Gurkha who beheaded Taliban soldier in Afghanistan battle cleared to return

[Uchiha]

"If a man says he is not afraid of dying, he is either lying or is a Gurkha." - Sam.

Two words: Chuck Norris

 

[Areesh]

Two words: Chuck Norris

Hahahahaha.

 

[John Doe]

For the crybabies and poor whiners ( Areesh bitiya, I am talking to you here):





Col. Lalit Rai (Vir Chakra) 1964-1971 Pope House
Undiluted Heroism


I am third generation in the army and that too in the same Regiment. After I was commissioned, I joined 11 GORKHA RIFLES, the Regiment that my grandfather and father belonged to - it's like a tradition. I got commissioned into 7/11 GORKHA RIFLES. This incidentally, was not the battalion that I led into battle. The battalion I was destined to lead, into a fierce series of battles during 'OP VIJAY' was 1/11 GORKHA RIFLES, the one my father had been commissioned into about 42 years ago…
I had been posted to various places, served in every type of terrain conceivable - from deserts, mountains, jungles, ravines, plains, high altitudes, super-high altitudes - you name it. And after various instructional and staff appointments, took over the command of the 17 RASHTRIYA RIFLES( MARATHA LI ), a newly raised battalion in J&K, designed to combat insurgency and militancy. Command of a RASHTRIYA RIFLES Battalion is considered a very tough and a challenging assignment. I had promptly agreed to the offer for the command of 17 RR. I took it as a big challenge, firstly, because the troops were from the MARATHA Regiment, mostly hailing from in and around Pune, quite different from the troops I had been commanding throughout my career till then, and secondly, commanding a battalion in a militant infested area has its fair share of risks and tensions. However it did not take me long to realise that the Gorkha and the Maratha troops were so much like each other in so many ways, as events and achievements of the battalion would unfold later and substantiate my claim. I enjoyed and loved every moment of my command tenure with my MARATHA boys and we hit it off like a house on fire.

For my battalion I had designed a memento using a grenade as my model. A Grenade looks so simple, but if you pull out the pin, you know what happens, right? Simple, but Lethal: that's the motto (which graces the base of the memento) I adopted for my battalion, because that's what it was! This has since become the Motto for the 17 RASHTRIYA RIFLES, whom I'd christened the 'Stormy Seventeen' because we created a virtual storm for the militants, thereby making it extremely difficult for them to survive in our area of responsibility. We'd created some sort of a record there, by eliminating the maximum number of militants, and getting a sizeable number of them to surrender. Since our area of responsibility was very large with hundreds of villages under us, everyday threw up different types of problems and challenges. All these incidents added richly to our experience. This kept me quite engrossed and extremely busy, throughout my tenure there.

OPERATION VIJAY happened in Kargil, while I was busy combating militants elsewhere in the same state. This was somewhere in the first week of May 2001. By the time the actual fighting developed, it was almost the end of May and by now people had realised that the Pak army was fully involved and it wasn't just some militants. 1/11
GORKHA RIFLES had the privilege of being the first battalion to be rushed in for 'OP VIJAY'. At that point of time, my 'Colonel Of The Regiment' (a very senior officer of the Regiment is appointed as the Colonel Of The Regiment, to oversee regimental issues as also do the command planning for the battalions of the Regiment. He is considered to be the father figure of the Regiment) contacted me. He said, `The previous Commanding Officer of 1/11 GR has taken premature retirement and gone, the battalion is presently in the thick of battle,' and asked, 'Would you like to take over the fight and do something about it?' Lt Gen J B S Yadava, AVSM, VrC, VSM, who is presently the Deputy Chief Of Army Staff, was also my commanding officer in 7/11 GR when I was a young officer. I was his adjutant and I had really learnt a lot from this veteran and Vir Chakra award winner of the 1971 Indo-Pak war. He probably had faith in me and was banking on me to do something for the battalion in that difficult hour.

I didn't hesitate; I said, `definitely.' But he also added, 'I know it is unfair on my part to ask you to take up this tough assignment, especially when the Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers and the troops are new to you.' (Remember, I was coming back to the Regiment after serving with the Rashtriya Rifles). Even the terrain was absolutely new to me, the information about the enemy at that point of time was not adequate; things were not all that clear. I wasn't exactly in a very enviable situation. I had however convinced myself that I would take a chance. I was anyway combating uncertainty day and night. Earlier, I had this huge guesthouse to myself in Doda district and every night I used to sleep in a different room, as we used to be under rocket and machine-gun attacks regularly. In fact, when days passed by without some firing or some incident, I used to feel that something was missing! All that of course changed later, as they never even dared to venture anywhere near us. We had successfully managed to dominate our area of responsibility fully, after months of relentless and successful operations against the militant groups.

Once I accepted the offer to command 1/11 GR, they moved me by helicopter within 48 hours and dropped me bang in the middle of the battle-zone. Many operations were going on in full swing at various places in the front. The moment I landed at the base, there was heavy shelling by the enemy artillery and my reception party ran helter-skelter for cover. My reception was now complete with the enemy also chipping in with their artillery shelling. All of us, of course had to dive for cover, this gave me an indication of the difficult times that lay ahead of us.

In a month's time through vigorous effort, I improved and consolidated my battalions posture against the enemy. I got to know the boys, visited every piquet and reconnoitered the complete area of responsibility. By end June I had learnt a lot about the enemy and his capabilities…and was now adequately prepared, given the situation. In the Batalik sector where my battalion was now located, the terrain was really tough and unforgiving, compounded with the most inhospitable weather. After due deliberation and reconnaissance everyone, right upto the highest commander, had more or less assessed that if the formidable and dominating enemy position at Khalubar was to be captured, the complete area would become more or less untenable by the enemy. But the problem was that Khalubar was located at an altitude of 17500 metres above mean sea level, with the enemy sitting well entrenched, with lethal and sophisticated weapons in a dominating position, it was also located deep in the heart of the enemy defences. This implied that the attacker would be under enemy fire right from the word go. The attack would also have to be made uphill under accurate and intense enemy fire. The next logical question was 'who is going to capture it and how? When I volunteered for this seemingly impossible task, people thought I had gone bonkers!

To cut the story short, I led my battalion to battle from the front, into one of the fiercest battles of 'OP VIJAY'. As a commanding officer you are expected to be sufficiently forward with the troops, but not actually lead the assault like I did. The main role of the Commanding Officer is to plan and coordinate well and provide good leadership at all times. Being new I really had no choice but to lead physically from the front on that fateful day of July 1999.

It took us 14 hours of extremely torturous and dangerous marching with heavy loads of arms, ammunition, winter clothing, and other special equipment for negotiating the steep snow covered slopes, rations, etc. to reach the objective. Throughout the move we came under heavy enemy small arms fire and artillery shelling. The intensity and the accuracy of the enemy's fire grew even as we laboriously plodded our way up through snow and sharp jagged rocks at steep inclines. The prevalent temperature at this time was about minus 29 degrees Celsius. A real marrow chilling temperature, which numbs your whole body and deadens the senses.

We had started the attack with a few hundred people. We had closed in to about 600 yards of the enemy position, when the firing became very intense and effective and it seemed impossible to proceed further against this curtain of lead and fire from the tracer bullets. You could see the bullets and rockets hurtling towards us with fearsome intensity and sound. My heart still shudders when I remember the heart wrenching screams and cries of my boys who fell under this wilting fire from the enemy's heavy machine gun as also from his Air Defence gun. The sight of my boys battered, torn and ripped apart by machine gun fire, bleeding profusely, still haunts me, and I often wake up sweating and gasping for air from such nightmares. It was a real test for me, egging the boys on, towards almost certain death, from effective and intensive enemy fire. To close in with the enemy and finish him off before he finished us off. At this point of time I focused myself totally to the immediate task ahead of me - to capture the objective and nothing else. All thought of the family and home was totally blocked out, to rule out even one percent chance of any weakening in my resolve. We pushed ahead despite heavy casualties with approximately 30 - 40 soldiers whom I could muster. The others were either injured or pinned down by heavy enemy fire. Maximum casualties were being caused by fire coming from Khalubar top while the other was from a flank, which, we later named 'Bunker Area'. I decided to capture the top, with the 40 men I could muster, and sent Capt Manoj Pandey to capture and silence Bunker Area with approximately 30 men. We charged up towards the enemy position, chopping enemy heads enroute, and succeeded in capturing the top. When I took a quick head count on top, there were only eight of us left, who were fit enough to fight.


It was literally an uphill task, almost like a scene straight out of Charge of the Light Brigade! The gradients we had to negotiate were between 75° and 80°! It was snowing and extremely cold. The rock that we were climbing was of the jagged variety that chops you to the quick if you make one false move! To top this worst-case scenario possible, there was that enemy fire coming on us right from the top! The enemy could see our every move from the top!

But my Gorkha boys really proved their worth in gold and were unstoppable; I have to doff my hat to my boys! Where normal guys would have had a tough time even walking in those altitudes, my boys sprinted! They charged up and when we were at close quarters with the enemy, my boys did what they had been dying to do for so long, they removed their khukris and started chopping enemy heads. As we charged up, I could see the heads rolling down. When the Pakistanis saw that - they couldn't hold themselves any longer. They just got up and started running away. It was a sight to behold! 5 ft tall Gorkhas jumping up and chopping off the heads of these strapping, 6 ft tall intruders, who were fleeing in sheer terror.

So like I mentioned earlier, we were just eight of us, bang in the middle of an enemy position. It became imperative that we hold on to it. It was equally critical for the enemy to push us out because we were not only dominating their replenishment route i.e. for additional arms and ammunition, rations and things like that, but we were also cutting off their route of retreat. So they launched counter attack after counter attack and there I was, with eight chaps holding on resolutely and repulsing attack after attack.

It was almost an impossible task. The enemy would muster up about a platoon (about 30 to 40 troops) and start creeping up slowly and attack us! And with just eight guys, you can imagine just how thin my defense was! Any direction of attack would have only met with one or two rifle fire, however I had all eight guys facing every counter attack. And that was only possible because on a parallel mountain spur, a few kilometers away, I had my troops holding defences against the enemy. So the company commander, whose company was on the other mountain spur, was watching our desperate stand through a pair of binoculars and he became my eyes from that side.

He would tell me, 'Sir, there are now 40 chaps to your left coming at you through the big boulder…' and we would shoot those guys down. And I'm pretty sure that the Pakis haven't yet figured out as to how we managed to know their exact route up. I'm sure they must have thought that we were almost a company atop this position. Quite a few of us were already injured; I had got a bullet in my leg and splinters in my calf and had begun to bleed profusely. Towards the end, a situation arose where I had only two bullets left with me in my rifle - and that rifle belonged to my dead radio operator. In my hurry and concern for my boys and the task, I had literally taken off in my full uniform and I had even forgotten to remove my red collar dogs. I realized my folly much, much later…when I was in the thick of battle. So when I found out that I was down to the last two bullets, I made a quick resolve, one bullet for myself when it comes to that. As for the other one, I decided to take one **** chap with me before I went.

