War casualties

On 28 January 2008, ORB published an update based on additional work carried out in rural areas of Iraq. Some 600 additional interviews were undertaken September 20 to 24, 2007. As a result of this the death estimate was revised to 1,033,000 with a given range of 946,000 to 1,120,000

ORB survey of Iraq War casualties - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I take it you are one of those people who jump in anger believing all that the "Studies" said, usually, this type of people have their own agenda and only need to see, not digest, the studies seemingly support his argument or side, and dove in head first and support the so called "claim"

But I want to ask you one simple question. "HAVE YOU ACTUALLY LOOK AT HOW THEY CONDUCT THE STUDY?"

Let's take the New Survey claiming 500,000 civilian have been killed by US led War in Iraq First.

Violence caused most of the deaths, but about a third were indirectly linked to the war, and these deaths have been left out of previous counts, said lead author Amy Hagopian, a public health researcher at the University of Washington.

Those included situations when a pregnant woman encountered difficult labor but could not leave the house due to fighting, or when a person drank contaminated water, or when a patient could not get treated at a hospital because staff was overwhelmed with war casualties.

So, basically, if someone cut his hand in Iraq, and they ran to the local emergency room and because the ER is filled with War casualty and he got ignored and died waiting on treatment by whatever reason, that counted as an "Indirect Death" and a casualty of war, that's according to the survey definition.

While the "Indirect death" the survey mentioned is blanketed to all death that was "result" in the "Direct Combat" the studies fail to realise two simple thing.

1.) US/NATO forces does not treat their casualty in local hospital

2.) Iraqi Insurgent is the entity that hold normally hold the Hospital Staff at hostage and order them to treat their own wounded first.

and the survey also fail to mention it is US/NATO policy to accept overflow casualty of both hostile (Iraqi Insurgent) and Local Civilian in any way, shape or form affected by the fighting into their Role 3 or even evac into Role 4.
So, essentially the first study blaming because of the fighting, the insurgent overwhelm the local hospital and people died because of it and they WILL BE COUNT as civilian dead contribute to US led invasion.

That's pretty much the same when somebody drive over a bridge at night and killed, and you don't blame the driver, you blame the bridge, essentially, if the bridge wasn't there, then there would be no accident.

Then let's look at the Second report.

The ORB estimate was performed by a random survey of 1,720 adults aged 18+, out of which 1,499 responded, in fifteen of the eighteen governorates within Iraq, between August 12 and August 19, 2007

The first thing you go looking for is the reputable sampling method. The percentage of error, reported in this survey(+/- 2.5%) is based on a distributed sampling (Which does not mention) and over a 1700 sample out of a 36 million population.

However, the study errorously use the same percentage of error regardless of distribution and apply to the estimate. Hence the estimate is 1,002,000 and the survey number is swing from +/-2.5% directly applies to the sampling estimate.

If you have any mathematic and statistic background, you will know there are 2 flaw in this calculation. First of all being the sample size. Can you actually represent a 36 million population by mere 1700 sample? Even if we assume the distribution (15/17 governate) is even and fair, the number of example is too small (to those who don't know, that's 0.004% representation.)

Then they use the D1 2.5% instead of the D3 (3.5 to 4.5%) as their sampling error?? How can a 0.004 % representation can call for D1 Standard Deviation, which is in the centre of a bell curve and that means the littlest different is beyond me, but seems as if they try to manipulate the number by using the smaller SD on a smallest representation (Usually Smaller SD used on larger representation)

Here is a good way to do a fair sampling

http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/sampstat.php

And the studies shown does not follow that flow.

Then

"How many members of your household, if any, have died as a result of the conflict in Iraq since 2003 (ie as a result of violence rather than a natural death such as old age)? Please note that I mean those who were actually living under your roof."

That is the question they have put out, and the answer distribution is as follow
None- 72%
One - 14%
Two - 3%
Three - 1%
Four or more < 0.5%
Don't know 2%
Do not answer 8%
Total < 100.5%

ORB reported that "48% died from a gunshot wound, 20% from the impact of a car bomb, 9% from aerial bombardment, 6% as a result of an accident and 6% from another blast/ordnance

So, what we see here is basically a number that included EVERYTHING except natural death.

So by essentially saying all these death are related to US Led invasion is essentially assuming 2 things.


1.) There were 0 violence (Sectarian or Criminal) BEFORE US invasion


2.) All death hereafter were contributed to US/NATO Forces.

Well, death from Gunshot wound can be from many way, not just US/NATO were fighting you know, so does the impact of a car bomb, US/NATO don't plant car bomb. Nor did all the car bomb targeting US/NATO personnel.
So, by assuming all the death happen after 2003 is a contribution to US led invasion, the study essentially ignore the background, the sectarian violent and criminal death rate. I don't know about you, but did Iraq suffer no death beside Natural death before US invasion??

Hence this study have been lambasted by many to be inaccurate.

http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228654909_Conflict_Deaths_in_Iraq_A_Methodological_Critique_of_the_ORB_Survey_Estimate

But then I guess, you have an agenda in place so you would dove head in and believe all these nonsense, so for you, US Army would and always will be just a civilian killing machine, no matter what.

 

[The SC]

I take it you are one of those people who jump in anger believing all that the "Studies" said, usually, this type of people have their own agenda and only need to see, not digest, the studies seemingly support his argument or side, and dove in head first and support the so called "claim"

But I want to ask you one simple question. "HAVE YOU ACTUALLY LOOK AT HOW THEY CONDUCT THE STUDY?"

