Has China been practicing preemptive missile strikes against U.S. bases?

[gambit]

http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2015/02/america-war-93-time-222-239-years-since-1776.html

old man whom are you trying to fool?

Young pup, do you think Asia really cares ? You are fooling yourself if you think Asians cares.

 

[terranMarine]

Young pup, do you think Asia really cares ? You are fooling yourself if you think Asians cares.

Asia? I'm talking about the world and you think Asia cares about your claim US the peace keeper part? Who the warmonger is everybody can judge for themselves.

 

[JOEY TRIBIANI]

http://www.businessinsider.com/lead...inker-china-now-has-only-one-real-ally-2016-2

You tend to mistake trade relations with authentic alliances.

Chinese missiles are good but less capable than those of Russia and US on average.

Anyways, Trump administration has the guts to stand-up to China, should a situation demand it. Don't expect every American President to be spineless like Barack Obama.

You make it sound like as if China is a godly entity. It is just a country with strengths and weaknesses. And Americans fully understand those weaknesses.

You excluded the Russian factor in any future Us-Sino war . russia will intervene as she intervene in syria .

 

[gambit]

Asia? I'm talking about the world and you think Asia cares about your claim US the peace keeper part? Who the warmonger is everybody can judge for themselves.

Yes, Asia do not care about US military adventures in other parts of the world.

So far, the US had proven we have no designs on their countries, even the South Koreans and the Japanese knows it despite our garrisons on their countries. Even the Viets who had the Americans fought a war in their country believes the US have no designs on their country. The Filipinos and the South Koreans remember WW II how the US and others saved them from the Japanese.

As for the Singaporeans, they remember this...

http://www.amazon.com/From-Third-World-First-Singapore/dp/0060197765

Chapter 37

Deng Xiaoping's China

The Malaysians must be suspicious of Deng. There were underlying suspicions and animosity between Malay Muslims and Chinese in Malaysia, and between Indonesians and their ethnic Chinese. Because China was exporting revolution to Southeast Asia, my Asean neighbors wanted Singapore to rally with them, not against the Soviet Union, but against China.

Asean governments regarded radio broadcasts from China appealing directly to their ethnic Chinese as dangerous subversion. Deng listened silently. He had never seen it this light: China, a big foreign power, going over the governments of the region to subvert their citizens. I said it was most unlikely that Asean countries would respond positively to his proposal for a united front against the Soviet Union and Vietnam and suggested that we discuss on how to resolve this problem. Then I paused.

Deng's expression and body language registered consternation. He knew that I had spoken the truth. Abruptly, he asked, "What do you want me to do?" I was astonished. I had never met a communist leader who was prepared to depart from his brief when confronted with reality, much less ask what I wanted him to do. I had expected him to brush my points aside as Premier Hua Guofeng had done in Beijing in 1976 when I pressed him over the inconsistency of China's supporting the Malayan Communist Party to foment revolution in Singapore, not Malaya. Hua had answered with bluster, "I do not know the details, but whenever communists fight, they will win." Not Deng. He realized that he had to face up to this problem if Vietnam was to be isolated. I hesitated to tell this seasoned, weather-beaten revolutionary what he should do, but since he had asked me, I said, "Stop such radio broadcasts; stop such appeals. It will be better for the ethnic Chinese in Asean if China does not underline their kinship and call upon their ethnic sympathy. The suspicion of the indigenous peoples will always be there, whether or not China emphasizes these blood ties. But if China appeals to these blood ties so blatantly, it must increase their suspicions, China must stop radio broadcasts from south China by the Malayan and Indonesian Communist Parties.

They remember how China used the race card to try to foment communist revolution on their country.

So yes, the rest of Asia do see US as the guarantor for peace and China as the aggressor, especially now China want to control the SCS, their economic lifeline.

 

[A.P. Richelieu]

Educate yourself before you run your mouth, white boy. Think our false flagging bs fools anybody?

search "quora Why-do-the-Chinese-view-Mao-Zedong-in-such-a-positive-light answers 20833048"

Speaking of history of violence...

And no Chinese soldiers were involved in attacking the UN in Korea.
No Chinese attacked the Soviets in 1969.
It is all mentioned in Alternative Facts literature.

 

[terranMarine]

Yes, Asia do not care about US military adventures in other parts of the world.