My boys were also quite tensed up, when they all realised that our moment of reckoning was finally staring us in the eye. I mean, when you realize that your death is arriving within a few minutes time, it becomes that much more agonising and difficult. On the other hand when you don't know, and death comes to you suddenly, it is okay and is probably a part of life. But here it was approaching us in another few minutes…. so I quickly bid a mental goodbye to everyone I held dear to me. I was suddenly woken up from my reverie by the crackle of my radio set. It was my officer from the other mountain position, with a frantic message, 'Sir, I can see about 35 Pakis moving up for another counter attack…" I thought to myself, 'Boy! This is it; the moment has finally come to say 'adieu'

My boys also looked at me for some reaction, I could feel the palpable tension in the air. I have always believed: a dash of humour can really relieve a lot of tension in your life. I had to alleviate their tension quickly and firm their resolve to fight to the end. The Pakis - were cursing and using the choicest of abuses even as they advanced, I gave it back to them in equal measure, with all the Punjabi that I knew. I turned to my boys and said, ' Dushman tumhare commanding officer Saab ko gaali de rahe hain aur tum log chup-chaap baithe ho?!' Now funny thing is that a Gorkha Johnny doesn't know how to give gaalis, and as far as discipline and obedience goes, he is unmatchable.

So they looked at each other and I could read the look in their eyes, it said, 'Saab ne hukum diya hai toh gaali dena hi padega. They looked around and wondered, who could perform this difficult task, and finally nominated one amongst them to give the gaalis. He got up and bellowed seriously, Pakistani *****, tum idhar aayega toh tumhara mundi kaat degaa! I turned around and told him, 'The Pakis will surely die…but they will die laughing that Gyan Bahadur can't even give proper gaalis !' They all broke into laughter and that kind of revved them up and got their josh back up again…and they all said, 'Abo tah kukri nikalera taeslai thik paarchhu… (We will take out our khukris now and sort him out) we'll fight…'

I radioed the Artillery Officer attached with us, located on the other mountain spur of 'Kukarthang' and asked him whether he knew where I was, and he replied in the affirmative. I then asked him to use me as a reference and give me several rounds of rapid-fire support. He was shocked! He tentatively wondered whether I really wanted him to direct our own Artillery fire, approximately 100-odd rounds on my head. We are talking about the Bofors round with its devastating effect - its such a powerful gun! I had to take a chance; I preferred to die there by own gunfire, rather than get captured by the enemy. And by now, even the enemy knew that our ammunition was running low…and as the seconds ticked by, the enemy crept closer and closer 40 yards…35 yards…25 yards…and … I yelled at him and said that I didn't have the time and to just do what he was told! He did and I could hear the deadly whistling screech of the shells (usually the fore bearers of death) coming at us, from the Gun position several kilometres behind us. My boys and I took shelter in the cracks of the huge boulders and the 100-odd rounds thundered and crashed all around us with a beautiful but deadly blast of shrapnel and flame. The temperatures suddenly rose due to the burning cordite and for a few seconds, we were engulfed in comfortable warmth, in otherwise the prevalent freezing cold. We could literally see the Pakis (who were advancing in the open), being blown to smithereens right in front of us. They didn't know what had hit them. Several times they tried to close in for the kill, since we had no ammunition left, but with the help of our accurate and prompt artillery gunners we sent them reeling back with heavy casualties.

We held on to the position for 36 hours without a wink of sleep or a drop of water to drink. We had not eaten a morsel of food for over 48 hours and were weak because of hunger and the freezing cold. After 36 hours or so, we shifted our position slightly away, as a deceptive measure. Meanwhile my second-in-command moved up with the reinforcements and we finally consolidated our position. KHALUBAR finally was ours. Victory gained after such great sacrifice of my brave boys was perhaps the sweetest thing for me, and nothing, repeat nothing, can ever better that.
As correctly assessed by all of us, once Khalubar fell, the Pakis ran from all the adjoining areas! We subsequently routed them from 11 formidable positions and we quickly pushed them across the LOC - line of control. The 'GORKHAS' had created such terror and dread in the minds of the Pakistanis that when one of the Prisoners of war (PWs) was captured; his FIRST request was to see a GORKHA soldier. I asked one of my boys to go to him and pull out his khukri, the moment he saw the ****. It was a funny sight - a huge Pathan cringing in sheer dread when confronted with one of the world's most renowned fighting machines - THE GORKHA SOLDIER.

The nations highest gallantry award, the PARAM VIR CHAKRA was awarded posthumously to young Capt. Manoj Pandey…for his valour and supreme sacrifice in the battle of Khalubar. For its sterling performance, the battalion was awarded a unit citation. We also earned the title of 'THE BRAVEST OF THE BRAVE' for having won a Param Vir Chakra and an Ashok Chakra (Lt Puneet Dutt had earlier won the AC in J&K in '98). For individual acts of bravery we won a bagful of gallantry awards. The President awarded me the Vir Chakra for inspirational leadership and conspicuous bravery of a very high order.

- Col. Lalit Rai, VrC

 

[DESERT FIGHTER]

whose body was lying in Snow. look at this Video.... it will Dewash your Brain.

Brother your Forgetting Major Batra

Yeah Dil Mange More

Isnt it so pathetic of ur army to film and upload such flag meetings to public? how would u feel if PA publics such kind of video... thank fully we have a proffesional army.

 

[Green Bullet]

Seriously Gurkha's can never match the true power of a Pathan...they have all tried, but failed epically.

 

[Shadow_Hunter]

Seriously Gurkha's can never match the true power of a Pathan...they have all tried, but failed epically.

why do u always keep saying these things? tell has ur army ever done a single thing to make u proud??? please tell me, jst one...4 wars lost with india. then a$$ licking US and now china.....i dont know why u are so obsessed with ur army...jst tell me one achievement of ur army......

 

[DarK-LorD]

Yes, you are right no one can match Gurkhas.

In 1962 India-china war a Indian Gurkha have behaded 5 chinese by his khukuri.

There war cry is "Jai Mahakaali, Aayo Ghurkhali".

Ghurkhas are the followers of Guru Gorakhnath in Gorakhpur district, UP, India.

Not just that in 1967 during the Chola incident a Gurkha officer chopped off a PLA soldier's hands

By this time the Chinese had taken up position, presumably because their commander had already taken a decision to escalate the incident. And one of the Chinese sentries bayoneted Gyan wounding him in the arm. The Gorkha's response was swift. Both arms of the Chinese who hit the JCO were chopped off with a Khukri.

 

[DarK-LorD]

Afghanistan: Gurkha Killed Guarding Checkpoint In Helmand Is Named As Rifleman Vijay Rai | UK News | Sky News

coincidence or a slap by Talibans?

Has any Talib idiot ever killed 30+ gurkhas singlehandedly.

 

[INDIAN SOLDIER]

Seriously Gurkha's can never match the true power of a Pathan...they have all tried, but failed epically.

If you really want to compare Bullet Bhaisaab:::

Gurkhas are the best fighters for mountain warfares. Even high altitude trekkers always seek for their help in himalyas..... They are full of courage, aggression, bravery, patriotism.....
If you want them to wrestle against a pathan,,,, even though its not a big deal for them......
BTW have you ever heard of Indian Sikh Fighters or Sikh religion?????? If NO just google for them and for sure you will get your reply.....
Finally,,,, every Indian Soldier is a reply for your question!!!! mind it

 

[DarK-LorD]

In World war only 1 lac 50,000 gurkhas took part... same amount of sikhs 8-9 lac hindus(rajputs mostly n other martial races) and 6-7 Lac Muslims frm what is today Pakistan..


From what i think gurkhas r over rated... they are short in height and thin in physical appearence.

Samurais were also short in height & thin but everybody respects them.

 

[DESERT FIGHTER]

For the crybabies and poor whiners ( Areesh bitiya, I am talking to you here):





Col. Lalit Rai (Vir Chakra) 1964-1971 Pope House
Undiluted Heroism


I am third generation in the army and that too in the same Regiment. After I was commissioned, I joined 11 GORKHA RIFLES, the Regiment that my grandfather and father belonged to - it's like a tradition. I got commissioned into 7/11 GORKHA RIFLES. This incidentally, was not the battalion that I led into battle. The battalion I was destined to lead, into a fierce series of battles during 'OP VIJAY' was 1/11 GORKHA RIFLES, the one my father had been commissioned into about 42 years ago…
I had been posted to various places, served in every type of terrain conceivable - from deserts, mountains, jungles, ravines, plains, high altitudes, super-high altitudes - you name it. And after various instructional and staff appointments, took over the command of the 17 RASHTRIYA RIFLES( MARATHA LI ), a newly raised battalion in J&K, designed to combat insurgency and militancy. Command of a RASHTRIYA RIFLES Battalion is considered a very tough and a challenging assignment. I had promptly agreed to the offer for the command of 17 RR. I took it as a big challenge, firstly, because the troops were from the MARATHA Regiment, mostly hailing from in and around Pune, quite different from the troops I had been commanding throughout my career till then, and secondly, commanding a battalion in a militant infested area has its fair share of risks and tensions. However it did not take me long to realise that the Gorkha and the Maratha troops were so much like each other in so many ways, as events and achievements of the battalion would unfold later and substantiate my claim. I enjoyed and loved every moment of my command tenure with my MARATHA boys and we hit it off like a house on fire.

For my battalion I had designed a memento using a grenade as my model. A Grenade looks so simple, but if you pull out the pin, you know what happens, right? Simple, but Lethal: that's the motto (which graces the base of the memento) I adopted for my battalion, because that's what it was! This has since become the Motto for the 17 RASHTRIYA RIFLES, whom I'd christened the 'Stormy Seventeen' because we created a virtual storm for the militants, thereby making it extremely difficult for them to survive in our area of responsibility. We'd created some sort of a record there, by eliminating the maximum number of militants, and getting a sizeable number of them to surrender. Since our area of responsibility was very large with hundreds of villages under us, everyday threw up different types of problems and challenges. All these incidents added richly to our experience. This kept me quite engrossed and extremely busy, throughout my tenure there.

OPERATION VIJAY happened in Kargil, while I was busy combating militants elsewhere in the same state. This was somewhere in the first week of May 2001. By the time the actual fighting developed, it was almost the end of May and by now people had realised that the Pak army was fully involved and it wasn't just some militants. 1/11
GORKHA RIFLES had the privilege of being the first battalion to be rushed in for 'OP VIJAY'. At that point of time, my 'Colonel Of The Regiment' (a very senior officer of the Regiment is appointed as the Colonel Of The Regiment, to oversee regimental issues as also do the command planning for the battalions of the Regiment. He is considered to be the father figure of the Regiment) contacted me. He said, `The previous Commanding Officer of 1/11 GR has taken premature retirement and gone, the battalion is presently in the thick of battle,' and asked, 'Would you like to take over the fight and do something about it?' Lt Gen J B S Yadava, AVSM, VrC, VSM, who is presently the Deputy Chief Of Army Staff, was also my commanding officer in 7/11 GR when I was a young officer. I was his adjutant and I had really learnt a lot from this veteran and Vir Chakra award winner of the 1971 Indo-Pak war. He probably had faith in me and was banking on me to do something for the battalion in that difficult hour.