Let's take the New Survey claiming 500,000 civilian have been killed by US led War in Iraq First.



So, basically, if someone cut his hand in Iraq, and they ran to the local emergency room and because the ER is filled with War casualty and he got ignored and died waiting on treatment by whatever reason, that counted as an "Indirect Death" and a casualty of war, that's according to the survey definition.

While the "Indirect death" the survey mentioned is blanketed to all death that was "result" in the "Direct Combat" the studies fail to realise two simple thing.

1.) US/NATO forces does not treat their casualty in local hospital

2.) Iraqi Insurgent is the entity that hold normally hold the Hospital Staff at hostage and order them to treat their own wounded first.

and the survey also fail to mention it is US/NATO policy to accept overflow casualty of both hostile (Iraqi Insurgent) and Local Civilian in any way, shape or form affected by the fighting into their Role 3 or even evac into Role 4.
So, essentially the first study blaming because of the fighting, the insurgent overwhelm the local hospital and people died because of it and they WILL BE COUNT as civilian dead contribute to US led invasion.

That's pretty much the same when somebody drive over a bridge at night and killed, and you don't blame the driver, you blame the bridge, essentially, if the bridge wasn't there, then there would be no accident.

Then let's look at the Second report.




The first thing you go looking for is the reputable sampling method. The percentage of error, reported in this survey(+/- 2.5%) is based on a distributed sampling (Which does not mention) and over a 1700 sample out of a 36 million population.

However, the study errorously use the same percentage of error regardless of distribution and apply to the estimate. Hence the estimate is 1,002,000 and the survey number is swing from +/-2.5% directly applies to the sampling estimate.

If you have any mathematic and statistic background, you will know there are 2 flaw in this calculation. First of all being the sample size. Can you actually represent a 36 million population by mere 1700 sample? Even if we assume the distribution (15/17 governate) is even and fair, the number of example is too small (to those who don't know, that's 0.004% representation.)

Then they use the D1 2.5% instead of the D3 (3.5 to 4.5%) as their sampling error?? How can a 0.004 % representation can call for D1 Standard Deviation, which is in the centre of a bell curve and that means the littlest different is beyond me, but seems as if they try to manipulate the number by using the smaller SD on a smallest representation (Usually Smaller SD used on larger representation)

Here is a good way to do a fair sampling

http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/sampstat.php

And the studies shown does not follow that flow.

Then



That is the question they have put out, and the answer distribution is as follow
None- 72%
One - 14%
Two - 3%
Three - 1%
Four or more < 0.5%
Don't know 2%
Do not answer 8%
Total < 100.5%



So, what we see here is basically a number that included EVERYTHING except natural death.

So by essentially saying all these death are related to US Led invasion is essentially assuming 2 things.


1.) There were 0 violence (Sectarian or Criminal) BEFORE US invasion


2.) All death hereafter were contributed to US/NATO Forces.

Well, death from Gunshot wound can be from many way, not just US/NATO were fighting you know, so does the impact of a car bomb, US/NATO don't plant car bomb. Nor did all the car bomb targeting US/NATO personnel.
So, by assuming all the death happen after 2003 is a contribution to US led invasion, the study essentially ignore the background, the sectarian violent and criminal death rate. I don't know about you, but did Iraq suffer no death beside Natural death before US invasion??

Hence this study have been lambasted by many to be inaccurate.

http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228654909_Conflict_Deaths_in_Iraq_A_Methodological_Critique_of_the_ORB_Survey_Estimate

But then I guess, you have an agenda in place so you would dove head in and believe all these nonsense, so for you, US Army would and always will be just a civilian killing machine, no matter what.

There is no anger, you are totally wrong, I have presented facts that might have made you angry, since you'd like people to believe that the US killed 500 people in Iraq during the whole occupation. That is just insulting everybody's intelligence, but they all know that you do not care and will continue to lie.

 

[jhungary]

There is no anger, you are totally wrong, I have presented facts that might have made you angry, since you'd like people to believe that the US killed 500 people in Iraq during the whole occupation. That is just insulting everybody's intelligence, but they all know that you do not care and will continue to lie.

lol, now your "fact" is not really fact now? isn't it? and Me Angry? Sure, I am angry I can't kill more. I get 2 during my whole tour in Iraq. 2 people, that's a small number don't you think? People are angry that the casualty is not higher, is that what you want to hear?

By the way, I said my whole BCT killed 465 people in a year, in all you are looking at about 60,000-70,000 casualty directly related to "Combat" death in the whole war. If you trying to put word into my mouth, then this is my last post on you about this issue

 

[The SC]

lol, now your "fact" is not really fact now? isn't it? and Me Angry? Sure, I am angry I can't kill more. I get 2 during my whole tour in Iraq. 2 people, that's a small number don't you think? People are angry that the casualty is not higher, is that what you want to hear?

By the way, I said my whole BCT killed 465 people in a year, in all you are looking at about 60,000-70,000 casualty directly related to "Combat" death in the whole war. If you trying to put word into my mouth, then this is my last post on you about this issue

You said your whole BCT killed 465 people in a year, in all you are looking at about 60,000-70,000 casualty directly related to "Combat" death in the whole war. You forgot to add in a year again (you have replaced it with the whole war), multiply that by 12 years and you get the one million figure either way, so, if your BCT killed 60,000-70,000, how many other BCTs were there? You had at least ten brigades...
No need to reply, I am just adding facts and logic to what your are denying.