So far, the US had proven we have no designs on their countries, even the South Koreans and the Japanese knows it despite our garrisons on their countries. Even the Viets who had the Americans fought a war in their country believes the US have no designs on their country. The Filipinos and the South Koreans remember WW II how the US and others saved them from the Japanese.

As for the Singaporeans, they remember this...

http://www.amazon.com/From-Third-World-First-Singapore/dp/0060197765

They remember how China used the race card to try to foment communist revolution on their country.

So yes, the rest of Asia do see US as the guarantor for peace and China as the aggressor, especially now China want to control the SCS, their economic lifeline.

Right now i see Philippines and Malaysia having good ties with China , your eyes still covered by the sand?

 

[gambit]

Right now i see Philippines and Malaysia having good ties with China , your eyes still covered by the sand?

Let us know when both countries ceded their claims to the SCS islands to China.

 

[LeGenD]

Yes owned because after he found a flaw, you quickly edit the post to hide your flaw argument.

Their is no flaw in my argument in that post. I edited that post to improve my argument, not to conceal anything. Your friend (misunderstood) my argument and used my edit as a pretext to accuse me of projecting China as a warmongering state. Anybody with good grasp of English can read that post and will understand that I did not accuse China of being a warmongering state or anything of the sort.

My point is that China will have to do something drastic or irrational (insert an example here) to trigger an American military response, it won't come otherwise. Now, this statement does not implies that China is willing to provoke US to that extent.

Clear enough?

Also the fact your argument is rather weak. You can't compare China aggression with the US. There is no other that can rival them in the modern history.

I am (not) asserting that US is the good guy and China is the bad guy. I am simply pointing out the fact that both [China and US] have the political will and capability of being aggressive in pursuit of their interests.

Example 1: China intervened in the Korean War to rollback American advances in the region under the leadership of Mao Zedong. So who was the aggressor in this conflict? North Korea (1st); US (2nd); and China (3rd). If a state was genuinely innocent in all this, it was South Korea. The rest have justifications, narratives and excuses for their intervention and acts of aggression.

Example 2: China invaded Vietnam in response to Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia. So who was the aggressor in this conflict? I leave this to you.

If you concentrate on the number of wars US have fought, you will get the impression that it is a warmongering state but you need to focus on the context. Do you think that US is responsible for all of the wars it has fought? Do you think that US started World Wars? These matters are not so black and white. China have fought 3 wars since WW2 and was aggressor in 2 of them. This should tell you something.

Again, no attempt to paint China as the bad guy. Just telling you how things are in reality.

You see, this where you run into trouble and make you look stupid when you mentioned Mao. Mao didn't start any war. His war is mostly internal struggle. Don't count his war of anti-imperalism against him.

I understand that Mao Zedong is a hero to modern Chinese but a neutral observer would notice that he was not only brutal to his political opponents but also had an aggressive foreign policy. He intervened in the Korean War in support of North Korea and fought a war with India over the issue of Tibet. One could argue that war with India was unavoidable but US? He is also responsible for the issue of Taiwan. Now, China wants Taiwan to become a part of it but those guys are not keen about it.

As far as our modern history is concerned, there are multiple occasions in which we can start a war but we didn't. Just take a look at Diaoyu, South China Sea. We are way more powerful than Phillipines, Vietnam, and even Japan but we never used force and start a war with them. We could have and kick them off those islands in SCS but we didn't. If this is the US, they would have cock the head of their South American neighbors for trying to wrestle territories with them. That, my friend, the difference between us and the US.

You sure about that?

China invaded Vietnam and learned a lesson from it; 30,000 Chinese troops dead in a span of 2 months and Hanoi remained intact. I admire the bravery of Chinese troops though (respect where due).

Your restraint can be attributed to following factors:

1. Terrible experience in Vietnam War
2. Threat of American intervention
3. Element of unpredictability

Cost-benefit analysis, my friend.

If restraint is an argument then keep in mind that US have exercised it vis-a-vis Cuba, Mexico, Argentina, Iran, Syria and Cambodia. In-fact, US gave Iraq an ultimatum of 1 year to withdraw its forces from Kuwait prior to the Persian Gulf War.

Now you brought up the drone incident and I don't know how that relevant to the discussion or how you equal that to aggression. It was an incident in which we felt the drone was used to spy on us and thus we captured it and investigated. Once it was showed to be a research and commercial drone, we returned it in a very professional manner.