I didn't hesitate; I said, `definitely.' But he also added, 'I know it is unfair on my part to ask you to take up this tough assignment, especially when the Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers and the troops are new to you.' (Remember, I was coming back to the Regiment after serving with the Rashtriya Rifles). Even the terrain was absolutely new to me, the information about the enemy at that point of time was not adequate; things were not all that clear. I wasn't exactly in a very enviable situation. I had however convinced myself that I would take a chance. I was anyway combating uncertainty day and night. Earlier, I had this huge guesthouse to myself in Doda district and every night I used to sleep in a different room, as we used to be under rocket and machine-gun attacks regularly. In fact, when days passed by without some firing or some incident, I used to feel that something was missing! All that of course changed later, as they never even dared to venture anywhere near us. We had successfully managed to dominate our area of responsibility fully, after months of relentless and successful operations against the militant groups.

Once I accepted the offer to command 1/11 GR, they moved me by helicopter within 48 hours and dropped me bang in the middle of the battle-zone. Many operations were going on in full swing at various places in the front. The moment I landed at the base, there was heavy shelling by the enemy artillery and my reception party ran helter-skelter for cover. My reception was now complete with the enemy also chipping in with their artillery shelling. All of us, of course had to dive for cover, this gave me an indication of the difficult times that lay ahead of us.

In a month's time through vigorous effort, I improved and consolidated my battalions posture against the enemy. I got to know the boys, visited every piquet and reconnoitered the complete area of responsibility. By end June I had learnt a lot about the enemy and his capabilities…and was now adequately prepared, given the situation. In the Batalik sector where my battalion was now located, the terrain was really tough and unforgiving, compounded with the most inhospitable weather. After due deliberation and reconnaissance everyone, right upto the highest commander, had more or less assessed that if the formidable and dominating enemy position at Khalubar was to be captured, the complete area would become more or less untenable by the enemy. But the problem was that Khalubar was located at an altitude of 17500 metres above mean sea level, with the enemy sitting well entrenched, with lethal and sophisticated weapons in a dominating position, it was also located deep in the heart of the enemy defences. This implied that the attacker would be under enemy fire right from the word go. The attack would also have to be made uphill under accurate and intense enemy fire. The next logical question was 'who is going to capture it and how? When I volunteered for this seemingly impossible task, people thought I had gone bonkers!

To cut the story short, I led my battalion to battle from the front, into one of the fiercest battles of 'OP VIJAY'. As a commanding officer you are expected to be sufficiently forward with the troops, but not actually lead the assault like I did. The main role of the Commanding Officer is to plan and coordinate well and provide good leadership at all times. Being new I really had no choice but to lead physically from the front on that fateful day of July 1999.

It took us 14 hours of extremely torturous and dangerous marching with heavy loads of arms, ammunition, winter clothing, and other special equipment for negotiating the steep snow covered slopes, rations, etc. to reach the objective. Throughout the move we came under heavy enemy small arms fire and artillery shelling. The intensity and the accuracy of the enemy's fire grew even as we laboriously plodded our way up through snow and sharp jagged rocks at steep inclines. The prevalent temperature at this time was about minus 29 degrees Celsius. A real marrow chilling temperature, which numbs your whole body and deadens the senses.

We had started the attack with a few hundred people. We had closed in to about 600 yards of the enemy position, when the firing became very intense and effective and it seemed impossible to proceed further against this curtain of lead and fire from the tracer bullets. You could see the bullets and rockets hurtling towards us with fearsome intensity and sound. My heart still shudders when I remember the heart wrenching screams and cries of my boys who fell under this wilting fire from the enemy's heavy machine gun as also from his Air Defence gun. The sight of my boys battered, torn and ripped apart by machine gun fire, bleeding profusely, still haunts me, and I often wake up sweating and gasping for air from such nightmares. It was a real test for me, egging the boys on, towards almost certain death, from effective and intensive enemy fire. To close in with the enemy and finish him off before he finished us off. At this point of time I focused myself totally to the immediate task ahead of me - to capture the objective and nothing else. All thought of the family and home was totally blocked out, to rule out even one percent chance of any weakening in my resolve. We pushed ahead despite heavy casualties with approximately 30 - 40 soldiers whom I could muster. The others were either injured or pinned down by heavy enemy fire. Maximum casualties were being caused by fire coming from Khalubar top while the other was from a flank, which, we later named 'Bunker Area'. I decided to capture the top, with the 40 men I could muster, and sent Capt Manoj Pandey to capture and silence Bunker Area with approximately 30 men. We charged up towards the enemy position, chopping enemy heads enroute, and succeeded in capturing the top. When I took a quick head count on top, there were only eight of us left, who were fit enough to fight.


It was literally an uphill task, almost like a scene straight out of Charge of the Light Brigade! The gradients we had to negotiate were between 75° and 80°! It was snowing and extremely cold. The rock that we were climbing was of the jagged variety that chops you to the quick if you make one false move! To top this worst-case scenario possible, there was that enemy fire coming on us right from the top! The enemy could see our every move from the top!

But my Gorkha boys really proved their worth in gold and were unstoppable; I have to doff my hat to my boys! Where normal guys would have had a tough time even walking in those altitudes, my boys sprinted! They charged up and when we were at close quarters with the enemy, my boys did what they had been dying to do for so long, they removed their khukris and started chopping enemy heads. As we charged up, I could see the heads rolling down. When the Pakistanis saw that - they couldn't hold themselves any longer. They just got up and started running away. It was a sight to behold! 5 ft tall Gorkhas jumping up and chopping off the heads of these strapping, 6 ft tall intruders, who were fleeing in sheer terror.

So like I mentioned earlier, we were just eight of us, bang in the middle of an enemy position. It became imperative that we hold on to it. It was equally critical for the enemy to push us out because we were not only dominating their replenishment route i.e. for additional arms and ammunition, rations and things like that, but we were also cutting off their route of retreat. So they launched counter attack after counter attack and there I was, with eight chaps holding on resolutely and repulsing attack after attack.

It was almost an impossible task. The enemy would muster up about a platoon (about 30 to 40 troops) and start creeping up slowly and attack us! And with just eight guys, you can imagine just how thin my defense was! Any direction of attack would have only met with one or two rifle fire, however I had all eight guys facing every counter attack. And that was only possible because on a parallel mountain spur, a few kilometers away, I had my troops holding defences against the enemy. So the company commander, whose company was on the other mountain spur, was watching our desperate stand through a pair of binoculars and he became my eyes from that side.

He would tell me, 'Sir, there are now 40 chaps to your left coming at you through the big boulder…' and we would shoot those guys down. And I'm pretty sure that the Pakis haven't yet figured out as to how we managed to know their exact route up. I'm sure they must have thought that we were almost a company atop this position. Quite a few of us were already injured; I had got a bullet in my leg and splinters in my calf and had begun to bleed profusely. Towards the end, a situation arose where I had only two bullets left with me in my rifle - and that rifle belonged to my dead radio operator. In my hurry and concern for my boys and the task, I had literally taken off in my full uniform and I had even forgotten to remove my red collar dogs. I realized my folly much, much later…when I was in the thick of battle. So when I found out that I was down to the last two bullets, I made a quick resolve, one bullet for myself when it comes to that. As for the other one, I decided to take one **** chap with me before I went.

My boys were also quite tensed up, when they all realised that our moment of reckoning was finally staring us in the eye. I mean, when you realize that your death is arriving within a few minutes time, it becomes that much more agonising and difficult. On the other hand when you don't know, and death comes to you suddenly, it is okay and is probably a part of life. But here it was approaching us in another few minutes…. so I quickly bid a mental goodbye to everyone I held dear to me. I was suddenly woken up from my reverie by the crackle of my radio set. It was my officer from the other mountain position, with a frantic message, 'Sir, I can see about 35 Pakis moving up for another counter attack…" I thought to myself, 'Boy! This is it; the moment has finally come to say 'adieu'

My boys also looked at me for some reaction, I could feel the palpable tension in the air. I have always believed: a dash of humour can really relieve a lot of tension in your life. I had to alleviate their tension quickly and firm their resolve to fight to the end. The Pakis - were cursing and using the choicest of abuses even as they advanced, I gave it back to them in equal measure, with all the Punjabi that I knew. I turned to my boys and said, ' Dushman tumhare commanding officer Saab ko gaali de rahe hain aur tum log chup-chaap baithe ho?!' Now funny thing is that a Gorkha Johnny doesn't know how to give gaalis, and as far as discipline and obedience goes, he is unmatchable.

So they looked at each other and I could read the look in their eyes, it said, 'Saab ne hukum diya hai toh gaali dena hi padega. They looked around and wondered, who could perform this difficult task, and finally nominated one amongst them to give the gaalis. He got up and bellowed seriously, Pakistani *****, tum idhar aayega toh tumhara mundi kaat degaa! I turned around and told him, 'The Pakis will surely die…but they will die laughing that Gyan Bahadur can't even give proper gaalis !' They all broke into laughter and that kind of revved them up and got their josh back up again…and they all said, 'Abo tah kukri nikalera taeslai thik paarchhu… (We will take out our khukris now and sort him out) we'll fight…'

I radioed the Artillery Officer attached with us, located on the other mountain spur of 'Kukarthang' and asked him whether he knew where I was, and he replied in the affirmative. I then asked him to use me as a reference and give me several rounds of rapid-fire support. He was shocked! He tentatively wondered whether I really wanted him to direct our own Artillery fire, approximately 100-odd rounds on my head. We are talking about the Bofors round with its devastating effect - its such a powerful gun! I had to take a chance; I preferred to die there by own gunfire, rather than get captured by the enemy. And by now, even the enemy knew that our ammunition was running low…and as the seconds ticked by, the enemy crept closer and closer 40 yards…35 yards…25 yards…and … I yelled at him and said that I didn't have the time and to just do what he was told! He did and I could hear the deadly whistling screech of the shells (usually the fore bearers of death) coming at us, from the Gun position several kilometres behind us. My boys and I took shelter in the cracks of the huge boulders and the 100-odd rounds thundered and crashed all around us with a beautiful but deadly blast of shrapnel and flame. The temperatures suddenly rose due to the burning cordite and for a few seconds, we were engulfed in comfortable warmth, in otherwise the prevalent freezing cold. We could literally see the Pakis (who were advancing in the open), being blown to smithereens right in front of us. They didn't know what had hit them. Several times they tried to close in for the kill, since we had no ammunition left, but with the help of our accurate and prompt artillery gunners we sent them reeling back with heavy casualties.

We held on to the position for 36 hours without a wink of sleep or a drop of water to drink. We had not eaten a morsel of food for over 48 hours and were weak because of hunger and the freezing cold. After 36 hours or so, we shifted our position slightly away, as a deceptive measure. Meanwhile my second-in-command moved up with the reinforcements and we finally consolidated our position. KHALUBAR finally was ours. Victory gained after such great sacrifice of my brave boys was perhaps the sweetest thing for me, and nothing, repeat nothing, can ever better that.
As correctly assessed by all of us, once Khalubar fell, the Pakis ran from all the adjoining areas! We subsequently routed them from 11 formidable positions and we quickly pushed them across the LOC - line of control. The 'GORKHAS' had created such terror and dread in the minds of the Pakistanis that when one of the Prisoners of war (PWs) was captured; his FIRST request was to see a GORKHA soldier. I asked one of my boys to go to him and pull out his khukri, the moment he saw the ****. It was a funny sight - a huge Pathan cringing in sheer dread when confronted with one of the world's most renowned fighting machines - THE GORKHA SOLDIER.

The nations highest gallantry award, the PARAM VIR CHAKRA was awarded posthumously to young Capt. Manoj Pandey…for his valour and supreme sacrifice in the battle of Khalubar. For its sterling performance, the battalion was awarded a unit citation. We also earned the title of 'THE BRAVEST OF THE BRAVE' for having won a Param Vir Chakra and an Ashok Chakra (Lt Puneet Dutt had earlier won the AC in J&K in '98). For individual acts of bravery we won a bagful of gallantry awards. The President awarded me the Vir Chakra for inspirational leadership and conspicuous bravery of a very high order.

- Col. Lalit Rai, VrC

Abt the soldiers facing the brunt of several indian infantry,arty divisions n iaf :


Pakis,****,crying....Are u sure hes even a soldier?? more like a bad mouth fan boy ranting.

Lalak Jan (N-H)





Lalak Jan 'Dohat' (1967 - 1999)
32 yrs, Havaldar Major, 12 Northern Light Infantry (NLI)
Nishan-e-Haider (1999)
Pakistan

by Nasir M. Khan

Background
In 1984, India occupied the Pakistani posts at Siachen glacier. These posts had been vacated due to winters and snowing in the northern areas of Pakistan. India had in fact violated the Line of Control (LOC) in order to capture these posts. Pakistan's efforts to take these areas back from Indian possession turned out to be futile, and a war was fought in the worst possible circumstances for 15 years without any significant reward to either side.

The Indians posted an entire Division at Siachen Glacier. The ammunition and food was supplied to this division through the Srinagar-Leh Highway, the road joining the area of Leh (Siachen) with the capital of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar. The area surrounding the road was mountainous, with Tiger Hill being the peak that offered the best view of the entire northern area, providing those who were on it with a terrific aerial advantage. The Indian had previously used this peak to attack some defensive positions of Pakistan from time to time. Tiger Hill, located in the associated sectors of Batalik, Kargil and Drass, provided and aerial view of the Srinagar-Leh Highway. In September 1998, the posts had been vacated by India as part of a routine winter exercise, they were to reoccupy them in the summers.

In May 1999, a small sized Indian force of 4 men going along the Srinagar-Leh Highway lost contact with the rest of the army. A section, comprising 12 men was sent on the same road to locate the MIAs (Missing In Action). These 12 men also became MIA.

A small force (1200 men) of the Pakistan Army had occupied the vacated Indian posts, and were planning to hold on for sometime so that the Division at Siachen would have no other option but to retreat, due to the lack of ammunition and food supplies.

The Indians launched a full fledged attack on the small band of Pakistan Army soldiers.

Main Achievement
Tiger Hill had been occupied by 11 men of 12 NLI (Northern Light Infantry) unit of the Pakistan Army. One of these men was Subedar Sikander, the person who was responsible, with 10 other men, to hold back India's offensive long enough to force the Division at Siachen to retreat. His 2IC (Second in Command) was Havaldar Major Lalak "Blizzard" Jan (Blizzard = Dohat in local language).

Lalak Jan was one of the best in the NLI as far as mountain navigation was concerned, in addition to being one of the best, if not the best, rifleman.

The 10 men of 12 NLI were told by Subedar Sikander to change their positions while firing back at the attacking Indian forces. As the men followed the orders, the managed to bluff the Indians into believing that the size of the force was much more than 11.

On 1st of July, 1999, the 18 Grenadiers Battalion (India) launched a fierce attack on Tiger Hill by virtue of artillary shelling of the occupied bunkers. Subedar Sikandar placed his men in such positions that they managed to repulse the attack without any loss of life on their own part. It is not known how many men were lost by the 18 Grenadiers Battalion.

On the morning of 2nd July 1999, amidst the mist, the 18 Grenadiers launched another attack on Tiger Hills. Subedar Sikandar ordered his men to retreat to a secret bunker. Once the men were safe, he ordered Lalak Jan to descend Tiger Hill, and amidst the Indian Artillery shelling plant the landmines in the area in front of the Indians. The impossibility of the task was realized by all, but the Subedar insisted that the army has sent them down to fight, and that they would have to complete this task if they were to make a dent in the Indian offensive. Planting the landmines was the only way for them to damage the Indian armor and artillery, as none of the 11 men of 12 NLI had any heavy weaponry. The Subedar insisted that the mist would help Lalak Jan as well, and the Indians would not be expecting it either.

Accepting the daunting task, Lalak Jan descended Tiger Hills amidst the mist. The remaining men gave him as fierce a cover as possible to distract the Indians. Lalak Jan used his natural mountaineering ability to the fullest in the snow clad area and planted the landmines in such a manner that the Indians would encounter them in case they tried to move forward towards the hill.

Lalak Jan returned, having successfully planted the mines as ordered.

The trap was now set. All that the men required to do now was to lure the Indians into it. Subedar Sikandar told his men to gradually reduce the firing to a standstill.

About two hours after firing ceased from the Pakistan side, the Indians thought that they had managed to clear the area of the insurgents. Hence they began to move forward. The landmines reeked havoc with their initial forward movements. The Indians suffered heavy casualties, however, as they have not publicized this incident, the exact amount of damage is not known. The damage was in any case, severe enough that 18 Grenadiers did not attack Tiger Hills for at least 3 to 4 more days, until they were supported by another Indian Unit, 8 Sikh.

On 6th July, both 18 Grenadiers and 8 Sikh attacked Tiger Hills in the fiercest of Tiger Hill battles or the Kargil Operation. This time Chemical weapons were also used. Some of the Indian soldiers launched an attack from the steeper side of the hill. The NLI was not expecting an attack from this side. The NLI fought this battle at a heavy cost. 7 of the 11 men were killed, including Subedar Sikander. The Indians had managed to destroy a number of the Tiger Hill bunkers by either a hand to hand fight or by dropping a grenade into it.

Only Lalak Jan and 3 other men remained. The onslaught of the Indians was continuing and they were rapidly advancing towards capturing the hill. Lalak Jan, who was now the senior most person around, placed his men in strategic positions, at least two to three per person, and told them to fire without staying in one position. These four men, pitted against an enemy much superior in number and weaponry, managed to repulse the Indian onslaught by sheer courage and determination.

On 7th July 1999, 18 Grenadiers and 8 Sikh launched yet another offensive. This was a successful attack. 2 of Lalak Jan's men were killed. Lalak Jan and his only other remaining comrade in arms, Bakhmal Jan were both seriously injured. Not giving up, Lalak Jan got hold of an LMG and while Bakhmal Jan provided him with the ammunition, the two men kept trying to repulse the Indian attack. Lalak jan's left arm had been rendered useless as he had received a bullet in it. Bakhmal Jan, unable to sustain his injuries, died while supplying the ammunition to Lalak Jan.

From there on, in one of the most stunning demonstrations of determination, Lalak Jan held up the two units of the Indian Army for four complete hours. The Indian offensive finally slowed down and they descended Tiger Hills. The reason for this is not known, perhaps they thought that they could shell the bunker in which Lalak Jan was positioned.

After the Indian offensive had subsided, reinforcements (5 to 6 men) were sent to Tiger Hill under Captain Amer. When he saw the condition of Lalak Jan he told him to go back to the base camp as his arm was in no condition to be used. Lalak Jan told the captain that he did not want to die on a hospital bed, but would rather die in the battlefield. He told his Captain that he should not worry about the arm.

While this was going on at the hill, the Indians started shelling from a secret bunker in an adjacent hill. By that time the command of the handful of troops at Tiger Hill had been taken up by Captain Amer. He realized that the fire was coming from a secret bunker and also directed fire towards it, but the effort was in vain. The exact reason for the failure of this fire by the Pakistanis is not known. It could have been because of one of three reasons 1) The secret bunker was very well designed and protected by the Indians 2) the fire was not directed properly or 3) the bunker was not in the range of the light weaponry possessed by the Pakistanis atop Tiger Hill.

There was only one way left to counter the secret Indian bunker; it had to be blown up from a closer range.

When the injured Lalak Jan volunteered for the mission, his plea was immediately rejected by the captain, who was of the opinion that he would do it himself. However, Lalak Jan persuaded him, giving him his previous landmine installation experience coupled with his mountaineering skills as the explanation.

The Captain agreed.

Lalak Jan put a bag of explosives on his back, and while shouldering an AK-47 descended Tiger Hills for the second time amidst heavy Indian shelling. Managing to avoid being seen by the Indian forces, and utilising his knowledge of the hills to take cover, he located the secret bunker and threw the explosives inside the bunker.

The bunker, which was also an ammunition dump, blew up in what was probably the biggest blast of the entire Kargil Operation. Lalak Jan managed to take cover, but the Indian Army lost 19 to 20 men inside and nearby the bunker. The other Indian soldiers saw Lalk Jan and opened fire on him. Surrounded from all sides by Indian fire, Lalak Jan tried to resist and returned fire.

This effort was in vain, and Lalak Jan was killed when a number of bullets burst through his chest.

Contrary to what most writers have said on the topic in Pakistan, it is my own knowledge that the Indians did manage to capture Tiger Hills in the next attack. The loss of Tiger Hills was perhaps the biggest setback in the entire Kargil Operation, as after that other victories came for the Indians and they managed to get hold of perhaps the strategically most important peak from whether they could keep an eye on most of the offensives in the region.

On 15th of September 1999, the commanding officer of 12 NLI sent 2 commando forces to Tiger Hills to recover the body of Lalak Jan. The two forces were called 'Ababeel' and 'Uqaab'. Ababeel provided the fire cover while Uqaab went into the destroyed enemy bunker to retrieve the body of Lalak Jan.