Like I said, your argument is stupid and that logic will not fly if you are to compare the aggression of USA vs China. There is no comparison. The US have shown the determination to use force and they did used force as a coercion. I'm not asking you to praise us. You don't need to but you need to be objectively using your brain to think and make arguments, otherwise you will get owned by another person.

1. Both [China and US] have shown the determination to use force when they felt it necessary (see above).
2. China has threatened Taiwan with dire consequences should it declare independence (is this not coercion?).
3. China's artificial island in SCS region as a front-line base of operations against rivals.

I would also disclose something a bit personal here because it offers a valuable lesson: I had a business deal with a Chinese businessman in Hong Kong but that guy committed fraud and I suffered noticeable loss. However, I did not let this (not-so-memorable) experience cloud my assessment of China on the whole; their is good in China after-all. Nonetheless, this experience reminded me of an important distinction: that state-to-state relations can be different from what a common man may experience on the ground at personal capacity, that state-to-state relations are driven by mutual interests and sugarcoated narratives. However, an individual should not be blind in his judgement about the stuff he perceives positively from a distance, that he should proceed with caution in his dealings with anybody and do his homework well enough. In-fact, I can extrapolate this lesson to even state-level deals (defective Chinese locomotives anyone?)

Let me finish my argument on a lighter note: I admire China for its progress and friendship with Pakistan. I perceive China as a role-model of economic prosperity for the entire world and highlight it as an such in my discussions concerning Pakistan. I wish China best of luck in its future endeavors. However, I do not let my nationalism come in the way of my rationality: I tend to see good in all but I would call a spade a spade. I strive for truthfulness. That is it.

 

[ohmrlobalobayeh]

Yes, Asia do not care about US military adventures in other parts of the world.

So far, the US had proven we have no designs on their countries, even the South Koreans and the Japanese knows it despite our garrisons on their countries. Even the Viets who had the Americans fought a war in their country believes the US have no designs on their country. The Filipinos and the South Koreans remember WW II how the US and others saved them from the Japanese.

As for the Singaporeans, they remember this...

http://www.amazon.com/From-Third-World-First-Singapore/dp/0060197765

They remember how China used the race card to try to foment communist revolution on their country.

So yes, the rest of Asia do see US as the guarantor for peace and China as the aggressor, especially now China want to control the SCS, their economic lifeline.

Time to move out of your cave

 

[jhungary]

Their is no flaw in my argument in that post. I edited that post to improve my argument, not to conceal anything. Your friend (misunderstood) my argument and used my edit as a pretext to accuse me of projecting China as a warmongering state. Anybody with good grasp of English can read that post and will understand that I did not accuse China of being a warmongering state or anything of the sort.

My point is that China will have to do something drastic or irrational (insert an example here) to trigger an American military response, it won't come otherwise. Now, this statement does not implies that China is willing to provoke US to that extent.

Clear enough?


I am (not) asserting that US is the good guy and China is the bad guy. I am simply pointing out the fact that both [China and US] have the political will and capability of being aggressive in pursuit of their interests.

Example 1: China intervened in the Korean War to rollback American advances in the region under the leadership of Mao Zedong. So who was the aggressor in this conflict? North Korea (1st); US (2nd); and China (3rd). If a state was genuinely innocent in all this, it was South Korea. The rest have justifications, narratives and excuses for their intervention and acts of aggression.

Example 2: China invaded Vietnam in response to Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia. So who was the aggressor in this conflict? I leave this to you.

If you concentrate on the number of wars US have fought, you will get the impression that it is a warmongering state but you need to focus on the context. Do you think that US is responsible for all of the wars it has fought? Do you think that US started World Wars? These matters are not so black and white. China have fought 3 wars since WW2 and was aggressor in 2 of them. This should tell you something.

Again, no attempt to paint China as the bad guy. Just telling you how things are in reality.


I understand that Mao Zedong is a hero to modern Chinese but a neutral observer would notice that he was not only brutal to his political opponents but also had an aggressive foreign policy. He intervened in the Korean War in support of North Korea and fought a war with India over the issue of Tibet. One could argue that war with India was unavoidable but US? He is also responsible for the issue of Taiwan. Now, China wants Taiwan to become a part of it but those guys are not keen about it.


You sure about that?

China invaded Vietnam and learned a lesson from it; 30,000 Chinese troops dead in a span of 2 months and Hanoi remained intact. I admire the bravery of Chinese troops though (respect where due).