When his body was found, Lalak Jan had his AK-47 clinched to his chest. The Government of Pakistan awarded him Nishan-e-Haider, the country's highest award for extraordinary gallantry.

http://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&r...vbmKAw&usg=AFQjCNGf1CmrarY095VBNFU-etTiX5PvCA


Capt Karnal Sher Khan:

Karnal Sher Khan (1970 - 1999)
29 yrs, Captain, 12 Northern Light Infantry (NLI), 27 Sind
Nishan-e-Haider (1999)
Pakistan

Background
The background information is reproduced from the story of Lalak Jan since both died in the Kargil Operation
In 1984, India occupied the Pakistani posts at Siachen glacier. These posts had been vacated due to winters and snowing in the northern areas of Pakistan. India had in fact violated the Line of Control (LOC) in order to capture these posts. Pakistan's efforts to take these areas back from Indian possession turned out to be futile, and a war was fought in the worst possible circumstances for 15 years without any significant reward to either side.

The Indians posted an entire Division at Siachen Glacier. The ammunition and food was supplied to this division through the Srinagar-Leh Highway, the road joining the area of Leh (Siachen) with the capital of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar. The area surrounding the road was mountainous, with Tiger Hill being the peak that offered the best view of the entire northern area, providing those who were on it with a terrific aerial advantage. The Indian had previously used this peak to attack some defensive positions of Pakistan from time to time. Tiger Hill, located in the associated sectors of Batalik, Kargil and Drass, provided and aerial view of the Srinagar-Leh Highway. In September 1998, the posts had been vacated by India as part of a routine winter exercise, they were to reoccupy them in the summers.

In May 1999, a small sized Indian force of 4 men going along the Srinagar-Leh Highway lost contact with the rest of the army. A section, comprising 12 men was sent on the same road to locate the MIAs (Missing In Action). These 12 men also became MIA.

A small force (1200 men) of the Pakistan Army had occupied the vacated Indian posts, and were planning to hold on for sometime so that the Division at Siachen would have no other option but to retreat, due to the lack of ammunition and food supplies.

The Indians launched a full fledged attack on the small band of Pakistan Army soldiers.

Main Achievement
The Tiger Hill Complex is a set of six strategic posts; the Tiger Hill Top, Western Spur, Eastern Spur, India Gate, Rocky Knob and Helmet. If the Indian account is to be believed, Captain Karnal Sher Khan was responsible for setting up and defending one of these posts. On the other hand, the Pakistani account states that Sher was responsible for setting up forward defensive posts around the Gultari and Mushkoh Valley areas in Kargil, and that he had nothing to do with Tiger Hill. This article is based on the Indian account. In any case, the actual location does not matter as will be seen in the remainder of this article. From Indian readings, it appears that Sher was in fact defending the post on the Western Spur. The truth, however, will never be known. The active participation of the Kashmiri Freedom Fighters in the Tiger Hill battles is, however, a well researched fact.

Tiger Hill Top was the most strategic post at Kargil. This was the highest peak overlooking the Srinagar-Leh Highway. Although there were other active posts from where the Indian supply lines to Siachen glacier could be cut as well, Tiger Hill Top was the most effective. For the protection of Tiger Hill Top, the Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri Freedom Fighters occupied the five other posts in the Tiger Hill complex. The most important was the Western Spur post, which had to be neutralized in order to launch any sort of infantry offensive on the Tiger Hill Top post.

The task of isolating the Western Spur post was given to the Indian 8 Sikh Regiment (800 - 1000 men). Later on, this regiment also participated in the capture of Tiger Hill Top. The task of bombarding this post was given to the Indian 41 Field regiment (a full field unit with massive heavy artillery capability).

Manning the Western Spur post was Captain Karnal Sher Khan with 21 ORs (Other Ranks, men who are ordinary sepoys and do not hold any specific rank).

From 26th June to 27th June, the 41 Field Regiment excessively shelled the Western Spur post with no less than 19 Howitzers, while the Indian Air Force Mirage 2000 jets flew sorties over the post and pounded the bunkers with laser guided bombs. Under these circumstances some infantrymen from 8 Sikh also fired at the posts held by Sher and his men, and 'dared them to recite the Kalima, for it will be their final one'. Obviously, the Pakistanis and the Kashmiris did not get any sleep during this time.

It was around 9:00 PM on the 27th of June 1999 that the 8 Sikh launched a fierce attack on the Western Spur post. The tired 'intruders' tried to fight back, but the sheer number of the Indians (450 - 500 men) along with the IAF and Artillery support made it impossible for them to hold on. There were not many casualties on either side, but as far as Karnal Sher's men were concerned, there didn't have to be many, as they were not great in number to start with.

Karnal Sher finally retreated from the post, going to a point of lower elevation. The Indians had gotten hold of the Western Spur post. They were in a terrific position to launch the final offensive on the other posts, especially the Tiger Hill Top.

Karnal Sher was in a terrible spot. The Indians were now at an elevated position; they were much greater in number and had the support of a much bigger artillery. Unlike Sher's men they were well rested, as the enemy did not subject them to intense fire and they also had no shortage of ammunition or food.

One of Sher's men had died during the attack. Most of the others were wounded. To top it all, some Sikh soldiers were still daring them to come out and recite their final Kalima.

One of Karnal Sher's men asked him about what they were supposed to do next.

"Counter Attack", replied Sher

The stunned man gazed at Sher. Counter Attack under the circumstances was suicidal. The Indians had an advantage in every thinkable manner. They had also been fortifying their defense ever since they had taken the Western Spur.

"Counter Attack?", the man asked Sher again.

"Yes counter attack". The Indians attacked my post at night, with heavy artillery and air support. I will attack them in broad daylight with the men that I have left."

Sher had been operational in the area since November 1998. He knew the Drass Sector area inside out. He had a good idea of the positions that could be taken for an attack on the Western Spur. The 8 Sikh Regiment had not utilized any of those areas in their attack, hence Sher took the chance they were not well aware of their existence. During the night he placed his men in those positions, strategically placing the compact artillery that they had in the optimum areas.

The counter attack, with 21 men, was launched on the Indians occupying the Western Spur. Sher's men were told never to stay in on position while attacking, and the positions that every man was to move to and from during the attack were also identified. Every one of Sher's men was changing position to no less than 8 places.

This was the shortest battle of the entire Kargil operation, taking no more than one hour. There were many reasons for its success. First of all was the deployment. As an Indian soldier would be killed, the others would direct fire towards the area from where the fire came from. In the mean time however, the Pakistani/ Kashmiri would have changed his position to another area where he was safe from the Indian firing but still could see them.

Secondly, the Indians were not expecting an attack from the positions where Karnal Sher had deployed his men. Had they known about them in advance, they would have placed their own men over there as a defensive measure.

The third was the timing of the attack. It came at the most unexpected time, only 7 or 8 hours after the Indian offensive.

Finally, there was the sheer ferocity of the attack. Sher's men knew before going into the attack that they are going in for an impossible task. They had no fear of death, and that itself makes a better fighter during any battle.

As the 8 Sikh regiment began to retreat, Kernal Sher left his position and came out in the open. He started reciting the Kalima aloud.(LA ILLAH ILLALLA MUHAMMAD DUR RASULLULLAH) Picking up his machine gun he started charging towards the retreating forces.

"Cowards!" he said, "Where are you running off to? I will not let you run away like this."

Sher's remaining men, having suffered some casualties while they were ascending the Western Spur post, finally managed to reach on top. They replaced the Indian Flag with the Pakistani one and started chanting slogans of 'Allah O Akbar'. Sher, on the other hand, was obsessed with the retreating forces.

"I am reciting the Kalima as you had dared me to." he shouted, "Where are you running off to? Stop and fight. Make this my last Kalima if you can". While saying this he was seen running after the retreating troops, firing at will, with little or no opposition except from the ongoing artillery shelling. 10 or 12 of Sher's men, who had taken up positions on the Western Spur, also opened havoc wreaking fire on the retreating troops to add to their woes.

Captain Karnal Sher followed the Indian troops until he reached the proximity of the 8 Sikh Regiment base camp.

Most of the men who had retreated from the Western Spur had come back to the base camp. The base camp already had around 300 to 400 soldiers. When the commanding officer was given the news of the counter attack at the Western Spur post, he radioed back to the Indian intelligence and cursed them for letting him believe that there were only 20 odd men in the area. He told them that at least a company strength (150 men) of militants had just attacked and retaken the Western Spur post :idiot2: .

One of the soldiers told the Commanding officer that the enemy commander was following them down. The CO told the man not to worry as one man would not dare enter the base camp. However, he was anticipating that a much larger party of militants would attack the base camp. He ordered his men to take the necessary defensive positions.

While the 8 Sikh soldiers were taking their defensive positions, they were greeted with the sound of 'Allah O Akbar' followed by intense machine gun fire on those areas where any movement was taking place.

Anticipating a company sized attack, the CO was stunned to see one man, reciting the Kalima aloud, charging towards the center of the camp.

"Come out cowards!" Captain Sher shouted having reached the center, "I will show you how to fight a battle".

Angered by the dare inside their own camp, two Sikh soldiers tried to attack Sher. Their attack was of no avail; the captain, who had started firing in their direction the moment they tried to move, killed both.

It was apparent that this was not an attack by a complete company, but by only one man. "You are surrounded from all sides " the CO shouted to Sher, "There are no men with you. You cannot possibly kill us all. There does not have to be any unnecessary bloodshed. Lay down your weapon and Surrender".

Sher fired in the direction of the Commanding Officer's voice. "I would rather die than to surrender to you :army: " he said. While trying to continue firing, Sher realized that the ammunition in his machine gun had finished.

Seeing that he no longer had any ammunition, the Indian soldiers, including their CO, came out in the open and showed Sher that he was indeed surrounded from all sides. They started moving closer and closer to him, tightening their circle around him.

"Look around yourself" he said to Sher, "There is nothing more that you can do".

Sher looked around. There were more than fifty men who had surrounded him and could shoot him at point blank range. Instead of giving up, he started reciting the Kalima aloud once again. Seeing that the closest to him was the CO, he charged him and pushed him back by hitting him on the head with his empty machine gun. Seeing that Sher was not surrendering, and was in fact going to attack him for the second time, the 8 Sikh regiment Commanding Officer told his men to open fire on the militant.

The 8 Sikh regiment soldiers opened fire on Captain Sher. Hit many times, he tried to attack the CO for the third time, but of no avail.

Sher had always believed in not dying at the enemy's feet. He was about five feet away from the CO, who could see the desperate attempt Sher was making in not to fall down. Finally, Sher sat down, with his knees bent and touching the ground, and his machine gun still in his hand. The Kalima that he had been reciting so far became lower and lower in volume until it finally stopped. Captain Karnal Sher Khan had died.

Some of the Sikh soldiers became ecstatic that they had indeed made the 'intruder' recite his final Kalima. Two of them ran to Sher Khan's body to kick it from a sitting position into a one where his head was touching the ground.

Seeing the intent of his men, the CO ordered them to stop. He told them that this was a brave man and his body should not be desecrated at any cost. He ordered that Sher's body be brought back to Srinagar rather than being left at Tiger Hill. Upon finding out that Sher was a Pakistani Captain, he made sure that Sher gets a proper military treatment from the Indians. It was he who wrote the citation of Captain Sher, recommending him for the highest gallantry award in Pakistan. The citation can be found at Captain Sher Khan's residence in Fajounabad Charbagh, Swabi.

The government of Pakistan awarded Captain Karnal Sher Khan with Nishan-e-Haider, the country's highest gallantry award.

Further Developments
The 8 Sikh Regiment launched a massive attack at the Western Spur on the night of 3rd and 4th of July 1999. The Indians used eight 155mm Bofors howitzers and one MBRL (multi-barrel rocket launcher) at Western Spur in a direct firing role. No less than 5321 rounds were fired at the massive mountain in the next 10 hours. Milan anti-tank missiles were also pressed into the operation. The 8 Sikh soldiers advanced only after they were sure that the bunkers had been completely cleared. This time there was no 'Last Kalima' dare. Expecting to find some 100 or so bodies of the 'company' that had attacked them a week ago but seeing only 10 bodies on the post, the Indians assumed that all the others had ran away!.
After this was the task of capturing the Tiger Hill Top post. Details of that can be read in the story of Lalak Jan.


Thousands of indian soldiers fighting 10 at and in end 1 man while fleeing in sheer terror... thinking they r fighting a massive Pakistani force...


1 MAN MADE MADE INDIANS RUN... HE THRASHED THE INDIAN CO INSTEAD OF SURRENDERING AND BECAME AN IMMORTAL.

Naheen hay na umeed iqbal apni kashat-e-vairan say
Zara num ho tou yah matti bari zarkhaiz hay saqi

 

[Areesh]

For the crybabies and poor whiners ( Areesh bitiya, I am talking to you here

Sorry clown. But for now I am not in a mood to read stories. So you better watch a Chuck Noris movie at least for now. Don't worry you would get the honors soon when it would be the same old story of your as$ and my kick.

Very soon. Till then Bye Bye.

 

[DarK-LorD]

The Gurkha who killed 30 Taliban fighters alone:

'I thought I was going to die... so I tried to kill as many as I could': Hero Gurkha receives bravery medal from the Queen

By Daily Mail Reporter

Last updated at 1:19 PM on 2nd June 2011

A Gurkha soldier who single-handedly defeated more than 30 Taliban fighters has been awarded the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross by the Queen.

Corporal Dipprasad Pun, 31, described how he was spurred on by the belief that he was going to die and so had nothing to lose in taking on the attackers who overran his checkpoint in Afghanistan.

His gallantry award is second only to the Victoria Cross - the highest honour for bravery in the face of the enemy.

Cpl Pun, from the 1st Battalion the Royal Gurkha Rifles, was presented with the CGC during an investiture ceremony at Buckingham Palace, during which a number of other soldiers were recognised for their bravery.

Speaking after receiving the honour from the Queen, the Gurkha said: 'I'm very excited and happy to here in the Palace to receive the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross. This will be a great memory for the future.'

The soldier fired more than 400 rounds, launched 17 grenades and detonated a mine to thwart the Taliban assault on his checkpoint near Babaji in Helmand Province, southern Afghanistan, last September.

At one point, after exhausting all his ammunition, he had to use the tripod of his machine gun to beat away a militant who was climbing the walls of the compound.


More...

Army chief: Britain's ability to fight wars at risk unless more cash is invested in defence

After the ceremony, Cpl Pun was congratulated by investiture guests who queued up to shake his hand.

Speaking about the actions which earned him the CGC, he said: 'At that time I wasn't worried, there wasn't any choice but to fight. The Taliban were all around the checkpoint, I was alone.

'I had so many of them around me that I thought I was definitely going to die so I thought I'd kill as many of them as I could before they killed me.
Decorated: Sergeant Dipprasad Pun, 31, of the 1st Battalion the Royal Gurkha Rifles holds his Conspicuous Gallantry Cross

Decorated: Sergeant Dipprasad Pun, 31, of the 1st Battalion the Royal Gurkha Rifles holds his Conspicuous Gallantry Cross

'That incident happened in the middle of my tour and after that I thought nobody can kill us now - when we met the enemy I wasn't scared.

'I thought the Taliban did not have the capacity to fight with us.'

Cpl Pun, an acting sergeant during his Afghan deployment, was on sentry duty at the time of the attack when he heard a clinking noise outside the small base.

At first he thought it might be a donkey or a cow, but when he went to investigate he found two insurgents digging a trench to lay an improvised explosive device (IED) at the checkpoint's front gate.

He realised that he was completely surrounded and that the Taliban were about to launch a well-planned attempt to overrun the compound.

The enemy opened fire from all sides, destroying the sentry position where the soldier had been on duty minutes before.

Defending the base from the roof, the Gurkha remained under continuous attack from rocket-propelled grenades and AK47s for more than a quarter of an hour.

Most of the militants were about 50ft away from him, but at one point he turned around to see a 'huge' Taliban fighter looming over him.

The soldier picked up his machine gun and fired a long burst at the man until he fell off the roof.

When another insurgent tried to climb up to his position, the Gurkha attempted to shoot him with his SA80 rifle. But it did not work, either because it had jammed or because the magazine was empty.

He first grabbed a sandbag but it had not been tied up and the contents fell to the floor.

Then he seized the metal tripod of his machine gun and threw it at the approaching Taliban militant, shouting in Nepali 'Marchu talai' ('I will kill you') and knocking him down.

Two insurgents were still attacking by the time the heroic Gurkha had used up all his ammunition, but he set off a Claymore mine to repel them.

At this point his company commander, Major Shaun Chandler, arrived at the checkpoint, slapped him on the back and asked if he was OK.

In total he fired off 250 general purpose machine gun rounds, 180 SA80 rounds, six phosphorous grenades, six normal grenades, five underslung grenade launcher rounds and one Claymore mine.

The only weapon he did not use was the traditional Kukri knife carried by Gurkhas because he did not have his with him at the time.

The married soldier, whose father and grandfather were also Gurkhas, is originally from the village of Bima in western Nepal but now lives in Ashford, Kent.

His medal citation said he saved the lives of three comrades at the checkpoint at that time and prevented the position being overrun.

It read: 'Pun could never know how many enemies were attempting to overcome his position, but he sought them out from all angles despite the danger, consistently moving towards them to reach the best position of attack.'

Major General Nicholas Carter, who was commander of combined forces, including British troops, in southern Afghanistan during Cpl Pun's deployment, praised the soldier and those from the Mercian Regiment​ receiving gallantry awards today.

The senior officer, who received the Distinguished Service Order from the Queen for his leadership in the Middle East country, said: 'Their efforts have been tremendous. It was a privilege to have members of the 1st Battalion Royal Gurkha Rifles and the Mercian Regiment under my command.

'The Conspicuous Gallantry Cross does not get handed out lightly, it was a most remarkable achievement by that particular young Gurkha.'

Read more: Hero Gurkha handed bravery medal by Queen said: 'I thought I was going to die... so I tried to kill as many as I could' | Mail Online

 

[Green Bullet]

why do u always keep saying these things? tell has ur army ever done a single thing to make u proud??? please tell me, jst one...4 wars lost with india. then a$$ licking US and now china.....i dont know why u are so obsessed with ur army...jst tell me one achievement of ur army......

First learn to speak English correctly, and please wash that disgusting mouth as we don't want this esteemed Forum to be effected by your nonsense. In addition I am proud of my Army, they conducted them selves with great courage and valour, as they protect the borders of Pakistan. Your insinuations on Pakistan losing 4 wars is incorrect, so please take your propaganda and shove it where the sun don't shine...if you get my drift. Furthermore you must be inert because its the US who is begging Pkistan to do more as facts have suggested they are losing in Afghanistan, hence they are in a desperate situation.

But you should not focus on Pakistan, as India is known for its starving population, and sanitation problem, get that right and then come and talk.

 

[DarK-LorD]

Abt the soldiers facing the brunt of several indian infantry,arty divisions n iaf :


Pakis,****,crying....Are u sure hes even a soldier?? more like a bad mouth fan boy ranting.

Lalak Jan (N-H)





Lalak Jan 'Dohat' (1967 - 1999)
32 yrs, Havaldar Major, 12 Northern Light Infantry (NLI)
Nishan-e-Haider (1999)
Pakistan

by Nasir M. Khan

Background
In 1984, India occupied the Pakistani posts at Siachen glacier. These posts had been vacated due to winters and snowing in the northern areas of Pakistan. India had in fact violated the Line of Control (LOC) in order to capture these posts. Pakistan's efforts to take these areas back from Indian possession turned out to be futile, and a war was fought in the worst possible circumstances for 15 years without any significant reward to either side.

The Indians posted an entire Division at Siachen Glacier. The ammunition and food was supplied to this division through the Srinagar-Leh Highway, the road joining the area of Leh (Siachen) with the capital of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar. The area surrounding the road was mountainous, with Tiger Hill being the peak that offered the best view of the entire northern area, providing those who were on it with a terrific aerial advantage. The Indian had previously used this peak to attack some defensive positions of Pakistan from time to time. Tiger Hill, located in the associated sectors of Batalik, Kargil and Drass, provided and aerial view of the Srinagar-Leh Highway. In September 1998, the posts had been vacated by India as part of a routine winter exercise, they were to reoccupy them in the summers.
During the 1999 Kargil war with Pakistan, the most famous battle was the battle that took Tiger Hill, and turned the tide of the war.

The following interview is of Grenadier Yogendra Singh Yadav, an Indian Army soldier who was instrumental in capturing the strategic Tiger Hill during the Kargil War.

In May 1999, a small sized Indian force of 4 men going along the Srinagar-Leh Highway lost contact with the rest of the army. A section, comprising 12 men was sent on the same road to locate the MIAs (Missing In Action). These 12 men also became MIA.

A small force (1200 men) of the Pakistan Army had occupied the vacated Indian posts, and were planning to hold on for sometime so that the Division at Siachen would have no other option but to retreat, due to the lack of ammunition and food supplies.

The Indians launched a full fledged attack on the small band of Pakistan Army soldiers.

Main Achievement
Tiger Hill had been occupied by 11 men of 12 NLI (Northern Light Infantry) unit of the Pakistan Army. One of these men was Subedar Sikander, the person who was responsible, with 10 other men, to hold back India's offensive long enough to force the Division at Siachen to retreat. His 2IC (Second in Command) was Havaldar Major Lalak "Blizzard" Jan (Blizzard = Dohat in local language).

Lalak Jan was one of the best in the NLI as far as mountain navigation was concerned, in addition to being one of the best, if not the best, rifleman.

The 10 men of 12 NLI were told by Subedar Sikander to change their positions while firing back at the attacking Indian forces. As the men followed the orders, the managed to bluff the Indians into believing that the size of the force was much more than 11.

On 1st of July, 1999, the 18 Grenadiers Battalion (India) launched a fierce attack on Tiger Hill by virtue of artillary shelling of the occupied bunkers. Subedar Sikandar placed his men in such positions that they managed to repulse the attack without any loss of life on their own part. It is not known how many men were lost by the 18 Grenadiers Battalion.