Your restraint can be attributed to following factors:

1. Terrible experience in Vietnam War
2. Threat of American intervention
3. Element of unpredictability

Cost-benefit analysis, my friend.

If restraint is an argument then keep in mind that US have exercised it vis-a-vis Cuba, Mexico, Argentina, Iran, Syria and Cambodia. In-fact, US gave Iraq an ultimatum of 1 year to withdraw its forces from Kuwait prior to the Persian Gulf War.





1. Both [China and US] have shown the determination to use force when they felt it necessary (see above).
2. China has threatened Taiwan with dire consequences should it declare independence (is this not coercion?).
3. China's artificial island in SCS region as a front-line base of operations against rivals.

I would also disclose something a bit personal here because it offers a valuable lesson: I had a business deal with a Chinese businessman in Hong Kong but that guy committed fraud and I suffered noticeable loss. However, I did not let this (not-so-memorable) experience cloud my assessment of China on the whole; their is good in China after-all. Nonetheless, this experience reminded me of an important distinction: that state-to-state relations can be different from what a common man may experience on the ground at personal capacity, that state-to-state relations are driven by mutual interests and sugarcoated narratives. However, an individual should not be blind in his judgement about the stuff he perceives positively from a distance, that he should proceed with caution in his dealings with anybody and do his homework well enough. In-fact, I can extrapolate this lesson to even state-level deals (defective Chinese locomotives anyone?)

Let me finish my argument on a lighter note: I admire China for its progress and friendship with Pakistan. I perceive China as a role-model of economic prosperity for the entire world and highlight it as an such in my discussions concerning Pakistan. I wish China best of luck in its future endeavors. However, I do not let my nationalism come in the way of my rationality: I tend to see good in all but I would call a spade a spade. I strive for truthfulness. That is it.

Well, China have been in more war than just 3 since 1945.

They have been in 16 wars, conflict and border dispute in total.

A lot of them the Chinese started.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars_involving_the_People's_Republic_of_China4

And also, you should quit arguing with these people lol, it will get you nowhere but abuse.

 

[Zsari]

You’ve probably heard that China’s military has developed a “carrier-killer” ballistic missile to threaten one of America’s premier power-projection tools, its unmatched fleet of aircraft carriers. Or perhaps you’ve read about China’s deployment of its own aircraft carrier to the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. But heavily defended moving targets like aircraft carriers would be a challenge to hit in open ocean, and were China’s own aircraft carrier (or even two or three like it) to venture into open water in anger, the U.S. submarine force would make short work of it. In reality, the greatest military threat to U.S. vital interests in Asia may be one that has received somewhat less attention: the growing capability of China’s missile forces to strike U.S. bases. This is a time of increasing tension, with China’s news organizations openly threatening war. U.S. leaders and policymakers should understand that a preemptive Chinese missile strike against the forward bases that underpin U.S. military power in the Western Pacific is a very real possibility, particularly if China believes its claimed core strategic interests are threatened in the course of a crisis and perceives that its attempts at deterrence have failed. Such a preemptive strike appears consistent with available information about China’s missile force doctrine, and the satellite imagery shown below points to what may be real-world efforts to practice its execution.

The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force: Precision Strike with Chinese Characteristics

The PLA Rocket Force originally focused on nuclear deterrence. Since the Cold War, the force has increasingly focused on the employment of precision-guided conventional ballistic and land attack cruise missiles. The command now consists of about 100,000 personnel and was elevated in December 2015 to a status co-equal to that of China’s other military services.

In terms of specific missions, Michael S. Chase of the U.S. Naval War College wrote in 2014 that PLA Rocket Force doctrine calls for a range of deterrence, compellence, and coercive operations. In the event that deterrence fails, the missions of a conventional missile strike campaign could include “launching firepower strikes against important targets in the enemy’s campaign and strategic deep areas.” Potential targets of such strikes could include command centers, communications hubs, radar stations, guided missile positions, air force and naval facilities, transport and logistical facilities, fuel depots, electrical power centers, and aircraft carrier strike groups.