On the morning of 2nd July 1999, amidst the mist, the 18 Grenadiers launched another attack on Tiger Hills. Subedar Sikandar ordered his men to retreat to a secret bunker. Once the men were safe, he ordered Lalak Jan to descend Tiger Hill, and amidst the Indian Artillery shelling plant the landmines in the area in front of the Indians. The impossibility of the task was realized by all, but the Subedar insisted that the army has sent them down to fight, and that they would have to complete this task if they were to make a dent in the Indian offensive. Planting the landmines was the only way for them to damage the Indian armor and artillery, as none of the 11 men of 12 NLI had any heavy weaponry. The Subedar insisted that the mist would help Lalak Jan as well, and the Indians would not be expecting it either.

Accepting the daunting task, Lalak Jan descended Tiger Hills amidst the mist. The remaining men gave him as fierce a cover as possible to distract the Indians. Lalak Jan used his natural mountaineering ability to the fullest in the snow clad area and planted the landmines in such a manner that the Indians would encounter them in case they tried to move forward towards the hill.

Lalak Jan returned, having successfully planted the mines as ordered.

The trap was now set. All that the men required to do now was to lure the Indians into it. Subedar Sikandar told his men to gradually reduce the firing to a standstill.

About two hours after firing ceased from the Pakistan side, the Indians thought that they had managed to clear the area of the insurgents. Hence they began to move forward. The landmines reeked havoc with their initial forward movements. The Indians suffered heavy casualties, however, as they have not publicized this incident, the exact amount of damage is not known. The damage was in any case, severe enough that 18 Grenadiers did not attack Tiger Hills for at least 3 to 4 more days, until they were supported by another Indian Unit, 8 Sikh.

On 6th July, both 18 Grenadiers and 8 Sikh attacked Tiger Hills in the fiercest of Tiger Hill battles or the Kargil Operation. This time Chemical weapons were also used. Some of the Indian soldiers launched an attack from the steeper side of the hill. The NLI was not expecting an attack from this side. The NLI fought this battle at a heavy cost. 7 of the 11 men were killed, including Subedar Sikander. The Indians had managed to destroy a number of the Tiger Hill bunkers by either a hand to hand fight or by dropping a grenade into it.

Only Lalak Jan and 3 other men remained. The onslaught of the Indians was continuing and they were rapidly advancing towards capturing the hill. Lalak Jan, who was now the senior most person around, placed his men in strategic positions, at least two to three per person, and told them to fire without staying in one position. These four men, pitted against an enemy much superior in number and weaponry, managed to repulse the Indian onslaught by sheer courage and determination.

On 7th July 1999, 18 Grenadiers and 8 Sikh launched yet another offensive. This was a successful attack. 2 of Lalak Jan's men were killed. Lalak Jan and his only other remaining comrade in arms, Bakhmal Jan were both seriously injured. Not giving up, Lalak Jan got hold of an LMG and while Bakhmal Jan provided him with the ammunition, the two men kept trying to repulse the Indian attack. Lalak jan's left arm had been rendered useless as he had received a bullet in it. Bakhmal Jan, unable to sustain his injuries, died while supplying the ammunition to Lalak Jan.

From there on, in one of the most stunning demonstrations of determination, Lalak Jan held up the two units of the Indian Army for four complete hours. The Indian offensive finally slowed down and they descended Tiger Hills. The reason for this is not known, perhaps they thought that they could shell the bunker in which Lalak Jan was positioned.

After the Indian offensive had subsided, reinforcements (5 to 6 men) were sent to Tiger Hill under Captain Amer. When he saw the condition of Lalak Jan he told him to go back to the base camp as his arm was in no condition to be used. Lalak Jan told the captain that he did not want to die on a hospital bed, but would rather die in the battlefield. He told his Captain that he should not worry about the arm.

While this was going on at the hill, the Indians started shelling from a secret bunker in an adjacent hill. By that time the command of the handful of troops at Tiger Hill had been taken up by Captain Amer. He realized that the fire was coming from a secret bunker and also directed fire towards it, but the effort was in vain. The exact reason for the failure of this fire by the Pakistanis is not known. It could have been because of one of three reasons 1) The secret bunker was very well designed and protected by the Indians 2) the fire was not directed properly or 3) the bunker was not in the range of the light weaponry possessed by the Pakistanis atop Tiger Hill.

There was only one way left to counter the secret Indian bunker; it had to be blown up from a closer range.

When the injured Lalak Jan volunteered for the mission, his plea was immediately rejected by the captain, who was of the opinion that he would do it himself. However, Lalak Jan persuaded him, giving him his previous landmine installation experience coupled with his mountaineering skills as the explanation.

The Captain agreed.

Lalak Jan put a bag of explosives on his back, and while shouldering an AK-47 descended Tiger Hills for the second time amidst heavy Indian shelling. Managing to avoid being seen by the Indian forces, and utilising his knowledge of the hills to take cover, he located the secret bunker and threw the explosives inside the bunker.

The bunker, which was also an ammunition dump, blew up in what was probably the biggest blast of the entire Kargil Operation. Lalak Jan managed to take cover, but the Indian Army lost 19 to 20 men inside and nearby the bunker. The other Indian soldiers saw Lalk Jan and opened fire on him. Surrounded from all sides by Indian fire, Lalak Jan tried to resist and returned fire.

This effort was in vain, and Lalak Jan was killed when a number of bullets burst through his chest.

Contrary to what most writers have said on the topic in Pakistan, it is my own knowledge that the Indians did manage to capture Tiger Hills in the next attack. The loss of Tiger Hills was perhaps the biggest setback in the entire Kargil Operation, as after that other victories came for the Indians and they managed to get hold of perhaps the strategically most important peak from whether they could keep an eye on most of the offensives in the region.

On 15th of September 1999, the commanding officer of 12 NLI sent 2 commando forces to Tiger Hills to recover the body of Lalak Jan. The two forces were called 'Ababeel' and 'Uqaab'. Ababeel provided the fire cover while Uqaab went into the destroyed enemy bunker to retrieve the body of Lalak Jan.

When his body was found, Lalak Jan had his AK-47 clinched to his chest. The Government of Pakistan awarded him Nishan-e-Haider, the country's highest award for extraordinary gallantry.

http://www.google.com.au/url?sa=t&r...vbmKAw&usg=AFQjCNGf1CmrarY095VBNFU-etTiX5PvCA


Capt Karnal Sher Khan:

Karnal Sher Khan (1970 - 1999)
29 yrs, Captain, 12 Northern Light Infantry (NLI), 27 Sind
Nishan-e-Haider (1999)
Pakistan

Background
The background information is reproduced from the story of Lalak Jan since both died in the Kargil Operation
In 1984, India occupied the Pakistani posts at Siachen glacier. These posts had been vacated due to winters and snowing in the northern areas of Pakistan. India had in fact violated the Line of Control (LOC) in order to capture these posts. Pakistan's efforts to take these areas back from Indian possession turned out to be futile, and a war was fought in the worst possible circumstances for 15 years without any significant reward to either side.

The Indians posted an entire Division at Siachen Glacier. The ammunition and food was supplied to this division through the Srinagar-Leh Highway, the road joining the area of Leh (Siachen) with the capital of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar. The area surrounding the road was mountainous, with Tiger Hill being the peak that offered the best view of the entire northern area, providing those who were on it with a terrific aerial advantage. The Indian had previously used this peak to attack some defensive positions of Pakistan from time to time. Tiger Hill, located in the associated sectors of Batalik, Kargil and Drass, provided and aerial view of the Srinagar-Leh Highway. In September 1998, the posts had been vacated by India as part of a routine winter exercise, they were to reoccupy them in the summers.

In May 1999, a small sized Indian force of 4 men going along the Srinagar-Leh Highway lost contact with the rest of the army. A section, comprising 12 men was sent on the same road to locate the MIAs (Missing In Action). These 12 men also became MIA.

A small force (1200 men) of the Pakistan Army had occupied the vacated Indian posts, and were planning to hold on for sometime so that the Division at Siachen would have no other option but to retreat, due to the lack of ammunition and food supplies.

The Indians launched a full fledged attack on the small band of Pakistan Army soldiers.

Main Achievement
The Tiger Hill Complex is a set of six strategic posts; the Tiger Hill Top, Western Spur, Eastern Spur, India Gate, Rocky Knob and Helmet. If the Indian account is to be believed, Captain Karnal Sher Khan was responsible for setting up and defending one of these posts. On the other hand, the Pakistani account states that Sher was responsible for setting up forward defensive posts around the Gultari and Mushkoh Valley areas in Kargil, and that he had nothing to do with Tiger Hill. This article is based on the Indian account. In any case, the actual location does not matter as will be seen in the remainder of this article. From Indian readings, it appears that Sher was in fact defending the post on the Western Spur. The truth, however, will never be known. The active participation of the Kashmiri Freedom Fighters in the Tiger Hill battles is, however, a well researched fact.

Tiger Hill Top was the most strategic post at Kargil. This was the highest peak overlooking the Srinagar-Leh Highway. Although there were other active posts from where the Indian supply lines to Siachen glacier could be cut as well, Tiger Hill Top was the most effective. For the protection of Tiger Hill Top, the Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri Freedom Fighters occupied the five other posts in the Tiger Hill complex. The most important was the Western Spur post, which had to be neutralized in order to launch any sort of infantry offensive on the Tiger Hill Top post.

The task of isolating the Western Spur post was given to the Indian 8 Sikh Regiment (800 - 1000 men). Later on, this regiment also participated in the capture of Tiger Hill Top. The task of bombarding this post was given to the Indian 41 Field regiment (a full field unit with massive heavy artillery capability).

Manning the Western Spur post was Captain Karnal Sher Khan with 21 ORs (Other Ranks, men who are ordinary sepoys and do not hold any specific rank).

From 26th June to 27th June, the 41 Field Regiment excessively shelled the Western Spur post with no less than 19 Howitzers, while the Indian Air Force Mirage 2000 jets flew sorties over the post and pounded the bunkers with laser guided bombs. Under these circumstances some infantrymen from 8 Sikh also fired at the posts held by Sher and his men, and 'dared them to recite the Kalima, for it will be their final one'. Obviously, the Pakistanis and the Kashmiris did not get any sleep during this time.

It was around 9:00 PM on the 27th of June 1999 that the 8 Sikh launched a fierce attack on the Western Spur post. The tired 'intruders' tried to fight back, but the sheer number of the Indians (450 - 500 men) along with the IAF and Artillery support made it impossible for them to hold on. There were not many casualties on either side, but as far as Karnal Sher's men were concerned, there didn't have to be many, as they were not great in number to start with.

Karnal Sher finally retreated from the post, going to a point of lower elevation. The Indians had gotten hold of the Western Spur post. They were in a terrific position to launch the final offensive on the other posts, especially the Tiger Hill Top.

Karnal Sher was in a terrible spot. The Indians were now at an elevated position; they were much greater in number and had the support of a much bigger artillery. Unlike Sher's men they were well rested, as the enemy did not subject them to intense fire and they also had no shortage of ammunition or food.

One of Sher's men had died during the attack. Most of the others were wounded. To top it all, some Sikh soldiers were still daring them to come out and recite their final Kalima.

One of Karnal Sher's men asked him about what they were supposed to do next.

"Counter Attack", replied Sher

The stunned man gazed at Sher. Counter Attack under the circumstances was suicidal. The Indians had an advantage in every thinkable manner. They had also been fortifying their defense ever since they had taken the Western Spur.

"Counter Attack?", the man asked Sher again.

"Yes counter attack". The Indians attacked my post at night, with heavy artillery and air support. I will attack them in broad daylight with the men that I have left."

Sher had been operational in the area since November 1998. He knew the Drass Sector area inside out. He had a good idea of the positions that could be taken for an attack on the Western Spur. The 8 Sikh Regiment had not utilized any of those areas in their attack, hence Sher took the chance they were not well aware of their existence. During the night he placed his men in those positions, strategically placing the compact artillery that they had in the optimum areas.

The counter attack, with 21 men, was launched on the Indians occupying the Western Spur. Sher's men were told never to stay in on position while attacking, and the positions that every man was to move to and from during the attack were also identified. Every one of Sher's men was changing position to no less than 8 places.

This was the shortest battle of the entire Kargil operation, taking no more than one hour. There were many reasons for its success. First of all was the deployment. As an Indian soldier would be killed, the others would direct fire towards the area from where the fire came from. In the mean time however, the Pakistani/ Kashmiri would have changed his position to another area where he was safe from the Indian firing but still could see them.

Secondly, the Indians were not expecting an attack from the positions where Karnal Sher had deployed his men. Had they known about them in advance, they would have placed their own men over there as a defensive measure.

The third was the timing of the attack. It came at the most unexpected time, only 7 or 8 hours after the Indian offensive.

Finally, there was the sheer ferocity of the attack. Sher's men knew before going into the attack that they are going in for an impossible task. They had no fear of death, and that itself makes a better fighter during any battle.

As the 8 Sikh regiment began to retreat, Kernal Sher left his position and came out in the open. He started reciting the Kalima aloud.(LA ILLAH ILLALLA MUHAMMAD DUR RASULLULLAH) Picking up his machine gun he started charging towards the retreating forces.

"Cowards!" he said, "Where are you running off to? I will not let you run away like this."

Sher's remaining men, having suffered some casualties while they were ascending the Western Spur post, finally managed to reach on top. They replaced the Indian Flag with the Pakistani one and started chanting slogans of 'Allah O Akbar'. Sher, on the other hand, was obsessed with the retreating forces.

"I am reciting the Kalima as you had dared me to." he shouted, "Where are you running off to? Stop and fight. Make this my last Kalima if you can". While saying this he was seen running after the retreating troops, firing at will, with little or no opposition except from the ongoing artillery shelling. 10 or 12 of Sher's men, who had taken up positions on the Western Spur, also opened havoc wreaking fire on the retreating troops to add to their woes.

Captain Karnal Sher followed the Indian troops until he reached the proximity of the 8 Sikh Regiment base camp.

Most of the men who had retreated from the Western Spur had come back to the base camp. The base camp already had around 300 to 400 soldiers. When the commanding officer was given the news of the counter attack at the Western Spur post, he radioed back to the Indian intelligence and cursed them for letting him believe that there were only 20 odd men in the area. He told them that at least a company strength (150 men) of militants had just attacked and retaken the Western Spur post :idiot2: .

One of the soldiers told the Commanding officer that the enemy commander was following them down. The CO told the man not to worry as one man would not dare enter the base camp. However, he was anticipating that a much larger party of militants would attack the base camp. He ordered his men to take the necessary defensive positions.

While the 8 Sikh soldiers were taking their defensive positions, they were greeted with the sound of 'Allah O Akbar' followed by intense machine gun fire on those areas where any movement was taking place.

Anticipating a company sized attack, the CO was stunned to see one man, reciting the Kalima aloud, charging towards the center of the camp.

"Come out cowards!" Captain Sher shouted having reached the center, "I will show you how to fight a battle".

Angered by the dare inside their own camp, two Sikh soldiers tried to attack Sher. Their attack was of no avail; the captain, who had started firing in their direction the moment they tried to move, killed both.

It was apparent that this was not an attack by a complete company, but by only one man. "You are surrounded from all sides " the CO shouted to Sher, "There are no men with you. You cannot possibly kill us all. There does not have to be any unnecessary bloodshed. Lay down your weapon and Surrender".

Sher fired in the direction of the Commanding Officer's voice. "I would rather die than to surrender to you :army: " he said. While trying to continue firing, Sher realized that the ammunition in his machine gun had finished.

Seeing that he no longer had any ammunition, the Indian soldiers, including their CO, came out in the open and showed Sher that he was indeed surrounded from all sides. They started moving closer and closer to him, tightening their circle around him.

"Look around yourself" he said to Sher, "There is nothing more that you can do".

Sher looked around. There were more than fifty men who had surrounded him and could shoot him at point blank range. Instead of giving up, he started reciting the Kalima aloud once again. Seeing that the closest to him was the CO, he charged him and pushed him back by hitting him on the head with his empty machine gun. Seeing that Sher was not surrendering, and was in fact going to attack him for the second time, the 8 Sikh regiment Commanding Officer told his men to open fire on the militant.

The 8 Sikh regiment soldiers opened fire on Captain Sher. Hit many times, he tried to attack the CO for the third time, but of no avail.

Sher had always believed in not dying at the enemy's feet. He was about five feet away from the CO, who could see the desperate attempt Sher was making in not to fall down. Finally, Sher sat down, with his knees bent and touching the ground, and his machine gun still in his hand. The Kalima that he had been reciting so far became lower and lower in volume until it finally stopped. Captain Karnal Sher Khan had died.

Some of the Sikh soldiers became ecstatic that they had indeed made the 'intruder' recite his final Kalima. Two of them ran to Sher Khan's body to kick it from a sitting position into a one where his head was touching the ground.

Seeing the intent of his men, the CO ordered them to stop. He told them that this was a brave man and his body should not be desecrated at any cost. He ordered that Sher's body be brought back to Srinagar rather than being left at Tiger Hill. Upon finding out that Sher was a Pakistani Captain, he made sure that Sher gets a proper military treatment from the Indians. It was he who wrote the citation of Captain Sher, recommending him for the highest gallantry award in Pakistan. The citation can be found at Captain Sher Khan's residence in Fajounabad Charbagh, Swabi.

The government of Pakistan awarded Captain Karnal Sher Khan with Nishan-e-Haider, the country's highest gallantry award.

Further Developments
The 8 Sikh Regiment launched a massive attack at the Western Spur on the night of 3rd and 4th of July 1999. The Indians used eight 155mm Bofors howitzers and one MBRL (multi-barrel rocket launcher) at Western Spur in a direct firing role. No less than 5321 rounds were fired at the massive mountain in the next 10 hours. Milan anti-tank missiles were also pressed into the operation. The 8 Sikh soldiers advanced only after they were sure that the bunkers had been completely cleared. This time there was no 'Last Kalima' dare. Expecting to find some 100 or so bodies of the 'company' that had attacked them a week ago but seeing only 10 bodies on the post, the Indians assumed that all the others had ran away!.

After this was the task of capturing the Tiger Hill Top post. Details of that can be read in the story of Lalak Jan.




Naheen hay na umeed iqbal apni kashat-e-vairan say
Zara num ho tou yah matti bari zarkhaiz hay saqi

It was 10:30 a.m. on July 5, 1999 at 16,500 feet above the sea level. We were 25 soldiers of the 18 Granadiers unit of the Indian Army. We were ordered to advance to capture Tiger Hill in the Drass Sector. After scaling the rocks for three nights, we were just 50 metres below Tiger Hill. As chance would have it, a stone slipped during our scaling operation. As the stone rolled down, it provoked heavy crossfire from the Pakistani bunkers which were just 10 meters above us. Due to the heavy firing, 18 of our jawans and officers had to retreat. Now, we were just seven jawans near the Pakistani bunkers. We were in a precarious situation, neither could we advance nor retreat. We thus had to wait for the right opportunity.

By then, the enemy had deployed a company of 135 soldiers on top of Tiger Hill. After the firing stopped, we (seven of us) slowly began advancing to capture the Pakistani bunkers, just 10 metres away from us. At about 11:30 a.m. we opened fire at the bunker and gunned down four Pakistani soldiers. After we captured the Pakistani bunker, the Pakistan Army from the top of Tiger Hill sent 10 jawans to assess our strength.


Tiger Hill was just 40 metres away from us. As they moved near, we gunned down eight of them. Two escaped and reported back to their bosses that there were seven of us. After the preparations at 11:30 a.m. on the same day, 100 Pakistani Army men attacked our bunker. The attack was fierce, though we could gun down 35 Pakistani soldiers, I lost all six of my comrades. I carried 25 kg of ammunition with me and I almost got my ammunition exhausted and a re-supply wasn't possible from below. It was a very critical time. I was the sole survivor with six of my colleagues already dead and I was amid the corpses of Indian and Pakistani soldiers. The Pakistani troops thought they had destroyed the Indian Army below Tiger Hill.

To ensure that all Indian jawans were dead, they shot at the bodies of Indian soldiers. I sustained about 15 gunshot injuries on my legs, arms, thigh and in other parts of my body. The Pakistanis were sure that I was dead. Then they took away the weapons from the bodies. But one soldier forgot the grenade that lay in my pocket. Meanwhile, I regained consciousness. And after that things moved fast. I took out my grenade, pulled the pin and threw it at the enemy. It fell in the enemy's cap which was hanging behind his neck. It exploded before he could react. After the explosion, his body was blown off in the air plunging the Pakistani Army camp into confusion - they thought that the Indian Army had attacked.


By then, I picked up the Peeka Rifle of a Pakistani soldier lying nearby and I opened fire which left five Pakistani soldiers dead. After my attack, the enemy camp thought that it was the Indian Army which had attacked them. I heard the order on their wireless to retreat from the Tiger Hill and further heard the instruction to attack the Indian MMG-base 500 metres below Tiger Hill. My main task was now to save the MMG base. But by that time, I had lost too much blood and was unable to stay conscious. I decided to move through a drain. I dumped myself in the drain covering my head.

Now within five minutes I was below 400 meters and I saw my boss, Lieutenant Balwan. I told him that the Pakistanis wanted to attack the MMG base and had vacated Tiger Hill. On this tip-off, the officials deployed 'Charlie' and 'Delta' companies at Tiger Hill and deployed 'Bravo' company to save the MMG base. After a few minutes, Pakistani forces attacked the MMG base. This battle resulted in all the Pakistani soldiers being killed, since we had prior information of their arrival. Meanwhile, the 'Delta' and 'Charlie' companies had captured Tiger Hill. The war of seven hours was over and this is how we won Tiger Hill!