Chase also stated that, “In all, Chinese military writings on conventional missile campaigns stress the importance of surprise and suggest a preference for preemptive strikes.” And while most Sinologists discount the idea of a true bolt-from-the-blue attack in a crisis without first giving an adversary a chance to back down, preemptive missile strikes to initiate active hostilities could be consistent with China’s claimed overall military strategy of “active defense.” As a 2007 RAND study of China’s anti-access strategies explained, “This paradox is explained by defining the enemy’s first strike as ‘any military activities conducted by the enemy aimed at breaking up China territorially and violating its sovereignty’…and thereby rendered the equivalent of a ‘strategic first shot.’” China analyst Dean Cheng stated similarly in 2015, “From Mao to now, the concept of the active defense has emphasized assuming the strategic defensive, while securing the operational and tactical initiative, including preemptive actions at those levels if necessary.” Thus, China could consider a preemptive missile strike as a defensive “counter-attack” to a threat against China’s sovereignty (e.g., over Taiwan or the South China Sea) solely in the political or strategic realm.

If such a strike still seems unlikely, consider that U.S. military and civilian leaders may have a blind spot regarding the capabilities of the PLA Rocket Force. The bulk of the PLA Rocket Force — the conventionally armed precision-strike units — have no real counterpart in the U.S. military. American long-range ballistic missiles are all nuclear-tipped and therefore focused on nuclear deterrence, and the Army’s short-range tactical ballistic missiles are designed for battlefield use. Also, per the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia, the United States fields no medium- or intermediate-range ballistic missiles of any kind, nor any ground-launched land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). When Americans think of preemptive strike, they likely think of weapons launched by air or sea-based platforms, discounting the viability of a different paradigm: ground-based precision-strike missiles used for the same mission.

Coming of Age

A 2015 RAND study said that by 2017 (i.e., now) China could field about 1,200 conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles (600-800 km range), 108 to 274 medium-range ballistic missiles (1000 to 1500+ km), an unknown number of conventional intermediate-range ballistic missiles (5,000 km), and 450-1,250 land attack cruise missiles (1500+ km). RAND also estimated that improvements in the accuracy of China’s ballistic missiles may allow them to strike fixed targets in a matter of minutes with an accuracy of a few meters. RAND assesses that key U.S. facilities throughout Japan could already be within range of thousands of difficult-to-defeat advanced ballistic and cruise missiles. Even U.S. bases on the island of Guam could be within range of a smaller number of missiles (See Figure 1).

Fig. 1: PLA Rocket Force Missile ranges vs. U.S. bases in Asia.
In recent years, the PLA Rocket Force appears to have been making real the specific capabilities necessary to support execution of the preemptive strike discussed above. As examples, a 2009 RAND study of open-source literature suggested that flechette sub-munitions would likely be used against missile launchers, parked aircraft, fuel tanks, vehicles, air defense weapons, and ships in port. Penetrating munitions would be used against airfield runways, aircraft shelters, and semi-underground fuel tanks. In terms of sequencing, the study suggested that an initial wave of ballistic missiles would neutralize air defenses and command centers and crater the runways of military air bases, trapping aircraft on the ground. These initial paralyzing ballistic missile salvos could then be followed by waves of cruise missiles and Chinese aircraft targeting hardened aircraft shelters, aircraft parked in the open, and fuel handling and maintenance facilities.

These capabilities may already have been tested at a ballistic missile impact test site (see Figure 2) located on the edge of the Gobi Desert in western China. Commercial satellite images seem to show a range of test targets representing just the sort of objectives discussed in the doctrine above, including groups of vehicles (perhaps representing mobile air and missile defense batteries — see Figure 3), aircraft targets parked in the open (Figure 4), fuel depots (Figure 5), runway cratering submunition tests (Figure 6), electrical power facilities (Figure 7), and the delivery of penetrating munitions to hardened shelters and bunkers (Figure 8). Of note, the 2007 RAND study mentioned above stated that submunitions are generally not capable of penetrating the hardened shelters use to house fighter aircraft at many air bases, that China’s ballistic missiles lack the accuracy to ensure a high percentage of direct hits using unitary warheads, and thus, “fighter aircraft in hardened shelters would be relatively safe from Chinese ballistic missile attack.” This clearly appears to no longer be the case, and the demonstrated ability to precisely deliver penetrating warheads to facilities such as command centers in a matter of minutes could also provide a key capability to destroy them, with their command staffs, in the initial waves of an attack.

Fig. 2: Possible PLA Rocket Force ballistic missile impact range in Western China.

Fig. 3: Left side – Possible vehicle targets with sub-munition impact pattern, imagery dated Dec. 2013. Right side – U.S. Patriot air and missile defense battery, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan. Scale of sub-munition pattern overlaid for comparison.

Fig. 4: Possible parked aircraft target, imagery dated August 2013. Upper left aircraft shaped target, imagery dated May 2012. Lower right – F-22 Fighter Parking Area, Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan.

Fig. 5: Possible test targets simulating above-ground fuel tanks, imagery dated September 2012. Compared to actual fuel tanks in Japan, similar scale.

Fig. 6: Possible runway cratering munition testing, imagery dated Sept. 2012.

Fig. 7: Possible mock electronic substation target, imagery dated July 2013. Note no electrical lines running to or from the target in its very remote location. While no craters are visible, disablement may be planned using other methods, such as dispersal of conductive graphite filaments.

Fig. 8: Possible hardened aircraft shelter or bunker test targets, imagery dated Oct. 2016. Penetrator sub-munition impacts visible. Lower right: Misawa Air Base, Japan, similar scale.
China has not been shy about displaying the advancing capabilities of the PLA Rocket Force. Beijing openly displayed some of its latest missiles (such as DF-26 “Guam-killer” missile) in its 70th anniversary parade in 2015 and painted the missiles’ identification on their sides in western characters, in case anyone missed the point. The PLA Rocket Force also put out a recruiting music video and other TV footage showing the employment of multiple coordinated missile launches, as well as the use of submunitions.

Pearl Harbor 2.0?

In 2010, Toshi Yoshihara of the U.S. Naval War College wrote that authoritative PLA publications indicated that China’s missile forces might attempt a preemptive strike to knock out the U.S. Navy in Asia by specifically targeting vulnerable carriers and warships in port. Yoshihara noted in particular that, “Perhaps no other place captures the Chinese imagination as much as Yokosuka,” the major U.S. naval base near Tokyo home to the U.S. Navy’s sole permanently forward-deployed aircraft carrier, USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), as well as other ships and vital support facilities (see Figure 9). In 2012, Dr. Yoshihara again stated that:

[T]he Imperial Japanese Navy’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor remains a popular, if somewhat tired, metaphor for the dangers of unpreparedness and overexposure to risk…But the real possibility that U.S. bases in the Western Pacific could once again be vulnerable…has occasioned little publicity or debate.

Fig. 9: Home of U.S. 7th Fleet, Yokosuka, Japan.
Evidence that China may have been practicing to strike ships in port with ballistic missiles would lend credence to Yoshihara’s concerns. And such evidence exists: images taken in 2013 (see Figure 10) seem to show China testing its ability to do so.

Fig. 10: Possible moored ship and naval facility targets, imagery dated August 2013. Compared for scale with actual U.S. destroyer.
Specifically, the PLA Rocket Force appears to have been practicing on several ship targets of a similar size to U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyers moored in a mock port that is a near-mirror image of the actual inner harbor at the U.S. naval base in Yokosuka (see Figure 11). Note what looks like an impact crater located near the center of the three ship targets, close enough to have potentially damaged all three ships with submunitions. The display of these targets may itself constitute signaling to the United States and its allies as a long-term deterrent effort. All the same, it bears considering that the only way that China could realistically expect to catch multiple U.S. ships in port as shown above would be through a surprise attack. Otherwise, with clear signs of imminent hostilities, the United States would likely have already sent its fleet to sea. Some skeptics might say that catching the U.S. flat-footed would be unlikely, but history teaches us not to discount the possibility of successful surprise attacks.

The Need for Enhanced Deterrent Measures

U.S. and allied efforts are underway to improve defensive areas such as base hardening and force dispersal, as well as to conduct advanced research into ballistic missile defenses such as high-velocity projectiles, rail guns, and lasers. My colleague Elbridge Colby has written with Jonathan Solomon extensively about conventional deterrence and the specific capabilities that the United States can develop in the next few years that will be critical to fielding a force “that can prevail in regional wars while still performing peacetime missions at a reasonable level.” The possibility that a threat of preemptive attack from the PLA Rocket Force already exists underscores an urgent need to take further action now.

First, the United States should very publicly deploy the most robust missile defenses that it can to protect its bases in Japan. In the long term, technological breakthroughs will probably be necessary to pace the growing precision-strike ballistic missile threat at a reasonable cost. But for now, a layered ballistic missile defense is necessary, as the short-range Patriot air and missile defense batteries currently guarding U.S. and allied bases in Japan seem unlikely to succeed against a mass Chinese raid. Such a robust missile defense also requires deployment of the U.S. Army’s Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system to Japan and/or tasking Aegis ballistic missile defense destroyers for duty focused on the defense of U.S. bases. Given that U.S. destroyers would likely have other business to conduct in a conflict with China, near-term deployment of THAAD to Japan (which will require tough trade-offs given the current worldwide demand and limited number of available batteries) is necessary to defend U.S. forces. Once deployed, U.S. and allied ballistic missile defense forces will need to publicly practice coordinated defense against mass ballistic missile attacks. Even well-practiced defenders would face a tough challenge in coordinating a real-world defense against a ballistic missile attack of unprecedented scale from a potentially flat-footed stance, with mere minutes to do so and only one chance to get it right.

Given the difficulty and uncertainty associated with defending against a mass missile raid even with robust, layered defenses, U.S. forces and personnel stationed at bases in Japan and Guam need to practice rapid evacuation of the types of facilities targeted in Rocket Force doctrine. Similarly, key U.S. command centers in Japan should practice rapid execution of continuity of operations plans, given that the time available between the first detection of a missile launch by U.S. space-based missile warning sensors to its impact would probably be on the order of 10 to 15 minutes. In that short amount of time, U.S. early warning centers would have to detect the launched strike, assess it, and warn U.S. forces overseas. Those overseas personnel and command staffs would then need to execute evacuation and continuity procedures in a matter of a few short minutes. Similarly, U.S. ships in port in the Western Pacific would need to be able get away from their pier positions in a matter of minutes, and high-value air units in the region would need to be able to quickly move their aircraft from their parked positions. In any case, no margin of error will exist for lack of training or proficiency in execution.

The United States and its allies should take action now to ensure that China does not think that it can gain the upper hand in a conflict through successful missile strikes against U.S. bases in Asia. They must ensure that China is not tempted, as some of the United States’ previous adversaries have been, into making the grave error of trying to knock the United States down, expecting it not to get back up.

Source: https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/h...preemptive-missile-strikes-against-u-s-bases/

The chance of China launch a surprise attack is next to zero, but a plan for pre-emptive strike acts both as a deterrent and point of escalation, that if Chinese assets are fired upon by the US in a standoff, such as during missions in and over the South China Sea, China would possibly respond with a missile strike, not necessarily an all out strike, but all options are certainly available.

 

[rott]

The reason why your China have not dared done anything beyond harassing fishermen is because your leadership knows the US will act -- after a certain threshold.

Do not mistake the policies of one US President administration to be inevitable lock down for the next. The difference between US and China, if perception is reality, is that the US is the guarantor of peace and China is not. All the graphics about how many US military adventures around the world means shit to Asia. All they care is what China want and what the US can do to deny that want.

You seriously believe that? Hiding behind the word peace to pit countries against countries? Please give me the shit that you smoke everyday.
Peace is a word which shouldn't be used in the same sentence with the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

 

[Akasa]

If this materializes, the Chinese regime would have to come to terms with an unconditional surrender a few years down the road. Their leadership has to be deluded to imagine that the PLA would be capable of holding off a combined USN/USAF counterattack and that the CCP wouldn't collapse in a few subsequent months (or weeks) from a combination of massive military losses, domestic unrest, shutdown of international trade, and civilian infrastructure damage from US munitions.

Educate yourself before you run your mouth, white boy. Think our false flagging bs fools anybody?

search "quora Why-do-the-Chinese-view-Mao-Zedong-in-such-a-positive-light answers 20833048"

Speaking of history of violence...

A brief history of Chinese pre-emptive attacks:
1950: Tibet
1951: Korea
1955: First Taiwan Strait Crisis (Kinmen/Matsu islands)
1958: Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (Kinmen/Matsu Islands)
1962: India (Ladakh)
1967: India (Nathu La & Cho La)
1969: Soviet Union (Treasure Island)
1974: Paracel Islands
1979: Vietnam
1981: Lang Son (Hill 400/1688)
1984: Vietnam (Cao Bang, Lang Son, Trang Dinh)
1988: Spratly Islands

 

[war&peace]

1962: India (Ladakh)

That was the most memorable..the way China invaded and kicked Indian butts was amazing...

 

[Akasa]

That was the most memorable..the way China invaded and kicked Indian butts was amazing...

Well, I guess I shouldn't be surprised to find members of PDF who support the resolution of territorial disputes via aggression & confrontation.